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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CYNICISM AMONG
A SELECTED SAMPLE OF ADOLESCENTS IN ALBERTA

by
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A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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ABSTRACT

Employing the technique of survey research, this exploratory study attempts to delineate patterns of attitude development related to the expression of political and personal cynicism by a selected group of adolescents of Alberta. The study also attempts to specify the relative effects of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media, political socialization agents, upon each of the several variables pertaining to cynical attitudes. Its subjects are 1570 students in the upper five grades of the public schools of three Albertan rural communities and one large urban community.

Data were obtained from a self-administered, paper-and pencil questionnaire and a battery of political attitude scales given out by classroom teachers during regular class time. These data were analyzed statistically in terms of the significance of the differences between and among group mean scores, step-wise multiple regression and Pearson product-moment correlation and tests of significance using the distribution of t. Finally, the Multiple Classification Analysis technique was employed to specify the relative effects of political socialization agents upon cynical attitudes toward politics and society.

The substantial increase in political cynicism during adolescence which has been found elsewhere is not reconfirmed here. Although the overall impression to be gained from the data is that greater feelings of cynicism ensued with maturation, no significant statistical relationship was found between age variable and any of the selected political and personal attitudes empirically measured in this investigation. Not only were differences among mean cynicism scores not statistically significant for unadjusted group mean scores, but

also for contrasts among age's group mean scores statistically adjusted for effects of nine socio-political background characteristic variables plus school grade.

As a practical alternative to chronological age, we related the development of political and personal cynicism to school grade. A significant statistical relationship was found between school grade and the three cynicism scales. Surprisingly, eight and ten graders, on the whole, obtained statistically significant higher mean cynicism scores than nine, eleven and twelve graders. We cannot explain away the inconsistent findings between age and school grade variables. However, these incongruities left us with severe doubts about the advisability of employing the school grade variable to investigate developmental patterns of political attitudes.

Using MCA, it was found that the mass media political influence variable, in general, was the strongest and most direct predictor of political and personal cynicism scales' scores. The school was the second-best predictor, followed in importance by the family, with the peer group having the weakest effect.

In general, political and personal cynicism were found to vary significantly between and among sex, religious preference, social class, federal and provincial political party preferences, area of residence and school system variables' groups. The length of residence variable is not correlated with political and personal cynicism. Finally, cynics were found to be much less likely to become interested and active in politics.

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CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF THE STUDY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the fundamental conditions for the survival of a political system is that the young people must acquire the knowledge, values, norms and attitudes expected from members of the system.¹ To this end, all political regimes seek to instill in their young members a set of accepted and proper political orientations.² The future citizen must acquire a complex of beliefs, feelings, skills and codes of behaviour which will help him to evaluate and relate to the political world around him.³ This highly complex process of induction into the political culture may be referred to as "political socialization or politicization."⁴ In the broadest sense, political socialization refers to

¹David Easton, "The Function of Formal Education in a Political System," The School Review, Vol. 64 (Autumn, 1957), p. 311.

²According to Greenberg, this proposition is one of the best established in the literature of political science. See Edward S. Greenberg (ed.), Political Socialization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), p. 5.

³Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 17.

⁴Easton, op. cit.; for a definition of political socialization as the process of induction into the culture, see Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in The Politics of the Developing Areas, eds. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 60.

the development process through which citizens gradually learn "the norms, attitudes and behaviour accepted and practiced by the ongoing political system."⁵ For our purposes, we shall view political socialization simply as that process, mediated through various agencies of society, by which individuals acquire attitudes, beliefs, norms and values toward the ongoing political system of which they are members and to their own roles as citizens within that political system.⁶

Through political socialization, future citizens learn their positions in the political matrix and the ways of the larger political community in which they will eventually assume adult roles. It appears that this learning process continues in one form or another throughout one's lifetime.⁷ No matter what his developmental stage⁸ or age,

⁵Roberta Sigel, "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values," Psychology and Politics: An Introductory Reader, eds. Leroy N. Rieselbach and George I. Balch (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 78.

⁶We recognize that this definition could be described as "loose" and that it may encompass a wide range of conceptual approaches and theories without a commitment to any one in particular. For other definitions of political socialization, see Richard Dawson, "Political Socialization," Political Science Annual 1966: An International Review, ed. James A. Robinson, Vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), pp. 7-10; William R. Schoonfeld, "The Focus of Political Socialization Research: An Evaluation," World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3 (April, 1971), pp. 546-551.

⁷Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., p. 206.

⁸For instance, Erikson outlines a sequence of eight psychosocial stages in ego development. Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (2nd ed.; New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1963), pp. 247-274; and Sullivan defined seven stages in his interpersonal theory of personality development. H. S. Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1953), pp. 33-34.

every person can be described as existing in a state of flux--a state of constant changes in his socio-political characteristics.⁹ While accepting that political socialization is a continuous process throughout one's life cycle, we feel nevertheless that there are certain developmental stages in the cycle which are particularly significant in terms of political development, change and maturation, and that adolescence is one such notable stage.

Whether recognized as a separate developmental stage or not,¹⁰ adolescence is a time of change, a time when decisions are made that

⁹For further discussion, see Orville G. Brim, Jr., "Socialization Through the Life Cycle," Items, Vol. 18 (March, 1964), pp. 1-5; Orville G. Brim, Jr. and Stanton Wheeler, Socialization After Childhood: Two Essays (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); and Frederick Elkin and Gerald Handel, The Child and Society: The Process of Socialization (2nd ed.; New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 142-144.

¹⁰Some authors have noted that adolescence as a distinct period of life is a social invention. See, for example, Elkin and Handel, op. cit., pp. 144-146; and Frederick Elkin and William A. Westley, "The Myth of Adolescent Culture," American Sociological Review, Vol. 20 (1955), pp. 680-684.

have a life long effect.¹¹ Taken literally, adolescence is the process of becoming adult, growing into maturity. Perhaps, "human development reaches its most complex stage during adolescence."¹²

Adolescence, then, can be said to be "an age-grade period"¹³ of transition during which a hierarchy of values is established,¹⁴ a period characterized by special disturbances.¹⁵ It is not only a

¹¹In general, it is evident from the literature that adolescence has been accepted as a clearly delineated and important developmental stage in the life of an individual. For more detailed readings on adolescent socialization and theories of adolescent development, see, for example, Glen H. Elder, Jr., "Adolescent Socialization and Development," Handbook of Personality Theory and Research, eds. Edgar F. Borgatta and William W. Lambert (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pp. 239-364; Ernest Q. Campbell, "Adolescent Socialization," Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 821-859; E. Kuno Beller, "Theories of Adolescent Development," Understanding Adolescent, ed. James F. Adams (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), pp. 70-100; Elizabeth Douvan and Martin Gold, "Model Patterns in American Adolescence," Review of Child Development Research, eds. Lois W. Hoffman and Martin L. Hoffman, Vol. 11 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), pp. 469-528; Martin Gold and Elizabeth Douvan (eds.), Adolescent Development: Readings in Research and Theory (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 1-4; Harold W. Bernard (ed.), Readings in Adolescent Development (Scranton, Penn.: International Textbook Company, 1969); James S. Coleman, The Adolescent Society (New York: The Free Press, 1961); A. S. Alissi, "Concepts of Adolescence," Adolescence, Vol. 7, No. 28 (1972), pp. 491-510; Jerome Kagan, "A Conception of Early Adolescence," Daedalus, Vol. 100 (1971), pp. 997-1012; Rolf E. Muuss, "Theories of Adolescent Development-- Their Philosophical and Historical Roots," Adolescence, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1966), pp. 22-44; and Sullivan, op. cit.

¹²Beller, op. cit., p. 70.

¹³Elkin and Westley, op. cit., p. 680.

¹⁴Beller, op. cit., p. 79.

¹⁵Gold and Douvan, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

period of physical maturation, but, also, a period of psychological, social and political development. In short,

[c]hildren actively shape the form of their socialization; this is particularly true of the adolescent who brings to encounters physical, cognitive, and social capacities which approach those possessed by adult. The adolescent's cognitive abilities enable self-evaluations and decisions to be made within the context of the anticipated future. . . . Participation in activities and relationships is particularly instrumental¹⁶ in the preparation of youth for contemporary and future roles.

In terms of growth, strength, fecundity and mental capacity, full maturity tends to be attained only a short time after puberty; but, socially and politically, most adolescents have a long way to go before full adult status is reached.¹⁷ "During adolescence the youngster gropes, stumbles, and leaps towards political understanding."¹⁸ Indeed, during this, at times turbulent, developmental stage, political aspirations and attitudes, and political self¹⁹ are especially sensitive to many stimuli both of a political and non-political nature and are thus subjected to dramatic and subtle changes that are crucial in shaping the future political life of an individual. Decisions are made or deferred, actions are undertaken or rejected. And, regardless of the nature and direction of an expression or an act, effects of the many choices made during this period of transition between childhood and adulthood will be profound and long lasting on future political,

¹⁶Elder, op. cit., p. 239.

¹⁷Beller, op. cit., p. 70.

¹⁸Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 4 (1966), p. 292.

¹⁹For a discussion of the concept of political self, see Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., pp. 15-24.

or soci-civic, behaviour of citizens. In fact, as a time of deep and lasting changes in the development of political attitudes (or orientations²⁰), adolescence is perhaps second only to early childhood.²¹ Clearly, adolescence appears to be the age at which most individuals crystalize their political viewpoints.²²

Members of a political system may display a wide variety of both positive and negative attitudes toward political objects, or subject-matters: the government or authorities, the regime and the political community.²³ Members may differ, for instance, with regard

²⁰For a definition of the concept of political orientations, see David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "Youth and the Political System," Culture and Social Character, eds. S. M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 228.

²¹A substantial body of research literature provides suggestive evidence that adult opinions and attitudes are, in large part, the end product of adolescence's political socialization. See, for example, Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," Political Attitudes and Public Opinions, eds. Dan D. Nimmo and Charles M. Bonjean (New York: David Mackay Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 175-202; E. Q. Campbell, op. cit.; Bernard, op. cit., pp. 367-409; and Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 18 (Spring, 1954), pp. 23-39.

²²See Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 51-68; Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 216-219; and Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (1962-63), pp. 527-528.

²³For an elaboration of these concepts, see Easton and Hess, op. cit., pp. 229-231; David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Psychology and Politics, eds. Leroy N. Rieselbach and George I. Balch (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 93; and David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 58-61.

to the degree of acceptance-rejection, trust-suspicion and interest-apathy that they express toward political authorities and institutions. For the most part, it has been found that much development of political orientations begins at very early ages, and that, exclusive of partisanship and the role of pressure groups, many of the basic identifications and loyalties to the polity have been substantially developed by the time an individual leaves elementary school.²⁴

In an analysis based on extensive pre-test data, David Easton and Robert Hess indicated that the child's political learning, which appears to get a good start even before he enters elementary school, undergoes the most rapid change during elementary school.²⁵ They suggested that many basic political attitudes were firmly established by the time the child had completed these years in school.²⁶ They

²⁴For detailed studies of early political socialization, interested students should see, for instance, Easton and Dennis, op. cit.; Easton and Hess, "Youth in the Political System," op. cit., pp. 226-251; Easton and Hess, "The Child's Political World," op. cit., pp. 89-106; Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967); and Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). It should be noted that the evidence in most of these studies derives from secondary analysis of only two or three data sets.

²⁵Easton and Hess, "The Child's Political World," op. cit., p. 96.

²⁶Easton and Hess, op. cit., p. 96.

concluded that,

for most young people, there is little evidence that fundamental attitudes and values with respect to the regime and political community are any different when they leave high school than they were upon entrance.²⁷

Further evidence is found in a series of articles by David Easton and Robert Hess, and David Easton and Jack Dennis which suggest that the American child's basic orientations toward the political system is firmly established at a relatively early age. Other scholars also support this view. In their collaborative work, Robert Hess and Judith Torney sum up their discussion of the socialization of children into the political system of the United States by observing that

the young child's involvement with the political system begins with a strong positive attachment to the country;. . . The attachment to the country is stable and shows almost no change through elementary-school years. . . .²⁸

In short, we interpret these results as indicating that toward the end of the eighth grade, many attitudes, concepts and basic orientations toward the political system has been acquired by children.²⁹

Yet, close scrutiny of the works of the above scholars reveals that, while evidence was presented to suggest that positive basic political orientations with respect to the regime and the community are acquired at an early age, no documentation is offered to imply that

²⁷Ibid. For support of this view, see, also, David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals, Vol. 361 (1965), pp. 40-57; Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 213-217; and Easton and Hess, "Youth and the Political System," op. cit., pp. 226-251.

²⁸Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 213.

²⁹Ibid., p. 220.

negative political orientations with respect to government or authorities are acquired at an early age. Indeed, not all researchers are persuaded of the exclusive importance of the childhood years in the development of political orientations.

Fred Greenstein, who investigated the political orientations and cognitions of elementary school children in New Haven, hypothesizes that ". . . much of an individual's orientation toward politics already has become fixed by late adolescence."³⁰ In their summary political socialization text, Dawson and Prewitt conclude, somewhat ambivalently, that

important aspects of political maturation take place during later adolescence, but most often development during this period crystallizes and internalizes patterns established during the pre-adolescent period. By the end of adolescence the political self of the individual is pretty well established.³¹

On the other hand, Robert Lane feels that "late adolescence and early maturity may be a critical period for establishing political attitudes."³² While Lane's view is not the prevailing one among political scientists, nevertheless, there is reason to believe, at least in the dominant American culture, that negative and other more evaluative orientations to the polity which characterize many adults develop during later years in junior and senior high schools. And we suspect that one such instance of later political socialization is the development of cynical feeling toward the political processes.

³⁰Greenstein, op. cit., p. 166. Italics added.

³¹Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., p. 51.

³²Lane, op. cit., p. 219.

II. THE PROBLEM

In general, a cynical attitude toward politics has not been found among younger elementary children. In an empirical treatment of the political socialization of American elementary school-children, Fred Greenstein noted that:

The most conspicuous difference between adult political orientations and those of the . . . children was in attitudes of cynicism and distrust toward politics. Virtually no children entertained these widespread adult views.³³

In fact, he found that ". . . there was no evidence among elementary school children even of a frame of reference which would make it possible to use questionnaire items designed to evoke political cynicism."³⁴

Further, he told us that "the prevailing adult theme of cynicism toward politics and politicians evidently develops at adolescence or later."³⁵

Finally, Greenstein speculated that, if the sample of his research had been extended to include adolescent respondents, "a further development of considerable interest would have been evident--the advent of the

³³Fred Greenstein, Children and Politics, p. 31; emphasis his.

³⁴Greenstein, op. cit., p. 31.

³⁵Ibid., p. 154. However, disagreement appears to exist between Greenstein's findings and those of Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron, Jr., obtained in their study carried out in the Appalachian region of eastern Kentucky. They contended that, early in life, children in Appalachia appears to become relatively cynical toward the political system with relatively little change in exhibited cynicism with maturation. However, the data provided by these authors seem to be more suggestive of their contention than supportive of it. See Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron, Jr., op. cit., pp. 569-570; and Herbert Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 146-148.

cynicism toward politics which is so prevalent among adults."³⁶ Thus, he felt that a replication of his study was necessary with a new sample extended to include adolescent respondents.³⁷

Moreover, adolescence has been suggested as the period when political cynicism first appears in individuals.³⁸ Later empirical researches dealing with adolescent respondents have reported political cynicism with this age-grade group.³⁹ In particular, it has been found that political cynicism increases from the eighth to twelfth grades, but does not obtain the level characteristic of students' teachers and parents.⁴⁰ Easton and Dennis, for instance, suggest that adolescence is a period when general anti-authority youthful exuberance combines with increased police contacts to produce an erosion of positive political orientations. Moreover, these two authors claim that with maturation and the addition of adult responsibilities, political orientations toward political authorities will

³⁶Greenstein, op. cit., p. 55.

³⁷Ibid., p. 161.

³⁸See, for instance, Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (December, 1960), p. 942; and Kenneth Keniston, The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1960), p. 401.

³⁹For instance, see M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (March, 1968), pp. 169-184; Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron, Jr., op. cit., pp. 569-570; and Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 146-148.

⁴⁰See, for example, Sandra J. Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism Among Negro and White Adolescents," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1969, New York, New York), p. 5; and M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, "Patterns of Political Learning," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 38 (1968), pp. 462-465.

again become more positive.⁴¹ Thus, it appears that negative political orientations toward political objects are chronologically late arrivals and, as it has been demonstrated, one such negative political orientation is political cynicism.

Statement of the Problem

This study focusses primarily on what is believed to be a major change in adolescents' political attitudes during the high school years, that is, the development of political cynicism. An examination of this overshadowing change can be considered within two major categories. The first has to do with the rate at which political cynicism is developed by adolescents and the patterned sequence in which these changes occur. By comparing grades in school and chronological age groups along the lines of cohort analysis, the developmental changes and pattern of acquisition of political cynicism can be investigated. The second category has to do with factors which may influence the development of political orientations among adolescents. It deals with the various conditions which may retard or may facilitate adolescents' acquisition of political cynicism. Here, we are, first, particularly concerned with the impact of certain major agencies of political socialization on the formation of political cynicism. Secondly, our investigation centers on effects of certain mediating influences on adolescents' political attitudes. Thus, this investigation explores the amount and the distribution of feelings of political cynicism among a sample of adolescents of different

⁴¹Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System, pp. 295-303.

age-grade cohort groups. Specifically, this research examines the following kinds of interrelated questions:

1. Are there any significant differences in feelings of political cynicism among eighth- through twelfth-graders? Or, in terms of ordered differences, do feelings of political cynicism among adolescents increase as grades in school increase?

2. What roles, if any, do the family, the school, the peers and the mass media play in creating feelings of political cynicism among eighth- through twelfth-graders? Or, what are the relative contributions of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media upon the development of feelings of political cynicism among adolescents?

A question may arise as to whether any variations in the relationships between the family, the school, the peer group or the mass media, on the one hand, and development of feelings of political cynicism among adolescents, on the other, might not be simply a spurious artifact of effects of other socio-psychological background factors. In his discussion of some of the major problems of political socialization research, Dennis observed that sub-cultural and group variations with regard to such factors as sex, socio-economic status, religious, and regional or other groupings would exhibit different patterns of political learning, or disparities, in the transmission of politico-cultural orientations.⁴² For him, "the empirical questions

⁴²Jack Dennis, "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," Midwest Journal of Politics, Vol. 12 (1968), p. 104.

concerned how extensive are these differences and how persistent."⁴³

Thus, he states that

the basic subsidiary questions include the identification of which agencies have roles in given settings, how much influence each has and the direction of influence, and what is the internal and external factors that explain the effects that each agent [of political socialization] may have.⁴⁴

In order to explore whether or not the strength of family, school, peer group or mass media influences upon the development of political cynicism among adolescents are diluted by intervening factors, or "conditioning agents,"⁴⁵ it was also necessary to collect information on certain socio-psychologically relevant background factors of adolescents. Such information was collected on the following background factors: (1) sex, (2) socio-economic level, (3) religion, (4) place of residence, (5) length of residence in communities, (6) type of school system attended, (7) political party preference, and (8) feelings of personal cynicism of adolescents. Precisely, the subsidiary problem of the study was to investigate the mediating influence of these socio-psychological factors upon the development of political cynicism among adolescents.

Need of the Study

Currently, adolescents appear to be viewing the adult socio-

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 110.

⁴⁵This term is borrowed from Richard M. Merelman, Political Socialization and Educational Climates: A Study of Two School Districts (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), p. 116.

political value system with some concern. This may often be simply the result of adolescents' lack of appropriate experiences in politics. Young people seem to feel that there are many flaws in the structure of the socio-political establishment and that some social and political changes are imperative. They seem to despise compromises and to consider those adults who are not in agreement with their viewpoints to be out of touch. Whatever political values have been passed down to them by their parents, adolescents find unacceptable since their world, as they see it, is vastly different from that of their parent. Simply, the young distrust their elders.⁴⁶ Yet, most parents of today's adolescents view the present situation as temporary and seem to show a deeply entrenched, optimistic belief that today's radical youth will be tomorrow's socio-political establishment. Perhaps so, but the significance of the impact on political processes of adolescents' open--and sometimes violent--activism has thrown into sharp relief the pressing need for a better understanding of the political socialization of young people. In this respect, Marvin Powell and Allen Frerichs remark that

it [is] essential to learn as much as possible about attitudes and values of [adolescents]; how they develop, how to prevent their distortion, how to develop more reality-oriented perceptions of value systems . . . While this is a difficult area to investigate, such investigation must be accomplished if we are to overcome prejudice, bias and misunderstanding.⁴⁷

⁴⁶See Douglas Holmes, Monica B. Holmes and Lisa Appignanesi, The Language of Trust (New York: Science House, Inc., 1971), pp. 85-106.

⁴⁷Marvin Powell and Allen H. Frerichs (eds.), Readings in Adolescent Psychology (Minneapolis: Burgess Publication, 1971), p. 252.

As well, Edward S. Greenberg noted that

if we accept the proposition that governments are affected in some manner by the political opinions of its citizens, then knowledge of the process of formation of political opinions [and orientations] become essential.⁴⁸

In many areas of political life, Canadian adolescents have become important actors. What adolescents think or feel, for instance, may not only be relevant to their future political behaviour, but, may have immediate political impact, especially since eighteen year-olds can now vote in federal elections, as well as in most provincial and municipal elections. At present, there are very few studies that attempt to explore the development of political orientations among Canadian children and adolescents.⁴⁹ Thus far, the vast majority of empirical research dealing with the development of political orientations among adolescents has been carried out in the United States.⁵⁰ Indeed,

⁴⁸Edward S. Greenberg (ed.), Political Socialization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), p. 6.

⁴⁹See, for instance, George René Robert, "Political Orientations of Calgary Children from Grade Four to Eight" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Calgary, 1969); Edmund Sullivan, Neall Byrne and Mary Stoger, "The Development of Canadian Students' Political Conceptions," Interchange, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 56-67; Emil J. Haller, "The Political Socialization of Children and the Structure of the Elementary School," Interchange, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 45-55; Jon H. Pammett, "The Development of Political Orientations in Canadian School," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (March, 1971), pp. 132-141; and S. K. Harvey and T. G. Harvey, "Adolescent Political Outlook: The Effects of Intelligence as an Independent Variable," Midwest Journal of Politics, Vol. 14 (1970), pp. 565-595.

⁵⁰For example, see Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System; Hess and Torney, op. cit.; Greenstein, Children and Politics; Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Merelman, op. cit.; Hirsch, op. cit.; Bachman, Youth in Transition; and Charles F. Andrain, Children and Civic Awareness: A Study in Political Education (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1971).

no study concerned specifically with the development of feelings of political cynicism among Albertan, or even Canadian, adolescents has yet been located by the investigator. Moreover, there has been no comparable work done in Canada in the area of the development of political attitudes among adolescents, despite the fact that the "products" of this country's political socialization, as A. B. Hodgetts documents, are extremely unsatisfactory, and particularly lacking in conception of a Canadian political culture and heritage.⁵¹

As a historian of Canada, Hodgetts feels that the stability of the entire Canadian political system depends upon the reservoir of support on which it can count. In studying English-speaking Canadian students in grades ten and twelve across Canada, he found that the "legitimate national interests of this country [Canada] are not being served . . . "⁵² for

. . . the majority of English-speaking high school graduates . . . [are] without the intellectual skills, the knowledge and the attitudes they should have to play an effective role as citizens in present-day Canada. . . .⁵³

By and large, Hodgetts found that "the strongest, most widely held attitude of the students in our survey was either complete indifference or deep cynicism toward politician and political life."⁵⁴ He concluded

⁵¹A. B. Hodgetts, What Culture? What Heritage?: A Study of Civic Education in Canada (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1968).

⁵²Hodgetts, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵³Ibid., p. 116.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 78.

that the "cynicism of many of our young people toward politics was caused partly by the unrealistic, oversimplified courses of study in civics."⁵⁵

Our investigation attempts to make a more detailed assessment of the development of feelings of political cynicism among a selected group of Canadian adolescents. The work of Hodgetts is valuable not only in providing descriptive data concerning certain political orientations in English-speaking Canadian adolescents, but also in pointing out grave inadequacies in these adolescents' political orientations. However, he does not deal with agents of political socialization other than the school, tending to concentrate on what is taught, rather than dealing extensively with adolescents' socio-psychological background characteristics that may affect how English-speaking adolescents interpret such teaching or how they affect the development of political orientations among these adolescents.

In terms of our knowledge about the development of evaluations of political authorities, there is no information readily available which is devoted to the analysis of the relative importance of all four agencies--the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media--in the political socialization process, on the one hand, and the development among adolescents of feelings of cynicism toward the political processes, on the other hand. By dealing both with the development of adolescents' political cynicism and the extent of dissatisfaction among today's Canadian youth, as well as with the role played by these

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 116.

four agents of socialization in this development, we expand those analyses made by Greenstein, Easton and Dennis and other political science scholars which were based mostly on elementary school children.

If "politics rests upon collective actions which in time depend upon a basic spirit of trust and a capacity for cooperation,"⁵⁶ then it may be of some importance to know something about whether or not adolescents possess such "a basic spirit of trust." For the types of action an individual will visualize toward political objects will be shaped, to a large extent, by the sort of feelings he expresses toward them. In this perspective, Kenneth Langton informs us that:

if we find, for instance, that feelings of personal political [cynicism] are related to political behaviour, we must also ask how these attitudes are formed, and investigate the socialization agencies which are important in the process.⁵⁷

Moreover, Lucian Pye reported, at a conference on political modernization held by the Council's Committee on Comparative Politics on June 8-11, 1959, that several conferees held the view that future modernization research should be directed at the study of the significant agencies of political socialization from one political system to another.⁵⁸ Thus, several members of the Committee felt that future research should be concerned with the roles in the political

⁵⁶ Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12 (New York: Crowell Collier, 1968), p. 223.

⁵⁷ Langton, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵⁸ Lucian W. Pye, "Political Modernization and Research on the Process of Political Socialization," Items, Vol. 13 (September, 1959), p. 27.

socialization process performed by various agencies such as political party, education, journalists and others.⁵⁹

In the same manner, in attempting to answer "what should we study," Jack Dennis invited political researchers to pay the greatest substantive attention in the next period of research

. . . to how explanatory factors vary under different geocultural and social conditions--especially across historical epochs and among subgroupings within the same population. Do the relative influence of family, peers, and school vary from country to country or from generation to generation? . . . [T]he task is still one of making them [the above kinds of questions] explicit and giving them reliable empirical treatment.⁶⁰

This point is further supported by Herbert Hirsch, who emphasizes that "more sub- and cross-cultural data are clearly called for" in the sub-field of political socialization.⁶¹

A potential area of concern of scholars dealing with political socialization has centered on the role of sub-cultural or status group differences in the development of political orientations. For instance, various studies have shown that male and female children tend to exhibit different learning patterns of political orientations.⁶² Undoubtedly, socio-economic, religious, regional or other such groupings could also act as bases of continuing disparities in the transmission and

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 28

⁶⁰Jack Dennis, "Future Work on Political Socialization," Socialization to Politics: A Reader, ed. Jack Dennis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), p. 495.

⁶¹Hirsch, op. cit., p. 9.

⁶²See, Hyman, Political Socialization, pp. 17-38.

development of political orientations among adolescents. Jack Dennis laments the fact that, even though

. . . there are many differences among various strata or groupings which have apparent political consequence; . . . only a few, including sex and social class, have been given attention in the published work on political socialization.⁶³

For him, "the empirical questions concern how extensive are these differences" and how persistent they are among groups, groupings, strata and organizations which sustain diverse socio-political sub-cultures.⁶⁴

Finally, David Easton urged that the task of research ought to be to attempt to discover answers to such problems as:

to what extent do the kinds of orientations absorbed by students under any one instructional staff [and other agencies in the political socialization process] vary with socioeconomic . . . religious background and political preferences of the students?⁶⁵

Easton felt that answers to such questions would provide knowledge about political consequences of education (and other agencies in the political socialization process) and would permit educationists to acquire some information about the success of education for achieving its goal in the area that is loosely called "training for citizenship."⁶⁶

In short, a brief summary of available literature would show that these matters--the development of political cynicism and the

⁶³Dennis, "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," p. 105.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 104.

⁶⁵David Easton, "The Function of Formal Education in a Political System," p. 316.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 316.

relative influence of certain agencies in the political socialization process upon the development of political cynicism--have been badly neglected by Canadian political scientists in their research efforts. Further, the meagerness of factual knowledge about political cynicism and influence of political socialization agencies among adolescents in Canada underscores the need for investigation such as this one. This study will attempt to meet this need by offering objective and concrete evidence about the development of political cynicism among adolescents. And, hopefully, this study will extend the base of accumulated knowledge relevant to the political socialization process in Canada while, at the same time, describing somewhat thoroughly the relative impact of singled-out agencies of the political socialization process.

Delimitation of the Study

Although the present investigation attempts to go beyond the kind of chronological description that has marked much of the research in political socialization, it retains a highly descriptive character and certainly remains at the exploratory level. This is largely so because of the body of pertinent data available. However, limitations of this sort are not unusual. As Scott Greer has noted, much of the present social science research must be designed with the intention of providing an adequate foundation for the development of complex theoretical systems in the future.⁶⁷

⁶⁷Scott Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 166-174.

This investigation is concerned with only one general political attitude--political cynicism, as manifested by a group of urban and rural Albertan adolescents. Although we would agree with Milbrath's claim that "[p]olitical attitudes are cognitions about positive or negative feelings toward political object,"⁶⁸ there is no attempt here to evaluate the cognitive component of political cynicism, only the affective component is considered. This represents a limitation of the study.

The nature of the sample of adolescents under study here must also be considered. The role played by four selected social agencies in the political socialization process in relation to the development of political cynicism is examined among a non-random sample of 1570 eighth- through twelfth-grade students. Pupils were sampled from both public and separate schools in one urban community, Edmonton, and from public schools in three rural communities, Slave Lake, Rimbey and Okotoks. These were students who completed and returned a battery of political attitude tests and a socio-political information questionnaire to the researcher. These four communities are hardly representative of Western Canadian, or even Albertan, urban and rural communities. Certainly, they cannot be considered to sample accurately the spectrum of Canadian communities; probably, no four Canadian communities can. Nor do the 1570 adolescent respondents constitute a statistical random cross-section of the universe of urban and rural adolescents of Alberta. The technique employed in the administration of this survey automatically

⁶⁸Milbrath, op. cit., p. 50.

excluded from the sample all adolescents not registered in the upper five grades of the participating public and separate schools--dropouts, private school students, and any individuals in these adolescent grade-age groups who either had not yet reached grade eight or who had already graduated from high school--and all who were absent from school on the days questionnaires were distributed, completed and returned. Accordingly, the non-representative nature of the sample is a limitation and thus this study must be regarded as exploratory in character.

The research design employs the methodology of the sample survey. Moreover, as with much other research studying the developmental process of political attitudes, this investigation is cross-sectional in breadth. Different groups of adolescent respondents are compared at successive grade-age levels. Underlying such a "quasi-longitudinal" study is the assumption that systematic variation in feelings of political cynicism from grade to grade, and from year to year, is evidence of developmental change. This assumption is also a limitation of the study.

Finally, since the items on the political cynicism scales do not distinguish among levels of politics--that is, do not separate the national, or federal, political system from provincial and local governments and politicians--they can be considered to have measured only the broadest and most general orientations to politics. The obtained data provide no means of determining which politics and politicians the adolescent respondents were judging as they answered the cynicism battery. It is possible that the failure to specify such a frame of reference in the battery of political attitude tests, or to use separate batteries for federal, provincial and local politics and politicians, significantly affects the results.

Assumptions

Besides these assumptions in the delimitation of the study, the following were also postulated in this investigation:

1. The language of the socio-political questionnaire and battery of political cynicism tests is non-technical, and, although subject to a variety of individual interpretations, was commonly understood.

2. Responses to the socio-political questionnaire and the battery of political cynicism tests, upon which the major portion of this work is based, represented the respondents unreserved, honest and best judgement.

3. The socio-political questionnaire and battery of political cynicism tests, the instruments of the investigation, were adequate for the satisfaction of the objective of the study. That is, the items on both the political and personal cynicism scales were meaningful to the adolescents who responded and will effectively identify those among the respondents who felt either politically or personally cynical.

4. In reporting an investigation of political attitudes and orientations among Colombia secondary school children, Reid Reading noted that underlying all research into the area of political socialization are the following assumptions:

first, that attitudinal data are useful for understanding and predicting patterns of behaviour and the nature of interactions and relationships that occur in a given society; second, that the socialization process has implications for the state of the political system; and third, that early experience is related to later behaviour.⁶⁹

⁶⁹Reid Reading, "Political Socialization in Columbia and the United States: An Exploratory Study," Midwest Journal of Politics, Vol 12 (1968), pp. 352-353.

Such assumptions are subsumed in this investigation.

5. Finally, we postulate that political socialization processes will vary not only between societies, but also within a society, over time; and will extend, as it were, vertically into adult political learning. As well, the processes will stretch horizontally into both political and non-political learning.⁷⁰

Hypotheses

The main hypotheses to be tested in this study are:

1. There are no significant differences among the group mean scores on the Political Cynicism scale attained by the adolescents when grouped (a) by grade level or (b) by single years of age.

2. Even when group differences in regard to relevant socio-psychological background factors are taken into account, there are no significant differences among the group mean scores on the Political Cynicism Scale obtained by those adolescents who are eighth- through twelfth-graders, or among those who are thirteenth- through eighteenth-years of age.

3. The development of political cynicism among adolescents is not significantly related to family, school, peer-group, or mass media politicization factors.

4. No significant contribution to prediction of the summated score on the political Cynicism Scale is made by knowing both adolescents' grade-age groups and the relevant information on the political socialization agents and socio-psychological background factors.

⁷⁰Greenstein, Children and Politics, p. 10

5. The correlation between summated scores obtained by adolescents on the Political Cynicism Scale and on the Personal Cynicism Scale is not significantly different from zero.

IV. SUMMARY

This study attempt to discover how adolescents of different grade-age groups and socio-psychological circumstances view politics and politicians. Our interest focusses on a descriptive profile of the development of feelings of political cynicism found among adolescents. Comparisons among grade and age groups are employed to investigate the growth of feelings of political cynicism during the adolescent developmental stage. In looking for explanations of influence patterns, two additional purposes of our study emerge: (1) to explore the relative impact of four political socialization agents--family, school, peers and mass media--upon the development of political cynicism among adolescents and (2) to appraise the effects of selected relevant socio-psychological background factors upon the acquisition of this negative political orientation by adolescents. A statistical, rather than an experimental, method is used to control the effects of relevant political socialization agents and background factors to ensure that the developmental process observed may be ascribed, within statistical limits of error, to grade-age variations and not to the influence of those other agents and factors. The principal intent of the remainder of the dissertation is to investigate the correlations of particular agents of political socialization and selected socio-psychological variables with the development of political cynicism among groups of adolescents

who are eighth- through twelfth-graders, and thirteenth- through eighteenth-years of age.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL CYNICISM: THE CONCEPT AND A DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORK

The substance of this study, as described in the previous chapter, focusses upon tracing the development of feelings of political cynicism during adolescence, as reflected in data collected from a sample of young Albertans. Being introductory in character, that earlier discussion necessarily provided only a general overview of the matters to be dealt with in the study. A number of such matters require more detailed treatment. Despite the fact that the exploratory character of the study has been clearly indicated, we must ensure that major concepts employed in our analysis are so specified that the substance and meaning given to them is adequately clear. Moreover, although no attempt is being made here to set out and test a particular theory about the matters under study, the broad explanatory framework guiding the study should be discussed in greater detail. In the present chapter we will undertake to accomplish the task of providing a more precise statement of such matters.

A matter of obvious importance in this vein concerns the conceptual definition of the main dependent variable: political cynicism. Thus, in the first part of this chapter we discuss various conceptual definitions given in the available literature on political attitudes for the notion of political cynicism. Having reviewed these formulations, we then set out our own definition of the concept. In the remaining part of the chapter, two related explanatory schemes

are advanced to provide a rationale for our expectation that political cynicism is an orientation toward politics acquired during adolescence. Finally, the overall purpose of the study is elaborated within the developmental perspective these explanatory schemes provide.

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CYNICISM

There are indications that North Americans are becoming increasingly cynical about, or mistrustful of, their political leaders, and possibly even the political system. For example, a longitudinal study of a representative sample of young American males demonstrated patterns of growing levels of cynicism.¹ The University of Michigan Survey Research Center's election studies show that adults also have become more disillusioned and distrustful of government in recent years.²

If distrust of politicians and government is a basic political attitude, and Murray Levin suggests that it is,³ then, it seems likely that the feeling of political cynicism first appears during childhood

¹Jerald G. Bachman and Elizabeth Van Duinen, Youth Look at National Problems: A Special Report from the Youth in Transition Project (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1971), pp. 25-31.

²Bachman and Van Duinen, op. cit., p. 31. Also see Institute for Social Research, Newsletter, n.v. (Winter, 1972), p. 5 and (Spring-Summer, 1973), pp. 4-5.

³Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 28; for a discussion of two types of political cynicism: towards personnel and towards institutions, see William A. Mitchell, "The Ambivalent Social Status of the American Politician," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 12 (September, 1959), pp. 690-691; and William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 50-52.

or adolescence. Therefore, to discover how the politically cynical adult came to be so, one must study not only adults but also pre-adults. The period immediately before adulthood must receive attention in the search for evidence as to what creates distrust of the political in the individual.⁴ This investigation focusses upon the origin of that orientation to the political process which Robert E. Agger and his associates, as well as others, have labelled "political cynicism."⁵ Underlying this investigation is the premise that the origin of at least some political cynicism must lie in childhood and/or adolescence. Yet, we must first consider what one means by the term "political cynicism?" What is the specific nature of this attitudinal characteristic we have baptized "political cynicism?"

The Oxford English Dictionary defines a cynic as one "disposed to deny human sincerity and goodness." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary suggests that a cynical individual is "one who believes that human conduct is motivated wholly by self interest, and who expects nothing but the worst of human conduct and motives." But, in terms of the philosophy of the Greek cynics, the concept can be considered far more comprehensive. Those cynics were "irreverent toward culture,

⁴For instance, Thompson and Horton reported that they found as much political distrust among young adults (age 21-30) as among old people. Some individuals, therefore, must reach adulthood age with a distrustful orientation to politics. Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," Social Forces, Vol. 38 (1959-60), p. 192.

⁵Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (1960), pp. 477-506.

disloyal to the state, resentful to authority, anti-intellectual and scornful of conventional morality."⁶ For certain sociologists, cynicism is perceived as a way of defining and responding to social situations and, thus, is generated as a result of social processes. That is, the development of a cynical perspective depends wholly on the social experiences of the actors. From such a view point, cynicism may be seen "as the buildup of resentment and hostility due to the continual re-experiencing of frustration and strain."⁷ As such, cynicism consists of

first, diffuse feelings of hate, envy and hostility; second, a sense of being powerless to express these feelings actively against the person or social situations working them; and, third, a continued experiencing of this impotent hostility.⁸

As interesting and heuristically valuable as these definitions of cynicism are, they do not supply clear criteria for operationalization, nor do they indicate how political scientists have operationalized--or given empirical import to--the concept of political cynicism. What is needed is a definition of political cynicism whose meaning is relatively clear, which can be operationalized, and which describes an important dimension of attitudes. The point to be emphasized here is that a research must attempt to avoid the difficulty of working with

⁶See D. Hodges, "Cynicism in the Labor Movement," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 21 (1933), p. 33; for further discussion on Greek cynics, see Donald R. Dudley, History of Cynicism (London: Methuen, 1937); and G. F. Woods, Contemporary Cynicism, The John Coffin Memorial Lecture, 1963 (London: Alhtone Press, 1964).

⁷Erwin Bublitz, "An Analysis of Cynicism Within Law Enforcement" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of Utah, 1974), p. 53.

⁸Arthur Neederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1969), p. 67.

such an ambiguous and diversely interpreted concept as, for instance, alienation. One way of avoiding the problems of ambiguity, replicability, comparability and independent components, which are associated with usage of the concept alienation, is to utilize a more simple and straightforward concept with a generally accepted meaning.⁹ Simply, we are suggesting that political cynicism can be more easily defined and therefore more fruitfully explored than political or social alienation. For instance, in a study examining the assumed relationship between theory and research with respect to alienation, Lanny Neider found a growing body of diffuse theoretical formulations and findings on a variety of topics called alienation with little specification of what these findings meant.¹⁰

The first political scientists to utilize the label "political cynicism" were Robert Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein and Stanley A. Pearl in their survey research in Eugene and Springfield, Oregon.¹¹ They defined the term as "the extent to which people hold politicians and

⁹For a discussion of concept formation matters and the nature of the attitude concept with special reference to the study of political alienation, see J. Paul Johnston, "Methodological Variations on Some Traditional Themes in Attitude Theory, with Special Reference to the Study of Political Alienation" (paper presented at the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, June, 1971, St. John's, Newfoundland); and J. Paul Johnston and Conde R. Grondin, "Some Problems of Measurement and Interpretation in the Study of Political Attitudes" (a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, May, 1969, Seattle, Washington), pp. 3-7.

¹⁰A stratified, sequential random sample of fifty-one studies drawn from a population of one hundred three empirical researches on alienation were employed in Neider's study. See Lanny Aron Neider, "Conceptual Analysis of Alienation in Current Theory and Research" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, South Dakota State University, 1971).

¹¹Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, op. cit.

politics in disrepute, the extent to which these words symbolize something negative rather than something positive."¹² The variable was measured by six modified Likert-type questions relating to feelings about the morality, competence, trustworthiness and public concern of politicians.¹³

Although Edgar Litt gave no explicit definition of political cynicism in his study of Boston politics, there is little doubt that the author is referring to the same phenomenon as Agger, Goldstein and Pearl. He tends to see political cynicism as a pervasive distrust of all things political, as a belief that the political system and its actions are corrupt and selfish.¹⁴ In discussing political cynicism, Litt refers to the view of "the political process as a vast conspiracy run by and for politicians. . . ,"¹⁵ "politics [as] a racket conducted by nefarious means,"¹⁶ and ". . . politicians [behaving] without the restraints of the rule of the civic game."¹⁷

However, it appears that the attitude labelled political cynicism by the above scholars was originally described by Donald Stokes, who

¹²Ibid., p. 477; emphasis theirs.

¹³Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, op. cit., pp. 479-481.

¹⁴Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963), pp. 312-314.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 312.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 313.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 314.

dealt with it in terms of "basic evaluative orientations toward government and politics."¹⁸ By referring to a posture toward government and politics which reflects a continuum of high faith and confidence at the one extreme and lack of confidence at the other, Stokes stresses that he is speaking of a single dimension of feelings toward government and politics. Other recent studies which have explored the subject of political cynicism have presented a similar picture. They have tended to use a measure of their dependent variable which closely approximates the Stokes' measure of "basic evaluative orientations toward the government and politics." Researches by Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi,¹⁹ and Kenneth Langton and Kent Jennings²⁰ are examples of empirical works which employ a scale to measure political cynicism which, except for an additional question, is the same as used for Stokes' 1958 data. Other researchers utilizing the same or similar questions as Stokes have labelled their dependent variable political trust. For example, Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker explicitly stated that they are discussing the same attitude as Stokes: "We defined political trust,

¹⁸Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military, eds., Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Laswell (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 62.

¹⁹M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Patterns of Political Learning," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 38 (1968), pp. 443-467.

²⁰Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and High School Civics Curriculum in the United States," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 852-867.

following Stokes lead, as a basic evaluative orientation toward government."²¹

Various terms such as evaluative orientation,²² diffuse support²³ or diffuse evaluation,²⁴ political distrust,²⁵ political mistrust,²⁶ and political cynicism²⁷ appears to have been employed by different scholars to label essentially the same political attitude. Agger, Goldstein and Pearl as well as Litt in fact, used the terms "cynicism"

²¹Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (December, 1970), p. 1203. See also Joel D. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behaviour," American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (March, 1969), pp. 86-99.

²²See, for instance, Sandra J. Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism among Negro and White Adolescents," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1969, New York, New York), p. 1; and Sandra J. Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization," (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970), p. 14.

²³Robert Weissberg, "Adolescent Experiences With Political Authorities," Journal of Politics, Vol. 34 (August, 1974), pp. 797-824.

²⁴Robert Weissberg, "Adolescents' Perceptions of Political Authorities: Another Look at Political Virtue and Power," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16 (February, 1972), pp. 147-151.

²⁵Schley R. Lyons, "The Political Socialization of Ghetto Children: Efficacy and Cynicism," Journal of Politics, Vol. 32 (May, 1970), pp. 288-291.

²⁶Brett W. Hawkins, Vincent L. Mirando and George A. Taylor, "Efficacy, Mistrust and Political Participation: Findings from Additional Data and Indicators," Journal of Politics, Vol. 33 (November, 1971), pp. 1130-1136.

²⁷It should also be noted that political cynicism has sometimes been equated with realism and not being cynical with being naive.

and "trust" to refer to the two opposite poles of the same dimension. In short, the other researchers who have focussed primarily on this political attitude seem to have utilized one or the other of the two most common terms reported above: trust and cynicism.²⁸

The question of which of the above terms one utilizes seems to be more a matter of taste than a matter of essential definitional difference. Again, there is much to be said for the point of view that these terms are merely different labels of the same political attitude. They all refer to a lack of trust and confidence in politics and politicians, to a feeling that the political process is in violation of important civic norms which should be observed.²⁹ The politically cynical individual would agree that "the politician uses his office for personal enrichment and . . . grants favor in return for campaign contributions of grafts,"³⁰ that "politicians in general are corrupt,

²⁸See, for example, John Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious Hypothesis and Political Participation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 32 (May, 1970), pp. 444-449; John Fraser, "Personal and Political Meaning Correlates of Political Cynicism," Midwest Journal of Politics, Vol. 15 (May, 1971), pp. 347-364; Paul Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust Among Black Schoolchildren: Two Explanations," Journal of Politics, Vol. 34 (November, 1972), pp. 1243-1269; Marvin Zonis, "Political Elites and Political Cynicism in Iran," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1 (1968-69), pp. 351-371; Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 564-575; Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), pp. 75-81; Gamson, op. cit.; and Ada W. Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (June, 1970), pp. 389-410.

²⁹Finifter discussed much the same thing under the rubric of "perceived political normlessness." Finifter, op. cit.

³⁰Levin, The Alienated Voter, p. 35.

incompetent, or self-interested,³¹ and that, "even if the man who wins [public office] is honest, he cannot remain so because contact with politicians or the attainment of power will corrupt him."³² In this investigation, such an attitude is labelled political cynicism. To give a formal definition: Political Cynicism is an attitude characterized by feelings of disrepute and distrust directed toward politics and politicians.

To illustrate, a political cynic would overly emphasize negative characteristics of politicians. He would tend to view political leaders and professional politicians as either garrulous, grasping, lustful for power, corrupt, evil, untrustworthy, self seeking, pretentiously outgoing, lacking in principles, or as "manipulators," "political bosses" or "political hacks." Too, he will be inclined to regard the operation of government institutions and the value system "legitimizing it as either fraudulent, corrupt, cabalistic, catering to vested interests, evildoers and/or as betraying the public trust."³³ It is believed that operationalizing the concept of political cynicism through an appropriate measure and intelligently relating that measure to selected agents of political socialization and certain background factors can

³¹Murray B. Levin, The Compleat Politician: Political Strategy in Massachusetts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962), p. 153.

³²Ibid., p. 154.

³³This conceptualization of political cynicism draws heavily on Conde R. Grondin, "A Descriptive Survey of Academic Preparation in Political Science in Relation to Selected Political Attitudes of Urban Secondary Social Studies Teachers of Alberta" (an unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Alberta, 1969), p. 13; and Johnston and Grondin, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

assist one in gaining a better understanding about the development of this important political attitude.

II. DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORK

Behavioral Significance

An understanding of the significance of adolescent political cynicism must be developed through theoretical perspectives. Unless one links those perspectives to some observable events, he runs the risks of being at best irrelevant and at worst wrong. It is therefore important to consider specific forms of cynically oriented political behaviour, to illustrate the significance of cynical attitudes before moving to an articulation per se of the developmental framework of growth of political cynicism among adolescents. The structuring principle involved in this research is that basic political orientation acquired during adolescence structure not only the later learning of specific issue or belief³⁴ but, also, later adult behavior.³⁵ According to Donald Searing, Joel Schwartz and Alden Lind, if this principle is to be taken seriously as a research guide, then, the burden is upon the proponent of such principle to specify what sorts of political

³⁴Greenberg tells us that without the assumptions that adolescents' political learning is relevant to later adult orientations and that individual political attitudes have an impact on the operation of a nation's government and political life, there would hardly be reason to conduct research into political socialization. Edward S. Greenberg (ed.), Political Socialization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 4-6; and Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 4.

³⁵For a test of this structuring principle, see Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz and Alden E. Lind, "The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems," American Political Science Review, Vol. 67 (June, 1973), pp. 415-432.

behavior are likely to be related to what sorts of political orientations. To these authors, the point is that "an orientation's importance in adult behavior must be demonstrated before we can be sure that its [adolescence] genesis is of interest to political science."³⁶

A recent study by Joel Aberbach and Jack Walker clearly demonstrates that political cynicism can have important impact on the nature of inputs into the political system. Investigating black and white attitudes in Detroit, they found that blacks were more politically distrustful than whites.³⁷ Moreover, they linked the distrust expressed by black respondents to a militant ideology and a stated willingness to use violence in their struggles over fundamental issues.³⁸ On the other hand, political distrust among white respondents is rooted in their anti black attitudes of supporting segregation and their opposition to increase expenditure to improve ghetto conditions.³⁹ Concerning the behavioral significance of these findings. Aberbach and Walker concluded: "Distrust clearly stimulates a willingness to engage in violence or favorably predisposes people toward voting for extremist candidates"⁴⁰ who court backlash sentiments. Heightened

³⁶ Ibid., p. 431; emphasis their.

³⁷ Joel Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (December, 1970), pp. 1203-1204; For a summary of basic findings about political trust by race, interested students should consult Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust Among Black Schoolchildren: Two Explanations," Journal of Politics, Vol. 34 (November, 1972), pp. 1243-1275.

³⁸ Aberbach and Walker, op. cit., pp. 1204, 1211-13

³⁹ Ibid., p. 1212.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 1213.

levels of political cynicism, thus, appear to have potential for changing cooperation into non-cooperation and non-activity into activity.

Other researchers have also provided evidence to the effect that political cynicism is sometimes related to political activity. When feelings of distrust are associated with political activities, they tend to be connected with negative or extremist behavior. For instance, in a study examining various Presidential votes using Survey Research Center data, Aberbach discovered that only political trust (cynicism) was a viable predictor of direction of vote in the Presidential election of 1964.⁴¹ Feelings of distrust were correlated with voting for Goldwater, even when the variable of party identification was controlled.⁴² However, correlations of cynicism with directions of vote in the Presidential elections of 1956, 1958, and 1960 were found to be very weak.⁴³ Similarly, John Horton and Wayne Thompson uncovered a strong relationship between feelings of cynicism toward local government and voting against local bond referenda.⁴⁴ Marvin E. Olsen's research reveals similar results,⁴⁵ as does the work of Edward McDill

⁴¹ Joel Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (March, 1969), p. 93.

⁴² Ibid., p. 94.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism" A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 67 (May, 1962), p. 485.

⁴⁵ Marvin E. Olsen, "Two Categories of Political Alienation," Social Forces, Vol. 47 (March, 1969), pp. 288-299.

and Jeanne Ridley.⁴⁶ Such evidence is supportive of Donald Stokes' conclusion that individuals who are politically cynical must "be seen as latent support that might be tapped by parties or factions of an individual political leader whose stance is hostile to the prevailing order."⁴⁷

The above empirical studies about the behavioral correlates of political cynicism have all pointed to heightened forms of political activities. However, both Stokes and Almond and Verba⁴⁸ cite data which illustrate the fact that political cynicism does not necessarily lead to heightened forms of political activity, but to intensify withdrawal from political involvement. Stokes showed that those individuals who are negatively oriented toward politics were less likely to vote than those whose affective orientations are positive or neutral and that "apoliticals" are more negative in their political orientations than "party identifiers."⁴⁹ Almond and Verba similarly demonstrated that individuals who have low levels of political participation generally tended to be more dissatisfied with the structure of influence and

⁴⁶Edward L. McDill and Jeanne Clare Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation and Political Participation," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (September, 1962), pp. 205-217.

⁴⁷Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military, eds. Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 72.

⁴⁸Stokes, op. cit., pp. 61-72; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).

⁴⁹Stokes, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

political system than were individuals whose political participation was higher.⁵⁰ Other authors explicitly made the point with their findings, that persons who feel cynical about politics and politicians are much less likely to get involved in political activities.⁵¹

Although the body of research attempting to correlate political cynicism with political behavioral consequences is not large, it has been shown that the attitude of cynicism can be associated with radical political positions, support of extremist candidates, negative voting, protest activity and/or political disengagement. It has been argued that political cynicism can lead to a deterioration of the quality of an individual's political involvement within the political system in two different ways. There could be either an unleashing of intense and, perhaps, bitter reactions by, up to this time, relatively politically inactive citizens, or a withdrawal of political involvement on the part of citizens who have given up hope. Plainly, correlations of political cynicism with various forms of political involvement,⁵² as findings of above empirical studies suggest, do imply the fact that political cynicism is a significant topic for study. Thus, "it is important for the health of political society to understand how

⁵⁰ Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 188-199.

⁵¹ For an inventory of these findings, see Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), pp. 78-81; see also Institute for Social Research, Newsletter, n.v. (Winter, 1972), p. 5 and (Spring-Summer, 1973), pp. 4-5.

⁵² For a discussion of the general dimension of political involvement, see Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 16-22.

cynicism . . . [is] developed as [a] personality trait."⁵³

Political Cynicism Development

For Richard Merelman,

Experience with a culture is a prerequisite for assimilation or rejection of the culture, and aging, inasmuch as it indexes a person's exposure to cultural norms, should therefore be closely associated with shifts in political orientation.⁵⁴

Following Merelman's lead, we propose that ages of adolescents--or the age surrogate in the research, the grade level--will share the greatest portion of adolescent variance in feelings of political cynicism.

We know almost nothing about the developmental process of political cynicism in the life cycle of individuals. By and large, scholars interested in this area of political socialization have concluded from their findings that the American child's basic attachment and supportive attitudes toward the political system are firmly established at a relatively early age.⁵⁵ Further, they have inferred that these attitudes are widely and homogeneously distributed within

⁵³Ibid., p. 80.

⁵⁴Richard M. Merelman, Political Socialization and Educational Climates: A Study of Two School Districts (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), p. 58.

⁵⁵See, for instance, David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "Youth in the Political System" Culture and Social Character, eds. S. M. Lipset and L. Lowenthal (New York: Free Press, 1961); David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6 (1962), pp. 229-246; David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals, Vol. 361 (1965), pp. 40-57; Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967); Fred I. Greenstein, Children in Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969).

the political system.⁵⁶ These findings are by no means new; in fact, it might be said that these are part of the conventional wisdom of the discipline of political science. However, there is reason to suspect that supportive attitudes in America are not as homogeneously distributed as these scholars would lead us to believe. This suspicion is supported empirically by several studies. Notable is the following statement from the Appalachian region's study:

The greater cynicism of the sub-culture sample is evident. . . . [T]he entire 5-12 grade Knox County sample is significantly more cynical than the SRC [Survey Research Center] twelfth graders. The implication of this, of course, is that in Appalachia, unlike the rest of the United States, there is relatively little change in cynicism with maturation. . . . Early in life these children appear to become relatively cynical and they stay that way. Thus, though at this point it remains unexplained, there is no doubt that Appalachian children manifest far less favorable political affect⁵⁷ than do their counterparts elsewhere in the United States. . . .

The conclusion is highly speculative, however, and there is no evidence introduced in the report of that study to establish when the attitude of political cynicism began to express itself. From such findings, we feel justified in concluding that data about youth's development of political cynicism are very incomplete.

Few students of political socialization have offered systematic theories about the development of political attitudes among adolescents and even fewer have dealt with explanatory models of the development of

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), p. 570; similar findings were also reported by Herbert Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 146-148.

political cynicism.⁵⁸ To illustrate, after having identified three types of political orientations, Dawson and Prewitt fit these three types into "an age development pattern of political socialization."⁵⁹ In this paradigm, the child is seen as sloughing off undifferentiated, symbolic political associations and growing into a rationalizing, choosing, political animal.⁶⁰ This paradigm, however, is extremely sketchy. Nevertheless, it provides an undeniably useful summary of findings encompassed in much of the current literature of political socialization. Yet, it says little about the actual content of the political learning process. More important, it does not identify the growth process in political socialization and ignores the maturational forces that may push the adolescent from one set of political concerns to the next.

Robert Hess and Judith Torney suggest four models that describe in different ways the acquisition of political attitudes. In fact, they are solely "devices for examining attitudes the child brings to the political socialization process and the ways he utilizes experience in the development of political roles."⁶¹ These models are (1) accumulation,

⁵⁸For instance, R. W. Connell offers four theories of attitude formation. These he called (1) the Measles Theory, (2) the Mother's Milk Theory, (3) the Earthquake Theory, and (4) the Production-Line Theory in "The Origins of Political Attitudes: An Introduction," Politics, Vol. 2 (November, 1967), pp. 141-149; for examples of explanatory models, see Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron, Jr., op. cit., pp. 565-566; and Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 20-24; for a critic, see Dean Jaros, Socialization to Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 136-147.

⁵⁹Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 43.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 43-45.

⁶¹Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 19.

(2) interpersonal transfer, (3) cognitive development and (4) identification. In the accumulation model, the child's attitudes are the result of an accumulation of earlier learning. The interpersonal transfer model assumes simply that the child's interpersonal relations with adults serve as behavioral models in political systems. Similar to the interpersonal model is the identification model, which assumes that the child imitates the values and behaviors of some significant adult or peer whom he admires. Finally, the cognitive developmental model assumes that the child's level of maturity determines the kinds of political stimuli to which he can respond in the political environment.⁶² Hess and Torney believe that each of these models of political learning takes precedence at a different stage in the life cycle of an individual.⁶³ However, they fail to substantiate this contention. In fact, Hess and Torney rarely locate their actual findings within the theoretical models that they elaborated. As a result, the work gains most of its value not from its theoretical framework, but from the data which are provided.

We will interpret the differences in feelings of political cynicism among our eighth- through twelfth-graders, or thirteenth- through eighteenth-years of age, primarily by relying on two explanatory perspective which we call (1) the cognitive-developmental explanation⁶⁴

⁶²Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 19-22.

⁶³Ibid., p. 19.

⁶⁴Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 21.

and (2) the political-reality explanation.⁶⁵ In principle, these two explanatory perspectives could be mutually exclusive although, in the actual socio-political world at large, the circumstances out of which they arise are not. Nevertheless, the development of political cynicism among adolescents may be viewed in many ways, of course, but we prefer to believe that the capacity of adolescents to develop this political orientation depends more upon their level of cognitive development and "pattern of political de-idealization"⁶⁶ than upon any other explanatory schemes.

The cognitive-developmental explanation. We will begin by focussing our attention on the cognitive aspect of the evolution of political cynicism among adolescents. In this regard, the cognitive development model elaborated by a Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, offers some valuable insights.⁶⁷ According to Piaget, the child's increasing understanding of the world is characterized by a movement

⁶⁵This term is borrowed from Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust Among Black Schoolchildren" Two Explanations," Journal of Politics, Vol. 34 (November, 1972), p. 1249.

⁶⁶John J. Patrick, Political Socialization of American Youth: Implications for Secondary School Social Studies, Research Bulletin No. 3. (Washington, D. C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1967), p. 10.

⁶⁷For an attempt to incorporate Piagetian theory into an analysis of political socialization, see Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," American Political Science Review, Vol. 69 (September, 1969), pp. 750-767; Merelman, Political Socialization and Educational Climates, pp. 60-63; and Charles F. Andrain, Children and Civic Awareness: A Study in Political Education (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 59-71; for an overview of research in the Piagetian tradition, see Eleanor E. Maccoby, "The Development of Moral Values and Behavior in Childhood," Socialization and Society, ed. John Clausen (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 227-269.

through several well-defined conceptual stages of cognitive development: sensorimotor intelligence (age one), preoperational thinking (age two through seven), concrete operations (age seven to eleven) and formal operations (first appearing around age 12).⁶⁸ The complexity of Piaget's stage model though vast, need not deter us, and we need to utilize only those aspects of this cognitive development theory that are germane to the consideration of the political development of political cynicism among adolescents.⁶⁹

To Piaget, the great novelty that characterizes adolescent cognitive structure is the detachment of "the concrete logic from the objects themselves, so that it can function on verbal or symbolic statements without other support."⁷⁰ Beginning at the age of 11-12

⁶⁸Jean Piaget, "Development Psychology: A Theory of Development," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4 (New York: MacMillan, 1968), p. 140.

⁶⁹For the interested students, see, for instance, Barry J. Wadsworth, Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1971); Ruth M. Beard, An Outline of Piaget's Developmental Psychology for Students and Teachers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); Jean Piaget, "The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent," Adolescence: Psychological Perspectives, eds. G. Caplan and S. Lebovici (New York: Basic Book, Inc., 1969), pp. 22-26; David P. Ausubel and Pearl Ausubel, "Cognitive Development in Adolescence," Review of Educational Research, Vol. 36 (1966), pp. 403-413; David Elkind, "Cognitive Structure and Adolescent Experience," Adolescence, Vol. 2 (1967), pp. 427-434; David Elkind, "Cognitive Development in Adolescence," Understanding Adolescence, ed. James F. Adams (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 128-158; Rolf E. Muuss, "Jean Piaget's Cognitive Theory of Adolescent Development," Adolescence, Vol. 2 (1967), pp. 285-310; and Lawrence Irving E. Sigel, "The Attainment of Concepts," Review of Child Development Research, eds. Martin L. Hoffman and Lois W. Hoffman, Vol. One (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 209-248.

⁷⁰Piaget, "The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent," p. 23.

and culminating in late adolescence at about 16 or 17, the adolescent becomes increasingly capable of reasoning abstractly and mastering the formal thought operations. While the child at the concrete operational stage becomes able to reason on the basis of objects, the adolescent begins to reason on the basis of verbal propositions. In his thoughts, then, the adolescent can leave the real objective world behind and enter the world of ideas. As Joseph Adelson and Robert O'Neil put it,

. . . it is not enough to be exposed to mature knowledge and opinion; their [political ideas] absorption in turn depends on the growth of cognitive capacities. [emphasis in original] . . . In turn the growth of capacity allows the birth of ideology. [emphasis in original] . . . [T]here is an impressive difference between the younger and older adolescents in their orderliness and internal consistency of their political perspectives. What passes for ideology in the younger respondents is a raggle-taggle array of sentiments . . . In time these sentiments may mature (or harden) into ideologies or ideological dispositions. . . .⁷¹

Using Piaget's insight, Richard Merelman suggests specific component of cognitive requirements for engaging in political ideological thinking: an ability to reason from cause to effect (causally), a view that the political world is malleable and that humans can change it, a capacity to communicate with others and a general perception that individuals not fate cause political events.⁷² For Merelman, "to become an ideologue, a person must . . . have cognitive skills which allow him to see linkage between ideas and events. Such linkage determines the amount of constraint in his belief system."⁷³ It appears that all

⁷¹Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 4 (1966), pp. 304-305.

⁷²Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," pp. 753-754.

⁷³Ibid., p. 180.

these requisites come to full realization only during the stage of formal operations which begins at early adolescence and actually extends all the way to the mature thought processes of the adult.⁷⁴

Clearly, then, the pre-adolescent cannot achieve political attitudes, even in the most modest sense, until he has acquired and to some degree mastered the cognitive skills of the stage of formal operations. He must be able to manage abstractness; he must be able to synthesize and generalize his observations beyond the specific concrete instance; and he must be able to transcend the present and to imagine the future. His mind must also be capable to move with some ability within the ground of political concepts and he even must have achieved some discrimination in his sense of political structure before he can enter fully the realm of political attitude. Thus, the cognitive-developmental explanation suggests that the years of adolescence are a watershed era in the emergence of feelings of cynicism toward politics, and that the theoretical insights offered both by Piaget and Merelman have explicit relevance for understanding the development of political cynicism among adolescents. Indeed, Dean Jaros believes that the cognitive development theory is convenient as a device for describing characteristic political orientations of various age cohort.⁷⁵

⁷⁴Muuss, op. cit., p. 299.

⁷⁵Jaros, Socialization to Politics, pp. 145-146; a similar claim is made by Roberta S. Sigel, "Political Socialization: Some Reflections on Current Approaches and Conceptualizations" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1966, New York City, New York), p. 18.

The political-reality explanation. The cognitive-developmental explanation assumes that, as the adolescent matures, he is increasingly able to respond in more abstract and complex ways to his political environment. It argues that the quality and quantity of an adolescent's political orientations are a result of his personal cognitive development. The more developed the adolescent cognitive skills, the more inclined he is to develop personal standards by which he can judge both his and political system's behaviors. The cognitive development of adolescents enable them to go beyond concrete observations and to begin to evaluate realities of the political life on a more abstract basis.

This growth, in evaluation of realities of the political life, is marked by a progressive differentiation of idealism and realism and by an evaluation of these concepts in relation to each other.⁷⁶ To Russell Eisenman,

one of the most interesting characteristics of adolescents is their mixture of idealism and realism. On the one hand, the adolescent may live in . . . an unrealistic dream world, with concern for world peace, absence of graft in politics, and other idealistic conceptions. On the other hand, the adolescent may have a cynical, 'don't-kid-me-Mac,-I-know-the-score' outlook, which would seem to cast scorn upon all idealism.⁷⁷

It is, then, this adolescents' capacity for comparing the possible with the actual, how things are and how they might be, that lead them to perceive inconsistencies and discrepancies in adults' political attitudes and political behaviors. This new awareness underlies not only many of

⁷⁶See Joseph Adelson, "The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent," Daedalus, Vol. 100 (1971), pp. 1036-1037.

⁷⁷Russell Eisenman, "Values and Attitudes in Adolescence," Understanding Adolescence, ed. James F. Adams (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), p. 184.

the recurrent adolescents' feelings of dissatisfaction with the political system and the politicians, but also to question the value system of the adult political world.

To put it in another way, "as they approach adolescence, children begin a slow pattern of 'political deidealization'."⁷⁸ The adolescent discovers that there is a discrepancy between what he has been taught as being right and how people conduct themselves in political life. Further, since adults tend to show a strong tendency to shelter young children from the realities of political life by painting politics and politicians for the pre-adolescents in roseate color resulting in highly idealized childhood political images⁷⁹ and since adolescence brings with it an increased realistic perception of certain aspects of the political system, then, it is this newly perceived realistic view, when contrasted with idealistic view learned earlier, which produces feelings of dissatisfaction, and hence feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians.⁸⁰

For youth brought up in a sheltered environment, awareness of reality in the latter part of adolescence may result in feelings of apprehension and distrust towards the parental generation and social [and political] institutions,⁸¹

remarked Glenn Elder.

⁷⁸Patrick, op. cit., p. 10

⁷⁹Easton and Hess, "The Child Political World," p. 214.

⁸⁰Greenstein, Children in Politics, p. 52.

⁸¹Glen H. Elder, Jr., "Adolescent Socialization and Development," Handbook of Personality Theory and Research, eds. Edgar F. Borgatta and William W. Lambert (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), p. 282.

Few children, then, have a sophisticated understanding of political decision rules or actual knowledge with which to evaluate the trustworthiness of public officials. Children, unlike adolescents, have little or no opportunity to engage in reality testing with their political environment, simply because they have not as yet acquired cognitive competence--the psychological or cognitive disposition to examine the logic and consistency of their existing political beliefs. We suspect that the emergence of the ability of political-reality testing in adolescents occurs simultaneously with increasing political "de-idealization" which eventually may lead to recurrent feelings of political disillusionment which results in cynicism.

Let us put the matter in slightly different terms.

The adolescent's orientation toward the main values of his society is . . . beset with difficulties. Owing to the long period of preparation and the relative segregation of the children's world from that of the adults, the main values of the society are necessarily presented to the child and adolescent in a highly selective way, with a strong idealistic emphasis. The relative unreality of these values as presented to the children. . . creates among the adolescents a great potential uncertainty and ambivalence toward the adult world Therefore, the exploration of the actual meaning of major cultural values in their relation to the reality of the social world becomes one of the adolescent's main problems. This exploration leads in many directions--cynicism, idealistic youth rebellion, deviant ideology and behavior, or a gradual development of a balanced identity.⁸²

⁸²S. N. Eisenstadt, "Archetypal Patterns of Youth," Daedalus, Vol. 91 (1962), pp. 39-40.

Or, according to John J. Patrick,

. . . adolescence is a period when hallowed traditions are questioned for the first time, when political idols are shattered, when elements of adult skepticism or cynicism are noticed. No longer are adults viewed so awesomely as the bearers of unmitigated justice and wisdom, no longer is the adult world so forbiddingly mysterious and fancifully sacrosanct. The favorable political attitudes of adolescents are shaken when they hear adults talk about 'dirty politics,' 'political hacks,' 'crooked politicians'; when they become increasingly knowledgeable about the gap between political ideals preached at school, at church, or at home, and sordid political practices disclosed in the newspapers, or television, or in informal family discussions.⁸³

Clearly, then, the political-reality explanation discloses to us that adolescence is the developmental stage when feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians first appear in individuals.⁸⁴ Thus, the adolescent years are the obvious choice for studying the origins and development of political cynicism.

The cognitive-developmental explanation and the political-reality explanation are not mutually exclusive explanatory models, for both could be used to account for the development of political cynicism among adolescents. We probably cannot evaluate, neither do we intend to, their relative explanatory power for cognitive development and the ability to evaluate political reality tend to reinforce each others. Although, these two explanations may lead to different additional empirical consequences, we feel that these consequences will not be contradictory.

⁸³Patrick, op. cit., p. 11.

⁸⁴For further evidence, see, for example, Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, Vol. 54 (1960), p. 942; Kenneth Keniston, The Uncommitted (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), p. 401; and Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 58.

When basing hypotheses about the development of adolescents' political cynicism upon Piaget's stages of cognitive development and Merelman's theoretical insights, and upon the political-reality postulate, we should realize that the appearance of formal thought, during adolescence especially, is related to "1. the maturation of the nervous system, 2. experiences in interaction with physical reality, and 3. the influence of the social environment."⁸⁵ Moreover, individuals make a gradual transition from one stage to another. At times, adolescents may occupy an intermediate position, neither falling completely in the lower concrete operation stage nor in the higher formal operation stage.⁸⁶ With these caveats in mind, intuitively, we would expect younger adolescents, having less ideological concerns, to reveal a lesser amount of feelings of political cynicism. Likewise, we would expect older, more cognitively mature adolescents to express a greater amount of feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians. Therefore, we hypothesize that the development of political cynicism to be especially marked between age and grade levels and to be interpretable in terms of the general cognitive maturational and political reality explanatory schemes we have outlined.

⁸⁵Muuss, op. cit., p. 289.

⁸⁶Similar cautions are raised by Andrain, op. cit., p. 68.

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AGENTS IN SOCIALIZATION TO POLITICAL CYNICISM: ISSUES AND LITERATURE

The development of feelings of political cynicism among adolescent's does not operate in isolation--it is the result of early and late socialization experiences. In the first part of this chapter we direct our attention to the expected impact of the four selected agents of political socialization upon the acquisitions of political cynicism among adolescents. Finally, an overview of some of the pertinent literature to our research purpose concludes this chapter.

I. AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

In the study of political socialization clearly one of the most crucial questions is that of the role played by various socializing agencies. Most scholars share the conviction that, in the socialization process, "society cannot act for itself but must effect its purposes through organizations and individuals who are its 'agents' in the socialization process."¹ Obviously, each adolescent encounters a variety of influences which singly or in combination determine his

¹Alex Inkeles, "Society, Social Structure and Child Socialization," Socialization and Society, ed. John A. Clausen (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), p. 103.

feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians. The influences are many--family, school, peers and mass media--and combine variously as agents of political socialization to give each adolescent a slightly different perspective about politics. Thus, "in understanding the political development of the pre-adult, one of the central questions hinges on the relative and differentiated contribution of various socializing agents."² For clarity and convenience, the following section deals with four major agents of political socialization or variables which, singly and in combination, are all hypothesized to be important in shaping the postulated development of political cynicism among adolescents.

The Family.

As an agent of political socialization, the family has received detailed attention from a host of political socialization researchers.³ Most of these researchers agree that the family is one of the most

²M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (March, 1968), p. 169; emphasis their.

³For extended discussions of family political socialization, see particularly Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 51-70; Steven L. Wasbh, "The Impact of the Family on Politics: An Essay and Review of the Literature," Family Life Coordinator, Vol. 15 (1966), pp. 3-24; James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," The Annals, Vol. 361 (September, 1955), pp. 10-19; Greenstein, Children in Politics; Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 21-83; Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, pp. 33-70; James J. Best, Public Opinion (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1973), pp. 71-91; Hess and Torney, op. cit.; Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System; Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (March, 1963), pp. 527-535; and Robert E. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief," American Sociological Review, Vol. 24 (August, 1959), pp. 502-511.

potent and pervasive sources of political socialization. For instance, to Herbert Hyman, the family is "foremost among agencies of socialization and politics"⁴ while, for Fred Greenstein, the family is the primary agent of socialization in the transmission of generalized political orientations to the child.⁵ There are substantial reasons to expect strong relationships between family patterns and children's political values and behavior. The preponderance of family contact during childhood, the long-term and broad-ranging interaction of parent and child and the intensity of affective ties all suggest that the family should have a great impact on political socialization. Hess and Torney observe that the family fulfills its role as a political socializing agent in three ways: first, it transmits political attitudes to an individual; second, the parent serves as model to the individual; and, third, role definitions and expectations within the family structure are generalized to political objects.⁶

In recent years, Robert Lane, perhaps most successfully, demonstrated the pervasiveness of the family's influence in determining the political orientations of an individual.⁷ Lane proposed that the roots of an individual's political ideology are traceable to family

⁴Hyman, op. cit., p. 69.

⁵Greenstein, Children in Politics, p. 44; and Hyman, op. cit., p. 95.

⁶Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 154.

⁷See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962); and Robert E. Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 261-311.

interactions. An individual's basic orientations to politics, according to his thesis, derive from the family and most subsequent political values and behaviors arise from socio-political stimuli acting on these early formed dispositions.

The work of several other researchers provide corroboration for Lane's thesis. For instance, in his study of "radical youth," Kenneth Keniston traces political orientations of youth to ideological systems of the family.⁸ In an earlier review of "alienated youth," he also touched on the importance of the family in the development of political orientations among youth.⁹ Likewise, Almond and Verba noted a strong association between the decision-making structure in the family and an individual's feelings of political competency.¹⁰ Apparently, the impact of the family in the transmission of political orientations might result from the direct and explicit teaching of particular attitudes and/or from the less direct, informal and incidental influence of the family on personality characteristics in turn related to political attitudes.¹¹ Yet, this does not reduce the importance of the family's role as an agent of political socialization but rather illustrates its subtlety.

Beyond these researches, a considerable body of survey data tends to focus upon a narrower range of values, attitudes and behaviors,

⁸Kenneth Keniston, Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).

⁹Kenneth Keniston, The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965).

¹⁰Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 266-306.

¹¹Wasby, op. cit., p. 6.

and several of these studies support and supplement the specific propositions advanced by Lane. For example, Russell Middleton and Snell Putney reported a strong tendency for children to reflect the ideological views of their parents, with the major deviation coming from those respondents who were estranged from their parents.¹² With reference to political cynicism in particular, Jennings and Niemi present findings based on a national probability sample of high school seniors and their parents. They discover that the students were markedly less cynical than their parents and, moreover, that student-parent scores are virtually independent of each other, although traces of a relationship appear at the extremes of the scales¹³ and a modest correlation exists between parents and students when political conversations within the family are more frequent.¹⁴ Likewise, data are presented by Sandra Kenyon which show that children who perceived their father and mother as very interested in politics tend to be less cynical than those who see their parents as lower in political interest,¹⁵ but found no relationship between the frequency of parent-child political discussion and political cynicism.

¹²Middleton and Putney, op. cit.

¹³Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., p. 178.

¹⁴Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., pp. 178-182. It is untested whether or not youth's political cynicism reflects that of their parents when the cynicism of each is measured at the same point in the life cycle.

¹⁵Sandra J. Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970), p. 142.

In a comparative study of high school and university students, Frank Pinner found that Belgian and French students tended to exhibit more feelings of political distrust and disaffection than did Dutch students. At the same time, Belgian and French young peoples did show signs of parental overprotection while Dutch youth had more freedom. From these findings, Pinner argued that parental overprotected youth--regardless of their nationality--tend to be more distrustful of political figures and institutions.¹⁶ To be sure, family impact on an individual's acquisition of political orientations, specifically political cynicism, seems to be very subtle and many faceted.¹⁷

A summary statement provided by James Davies reflects the thrust of those scholars who hold the family to be the central agent of political socialization.

The family provides the major means for transforming the mentally naked infant organism into the adult, fully clothed in its own personality. And most of the individual's political personality--his tendencies to think and act politically in particular ways--have been determined at home, several years before he can take part in politics as an ordinary adult citizen or as a political prominent.¹⁸

Recently, however, several authors have begun to question the extent of the family's influence in the political socialization process. To illustrate, Hess and Torney asserted that "the effectiveness of the family as an agent of political socialization has been over-estimated."¹⁹

¹⁶Frank A. Pinner, "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," The Annals, Vol. 361 (September, 1965), pp. 58-70.

¹⁷Jaros, Socialization to Politics, p. 94.

¹⁸Davies, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁹Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 217.

Then, they went on in their study to demonstrate that the family's influence on children's political orientations declines as children grow older.²⁰ In a review of twelve studies conducted prior to 1957 dealing with the extent of political congruence between parent and child, Hyman found low associations between certain parent's and child's political orientations.²¹ More recently, Jennings and Niemi found little correlations between views of parents and high school seniors on many political issues.²² In short, these studies cast considerable doubt on the accuracy of assigning preeminent importance to the family as an agent of political socialization as had previously been done. Indeed, wide disparities between parent and youth consistently appear among attitudes toward political issues and in personality traits such as political cynicism. Comparing the Hyman's review with the results reported by Jennings and Niemi suggests the notion that many conditioning or intervening socio-political factors may dilute and lessen the strength of family's influence upon the development of an individual's political orientations.²³ The relative impact of the family's influence in the development of political orientations among adolescents elicit conflict. Because, as indicated above, the importance of the family in political socialization is unclear, accordingly, the family's role in the development of feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians among

²⁰Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 165.

²¹Hyman, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

²²Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., p. 182; see also Philip Noguee and Murray B. Levin, "Some Determinants of Political Attitudes Among College Voters," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 22 (1958), pp. 449-463.

²³Patrick, op. cit., p. 21.

adolescents is a major concern in our investigation.

The School.

The school is potentially an important instrument of political socialization and for the incubation and molding of political attitudes. "The school stands out as the central, salient and dominant force in the political socialization of the child," maintain Hess and Torney.²⁴ Speculation as to the relative importance and the extent of the school's impact on the political acculturation of the youth into the political system is not of recent origin, although it has only been in the past five years²⁵ that this particular area of investigation has been pursued in a more systematic fashion utilizing the tools of behavioral research.

From an extensive body of literature, it is clear that the relationship between school and the development of political attitudes has been a major concern for students of political socialization. This concern appears to have sprung from two diverse sources: the need to develop individuals into active, democratic citizens, and the knowledge that education per se has a marked impact on the formation of

²⁴Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 137; a similar conclusion was reached by Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., pp. 179-180.

²⁵Patrick, op. cit., p. 4.

orientations to politics.²⁶ Thus,

public schools in all societies are expected to function as important agents of political socialization by teaching culturally approved political aspirations and roles and stressing love of country and its political institutions.²⁷

²⁶For instance, see Merelman, Political Socialization and Educational Climates; Byron G. Massialas (ed.), Political Youth, Traditional Schools (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Byron G. Massialas, Education and the Political System (Readings, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969); Best, Public Opinion, pp. 92-109; Patrick, op. cit.; Andrain, Children and Civic Awareness, pp. 73-90; Hess and Torney, op. cit.; A. Morrison and D. McIntyre, Schools and Socialization (Middlesex, England: Penguin Book Limited, 1971); Jaros, Socialization to Politics, pp. 97-123; Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization, pp. 143-180; Langton, Political Socialization, pp. 84-119; Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, pp. 93-117; James S. Coleman (ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); O. J. Harvey, et al., "Teachers' Beliefs, Classroom Atmosphere and Student Behavior," American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 5 (March, 1968), pp. 151-166; Robert D. Hess, "Political Socialization in the Schools," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 38 (Summer, 1968), pp. 528-536; Sarane S. Boocock, "Toward a Sociology of Learning: A Selective Review of Existing Research," Sociology of Education, Vol. 39 (Winter, 1966), pp. 1-45; Stanley E. Dimond, Schools and the Development of Good Citizens (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1953); Kenneth Prewitt, George Von Der Muhll and David Court, "School Experiences and Political Socialization: A Study of Tanzanian Secondary School Students," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 3 (July, 1970), pp. 203-225; F. Glenn Macomber, "The Role of Educational Institutions in Adolescent Development," Understanding Adolescence, ed. James F. Adams (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), pp. 232-247; Judith V. Torney, "Contemporary Political Socialization in Elementary Schools and Beyond," The High School Journal, Vol. 54 (1970), pp. 153-163; Paul R. Abramson, "Political Socialization in English and American Secondary Schools," High School Journal, Vol. 54 (1970), pp. 68-75; Hans N. Weiler, "Education and Political Development," Review of Educational Research, Vol. 38 (1968), pp. 231-242; Dean Jaros and Bradley C. Canon, "Transmitting Basic Political Values: The Role of the Educational System," The School Review, Vol. 77 (1969), pp. 94-107; Paul Abramson, "The Differential Political Socialization of English Secondary School Students," Sociology of Education, Vol. 40 (1967), pp. 246-269; and William C. Kvaraceus, "Negro Youth and Social Adaptation: The Role of the School as an Agent of Change," Negro Self Concept, eds. William C. Kvaraceus, et al. (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1965), pp. 91-128.

²⁷Patrick, op. cit., p. 26.

And this inculcation of political norms, values and orientations by the school is carried out "formally through conscious, planned instructions, as well as informally through inadvertent, casual experiences in the school milieu."²⁸

It seems, however, that individual schools may differ in their influence as agents of political socialization.²⁹ Byron Massialas reported that "children attending suburban elementary schools tend to have a higher sense of political trust than do children attending inner-city schools."³⁰ Too, Allen Glen found in a study of three schools from southeastern Michigan that suburban school children tended to have significantly higher scores on a political trust scale than did either rural or inner-city youth.³¹ It appears, then, that in addition to general cognitive developmental factors, schools, in certain milieu, may influence the development of political trust among youth. The Hess and Torney research is also suggestive of the connection between school and feeling of trust toward politics and politicians, but no explicit relations are established by their investigation.³²

Studies conducted in the United States generally support the notion that the school's role is limited in assisting individuals to

²⁸Langton, Political Socialization, p. 84.

²⁹For instance, see Edgar Litt, "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," American Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (February, 1963), pp. 69-75.

³⁰Massialas, Political Youth, Traditional Schools, pp. 5-6.

³¹Allen D. Glen, "Elementary School Children's Attitude Toward Politics," Political Youth, Traditional Schools, ed. Byron G. Massialas (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 53-55.

³²Torney and Hess, op. cit.

build sophisticated socio-civic values, behaviors, and political knowledge, though educational experiences at all levels may suppress, substitute for, or transcend earlier familial experiences and shape basic attitudes that an individual acquires about political processes.³³ The school's limited role in the process of politicization is in part the result of the school program and of teachers of social studies courses.³⁴ Curriculum cannot and should not be shaped to assume total responsibility for the political socialization of individuals.³⁵ It is only one of several factors within the school that influence educational outcomes. Likewise, methods and personal characteristics of social studies teachers are in many ways as determinative of the results as is the curriculum.³⁶ As mentioned by John Patrick, the

³³James S. Coleman, "Introduction: Education and Political Development," Education and Political Development, ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 21.

³⁴For those who are interested in further discussion about teachers and politics, see, for instance, Langton, Political Socialization, pp. 86-87; Harmon Zeigler, The Political Life of American Teachers (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization, pp. 158-167; and Conde R. Grondin, "A Descriptive Survey of Academic Preparation in Political Science in Relation to Selected Political Attitudes of Urban Secondary Social Studies Teachers of Alberta" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Alberta, 1969).

³⁵See M. Kent Jennings, "Correlates of the Social Studies Curriculum: Grades 10-12," Social Studies in the United States, eds. C. Benjamin Cox and Byron G. Massialas (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), pp. 289-333.

³⁶Edgar B. Wesley and Stanley P. Wronski, Teaching Social Studies in High Schools (fifth edition; Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1964), pp. 42-43.

attitudes, values and classroom styles of school teachers are important aspects of political socialization in public schools, that may either reinforce or undercut the stated objectives of formal programs of political education.³⁷ In the end, teachers of social studies determine, to a degree, the success or failure of school political civic programs.³⁸

In the context of their classrooms, students will form and be exposed to a wide variety of attitudes about political objects and events.³⁹ The social studies teacher's role in this process is to reinforce in youth the civic virtues and democratic ideals necessary for them to become competent citizens, prepared to carry out the civic duties placed upon them in a democratic state. Accordingly, social studies teachers, whether deliberately or indirectly, will suggest or emphasize certain political values and avoid the discussion of others in their classrooms. In an examination of teachers' goals for teaching social studies, Lee Ehman "concludes that teachers are more interested in perpetuating the status quo and transmitting values than rationally analyzing controversy and values of the society,"⁴⁰ and "that the kind of discourse occurring in social studies classrooms may be more

³⁷Patrick, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁸See Province of Alberta, Department of Education, Senior High School Curriculum Guide for Social Studies 10, 20, 30 and 33 (Interim) (Edmonton: Department of Education, 1967), p. 9.

³⁹See Richard C. Remy, "High School Seniors' Attitudes Toward Their Civics and Government Instruction," Social Education, Vol. 36 (1972), pp. 590-597, 622.

⁴⁰Lee H. Ehman, "Normative Discourse and Attitude Change in the Social Studies Classroom," The High School Journal, Vol. 54 (1970), p. 78.

important for students' attitudes than the amount of exposure to these classes."⁴¹

It is generally held that high school social studies teachers present to their students "a view of the nation and its political processes which is incomplete and simplistic, stressing values and ideas but ignoring social realities."⁴² Edgar Litt's study in the Boston metropolitan area confirms that social studies teachers and textbooks present an unrealistic distorted and naive picture of the American political system. In this study, Litt examined the civic training of youth in upper-, middle- and lower-class communities. In the upper-class community, the textbooks used and the manner in which the civic course was taught emphasized participation as a responsibility of citizenship. Participation was also emphasized, if somewhat less rigorously, in the middle-class community and substantially less in the lower-class community.⁴³ Litt found that only in the upper-class community was there any significant attempt to teach the realities of the political process and how political power and group conflict are natural ingredients of political life. In the middle- and lower-class communities politics was presented as a "formal mechanistic set of governmental institutions with emphasis on its harmonious and legitimate nature, rather than a

⁴¹Ibid., p. 83; emphasis his.

⁴²Hess, op. cit., p. 531; emphasis his; see also Byron G. Massialas, "American Government: We are the Greatest!," Social Studies in the United States, eds. C. Benjamin Cox and Byron G. Massialas (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), pp. 165-195; and Frederick R. Smith and John J. Patrick, "Civics: Relating Social Study to Social Reality," Social Studies in the United States, pp. 105-127.

⁴³Litt, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

vehicle for group struggle and change."⁴⁴ Except for the upper-class community then, the civics training given to youth falls short of equipping them to come to grips with the real world of politics. It may well be that social studies teachers function more as promulgators of societal myths than as critical examiners of the political process. Robert Cleary believes that, in so doing, teachers breed political cynicism among students--particularly among disadvantaged students.⁴⁵ Unless the realities of politics are presented with the lofty principle and democratic ideals to students, teachers are simply nudging them toward cynicism and apathetic withdrawal. Moreover, the majority of students have at least

. . . a nodding acquaintance with the truths of politics by the time they reach high school, and some are already developing a cynical attitude toward government. An attempt to persuade them that government is ever benevolent is merely likely to feed their cynicism and convince them that the teacher is part of the 'system.' . . .⁴⁶

And yet, according to Langton, social studies teachers may be in a relatively weak position as direct transmitter of political values and attitudes.⁴⁷ As has been noted, many, if not most social studies teachers avoid the discussion of controversial political topics in their classrooms while opting for safer and presumed less stimulating political

⁴⁴Litt, op. cit., p. 74.

⁴⁵Robert E. Cleary, "Are We Encouraging Political Cynicism in our Schools?" Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. 51 (1969/70), pp. 549-553.

⁴⁶Robert E. Cleary and Donald H. Riddle, "Political Science in the Social Studies," Political Science in the Social Studies, (Thirty-sixth Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies (Washington, D. C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1966), p. 5.

⁴⁷Langton, Political Socialization, p. 86.

topics in thier classrooms while opting for safer and presumedly less stimulating political subject matters. Conceivably, the most significant teachers in the high school political socialization system may be those who control role assignments which are important within the adolescent culture, for instance, physical education teachers or drivers' education teachers.⁴⁸ Thus, in the development of good citizens and in the transmission of positive political orientations among adolescents, social studies teachers' impact may be relatively insipid--a fact which the literature seems to support.⁴⁹

In sum, it is conventional wisdom that the ability of the school to socialize an individual depends on a mix of factors such as "the political culture of the school, the perceptions of the teacher, the political culture of the community and the ego strength of the school."⁵⁰ Among these factors, the salience of social studies teachers as specific agents within the school environment upon the development of political orientations among adolescents is nebulous. It is apparent that attempts to assess their actual impact have produced controversial conclusions. In fact, as has been noted by Dean Jaros, there is astonishingly little hard evidence available in earlier works to support the contention that the school--more precisely, the social studies teacher--really is an important agent of political socialization.⁵¹

⁴⁸See, for instance, David Ziblatt, "High School Extracurricular Activities and Political Socialization," The Annals, Vol.361 (September, 1965), pp. 20-31.

⁴⁹Langton, Political Socialization, p. 169.

⁵⁰Best, Public Opinion, p. 109.

⁵¹Jaros, Socialization to Politics, p. 98.

In part, this may be due to the fact that

there has been very little systematic investigation of the impact of such aspects of the total school milieu as . . . teachers . . . All [aspects] may contribute to the political socialization process but the contribution of each is unclear.⁵²

In order to remedy this deficiency and to gain deeper insights into the relative importance of certain aspects of the total school environment upon the development of political orientations among youth, this investigation is, in part, concerned with the relative impact of social studies teachers upon the incubation of feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians among adolescents.

The Peer Group.

As the child reaches and moves through adolescence, he interacts more and more with peers, first, in neighborhood situations, then, in school situations. Similar to the family and the school, the peer group becomes an increasingly important factor in the political socialization process of adolescents, "perhaps the ultimate modern agent of socialization."⁵³ In the broadest sense, "peer group is a normal group of youth who have attained about the same level of maturity who come together without coercion to form a comfortable base from which the adolescent can launch his explorations."⁵⁴ Due to the fact that adolescents are social animals, they need peers and their approval and respect. Eventually, as the child grows into adolescence, peers become

⁵²Langton, Political Socialization, p. 169.

⁵³Jaros, Socialization to Politics, p. 133.

⁵⁴Hilmar Wagner, "The Increasing Importance of the Peer Group During Adolescence," Adolescence, Vol. 6 (Spring, 1971), p. 53; see also Hershel D. Thornburg, "Peers: Three Distinct Groups," Adolescence, Vol. 6 (Spring, 1971), pp. 59-76.

equal in influence to, and in the socialization of some political orientations, possibly surpass the family and the school in shaping political attitudes. Indeed, the adolescent's interaction with the peer group often exceeds that with the family.⁵⁵ To be sure,

. . . parent and parental desires are of great importance to children in a long range sense, but it is their peers whose approval, admiration, and respect they attempt to win in their everyday activities, in school and out. As a result, the old 'levers' by which children are motivated--approval or disapproval of parents and teachers--are less efficient.⁵⁶

While some researchers maintain that the influence of peer groups as an agent of political socialization becomes particularly in adolescence, more important than the family,⁵⁷ others perceive them as possible alternative sources of influence, if family cohesiveness is weak⁵⁸ while others maintain that they may serve mainly to reinforce

⁵⁵The shift from a family to a peer orientation during adolescence is documented, for instance, by Charles E. Bowerman and John W. Kinch, "Changes in Family and Peer Orientation of Children Between the Fourth and Tenth Grades," Social Forces, Vol. 37 (1959), pp. 206-211; Meredith Munns, Jr., "The Values of Adolescents Compared with Parents and Peers," Adolescence, Vol. 7 (1972), pp. 519-524; and Wagner, op. cit., pp. 53-58.

⁵⁶James S. Coleman, The Adolescent Society (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 11.

⁵⁷Coleman, op. cit., p. 11; and William H. Sewell, "Some Recent Developments in Socialization Research and Theory," The Annals, Vol. 344 (September, 1963), p. 174, concluded that the research indicates that ". . . there seems to be no disagreement with the notion that the adolescent period is one in which some childhood habits and roles must be abandoned while new roles . . . must be learned or that . . . peer groups are the most important socialization agenc[y] at this time."

⁵⁸See Langton, Political Socialization, p. 123.

the values and attitudes learned in the familial milieu.⁵⁹ As we have noted, the relative importance of peer groups as vital political socializing factor is exceedingly puzzling.⁶⁰ Indeed, assessing the impact of peer groups upon the development of political orientations among adolescents from the literature is next to impossible.⁶¹ The available data suggest that, at least with certain political orientations, the adolescent is likely to be in closer correspondence to his friends than his parents. And, the acquisition of political values and attitudes influenced by the peer group have often been regarded as running counter to the values passed on by parents and educational authorities. For, "the subculture of the peer group not only provides a world of standards that is apart from that of adults, but it also provides one that is in opposition to that of adults."⁶²

⁵⁹See Thomas J. Cook and Frank P. Scioli, Jr., "Political Socialization Research in the United States: A Review," Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, eds. Dan D. Nimmo and Charles M. Bonjean (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), p. 169.

⁶⁰See Kurt Danziger, Socialization (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), p. 114.

⁶¹See, for instance, Langton, Political Socialization, pp. 120-139; Frederick Elkin and Gerald Handel, The Child and Society: The Process of Socialization (second edition; New York: Random House, Inc., 1972), pp. 123-131; Cook and Scioli, Jr., op. cit., pp. 168-170; Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization, pp. 127-142; Jaros, Socialization to Politics, pp. 124-135; Patrick, op. cit., pp. 45-46; Best, Public Opinion, pp. 110-114; Joan D. Campbell, "Peer Relations in Childhood," Review of Child Development Research, eds. Martin L. Hoffman and Lois W. Hoffman, Volume one (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 289-322; Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, pp. 71-92; and Suzanne K. Sebert, "Friend and Peer Influence on the Politics of the High School Senior" (paper delivered at the Sixty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1969, New York City)

⁶²Elkin and Handel, op. cit., p. 130; emphasis their.

On the whole, "the values of peer-group culture are much more likely to reinforce the values of the adult world than to oppose them."⁶³ In short, peer groups and the family most often complement rather than contradict one another in their respective impact upon the development of political attitudes among adolescents. From all appearance, then, peer groups can and do politically socialize adolescents. As indicated by the relative length of this part, and as conceded by Dean Jaros,

. . . not much research has been done on peer groups as political socializers, the little evidence that exists has a positive ring. Surely, greater attention will be given to peers as transmitters and creators of political norms . . .⁶⁴

Since the peer group structure is ostensibly an important component of an adolescent's political socialization experiences, this investigation attempts to discover the relative impact of peers as "transmitters" and developers of feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians among adolescents.

The Mass Media.

In this investigation, the media of mass communication comprise newspapers, radio and television.⁶⁵ As agents of political socialization, one is able to find very few studies in the literature other than those

⁶³Danziger, op. cit., p. 115.

⁶⁴Jaros, Socialization to Politics, p. 134.

⁶⁵Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 275-298; Wilbur Schramm (ed.), Mass Communication (Urbana, Illinois: Illinois University Press, 1949); Melvin L. DeFleur, Theories of Mass Communication (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1966); and Milton Dickens and Frederick Milliams, "Mass Communication," Review of Educational Research, Vol. 34 (1964), pp. 211-221 are useful for summarizing and directing the reader toward the major studies, hypotheses and theories on the mass media.

dealing with how much television the child watches.⁶⁶ However, the available mass communication research literature⁶⁷ does suggest that: (1) political scientists have largely ignored the mass media as possible agents of political socialization and (2) early researchers in the field of mass communication suspected a correlation between mass media and political socialization, but they did not provide the empirical evidence to support their conjecture. Joseph Klapper discusses this possibility as follows:

⁶⁶See, for instance, Eleanor E. Maccoby, "Television: Its Impact on School Children," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 15 (Fall, 1951), pp. 421-444; and Fred Greenstein, "Political Socialization," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, Vol. 14 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 554; for an extensive inventory of research dealing with effects of mass communication, see Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: Free Press, 1960).

⁶⁷See, for instance, Herbert Hyman, "Mass Media and Political Socialization: The Role and Patterns of Communication," Communication and Political Development, ed. Lucian Pye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 128-148; Elkin and Handel, op. cit., pp. 131-140; Patrick, op. cit., pp. 46-48; Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization, pp. 194-200; Cook and Scioli, Jr., op. cit., pp. 172-173; Danziger, op. cit., pp. 118-121; Best, Public Opinion, pp. 114-126; Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, pp. 118-136; George Gerbner, "Mass Communication and the Citizenship of Secondary School Youth," The Adolescent Citizen, eds. Franklin Patterson, et al. (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 179-205; Steven H. Chaffee, L. Scott Ward and Leonard P. Tipton, "Mass Communication and Political Socialization," Journalism Quarterly, n.v. (Winter, 1970), pp. 647-659, 666; Walter M. Gerson, "Mass Media Socialization Behavior: Negro-White Differences," Social Forces, Vol. 45 (1966-67), pp. 40-50; and Jack McLeod, Scott Ward and Karen Tangill, "Alienation and Uses of the Mass Media," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 29 (1965-66), pp. 583-594.

. . . we have alluded, for example, to the probable but unmapped interplay between the mass media and cultural values. To look more closely into one aspect of this matter, one might postulate that the media play a particularly important role in the socialization and acculturation of children. . . . To what degree do the media structure, even for younger children, the society and the culture which they are entering? The influence of the media in these respects is no doubt modified by the influence of the family, of the school, and of the peer group. . . .⁶⁸

Dawson and Prewitt elaborate on the significance of mass media as an agent of political socialization in this way:

Newspapers, radio, television. . . transmit many types of messages which affect political orientations. Both day-to-day information about political events and evaluations of these events are transmitted from government to citizen, from group to group, from group to individual, from elite to nonelite, through the communication media. As a result of technological advancements in the communication media and the weakening of traditional social structures like the extended family and the local community, the mass media are becoming increasingly important as shapers of political orientations.⁶⁹

Although not a personal agent of socialization as are the family, teachers and peers, the mass media are agents of political socialization and, thus, may have an impact on the development of political attitudes among adolescents. Here, four observations provided by Dawson and Prewitt are of relevance in the evaluation of mass media as a political socialization agency. These are,

⁶⁸Klapper, op. cit., p. 255.

⁶⁹Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization, p. 194.

first, more often than not the media are transmitters of political cues which are originated by other agencies. Second, the information carried by mass media goes through a two-step flow. Third, the media tend to reinforce existing political orientations rather than create new ones. Fourth, the messages of the mass media are received and interpreted in a social setting, and in the context of socially conditioned predispositions.⁷⁰

The impression gathered from a survey of the impact of the mass media is that they are highly important in the provision of political information and in the creation of a general set of attitudes toward politics and politicians, but they probably have a greater reinforcing than a converting effect. Jennings and Niemi attempted to relate adolescents' media use for political news to political socialization.⁷¹ Utilizing a national sample of high school seniors and their parents, they found that 83% of the high school seniors and 87% of their parents reported following public affairs at least "some" of the time. They concluded:

. . . by the end of elementary school most children have made at least intermittent or occasional use of the mass media. . . . regular usage becomes more widespread during the high-school years, because of class assignments if for no other reason. The process continues after high school, so that regular media usage continues to climb well into the adult years.⁷²

Much of the same claim has been made by Sandra Kenyon. In her sample of grade eight, ten and twelve students, she found that media usage did

⁷⁰Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., p. 197.

⁷¹M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Patterns of Political Learning," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 38 (1968), pp. 450-452.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 451-452.

increase somewhat with grade.⁷³ In reference to the effect of exposure to political news in the media and political cynicism, Kenyon found no significant relationship between exposure to political news media in the sample overall, or when controlled for grade.⁷⁴ However, she discovered that there was "the barest suggestion that those low or high in cynicism may pay greater attention to political news than those who are neutral."⁷⁵

In a study conducted in five Wisconsin cities consisting of 1,291 respondents equally divided between junior and senior high school students, Steven Chaffee and others inferred that, "for the young junior high students, any use of the mass media tends to expose them to sources of increased political knowledge."⁷⁶ They concluded that,

in all, our data point to the inference that mass communication plays a role in political socialization insofar as political knowledge is concerned, but its influence does not extend to overt behavior such as campaigning activities.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, they reported that their most surprising finding was the extent to which their adolescent respondent felt their political opinions to be based on mass media reports. In fact, they rated "the mass media as more influential than parents, teachers or peers" upon their political opinion-formation.⁷⁸

⁷³Kenyon, op. cit., p. 192.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 192-193.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 192.

⁷⁶Chaffee, Ward and Tipton, op. cit., p. 655; emphasis their.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 658.

⁷⁸Chaffee, Ward and Tipton, op. cit., p. 659.

Likewise, in a recent investigation of fifth- through twelfth-grade students from a "typical" Appalachian poverty area, Herbert Hirsch ascertained that

radio, television, and newspapers are the three top ranked agents of information transmission, and these high rankings are not affected by the respondent's age or by the status of the intrafamilial relationships in his primary environment.⁷⁹

As previously remarked, there can be little doubt that the mass media, regardless of other variables, are the foremost agents of political information transmission for adolescents. Of more relevance to our investigation, however, Hirsch found that exposure to radio does relate to cynicism while exposure to television has no significant relationship, and greater exposure to newspaper leads to lower cynicism. Hirsch's data indicated, overall, that "increasing exposure to media is negatively related to cynicism. . . . Greater exposure leads to lower cynicism."⁸⁰

As has been noted from the foregoing discussion, evidently, the mass media do not generally change already existing political values and political attitudes, rather they may serve to reinforce already existing political orientations.⁸¹ Further, ". . . the mass communication research literature suggests that purposive use of media for public affairs and/or political information is virtually nonexistent until late in the high school years."⁸² Finally, the notable lack of research

⁷⁹Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, p. 135.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 150.

⁸¹See Gerson, op. cit., pp. 40-50.

⁸²Chaffee, Ward and Tipton, op. cit., p. 650.

investigating the impact of the mass media upon the development of political cynicism coupled with the apparent scholarly controversy found in the literature with regard to the proposition that rate of exposure to mass media make some difference in the attitudinal dimension of political cynicism stress the necessity to examine further the suspected relation between mass media and political cynicism. Indeed, these point out the need to consider in this investigation the degree of the mass media's influence upon the shaping of feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians among adolescents.

In summary, we are presently concerned with four socializing agents--the family, the school, the primary peer group and the mass media--as influencers in the formation of political cynicism among adolescents. The theoretical elucidation of the political role of these four classes of socialization agents is mixed, and the empirical data available are not very revealing. Intuitively, most students of political socialization agree, with little or no data to back them up, that all the above agents may have some impact upon the development of feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians among adolescents.

Our investigation, however, considers these agents in a dynamic not static context. That is, as time passes, continuing alterations are occurring within the network of these political socialization agents and the balance of influence on the development of political cynicism during the adolescent years among these agents may change. Normally, as an individual matures, both his social and political environments expand. Initially, the family constitutes an adolescent's social milieu, but, as he grows older, new political socialization agents enter his

political and social worlds and interact with the family. At the same time, adolescents themselves possess characteristics such as sex, socio-economic level, which may condition or modify the degree to which the above mentioned agents of political socialization can influence the development of political cynicism among adolescents. In short, no two adolescents learn about politics in the same way. Each is influenced by a multitude of factors that shape and reshape his values, attitudes and behaviors toward the political system. Some adolescents form strong positive attachments toward the government and the governmental authorities. Others do not and become distrustful and cynical. A variety of factors other than the influences of the family, the school, the peers and the mass media could cause these differences. Some of these factors are psychological while others are sociological in their origins. It is to the role of these intervening variables that we now turn our attention in our review of related literature.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The body of literature dealing explicitly and empirically with the development of political cynicism among adolescents is not large. Articles by Langton and Jennings,⁸³ and Jennings and Niemi⁸⁴ only touched on the subject; they compared black and white high school students and children on measures of political cynicism in articles

⁸³Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (September, 1968), pp. 852-867.

⁸⁴Jennings and Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," pp. 169-184; and Jennings and Niemi, "Patterns of Political Learning," pp. 443-467.

concerned primarily with other purposes. The young people in both studies did hold some negative orientations toward politicians and the government. Only in the past three of four years have there been studies of political cynicism which are of relevance to this investigation.

There exists an important body of research which show that a rapid increase in feelings of political cynicism occurs during the adolescent development stage. This has been found to take place, for instance, in three New England communities. Using the technique of survey research, Caroline Freeman attempted to delineate the origin of political cynicism among 3,500 student-respondents in the upper six grades of public schools. She found that, in each sample from the three communities, more than twenty percent of the students fell into the category of high cynicism, more than fifty percent in the medium cynicism category and only about twenty percent were categorized in the low cynic group.⁸⁵ Freeman reported that younger adolescents, those who just entered this developmental stage, manifested a lesser amount of cynicism toward politicians than older adolescents, those approaching adulthood.⁸⁶ She concluded "that distrust of politicians does develop--that is, increase--during the junior high and high school years"⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Caroline Smith Freeman, "The Origins of Political Cynicism: A Study of the Development of Political Orientations in Adolescents" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966), pp. 57-58.

⁸⁶ Freeman, op. cit., pp. 60-61

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 60.

and that "there would seem to be at least as much distrust of politicians among adolescents as among adults."⁸⁸ To a lesser degree, Suzanne Sebert's study of 2,080 senior high school students is supportive of the above finding. She discovered that students of high school age showed a substantially lesser degree of political cynicism than did their parents.⁸⁹ Similar findings are also exposed in Jerald Bachman's longitudinal study of a national sample of tenth-grade boys in United States public high school.⁹⁰

Schley Lyons' study of 2,868 fifth- through twelfth-grade students attending classes in the Toledo School System, 1968, is also directly related to the development of political cynicism in adolescents. He divided his student population into "inner-city" and "noninner-city" groupings.⁹¹ The major point established in Lyons' investigation was that "greater feelings of cynicism grew with increased age."⁹² According to Lyons, "students in both subsamples experienced a similar 'de-idealization' of politics and politicians with increased age."⁹³

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 59.

⁸⁹Sebert, op. cit., pp. 10 and 13.

⁹⁰Jerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Vol. II, The Impact of Family Background and Intelligence on Tenth-Grade Boys (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), pp. 150-151.

⁹¹Schley R. Lyons, "The Political Socialization of Ghetto Children: Efficacy and Cynicism," Journal of Politics, Vol. 32 (May, 1970), p. 292.

⁹²Lyons, op. cit., p. 294.

⁹³Ibid.

Sandra Kenyon's research exhibits similar results,⁹⁴ as does both the works of Hirsch⁹⁵ and Jaros and others⁹⁶ and, to a lesser degree, this has been reconfirmed by the study of Robert Weissberg.⁹⁷ To sum up, it appears that the growth in political cynicism typically begins more or less with the onset of adolescence. Thus, the adolescent years are the obvious choice for studying the origin and development of political cynicism.

Feelings of political cynicism have been the focal point of a number of other studies in both political science and sociology, although few of them dealt specifically with the development of feelings of cynicism among adolescents. Nevertheless, some resume of the important literature on this topic is called for.

The more general notion of personal cynicism might be considered as a parent disposition for such specifically political attitude. Here a noteworthy set of articles emanated from a study by Charles Neidt and Martin Fritz. During the development of a battery of questions tapping personal cynicism, Neidt and Fritz investigated the relationship between cynicism and certain student characteristics. Copies of the test were distributed at random intervals to 400 students enrolled in

⁹⁴Kenyon, op. cit., p. 53; and Sandra Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism Among Negro and White Adolescents" (paper delivered at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1969, New York City), p. 5.

⁹⁵Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, pp. 146-147.

⁹⁶Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron, Jr., op. cit., pp. 169-170.

⁹⁷Robert Weissberg, "Adolescents' Perceptions of Political Authorities: Another Look at Political Virtue and Power," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 16 (February, 1972), pp. 147-168.

psychology courses at Iowa State College during the years 1944 and 1945. Along with the testing instrument, students were asked to complete a short questionnaire attached to the test concerning their sex, religious preference, marital status, political preference, educational class level and father's occupation. Three hundred and eighty-seven students completed both instruments. Neidt and Fritz concluded that there was a highly significant difference between male and female students in their feelings of personal cynicism. In all classifications, males were reported to be more cynical than females. Significant relationships were also reported between feelings of personal cynicism and age, religious preference, and marital status. In general, older students were found to be more cynical than younger students.⁹⁸ Students expressing no religious preference obtained higher scores on the test of cynicism than catholic subjects, with protestants occupying an intermediate position between these two groups.⁹⁹ Married students were distinctly more cynical than others, and engaged students were the least cynical of all marital status groups. Neidt and Fritz also found that students classified by (1) political preferences (Democrat, Republican, or no preference), (2) educational levels (Freshman,

⁹⁸ Rotter disputes this finding by reporting that youngest children were found to be less trusting than only, oldest or middle children. Julian B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Interpersonal Trust," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 26 (May, 1970), p. 446; yet, in an analysis of overall trust scores for 4,605 introductory psychology students over a 6-year period, it was concluded that there was a significant decrease in interpersonal trust among college students. Dorothy J. Hochreich and Julian B. Rotter, "Have College Students Become Less Trusting?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 15 (1970), pp. 211-214.

⁹⁹ Rotter reported similar findings, *op. cit.*, p. 446; and Bachman's data are consistent with this finding, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

Sophomore, Junior and Senior), and (3) father's occupation (farmer versus nonfarmer)¹⁰⁰ in each case failed to reveal any significant difference in terms of their degree of cynicism.¹⁰¹

In a paper based on the above investigation, Fritz suggested that cynicism and idealism tended to co-exist in the same individuals. He pointed out that every one of the three hundred and eighty-seven subjects studied made at least some strongly cynical responses even though the tendency to give a greater number of highly idealistic answers was more pronounced.¹⁰²

Personal cynicism, also referred to in the literature as misanthropy or the lack of faith in people, has been found to be correlated with political cynicism by several authors. Robert Agger, Marshall Goldstein and Stanley Pearl found a direct relationship between political and personal cynicism among adult respondents in Oregon.¹⁰³ Too, Morris Rosenberg provided data supporting this

¹⁰⁰Rotter reveals that, at the University of Connecticut, socioeconomic level of parents show a small but consistent decrease in trust with decreasing socioeconomic levels, op. cit., p. 446.

¹⁰¹Charles O. Neidt, and Martin F. Fritz, "Relation of Cynicism to Certain Student Characteristics," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 10, (Winter, 1950), pp. 712-717; and Charles O. Neidt, "Relation of Cynicism to Certain Other Variables," Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 53, (1946), pp. 277-283.

¹⁰²Martin F. Fritz, "Co-Variation of Cynicism and Idealism," Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 54, (1947), pp. 231-234.

¹⁰³Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (August, 1961), p. 490.

relationship.¹⁰⁴ Edgar Litt found this relationship to hold among the best educated in a Boston suburb, but not among those with little education and not in Boston proper.¹⁰⁵ And Aberbach and Walker reported a positive but somewhat weaker relationship.¹⁰⁶ Finally, in two studies of adolescent respondents, both Caroline Freeman¹⁰⁷ and Sandra Kenyon¹⁰⁸ reconfirmed that personal cynicism is related to political cynicism. However, in his study of 2,213 tenth-grade students, Jerald Bachman discovered only a modest correlation ($R=.18$) between his "trust in people" scale and "trust in government" scale.¹⁰⁹ The rationale offered in the literature about the above mentioned relationship is that political cynicism is simply a specific manifestation of generalized suspicion and distrust of all people.

Bachman presented suggestive data that tenth-grade boys have somewhat less trust in people than do adults. Bachman acknowledged, however, that the difference found between his sample of tenth-grade boys and two national samples of adults could be due

¹⁰⁴Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, Vol. 21 (1956), p. 691.

¹⁰⁵Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (1963), pp. 320-322.

¹⁰⁶Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," pp. 1204-1205.

¹⁰⁷Freeman, op. cit., p. 162.

¹⁰⁸Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization," pp. 74-76.

¹⁰⁹Bachman, op. cit., p. 151.

entirely to the fact our respondents used questionnaires while the adults responded to interview questions; it may be harder to tell an interviewer that you don't trust people than to check such statements on a questionnaire. It is possible, however, that the differences are real, and reflect the norms of present adolescent society.¹¹⁰

Several more studies have investigated the relationship between feelings of cynicism about politics and politicians and participation in political processes.¹¹¹ In 1959, Agger, Goldstein and Pearl explored some of the causes and consequences of political cynicism in the body politic of a small Oregon metropolis. Agger and his colleagues encountered a correlation between personal cynicism and political cynicism. After they had analyzed the interrelationship of personal to political cynicism within each educational classification, they concluded that "in every case as personal cynicism increases, political cynicism increases."¹¹² They suggested that the relationship of personal to political cynicism perhaps could be explained partly by differences in educational level, nonetheless, a major portion of the connection was independent of this variable.¹¹³ Agger and his colleagues also found that political cynicism was related to at least one indicator of the level of political participation undertaken by the respondents. They discovered that the politically trusting reported generally a higher level of political discussion than did the politically cynical.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰Bachman, op. cit., p. 150.

¹¹¹See, also, sources cited above under "Behavioral Significance."

¹¹²Agger, Goldstein, and Pearl, op. cit., p. 490.

¹¹³Agger, Goldstein, and Pearl, op. cit., pp. 490-491

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 494-495.

The above study led Edgar Litt to investigate further the link between cynicism about politics and participation in political processes.¹¹⁵ A random sample of registered voters, selected from one, middle class political ward of Boston, was studied. The anticipated negative relationship between feelings of political cynicism and political participation was confirmed by the data amassed.¹¹⁶

In a study of local politics in four communities located in two different regions of the United States, Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert Swanson found no relationship between feelings of political cynicism and participation in politics. A political participation index revealed that, at all educational levels, the politically cynical were more apt to participate in local politics than were the politically trusting, although, among the highly educated, the difference was small. Their formulated hypothesis that decreasing participation in local community politics results from increased political cynicism on the part of the citizen was not supported in their data.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵Personal correspondence from Professor Edgar Litt to this investigator.

¹¹⁶Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," pp. 314-315; see, also, John Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious Hypothesis and Political Participation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 32 (1970), pp. 446; and Brett W. Hawkins, Vincent L. Marando and George A. Taylor, "Efficacy, Mistrust, and Political Participation: Findings from Additional Data and Indicators," Journal of Politics, Vol. 33 (1971), pp. 1130-1136.

¹¹⁷Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and The Ruled (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 627-631; see, also, Louis A. Zurcher, Jr. and J. Kenneth Monts, "Political Efficacy, Political Trust, and Anti-Pornography Crusading: A Research Note," Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 56 (1971-72), pp. 211-220.

Edward McDill and Jeanne Ridley attempted to isolate certain socio-psychological factors which account for variation in voting behavior. Their analysis was restricted to data obtained from 268 suburban residents in Tennessee who were eligible to vote in a local referendum election. Citing "a general distrust of political leaders"¹¹⁸ as part of alienation, they discovered that "politically alienated" respondents were less likely to have voted on the referendum.¹¹⁹ From this finding, they concluded that "political alienation" was significantly related to voting behavior.¹²⁰ Their conclusion is supported

¹¹⁸McDill and Ridley, "Status, Political Alienation, and Political Participation," p. 206.

¹¹⁹Since several scholars have conceptualized political cynicism as an integral part of political alienation, intuitively, reported findings involving alienation is deemed to be of some relevance to this investigation. Furthermore, feelings of political alienation has been found to be associated with feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians. But, perhaps, the point to be made here is that it is not necessary to be alienated in order to feel cynical; one can be cynical and withdrawn from the polity, or cynical and still feel engaged, still identify with the polity. For discussions of cynicism as one form of alienation, see, for instance, Joel D. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (March, 1969), p. 87; Horton and Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism," p. 489; Lane, Political Ideology, p. 162; Ada W. Finifer, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (June, 1970), p. 3901 and Freeman, op. cit., pp. 1-19.

¹²⁰McDill and Ridley, op. cit., pp. 209-213.

in the findings of other investigators.¹²¹ Each of these particular investigations ascertained that persons who felt "alienated" from politics were much less inclined to participate in political processes, or, conversely, that the "non-alienated" were generally the highest participators in politics.

In addition, among adolescents, political cynicism tends to be associated with lack of interest in politics and lower levels of political participation. In her investigation, Caroline Freeman ascertains that students who were high in political cynicism were more likely to show absence of party identification and the higher the cynicism, the lower the attraction of politics for the adolescent respondent.¹²² Likewise, Frederic Frey noted that students who were high in political cynicism were slightly less likely to have worn campaign buttons, met politicians, visited party headquarters, and expressed the intention of voting

¹²¹For example, see Angus Campbell, "The Passive Citizen," Acta Sociologica, Vol. 26, (fasc. 1-2, 1962), pp. 13-15; Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation and Political Apathy," Social Forces, Vol. 38, (March, 1960), pp. 188-189; William Erbe, "Social Involvement and Political Activity: A Replication and Elaboration," American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, (April, 1964), pp. 206-207; Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), pp. 66-69; Wayne E. Thompson, and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," Social Forces, Vol. 38, (March, 1960), pp. 192-195; Horton, and Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," pp. 490-493; Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, (December, 1956), pp. 694-695; Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 18, (Winter, 1954-1955), pp. 350-351; and Allen Schick, "Massachusetts Politics: Political Reform and 'Alienation'," (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University, 1963), pp. 29-30. (Mimeographed.)

¹²²Freeman, op. cit., p. 74.

regularly.¹²³ In short, adolescent cynics were found more likely to downgrade the importance of political participation. However, Sandra Kenyon fails to locate the occurrence of a relationship between political cynicism and political participation. She discloses that, among her student respondents,

there are not even any faint traces of such a relationship except in the twelfth grade, and there it is very weak. In the earlier grades, those with higher cynicism scores are more likely to participate. Thus, while the level of participation remains constant over grade, the direction of its relationship with political cynicism may even reverse.¹²⁴

To conclude, previous research in the case of political involvement in the part of adolescents and political cynicism displays contradictory results. Quantitatively, the weight of the evidence probably tips toward the argument that cynical adolescents are less politically active than their non-cynical counterparts.

Some studies disclosed that older persons tend to feel more cynical about politics and politicians than younger persons. In their Oregon study, Agger and his colleagues concluded that aging tended to produce more political cynics. Elderly persons tended also to display feelings of personal cynicism more often than younger people. Although the correlation was not perfect, it remained even with education controlled.¹²⁵ This suggested that the correlation was not merely a by-product of the trend for younger adults to have obtained more formal

¹²³Frederick W. Frey, "Political Cynicism Among Suburban Youth," reported in Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization," p. 9.

¹²⁴Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization," pp. 199-200; emphasis her.

¹²⁵Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, op. cit., pp. 488-489.

education than their elders. However, Thompson and Horton learned that individuals who were young--roughly twenty-one to thirty years of age--were as apt to be "politically alienated" as those who were elderly. The least degree of "political alienation" occurred among the "mature adults."¹²⁶ Likewise, in a study of two hundred and sixty-three secondary social studies teachers carried out in Alberta, it was found that younger teachers, those up to twenty-nine years of age, were more politically and personally cynical than elder teachers, those over forty-five years of age.¹²⁷

Some of these studies have also dealt with the matter of environmental influences on how and to what extent political cynicism is developed as a personality trait. In their Oregon study, Agger and his colleagues discovered that persons of higher socio-economic status (SES),¹²⁸ especially those with higher education, were least inclined to develop cynical attitudes towards politics. They concluded that a significant correlation existed between levels of income and development of feelings of political cynicism--the higher the income level, the lower the proportion of political cynics. The data also revealed that, within every income classification, the higher the level of education,

¹²⁶Thompson and Horton, op. cit., p. 192.

¹²⁷Grondin, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

¹²⁸For a review of related works dealing with the socialization process within the context of the social stratification system of the United States, see Alan C. Kerckhoff, Socialization and Social Class (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); and Edward Zigler, "Social Class and the Socialization Process," Review of Educational Research, Vol. 40 (1970), pp. 87-110.

the higher the proportion of politically trusting individuals.¹²⁹

The Thompson and Horton data, gathered in similar studies of two upstate New York communities, in the same manner showed that "politically alienated" persons were largely recruited from people of lower socio-economic status, whether indexed by occupation or educational attainment. In both of their community studies, they concluded that "political alienation" and low socio-economic position correlated significantly with each other.¹³⁰

Other studies have disputed these conclusions. In an analysis conducted at the University of Michigan, Angus Campbell attempted to learn something about the personality traits of political involvement. He discovered no correlation between feelings of cynicism and either education or socio-economic status. He concluded that apparently the origins of political cynicism rely "on something other than simple socio-economic status" and education.¹³¹ Similarly, in his Boston ward study, Litt noted that educational level was unrelated to the degree of political cynicism exhibited by voters.¹³² Too, in their Detroit study, Aberbach and Walker suggested that no relationship existed between political cynicism and education, occupation and income levels among either white or black respondents.¹³³ And,

¹²⁹Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, op. cit., pp. 487-488.

¹³⁰Thompson and Horton, op. cit., p. 193; and Horton and Thompson, op. cit., pp. 491-493.

¹³¹Campbell, op. cit., pp. 12-14.

¹³²Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," p. 319.

¹³³Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," p. 1205.

Herbert McClosky failed to find a connection between social class and political cynicism in his study of political influentials and the general electorate.¹³⁴

In the United States, Harmon Zeigler conducted a highly comprehensive study of The Political Life of American Teachers.¹³⁵ A matter of some interest to Zeigler was the extent to which a selected group of teachers held politicians and politics in disrepute; that is, the extent to which these terms symbolize something negative rather than something positive. Zeigler's study was based upon interviews with 803 high school teachers living in Oregon. These interviews were conducted by professional interviewers from January to March 1965. He concluded that a relationship was prevalent between social status mobility and feelings of political cynicism. Regardless of the length of teaching experience, Zeigler discovered that downwardly-mobile male teachers were more politically cynical than other male teachers and that upwardly-mobile female teachers were the most politically cynical of all the female teachers involved in the study. He argued that, for both male and female teachers, uncertainties of mobility were translated into cynicism.¹³⁶

We have seen that the literature on the association between social class and political cynicism among adults contains inconsistent findings. So too does the literature on adolescent. The tendency of

¹³⁴ Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 58 (June, 1964), pp. 368-372.

¹³⁵ Harmon Zeigler, The Political Life of American Teachers (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 6, 31-57.

lower status students to be more cynical than middle and upper status students has been reported in various studies. Utilizing father's education as an indicator of adolescents' social class, Freeman did find a consistent tendency for high school students of lower status to be more politically cynical. This relationship was discovered to exist in all three communities investigated.¹³⁷ Jaros and his two associates observed in their study of children's orientations to politics in a poor, rural, and isolated Appalachian county where all respondents were of lower social class that there was a substantial amount of cynicism exhibited even among younger respondents.¹³⁸ Similar findings were noted by Hirsch in his study.¹³⁹ And in Panama, among secondary school students, Donald Goldrich and Edward Scott discovered that upper status respondents were more likely to regard politics as honest and helping the country than were middle and lower status students.¹⁴⁰ However, when a comparison was made between fourth, eighth and eleventh graders, positive attitudes toward government were found to increase with age for the upper status group and to decrease for the middle and lower status groups.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷Freeman, op. cit., p. 62.

¹³⁸Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader," pp. 567-570.

¹³⁹Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, pp. 147-149.

¹⁴⁰Daniel Goldrich and Edward W. Scott, "Developing Political Orientations of Panamanian Students," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (1961), pp. 96-97.

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 97.

By contrast, in her study of one junior and one senior high school in Brooklyn, New York, Sandra Kenyon reported no relationship between social class and political cynicism in the overall sample, no matter what measure was utilized to determine class of respondents.¹⁴² Nonetheless, she acknowledged that the measurement of social class presented some problems, simply, because school authorities would not permit a question on father's occupation in her questionnaire.¹⁴³ So, from census data observations of the school's neighborhood areas, she developed a questionable indicator of social class.¹⁴⁴ Further, studies conducted in other cultures than the United States have reported similar findings. For instance, in Jamaica, faint traces of this relationship were observed by Langton when he found that working class children were more likely than middle or upper class children to rate politics and government "honest," but no class differences were reported in rating politics "dishonest."¹⁴⁵

There is, then, no clear and consistent pattern in the literature regarding social class and political cynicism. The inconclusive findings of the above research suggest a need for further studies which strive to overcome deficiencies and limitations in relation to sample size, instrumentation, method of analysis, and control of relevant variables

¹⁴²Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization," p. 122.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 120-121.

¹⁴⁵Kenneth Langton, "Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61 (September, 1967), pp. 753-754.

which may have confounded the relationship between both socio-economic status and educational level and feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians.

Of late, various researches have attempted to determine whether or not a relationship exists between sex and political cynicism. For example, in his study of a selected group of urban secondary social studies teachers, Grondin noted that male teachers consistently scored higher than female teachers on scales that assessed respondents' degree of political cynicism. On the base of the evidence provided by the data, the investigator concluded that urban male secondary social studies teachers were more likely than urban female secondary social studies teachers to have feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians.¹⁴⁶ In two studies of adolescents, similar findings were reported. Freeman discovered that female respondents tended to manifest less feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians than male respondents,¹⁴⁷ and traces of this relationship were indicated in Hirsch's study of Appalachian youth.¹⁴⁸

Contradictory findings, however, have been reported in other studies of adolescents. To illustrate, there was no relationship observed between sex and political cynicism in Kenyon's data on junior and senior high school students in Brooklyn, New York. "The data . . . do not support the hypothesis that girls will be less politically

¹⁴⁶Grondin, op. cit., pp. 86-87, 128.

¹⁴⁷Freeman, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁴⁸Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization, p. 148.

cynical than boys. In the sample overall, there is no association at all."¹⁴⁹ Controlling for grade of student, Kenyon found, at the same time, that there was tendency for girls to be less cynical than boys among the youngest group. This relationship ($\gamma = -.244$) was considered not to be statistically significant. This correlation tended to evaporate in the oldest group.¹⁵⁰ In like manner, Lyons' investigation of political cynicism in Toledo reported no significant difference between boys and girls in either his white or negro subsamples with regard to political cynicism.¹⁵¹ There is, thus, no distinct and congruent impression in the literature regarding sex and political cynicism. That the literature is inconsistent appears even more obviously in the rather scanty works on sex and political cynicism than with respect to social status.

In the same study mentioned above, Litt also appraises the effects of the political milieu upon feelings of political cynicism. His data showed that "exposure to Boston politics increased political cynicism."¹⁵² Litt suggested that political cynicism may well be acquired as "a community norm, a part of the political acculturation process in the city's daily routine."¹⁵³ It is interesting to note that in Murray Levin's study of political cynicism, again conducted in Boston, one of the most significant findings was that feelings of

¹⁴⁹Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization," p. 107.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 107-108.

¹⁵¹Lyons, op. cit., p. 301.

¹⁵²Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," p. 316.

¹⁵³Litt, op. cit., p. 319.

cynicism about politics and politicians were strongest among those who have been residing the longest in that city.¹⁵⁴

This type of cultural influence need not be confined to small regions within a particular country. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba conducted an analytical study of the political cultures in five nations: the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico. One major concern of this study dealt with feelings of political cynicism. These authors found significant differences in the percentage of citizens in each of these five nations who gave evidence of feelings of "political alienation." The relevant percentages were: United States, 7 per cent; Germany, 13 per cent; Great Britain, 14 per cent; Mexico, 35 per cent; and Italy, 38 per cent. Almond and Verba also found that the more highly "alienated" citizens knew less factual information about politics in their own political environment.¹⁵⁵ This finding seems to indicate that political cynicism may have an important influence on the learning of informative materials relevant to politics. In fact, we might note that the degree to which feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians are allowed to develop among adolescents may well be a significant inhibitor of satisfactory learning of, and development of, such positive socio-civic orientations as political efficacy and citizen duty.

¹⁵⁴Levin, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁵⁵Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 45-62.

IV. SUMMARY

This review of literature may be summarized in the following manner.

1. Generally, the studies involved in this review show that sources of political cynicism included early and late socialization experiences as well as post-socialization experiences as an adult. Both political and non-political occurrences, whether intended or unintended to have an effect on feelings of political cynicism by others, are included. Clearly, the development of basic political attitudes such as political cynicism can be affected by numerous experiences which can come at a variety of times. The political attitude of cynicism may be so formed by exposure to political attitudes of other individuals whether the attitude formation is intentional or unintentional. On the whole, previous researches have been unambiguous in demonstrating that a rapid increase in feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians occurs during the adolescent years, and that this growth in cynicism typically begins more or less with the onset of adolescence.

2. The consensus among numerous studies is that individuals who felt politically trusting appear to participate in political processes to a greater range and degree than those who felt cynical toward politics and politicians.

3. Most of the investigations, that examined causes and consequences of political cynicism mentioned in the above review, concluded that persons of higher socio-economic status, especially of higher educational level, tended to score low on scales measuring

political cynicism. In this connection, we should also note that a number of studies did suggest that no relationship exists between social class and feelings of political cynicism.

4. Several surveys have reported significant positive correlations between sex, age, culture and regional areas of respondents and feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians. However, with regard to sex, several studies of adolescents have reported a lack of differences between male and female respondents in feelings of political cynicism.

5. Various studies conducted in the United States showed that white persons and city dwellers were less apt to develop feelings of political cynicism. Southerners appeared to be more cynical about political processes than inhabitants of the other major regions of the United States. The available evidence suggests that the environment in which a person is raised may have some significant impact on the development of political cynicism among individuals.

6. Generally speaking, studies in the above review demonstrate substantially that feelings of political cynicism related to many of the same demographic and social-position variables which have been found to influence other political attitudes, values and behaviors, and, thus, may be expected to affect the development of feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians among adolescents. Thus, feelings of political cynicism have been related to a wide variety of socio- and psychopolitical orientations and factors in the past; and even a superficial review of works in other disciplines suggests many additional, related variables. Of course, every study cannot use every known predictor

(this study does not propose to do so) and one must constantly guard against adding variables to explanatory networks which may correlate with feelings of political cynicism among adolescents.

CHAPTER IV

INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE INVESTIGATION

After reviewing previous research and the available techniques, this investigation was designed as a survey-type study of a quasi-experimental¹ nature as it appeared to be the most suited to the immediate objectives. Little emphasis was placed on the development of new techniques for analysis and collection of data because a large collection of relevant literature has arisen which made it possible to borrow most of the instruments and procedures rather than to produce them from "scratch." A second factor influencing this decision was that the creation of such techniques would constitute a major undertaking, warranting separate and distinct projects. Of course, minor adaptations were necessary and will be noted where they occur.

The major tool employed to gain insight into the developmental process of political cynicism among our sample of Alberta high school students was a questionnaire constructed in two parts.² An attitudinal inventory comprises the first part of the questionnaire. Besides

¹For discussions about the "static-group comparison" and the "equivalent time-sample design," see Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 12-13 and 43-46; and Fred E. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioural Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), pp. 359-373.

²The entire questionnaire is included in Appendix A, p. 336.

political and personal cynicism items, the inventory contains political alienation, anomie, political efficacy and citizen duty scale items, which were included to provide technical assistance and as background for future research. Part Two of the questionnaire consists of a socio-political information inventory which allows the categorization of adolescent respondents in terms of age-grade groups. Also included in the information inventory were items designed to yield both information necessary to assess the relative contribution of each of the four selected agents of political socialization upon the development of political cynicism among adolescents and data pertinent to certain relevant background characteristics of these adolescents. Both the battery of political and personal attitude scales and the socio-political information inventory were to be answered by a selected group of urban and rural adolescents.

To allow respondents maximum freedom in answering these items, booklets containing both parts, or instruments, were distributed to students available to the investigator for survey through their classroom teachers. The anonymity of individuals answering the battery of political and personal attitude scales and the socio-political information inventory was a concern. This matter is particularly important in a study of this nature, involving personal attitudes about politics and political processes. Accordingly, the anonymity of all participating students was assured. After completion by the respondents, unsigned instruments were returned directly to the investigator, who was in the participating schools to instruct and to assist in the administration of questionnaires. Thereafter, responses received were tabulated by the investigator and data studied and analyzed. The results appear

in the following two chapters.

Budgetary restriction curtailed the study design in several instances, but only a cursory glance at social science research suggests this was to be expected. Problems that arose as a consequence of imposed limitations have already been noted in a previous section.³ Though the restrictions were bothersome, when the research was viewed as part of a systematic process of investigation the limitations became of much less consequence.

The present chapter contains a detailed description of both instruments used in the study, the design of a special battery of political attitude scales, the nature of the sample analysed, and the statistical procedures followed in processing the data.

I. INSTRUMENTS OF THE STUDY

Battery of Political Attitude Scales

To answer the first and second questions in the "Statement of the Problem"⁴ section, an operational definition of political cynicism, empirically based and objectively measured, is required. Attached to the socio-political information inventory, respondents were asked to fill out a fifty-three-item attitudinal inventory, all items of which were in an "agree-disagree" format. Measures of political cynicism and personal cynicism are based on fifteen and ten of these statements respectively. In addition, measures of political alienation, anomie, sense of political efficacy and sense of citizen duty are grounded on

³See Chapter I, pp. 22-24.

⁴See Chapter I, p. 13.

responses to six, nine, seven and six of these statements, respectively.⁵

Scalable and reliable measures of those political and personal attitudes selected were adopted from the following sources:

1. A test of political cynicism constructed by the investigator, in collaboration with Professor J. Paul Johnston of the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta;
2. A reduced and modified version of Martin F. Fritz and Charles O. Neidt's Practical Policy Test (Test of Cynicism), Form C-S;⁶
3. A modified version of Wayne Thompson and John Horton's Test of Political Alienation;⁷
4. Herbert McClosky and John Schaar's Anomy Scale;⁸

⁵Again, our investigation focuses solely on the development of political cynicism among adolescents. However, these four measures of both negative and positive political attitudes were included in the attitudinal inventory to provide technical assistance in determining the validity of the political cynicism scale. Further, due to "problems of access" to Albertan schools, these four measures were added to gather additional data for future research concerning the development of selected political attitudes among adolescents. Besides their usefulness in the forthcoming discussion about the validity and reliability criteria, these four measures are not a focal part of this investigation. For a discussion of "problems of access" to schools, see M. Kent Jennings and Lawrence Fox, "The Conduct of Socio-political Research in Schools: Strategies and Problems of Access," The School Review, Vol. 76 (December 1968), pp. 428-444.

⁶Martin F. Fritz, "A Short-Form Test of Cynicism," Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 55 (1948), pp. 319-322.

⁷Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," Social Forces, Vol. 38 (March, 1960), p. 192.

⁸Herbert McClosky and John H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," American Sociological Review, Vol. 30 (1965), p. 23.

5. Reduced versions of Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller's Sense of Political Efficacy Scale⁹ and Sense of Citizen Duty Scale;¹⁰

6. Selected and modified items from David Easton and Jack Dennis' eight-item political efficacy scale;¹¹ Kenneth Langton's three-item political efficacy scale;¹² Gwynn Nettler's seventeen-item alienation scale;¹³ and Harold Webster, Nevitt Sanford and Marvin Freedman's Test, Part J (Cynicism).¹⁴

The fifty-three-item attitudinal inventory is a shorter and transformed version of a one hundred and one-item original battery of attitude scales.¹⁵ The reduction and transformation was made wholly on the basis of the attitude scale scores of 470 subjects collected

⁹Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (White Plains, N. Y.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), p. 187.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 194.

¹¹David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 61 (March, 1967), p. 29.

¹²Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 143-144.

¹³Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure of Alienation," American Sociological Review, Vol. 22 (December, 1957), p. 675.

¹⁴Harold Webster, Nevitt Sanford and Mervin Freedman, "A New Instrument for Studying Authoritarianism in Personality," The Journal of Psychology, Vol. 40 (1955), p. 82.

¹⁵A shorter version containing sixty-five items was utilized by the investigator in a study of Albertan urban secondary social studies teachers. See Conde R. Grondin, "A Descriptive Survey of Academic Preparation in Political Science in Relation to Selected Political Attitudes of Urban Secondary Social Studies Teachers of Alberta" (an unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Alberta, 1969), pp. 53-59.

in a pilot study conducted at the University of Alberta during February and March, 1968, and of 263 secondary social studies teachers obtained during May and June, 1968.¹⁶ A detailed explication of these two studies is given in the following sections.

Design of the Battery of Political Attitude Scales

Since there was no published scale of political cynicism available at the time of the investigation which reflected the Canadian situation,¹⁷ it was decided to build a test of political cynicism, hereinafter referred to as the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale. Early in the development of this scale of political cynicism, a decision was made to proceed so that the final form of the scale would contain twenty, or less, tested items, each concerned with a political situation towards which subjects could express feelings of cynicism. This was one of the objectives for which a pilot study was undertaken.

A second objective of the pre-study was to develop a battery of political attitude scales containing no more than sixty-five items dealing with indexes of political attitude in four areas, namely, (1) cynicism, (2) alienation, (3) sense of political efficacy, and (4) sense of citizen duty. Also included in the battery were items

¹⁶For further information about this study, see J. Paul Johnston and Conde R. Grondin, "Some Problems of Measurement and Interpretation in the Study of Political Attitudes" (a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, May, 1969, Seattle, Washington); and Grondin, op. cit.

¹⁷This appears to be still the situation at the time of the writing of this dissertation.

which would assess respondents' views of human nature--of what people in general are like--or personal cynicism. Apart from the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale, no goals were established as to the numbers of statements which were to comprise each of the remaining attitude scales to be incorporated in the final draft of the battery of attitude scales.

A short battery of political and personal attitude scales was deemed mandatory for economical and practical purposes.¹⁸ A two-part, paper-and-pencil, questionnaire was to be administered by teachers during regular class time to students whose grades in school ranged from eighth- through twelfth-grade. Since the questionnaire administration was to be restricted not only to one school day in each school, but also to one period of regular class time, the investigator felt that both teachers and students would be more receptive and, thus, more inclined to co-operate in administering, responding to, and returning a short-form attitudinal inventory than a long battery of attitude scales. This was deemed necessary also to reduce the difference between the requested sample and the obtained one, which may be due to a reduced completion rate resulting almost entirely from poor reading habits. Thus, a pre-study was carried out essentially to arrange a short-version attitudinal inventory by means of certain rational statistical procedures.

¹⁸For a discussion on the question of practicality, see Robert L. Thorndike and Elizabeth Hagen, Measurement and Evaluation in Psychology and Education (2d ed.: New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961), pp. 194-200.

During December, 1967, and January, 1968, the investigator drafted statements for each of those areas towards which individuals might express feelings of political cynicism (political processes, professional politicians and non-professional politicians). We endeavoured to keep the language in the statements non-technical, in an informal style, and to avoid difficult words. Most of the statements were uttered in a pro-cynicism direction, while others were in an anti-cynicism direction.

In early January, 1968, a mimeographed collection of statements was produced. This first draft contained 115 items that the investigator considered to be appropriate for inclusion in the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale. Copies of the first draft were circulated to staff members of the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta. Critical appraisal of the items was invited from these persons. On the basis of comments received, and of the assistance provided by Professor J. Paul Johnston, about half of the items were considered inappropriate and were deleted; also, many of the items were strengthened by rephrasing, and several new items were added prior to the pre-study.¹⁹

Since all items in the list were derived on an a priori basis, and since political cynicism was to be a basic dependent variable of the study, it was felt advisable to attempt to weed out those items which were grossly non-discriminating. Accordingly, after the collection of pre-study data, biserial correlations of each item score with

¹⁹See Johnston and Grondin, op. cit., p. 11.

respective total scale score were computed. This statistical procedure was carried out to measure the discriminatory power of each item.²⁰

In the last week of January, 1968, a 151-item pilot study version of the battery of political attitude scales was mimeographed. In this version there were the following items:

1. sixty items retained from the first draft of the Grondin-Johnston Test of Political Cynicism,
2. sixty-five items from the Fritz and Neidt Test of Cynicism, Form C-S,²¹
3. a slightly modified version of the Agger, et al., six-item political cynicism scale,²²
4. a six-item political alienation scale devised by Thompson and Horton,²³
5. a seven-item sense of political efficacy scale, and
6. a seven-item sense of citizen duty scale.

Items were randomly distributed throughout the battery so that a "halo effect" of having similar items too close together would be avoided.

During the development of the battery of political attitude scales, a second version was assembled. In the materialization of this second version of the battery, which was subsequently utilized

²⁰George A. Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 242.

²¹Fritz, op. cit., pp. 319-322.

²²Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (1960), p. 479.

²³Thompson and Horton, op. cit., p. 192.

as one of two instruments to gather needed data to analyze selected political attitudes of urban secondary social studies teachers,²⁴ a decision was made to retain all of the Agger, et al., six-item political cynicism scale,²⁵ all of the Thompson and Horton six-item political alienation scale,²⁶ and at least six items from each of the sense of political efficacy scale and sense of citizen duty scale.

As well as selecting those items to be incorporated in the second draft of the battery of political attitude scales, a further decision was taken to divide the Fritz and Neidt Test of Cynicism²⁷ into two distinct scales. The first scale consisted of ten items, each more concerned with a political situation than a non-political situation towards which an individual could express feelings of cynicism. These ten items were to be retained in the second draft of the battery. The second scale contained fifty-five items, each more concerned with a non-political situation than a political situation towards which, again, a person could express feelings of cynicism. Only ten of these items were to be included in the final version of the battery. The first scale is referred to hereinafter as the Fritz Political Cynicism Scale and the second scale as the Personal Cynicism Scale.

In addition, during the development of the battery of political attitude scales, consideration was given to the selection of a response

²⁴For results, see Grondin, op. cit., pp. 77-112.

²⁵Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, op. cit., p. 479.

²⁶Thompson and Horton, op. cit., p. 192.

²⁷Fritz, op. cit., pp. 319-322.

scale. The investigator assumed that subjects' past experiences would result in feelings of acceptance or rejection towards each item of the battery, and that these feelings could be expressed in rough quantitative terms, that is, as mild or strong. Accordingly, a four-point response scale (A, a, d, D) was provided for respondents to use in indicating the strength of their acceptance or rejection of each battery item. To force subjects to reflect, as nearly as possible, the direction of their reactions to each of the battery's items, there was no "intermediate," "undecided" or "midpoint" position included in the response scale.

Arithmetic weight-values of 0, 0, 1, 2, were assigned to various responses along the scale before scoring the respective attitude scales included in the battery. This scoring plan was selected for the response scale provided in the attitudinal inventory because it had been tentatively singled out by Charles Neidt as the optimal scoring plan to be employed for further investigation of cynicism.²⁸ The battery of attitude scales embodies a majority of test items towards which feelings of cynicism could be expressed by respondents. Items in the battery of attitude scales were so arranged that a score weight of 2 or 1, respectively, would be obtained for certain items by expressing strong or mild agreement with them, and for other items by expressing strong or mild disapproval of them. Each attitude scale included in the battery was to be scored by counting the number of responses having a score-value of 2 and the number of responses having a score-value

²⁸Charles O. Neidt, "Selection of the Optimal Scoring Plan for the Fritz Test of Cynicism," Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 54, (1947), pp. 253-262.

of 1. Total response scale scores for each scale of any respondents were to be secured by combining the weighted responses. To facilitate scoring attitude scales of the battery, the responses of the subjects were transferred to electrically scored answer sheets, and all the scoring was accomplished with the use of an International Business Machine Test Scorer.

The Sample for the Pilot Study. The pre-study battery of political attitude scales was administered to a nonprobability sample of 470 male and female undergraduate students, enrolled in a variety of different classes across the campus of the University of Alberta, during the last week of February and first week of March, 1968. This sample is designated hereafter as "Students." These respondents were recruited from the Faculty of Arts, the Faculty of Science, the Faculty of Education, the Faculty of Commerce, the Faculty of Law and the Department of Extension. All subjects were unpaid volunteers. Copies of the pre-study battery of political attitude scales, consisting of 151 items, were distributed to students at regular class times. Students were requested to complete and return the attitudinal inventory to the investigator at the end of the class. Subjects were informed that the items of the battery measured "feelings toward political life," and were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with each of the statements on the "Scale of Responses" provided. To maintain anonymity, and in the hope of producing more candid or uninhibited replies, students were asked to return the battery unsigned.

Answers of respondents were scored by means of the scoring procedures described above. Biserial correlations for each item with

its respective total scale score were computed and used as measures of the discriminatory power of each item. In general, the most discriminatory items for each attitude scale in the pre-study battery of political attitude tests were chosen for inclusion in the second version of the battery, which was then administered to a selected group of urban, secondary level, social studies teachers.

The second draft of the battery of political and personal attitude scales was mimeographed in middle April, 1968. All the items were mixed together and then randomly distributed throughout the 65-item battery. This arrangement was employed in an attempt to avoid having similar items too close together. The 65-item battery incorporated the following attitude scales:

1. the Grondin-Johnston Test of Political Cynicism (Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.), twenty items;
2. the Fritz Political Cynicism Scale (Fritz Pol. Cyn.), ten items;
3. the Agger, et al., Test of Political Cynicism (Agger Pol. Cyn.), six items;
4. the Political Alienation Scale (Pol. Alie.), six items;
5. the Sense of Political Efficacy Scale (Pol. Eff.), seven items;
6. the Sense of Citizen Duty Scale (Cit. Duty), six items; and
7. the Personal Cynicism Scale (Per. Cyn.), ten items.²⁹

²⁹A copy of the second version of the battery of political attitude scales can be found in Grondin, op. cit., pp. 158-164.

Subjects of the Teacher Study. The second nonprobability sample, to be known as "Teachers," included 263 high school social studies teachers from the cities of Edmonton and Calgary, Alberta. These latter respondents were surveyed by mailed questionnaires. Approximately, fifty-seven percent of the mailed questionnaires were returned (N = 280), of which ninety-four percent (N = 263) were usable.³⁰

The answers of these respondents were scored afterward, using the very same response and scoring procedures as employed for the first pilot study. The resulting data were then used for an item analysis of the entire battery of scales. In the case of the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale, the results of this analysis were used to select the 15 "best" items, in terms of their psychometric measurement properties and their range of content over the two sub-dimensions: political processes and politicians. These latter items are those that compose the political cynicism scale that is used to measure the dependent variable of this investigation.³¹

The final version of the battery of political and personal attitude scales was mimeographed in mid-February, 1970. All items were again "scrambled" and distributed randomly throughout the fifty-three-item battery to avoid a "halo effect." In the meantime, the investigator elected not to include the Fritz Political Cynicism Scale (ten items) or the Agger, et al., Test of Political Cynicism (six items) in the final version. Instead, the McClosky and Schaar Anomy Scale, (nine

³⁰For further information, see Grondin, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

³¹Procedures for the selection of items are given in Johnston and Grondin, op. cit.

items)³² was added. The fifty-three-item battery incorporated the following attitude scales:

1. the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale (Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.), fifteen items;
2. the Personal Cynicism Scale (Per. Cyn.), ten items;
3. the Political Alienation Scale (Pol. Alie.), six items;
4. the McClosky and Schaar Anomy Scale (Anomy), nine items;³³
5. the Sense of Political Efficacy Scale (Pol. Eff.), seven items; and
6. the Sense of Citizen Duty Scale (Cit. Duty), six items.

A copy of the final version of the battery of attitude scales is included in Appendix A. A copy of the items and item discriminatory indices for each attitude scale is contained in Appendix B.

The four-point response scheme adopted in both the pilot and teacher studies was abandoned in the final version of the battery of political tests, and replaced by a response scale which treated the scale items as is done in the Likert method.³⁴ The scoring procedures, as described above, were retained. Accordingly, a five-point response scale was provided for respondents to indicate the strength of their acceptance or agreement, rejection or disagreement, or no opinion (A, a, ?, d, D) of each battery's items. Arithmetic weight-values of 1, 2,

³²McClosky and Schaar, op. cit., p. 23.

³³Ibid.

³⁴For a good description of this method, see Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), pp. 149-171; and J. P. Guilford, Psychometric Methods (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Books Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 459-460.

3, 4, and 5 were assigned to various response options along the scale before scoring the respective attitude tests included in the final version of the battery.

Items in the battery of political attitude tests were again so arranged that a score weight of 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 would be obtained for certain items for expressing strong or mild agreement with them or no opinion, and for other items by expressing strong or mild disapproval, or no opinion. Responses to fifteen and to ten of these items, respectively, were combined into summated rating, or Liker-type, scales yielding ordinal measures of political cynicism (the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale) and personal cynicism (the Personal Cynicism Scale) in which the more items answered cynically, the higher the scale score and the higher the presumed degree of cynicism. Similar response and scoring procedures were adopted for the other four political attitude scales incorporated in the final version of the battery of political and personal attitude scales.

For political cynicism, the scale could yield a possible range of total scores from 15 (low cynicism or political trusting) to 75 (high) and, for personal cynicism, potential scores could range from 10 (low) to 50 (high). Actually, the minimum total score obtained by respondents on the political cynicism scale was 17 and the maximum 73, and, on the personal cynicism scale, these total scores were 11 and 48, respectively. The distribution of political cynicism total scores roughly approximated the shape of the normal curve (kurtosis = $-.177$), but it skewed (skewness = $-.031$) insubstantially to the left (low), with a mean score of 45.5 and a median of 45.6. Similarly, the arrangement of personal cynicism total scores resembles the shape of the normal curve (kurtosis = $.003$);

however, it skewed (skewness = .379) noticeably to the right (high) with a mean score of 25.5 and a median of 25.1.

For convenience in certain analyses, the total scores on the political cynicism scale and the personal cynicism scale were divided into three fairly equal groups, of sufficient size to permit the introduction of controls, with the middle category being centered around the median, as shown in Table 1. Political cynics and personal cynics are thus operationally defined as the top third, or high scoring groups, of the overall sample and the trusting as the bottom third or low scoring groups.

Table 1

Operational Categories of Political and Personal Cynicism

Level of Cynicism	Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.			Personal Cynicism		
	<u>Scores</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Scores</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N.</u>
Low or trusting	17-41	33.1	520	11-22	33.0	518
Moderate or neutral	42-49	33.0	518	23-27	32.8	515
High or cynical	50-73	33.9	532	28-48	34.2	537
		<u>100.0</u>	<u>1570</u>		<u>100.0</u>	<u>1570</u>

In order to examine further the rate of attitude development, we turn to a measure of "attitude acquisition" developed by Robert Hess and Judith Torney. This measure is based on whether respondents expressed an opinion or not to items included in the battery of political and personal attitude scales. Thus, the inclusion of an "intermediate," "undecided," or "no opinion" response option in the response scheme was made mandatory. Computation of this measure is accomplished by summing

the number of "I don't know-No opinion" responses to each scale's items to form a DK (Don't Know) Index. A decrease in the "I don't know-No opinion" responses among respondents reflects the rate of attitude acquisition, or growth.³⁵

In addition to the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale items embodied in the battery of attitude scales, items twenty-eight to thirty-six were included as an integral segment of the socio-political information inventory, Part II of the questionnaire, to elicit feelings of political cynicism from respondents. These items were taken from Langton³⁶ and Bachman.³⁷ To a large degree, these nine items were included to obtain data necessary and useful in determining the validity of the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale, operating as a cross-examination of and a consistency check on the delineated feelings of cynicism toward political processes and politicians expressed by those respondents involved in the study. They are used in our analysis, therefore, to detect deliberate faking and as an operational validating measure of political cynicism. A list of these nine items is included in Appendix A. The items and their scores on item discriminatory indices are also listed in Appendix B.

Again, responses to these latter items were combined into a Likert-type attitude scale. This scale, designated hereafter as the

³⁵For a more detailed discussion on the DK Index, see Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 23-26.

³⁶Langton, op. cit., p. 94.

³⁷Jerald G. Bachman, et al., Youth in Transition, Vol. I (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967), pp. 225-226.

Political Cynicism Scale (Pol. Cyn.), produces a range of total scores from 2 (low cynicism) to 45 (high cynicism). Like the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's total scores, the distribution of these scores roughly resembles the shape of the normal curve (kurtosis = 1.365), and is also skewed slightly to the left (skewness = -.027). The mean score and median are 23.846 and 23.867, respectively. As well, for convenience in certain analyses, these total scores were collapsed into three generally equal groups, as exhibited in Table 2.

Table 2
Operational Categories of the Political Cynicism Scale

Level of Cynicism	Political Cynicism Scale		
	<u>Scores</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N.</u>
Low or trusting	2-21	33.8	530
Moderate or neutral	22-26	35.7	560
High or cynical	27-45	<u>30.6</u>	<u>480</u>
		<u>100.0</u>	<u>1570</u>

Validity and Reliability of the Battery of Attitude Scales

Along with procedures for selecting items to be included in attitude scales, one of the main problems in constructing an instrument to measure political attitudes involved the establishment of criteria for judging its adequacy. Two specific criteria were utilized to judge the adequacy of attitude scales embodied in the battery. These are

validity and reliability. The following discussion deals with these two criteria.³⁸

Validity. The extent to which scales included in the battery of political and personal attitude scales measured the attitude that they are intended to measure was established the following ways. First, four specialists in the area of political behavior have thoroughly studied each item for weaknesses. For the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale, items were then rated by these specialists who had been instructed, first, to pick out those items which, they felt, dealt with political cynicism and, second, to categorize these items according to attributes projected to political processes and institutions and to politicians in the context of the item. This group of judges thus provided an acceptable degree of content, or "face," validity. The other components of the measurement battery have been adapted from instruments of known content validity. Second, empirical and statistical evidence for the validity of respective scales was determined from correlations among attitude scales.³⁹ In Table 3, page 125, evidence of congruent and concurrent validities for the pilot study, the teacher study and the present study groups are presented.⁴⁰

³⁸For detailed discussions on these two criteria, see, for instance, Johnston and Grondin, op. cit., pp. 12-30; Kerlinger, op. cit., pp. 429-462; and Thorndike and Hagen, op. cit., pp. 160-194.

³⁹Robert L. Thorndike and Elizabeth Hagen, Measurement and Evaluation in Psychology and Education (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955), p. 110.

⁴⁰For a discussion on congruent and concurrent validities, see Ibid., pp. 109-118; and Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (2d ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), pp. 459-460, 462.

Table 3

Correlation Matrix Among Scales of the Battery of Attitude
Scales for Pilot Study, Teacher Study* and
(Adolescent Study) Groups

Scales	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Gr.-Jo.	1.00	--	.75	.70	--	-.36	-.37
Pol. Cyn.	1.00*	--	.65*	.71*	--	-.42*	-.33*
	(1.00)	(.58)	(.51)	(.65)	(.39)	(-.48)	(-.36)
2. Pol. Cyn.		--	--	--	--	--	--
			--	--	--	--	--
			(.37)	(.51)	(.29)	(-.38)	(-.31)
3. Per. Cyn.				.53	--	-.32	-.23
				.51*	--	-.24*	-.35*
				(.35)	(.32)	(-.40)	(-.44)
4. Pol. Alie.					--	-.37	-.23
					--	-.44*	-.26*
					(.29)	(-.47)	(-.30)
5. Anomy						--	--
						--	--
						(-.40)	(-.39)
6. Pol Eff.							.55
							.44*
							(.46)
7. Cit. Duty							1.00
							1.00*
							(1.00)

-- missing data

Evidence of congruent validity is shown by correlations between similar measures of the same political attitude, for example, the correlation between the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Pol. Cyn. Scale. Additional support for validity of the attitude scales is provided by the obtained concurrent validity. For instance, this is shown by correlations

among scales of political cynicism, political alienation, anomie and personal cynicism. Also, these correlations, plus those among scales of political cynicism, political efficacy and citizen duty, illustrate the criterion of discriminability. Simply, this means that the political cynicism constructed in this study is shown to be empirically differentiated from other attitude constructs.⁴¹

Thirdly, since all actual scores obtained are combinations of true score and error, correlations presented in Table 3 may be considered a compromise between correlations of underlying true scores and errors. Table 50 in Appendix C, page 362, presents estimated correlations among attitude scales corrected for attenuation due to error.⁴² This provides further statistical evidence for the validity of both political cynicism scales and the personal cynicism scale, plus the other four attitude scales embodied in the battery of attitude scales. Since it is believed that the attitude scales have admissible content and statistical validities, the investigator concluded that the Battery of Attitude Scales, Part I of the questionnaire, had acceptable validity for the purpose for which it had been constructed.

Reliability. It was impossible to obtain evidence on the reliability of the seven attitude scales through the test-retest method because copies of the battery of political attitude scales were returned unsigned to the investigator in all three studies (the pilot, teacher

⁴¹For further detail, see Kerlinger, op. cit. (2d ed.), p. 462.

⁴²The formula to compute "estimated correlations" was taken from Thorndike and Hagen, op. cit. (2d ed.), p. 194.

and adolescent studies). However, it was possible to obtain evidence on the reliability of the seven attitude scales of the battery through the split-half method.⁴³ Equivalent halves were obtained for each attitude scale by placing all the odd-numbered items in one half-scale and all the even-numbered items in another half-scale. Scores were derived for both half-scales and these were correlated. Reliability coefficients for each half-scale resulted. These, then, were used to estimate total-scale reliability scores employing the Spearman-Brown Formula.⁴⁴ This formula is

$$r_{xx} = \frac{2r_{hh}}{1+r_{hh}} \quad \text{where } r_{hh} \text{ is the actual correlation between two half-length scales.}$$

Table 51, in Appendix C, page 363, presents the computed half-scale total scores correlation coefficients for the pilot study, the teacher study and the adolescent study groups. Data with regard to estimated total scale reliability coefficients for seven attitude scales are presented in Table 4, page 128. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients shown there were deemed sufficiently high to indicate an acceptable level of reliability for each attitude scale in the Battery of Attitude Scales.

Directly related to the split-half method of estimating reliability coefficients is a particular type of coefficient which measures the

⁴³This method is recommended by Ferguson, op. cit., p. 377.

⁴⁴This Formula is reproduced from Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 378.

Table 4

Estimated Total Reliability Coefficients, t Values, Standard Error of Measurements
 an Alpha Coefficients for Seven Attitude Scales: Pilot Study, Teacher Study
 and Adolescent Study Groups

Scales	Pilot Study			Teacher Study			Adolescent Study					
	r_j	s_{em}	t_j	Alpha	r_j	s_{em}	t_j	Alpha	r_k	s_{em}	t_k	Alpha
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	.89	8.75	42.22***	.87	.87	6.62	28.50***	.87	.79	4.27	51.02***	.81
Pol. Cyn.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	.87	2.12	69.86***	.85
Per. Cyn.	.75	4.66	24.58***	.80	.72	3.06	16.76***	.69	.68	3.46	36.73***	.66
Pol. Alie.	.59	2.62	15.81***	.59	.55	2.46	10.64***	.79	.65	2.56	33.87***	.63
Anomy	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	.71	3.23	39.92***	.69
Pol. Eff.	.64	3.54	18.02***	.61	.56	3.36	10.92***	.59	.58	2.87	28.19***	.53
Cit. Duty	.78	3.85	26.96***	.69	.64	2.69	13.46***	.66	.68	2.26	36.72***	.64

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level

*** Significant at the .001 level

NA Missing Data

reliability of a scale labelled "alpha."⁴⁵ Simply, "alpha is the reliability of the total score obtained by summing the scores on the separate items."⁴⁶ Following Aubrey McKennell's recommendation,⁴⁷ we computed the particular averages of all inter-item correlations comprising the seven subsets of items of the battery of attitude scales. These seven values, \bar{r}_{ij} , were then entered into the following formula:

$$\alpha = \frac{n\bar{r}_{ij}}{1+(n-1)\bar{r}_{ij}}$$

where n = the number of separate items in a scale; and

\bar{r}_{ij} = the average of all the inter-item correlations in the scale.⁴⁸

The values so obtained are deemed to be estimates of the reliability of the n items used in individual political and personal attitude scales of the battery. Table 4, page 128, shows these computed Alpha coefficients for all seven scales. Since the alpha values for the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale and Political Cynicism Scale did not sink below a level of .6 or .7, we feel that these two scales are reliable, and thus suitable, measures of political cynicism.

Reference to Table 52, in Appendix C, page 364, reveals additional evidence on the reliability of the battery's seven attitude

⁴⁵For a discussion of "alpha: as a coefficient of reliability, see Aubrey McKennell, "Attitude Measurement: Use of Coefficient Alpha with Cluster or Factor Analysis," Sociology, Vol. 4 (1970), pp. 228-231.

⁴⁶McKennell, op. cit., p. 229.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 230.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 239.

scales. While there is evidence that the two sample groups on which data are presented in that table, the pilot study and the adolescent study, cannot be considered random samples from a common population, there is also noticeable documentation which suggests that certain attitude scales generally reproduced approximate quantitative attitude measures for both groups. In fact, these attitude scales are deemed appreciably consistent and reproducible to indicate a reasonable degree of reliability of the battery of attitude scales. In this sense, the validity and reliability associated with the instrument appeared satisfactory and, thus, it provided a suitable device for the collection of data on the political attitudes dealt with in this investigation.

The Socio-Political Information Questionnaire

Part Two of the questionnaire, consisting almost entirely of closed-end items, was designed to parallel the second question asked in the "Statement of the Problem" section, and to yield information relevant to the sub-problem of this investigation.⁴⁹ The instrument developed for the present work was a conglomerate built from previously published materials and included only a few original items. In all, adolescent respondents were requested to complete a forty-one-item socio-political information inventory. A copy of the inventory is provided in Appendix A.

Besides items twenty-eight to thirty-six, which were included as a further attempt to elicit feelings of political cynicism, the inventory contained items to gather data in connection with agents of

⁴⁹See Chapter I, pp. 13-14.

political socialization and socio-political background characteristic variables of relevance in the study.⁵⁰ Among these were standardized items to determine the school grade, age, sex, socioeconomic level, religion, place of residence and length of residence in the community of the adolescent respondent. These items, like most of the other items in the socio-political information inventory, consisted of "multiple-choice" and "fill-in-the-blank" type questions. The request for information here had two purposes--to ascertain the nature of the sample in terms of age-grade levels and to derive the needed information about the independent and control variables of the study.

Items 10, 11, 12 and 21 were to elicit responses from the adolescents about parents' and families' political influence and political activities. Likewise, items 13, 14 and 19 questioned adolescents about political influence and political activities of the school setting and of the teachers, while items 10e and 10d provided information about peers' political influence. Finally, the political influence of the mass media was to be ascertained from answers to item 20. Information received from these items was to be aggregated and then collapsed into dichotomous political influence and political activity indexes. The data provided by these indexes are considered necessary to our attempt to gain insight into the possible impact of the parent, the school, the peer group and the mass media upon the development of political cynicism among adolescents.

⁵⁰Considerable data of possible relevance for research, in addition to those to be mentioned below, were also collected in this study but were intended for other research projects.

Answers to items 17 and 18 provided needed information about the respondent's political interest and involvement. These latter items were designed to be convertible readily into an index to describe adolescents' political involvement.

Finally, item 37 asks the respondent to describe his political party preference and to indicate potential voting behavior, both at the provincial and the federal levels of politics. The political preferences of his parents and friends were also asked about; items 38 and 39 are concerned with these political preferences.

Techniques of index and cluster building were used to reduce drastically the number of potential relationships to be analyzed in this investigation. This broad analysis strategy may best be described as a process of data reduction. Considering the number of items of socio-political information per adolescent respondent, it would be more confusing than helpful to analyze and to report these bits of data one at a time. Accordingly, one of the first steps in the analysis of data was to condense many of these item responses by constructing indexes. There are two stages involved in arriving at index scores: the first is a developmental stage requiring the selection of items, or ingredients, to be included in a particular index; the second stage is the calculation of the index score. In our study, nine composite measures or indexes were constructed. These composite indexes, along with their "ingredient" items are listed in Table 5; ranges of total score and median scores are also provided. However, efficiency and convenience required further reduction of the data in order to examine and to describe many aspects of our respondents' attributes and attitudes. Thus, we reduce some of

Table 5

Composite Indexes with Ingredient Items, Ranges of
Total Scores and Median Scores

Composite Indexes	Items	Ranges	Medians
Socio-economic Level (SEL)	6, 7, 8	0 to 16	7.94
Parent Pol. Influence Index	10a, 10b	0 to 10	4.87
Family Pol. Influence Index	10a, 10b, 10c	0 to 15	6.77
Teacher Pol. Influence Index	19a, 19b	0 to 10	4.30
School Pol. Influence Index	13, 14, 19a, 19b	0 to 18	10.51
Peers Pol. Influence Index	10d, 10e	0 to 10	4.19
Mass Media Pol. Influence Index	20a, 20b, 20c	0 to 21	15.32
Parent Pol. Interest Index	11, 12, 21	0 to 14	8.55
Adolescent Pol. Interest Index	17, 18	0 to 9	5.46

the data still further by dividing the various index total scores into approximately equal dichotomous or trichonomous group summary measures. Table 6, page 134, presents the results of the strategy of this kind of data reduction. Although our choice of aggregating and categorizing our data is somewhat arbitrary, it proves to be a useful approach for reducing our data to a manageable number of dimensions in our analysis strategies. Moreover, the use of various composite measures of political influence and political interest greatly simplifies our investigation.

Table 6

Operational Categories of SEL, Political Influence and
Political Interest Indexes' Summary Measures

Summary Measures	Range of Total Scores	Number of Respondents	Percent of Respondents
Socio-economic Level			
Low SEL	1-6	552	35.2
Medium SEL	7-10	547	34.8
High SEL	11-16	443	28.2
Missing Data	0	28	1.8
Parent Political Influence			
Low Influence	1-5	702	44.7
High Influence	6-10	681	43.4
Missing Data	0	187	11.9
Family Political Influence			
Low Influence	2-7	702	44.7
High Influence	8-15	686	43.7
Missing Data	0	182	11.6
Teacher Political Influence			
Low Influence	1-4	801	51.0
High Influence	5-10	728	46.4
Missing Data	0	41	2.6
School Political Influence			
Low Influence	2-10	778	49.6
High Influence	11-18	787	50.1
Missing Data	0	5	0.3
Peers Political Influence			
Low Influence	1-4	858	54.6
High Influence	5-10	673	42.9
Missing Data	0	39	2.5
Mass Media Political Influence			
Low Influence	1-15	744	47.4
High Influence	16-21	770	49.0
Missing Data	0	56	3.6
Parent Political Interest			
Low Interest	1-8	766	48.8
High Interest	9-14	795	50.6
Missing Data	0	9	0.6
Adolescent Political Interest			
Low Interest	1-5	794	50.6
High Interest	6-9	769	49.0
Missing Data	0	7	0.4

II. POPULATION OF THE STUDY

Determining the sampling procedures presented the most serious obstacles. These problems were attributable largely to financial, time and "problems of access" to schools, considerations. An "ideal" sample was impossible; only minimal criteria, fulfilling the requisites of an exploratory study, could be satisfied. Several standards provide guides. It was desirable to obtain a certain minimum of cases, in as representative a manner as possible, to insure that the number of subjects composing the sample would be suitable for testing the hypotheses, while remaining within reasonable time and financial budgets.

In light of the hypotheses, the adolescent population of Alberta composed the working universe and defined the core type of subjects required by the study. The requirements suggested that working through the junior and senior high schools would be the most expeditious procedure for securing ample subjects for the research. Although a longitudinal study observing respondents from the ages of thirteen through eighteen years would have been both desirable and valuable, in that it would have extended the present study and cross-validated other researches, the cost of such an undertaking was prohibitive. Fortunately, this procedure was deemed not essential for our investigation as other less costly techniques, both in terms of finance and time, were available to fulfill the goal of the study, such as cross-sectional and quasi-longitudinal design features, although long term panel studies will be necessary to unravel many of the intricacies in the development of political attitude process.

Likewise, to draw a random sample of adolescents was attractive, but infeasible and impractical due to the inability to secure the schools' cooperation. The decision was made to adopt a non-probability sample design of a cross-section of approximately 2,000 grade eight through grade twelve students. This scheme permitted working through certain cooperating separate and public schools that were more or less representative of Alberta's four geographical areas: northern, central and southern rural areas, and urban areas.⁵¹ As originally formulated, after discussing the research with supervisors in the Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, we attempted to survey approximately seventy students for each grade level in respective rural areas and two hundred students for each grade level in an urban area equally divided between separate and public schools. This relatively large group of young people intuitively appears to be sufficient to provide the necessary substantial body of data required to explore the development of political cynicism in youths of differing personalities and in communities of varying political atmospheres.

Stressing a direct, clear approach, the selection and recruitment of schools to participate in this research was as follows. In rural areas, efforts began in November, 1969, to secure the participation

⁵¹For a good overview of sampling theory, see Bernard Lazewitz, "Sampling Theory and Procedures," Methodology in Social Research, eds. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., and Ann B. Blalock (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), pp. 278-328. One of the better summary statements is found in Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social Research (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968), pp. 145-158. See, also, Kerlinger, op. cit. (2d ed.), pp. 117-132. Of related interest see Frederick F. Stephan and Philip J. McCarthy, Sampling Opinions: An Analysis of Survey Procedure (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958).

and to gain the cooperation of those schools: telephone calls from the investigator to particular known school staff members were placed to ascertain obstacles in requesting both staff and students collaboration and time to participate in the survey. Then, a letter of invitation was sent to principals of schools. One reason is that principals had to be contacted at some point, simply because they are the persons who make de facto decisions about whomever enters their schools to carry out research. Often this procedure was sufficient to obtain a particular school's participation, but further mail and telephone contacts were used when necessary. Most school principals contacted felt free to act unilaterally, or with immediate informal clearance from their school superintendents. In three instances, higher authorities refused entry to schools under their jurisdictions by reason that both questionnaires contained objectionable questions that had to do with political matters. Of course, even the most extensive efforts did not (and will not) secure the participation of all school principals or teachers contacted. Of those who declined, many expressed an interest and a desire to participate, but were not able to do so. Most of these fell in the categories of grade nine and twelve teachers who dealt with subject matters required of students to obtain either junior or senior matriculation. Thus, these teachers did not want to disrupt school routine to participate in this study.

In the selected urban area, Edmonton, the first step in the process of obtaining school cooperation involved the completion of a "request for assistance in graduate research project" form. Such a request was forwarded during mid-February, 1970, to the Division of Field Experiences, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, which

acts as a clearing house for research projects involving schools in the Edmonton Public School District and the Edmonton Separate School District. Following a scrutiny of this investigator's request for assistance, the Director of Curriculum--Humanities Branch with the Supervisor of Social Studies, Edmonton Public School District, granted permission to the investigator to contact two principals of schools, with the understanding that final authorization to carry out the survey rested with these two individuals, one in charge of a large senior high school complex, the other of a sizable junior high school. Shortly, in accordance with the directive received, these two school principals were contacted by the investigator who received a cordial invitation to execute his survey in their schools. Later, various social studies departmental heads and teachers provided notable collaboration in the administration of the two-part questionnaires to student participants in this study from the Edmonton Public School District.

At the same time, approval to carry out the research project among schools under the jurisdiction of the Edmonton Separate School District was withheld until the researcher met, in person, with the Administrative Assistant, Department of Instruction, and the Social Studies Supervisor to provide further information about his research project. Such a meeting was arranged promptly. After consultation with the investigator, these two administrators were persuaded to provide authorization to the investigator to contact school principals who might be willing to let him conduct his survey in their respective schools. Various junior and senior high school principals were subsequently met and administrative arrangements for the survey which were most convenient for their staffs were completed. In sum, the

sample of both urban and rural schools willing to cooperate in the survey was established by the beginning of April, 1970. In this study, participating schools were selected according to the number of students they served. Table 7 lists participating schools with the number and percent of respondents from each individual school.

Table 7
Participating Schools in the Adolescent Study

Schools	Number of Respondents	Percent of Respondents
Edmonton Public School District		
Strathcona High School	250	15.9
Hardisty Junior High School	198	12.6
Edmonton Separate School District		
Austin O'Brien High School	113	7.2
St. Mary's High School	237	15.1
St. James Junior High School	60	3.8
St. Thomas More Jr. High School	138	8.8
Rural Public Schools		
Slave Lake Jr. and Sr. High School	138	8.8
Rimbey Jr. and Sr. High School	167	10.8
Okotoks Jr. and Sr. High School	269	17.1
	1570	100.0

III. DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Data collection involved the administration of two-part, paper-and-pencil questionnaires by classroom teachers during regular class time to students whose grades in school range from the eighth- through twelfth-grade. Teachers were instructed to remain at the front of the room and to refrain from looking either over students' shoulders or to interpret answers and/or to give examples of answers after the distribution of the questionnaires. It was hoped that the instructions to teachers would avoid the creation of a "test-taking" climate which has the potential of influencing youthful respondents to respond to attitudinal items in a "correct" or "expected" manner rather than responding directly and affectively to the items. As a further attempt to encourage frank replies, students were requested to return their completed questionnaires unsigned and face down to a desk located in the back of the classroom where they were to be collected directly by the investigator. Finally, the usual guarantee that results would be kept confidential were offered. In order to minimize any discussion of both instruments among students, questionnaires were administered only on one school day in each of the participating schools. The investigator was present in these schools to instruct and to assist teachers in the administration of questionnaires.

Data gathering began in the early part of April, 1970, and was terminated by the middle of May, 1970. In all, 1576 booklets containing both parts of the questionnaire were returned to the investigator. Out of these 1576 respondents, four persons either failed or refused to complete substantial segments of either the

battery of attitude scales or the socio-political information inventory. Two students completed their questionnaires facetiously and were dropped from the sample. No student is known to have refused to participate in the survey. In all, the responses of 1570 student-adolescents were available for the study. Table 8, page 142, summarizes the nature of the sample of the study. A more detailed summary of the nature of the sample broken down by grade levels of respondents is given in Table 9, page 143. The responses contained in these booklets, which consisted of both instruments--the battery of attitude scales and the socio-political information inventory--constituted the data of the study.

In conclusion, the sample available in the present study was not drawn randomly from the universe of Alberta adolescents; in fact, students in certain schools were systematically excluded and in many schools in certain school districts we were refused permission to conduct the study. Nevertheless, the sample appears representative of the thirteen to eighteen-year-old junior and senior high school students in public and separate schools of the Province of Alberta. Moreover, it is likely that the respondents bear some resemblance to their counterparts throughout Canada. Even if the sample had been drawn in a more exacting manner, the interpretations would still have had to have been qualified. Thus, it would be invalid to generalize universally on the basis of this study. The sample provides only one "block" of data which must be fitted to other similar work before formulating generalizations about the development of political cynicism among adolescents. Ultimately, this selection of subjects can only

Table 8
Inventory of the Nature of the Sample: Variables by Number and
Percent of Adolescent Respondents

Variables	Number of Adolescents	Percent of Adolescents
Grade		
eight	369	23.5
nine	311	19.8
ten	307	19.6
eleven	307	19.6
twelve	276	17.6
Age		
up to age 13	185	11.8
age 14	321	20.4
age 15	322	20.5
age 16	317	20.2
age 17	267	17.0
age 18 and over	151	9.6
no answer	7	0.4
Sex		
male	721	45.9
female	849	54.1
Father's Occupation		
professional	181	11.5
managerial	361	23.0
skilled labour	182	11.6
semi-skilled labour	397	25.3
farmer	199	12.7
unskilled labour	103	6.6
retired, deceased, no answer	147	9.4
Father's Education		
university	313	19.9
grade 12	292	18.6
grade 10-11	252	16.1
grade 7-9	382	24.3
no schooling to grade 6	124	7.9
no answer, don't know	207	13.2
Father's Annual Income		
\$15,000 and over	172	11.0
\$10,000-\$14,999	224	14.3
\$7,000-\$9,999	261	16.6
\$5,000-\$6,999	181	11.5
under \$4,999	149	9.5
no answer, don't know	583	37.1
Social Class Self Identification		
upper class	271	17.3
middle class	441	28.1
low middle class	358	22.8
working class	348	22.2
no answer, don't know	152	9.7
Religion		
protestant	822	52.4
roman catholic	506	32.2
other religion	157	10.0
no religion	34	2.2
no answer	51	3.2
Place of Residence		
urban area	996	63.4
rural area	574	36.6
Length of Residence in Community		
up to 4 years	421	26.8
5 to 9 years	380	24.2
10 to 15 years	407	25.9
15 years and over	344	21.9
no answer, don't know	18	1.1
Type of School Attended		
senior high school	600	38.2
junior high school	396	25.2
junior and senior high schools	574	36.6
Political Party Preference-Federal Election		
Liberal	444	28.3
Conservative	280	17.8
CCF-NDP	87	5.5
Social Credit	60	3.8
don't know	506	32.2
wouldn't bother voting	83	5.3
no answer	110	7.0
Political Party Preference-Provincial Election		
Liberal	297	18.9
Conservative	246	15.7
CCF-NDP	80	5.1
Social Credit	246	15.7
don't know	534	34.0
wouldn't bother voting	82	5.2
no answer	85	5.4

Table 9
Relationship Among School Grade Level's Groups and Adolescent
Background Characteristic Variables' Groups

Background Characteristic Variables	GRADE IN SCHOOL											
	Grade 8		Grade 9		Grade 10		Grade 11		Grade 12		Total	
	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.
Age												
up to age 13	93.0	172	7.0	13	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	100	185
age 14	49.2	158	47.0	151	3.7	12	0.0	0	0.0	0	100	321
age 15	9.0	29	37.3	120	47.8	154	5.9	19	0.0	0	100	321
age 16	2.2	7	6.9	22	38.8	123	47.3	150	4.7	15	100	317
age 17	0.7	2	0.7	2	4.1	11	43.8	117	50.6	135	100	267
age 18 and over	0.0	0	0.0	0	4.0	6	13.9	21	82.1	124	100	151
no answer	14.3	1	42.9	3	14.3	1	0.0	0	28.6	2	100	7
Sex												
male	22.3	161	22.3	161	17.8	128	19.7	142	17.9	129	100	721
female	24.5	208	17.7	150	21.1	179	19.4	165	17.3	147	100	849
Father's Occupation												
professional	11.0	20	14.9	27	24.3	44	19.9	36	29.8	54	100	181
managerial	23.3	84	21.3	77	18.8	68	18.3	66	18.3	66	100	361
skilled labour	32.4	59	15.9	29	18.1	33	19.2	35	14.3	26	100	182
semi-skilled labour	25.9	103	24.4	97	16.4	65	20.4	81	12.8	51	100	397
farmer	21.6	43	15.1	30	26.1	52	21.6	43	15.6	31	100	199
unskilled labour	25.2	26	21.4	22	19.4	20	19.4	20	14.6	15	100	103
retired, deceased, no answer	23.1	34	19.7	29	17.0	25	17.7	26	22.4	33	100	147
Father's Education												
university	13.4	42	16.0	50	17.9	56	24.6	77	28.1	88	100	313
grade 12	22.9	64	23.3	68	21.9	64	16.8	49	16.1	47	100	292
grade 10-11	21.0	53	18.7	47	17.1	43	23.4	59	19.8	50	100	252
grade 7-9	24.3	93	19.1	73	20.7	79	19.1	73	16.8	64	100	382
no schooling to grade 6	26.6	33	15.3	19	25.0	31	21.0	26	12.1	15	100	124
no answer, don't know	40.6	84	26.1	54	16.4	34	11.1	23	5.8	12	100	207
Father's Income												
\$15,000 and over	17.4	30	16.9	29	13.4	23	21.5	37	30.8	53	100	172
\$10,000-\$14,999	13.4	30	17.9	40	25.9	58	21.0	47	21.9	49	100	224
\$7,000-\$9,999	19.9	52	17.6	46	21.5	56	22.2	58	18.8	49	100	261
\$5,000-\$6,999	12.7	23	14.9	27	26.5	48	24.3	44	21.5	39	100	181
under \$4,999	19.5	29	20.1	30	14.8	22	27.5	41	18.1	27	100	149
no answer, don't know	35.2	205	23.8	139	17.2	100	13.7	80	10.1	59	100	583
Social Class Self Identification												
upper class	15.5	42	22.1	60	19.6	53	20.3	55	22.5	61	100	271
middle class	21.1	93	19.7	87	18.6	82	20.6	91	20.0	88	100	441
low middle class	17.3	62	19.3	69	21.2	76	20.9	75	21.2	76	100	358
working class	32.2	112	19.0	66	20.1	70	18.4	64	10.3	36	100	348
no answer, don't know	39.5	60	19.1	29	17.1	26	14.5	22	9.9	15	100	152
Religion												
protestant	20.8	171	19.1	157	19.7	162	21.9	180	18.5	152	100	822
roman catholic	26.7	135	21.1	107	19.6	99	15.8	80	16.8	85	100	506
other religion	24.8	39	18.5	29	22.9	36	21.0	33	12.7	20	100	157
no religion	14.7	5	11.8	4	17.6	6	23.5	8	32.4	11	100	34
no answer	37.3	19	27.5	14	7.8	4	11.8	6	15.7	8	100	51
Place of Residence												
urban area	20.9	208	18.9	188	18.1	180	18.4	183	23.8	237	100	996
rural area	28.0	161	21.4	123	22.1	127	21.6	124	6.8	39	100	574
Length of Residence												
up to 4 years	30.2	127	25.2	106	18.3	77	13.5	57	12.8	54	100	421
5 to 9 years	21.3	81	21.1	80	20.3	77	19.7	75	17.6	67	100	380
10 to 15 years	35.6	145	22.1	90	17.4	71	13.0	53	11.8	48	100	407
15 years and over	2.3	8	9.0	31	23.5	81	34.6	119	30.5	105	100	344
no answer, don't know	44.4	8	22.2	4	5.6	1	16.7	3	11.1	2	100	18
Type of School Attended												
senior high school	0.0	0	0.0	0	30.0	180	30.5	183	39.5	237	100	600
junior high school	52.5	208	47.5	188	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	100	396
jr. and sr. high schools	28.0	161	21.4	123	22.1	127	21.6	124	6.8	39	100	574
Political Party Preference- Federal Election												
Liberal	12.4	55	21.6	96	21.4	95	19.6	87	25.0	111	100	444
Conservative	17.5	49	20.0	56	23.2	65	21.4	60	17.9	50	100	280
CCF-NDP	14.9	13	16.1	14	18.4	16	26.4	23	24.1	21	100	87
Social Credit	20.0	12	20.0	12	16.7	10	25.0	15	18.3	11	100	60
don't know	29.1	147	20.8	105	18.4	93	18.4	93	13.4	68	100	506
would not vote	37.1	31	18.1	15	14.5	12	20.5	17	9.6	8	100	83
no answer	56.4	62	11.8	13	14.5	16	10.9	12	6.4	7	100	110
Political Party Preference- Provincial Election												
Liberal	19.9	59	23.9	71	18.5	55	20.5	61	17.2	51	100	297
Conservative	15.4	38	24.0	59	18.7	46	17.1	42	24.8	61	100	246
CCF-NDP	21.3	17	15.0	12	20.0	16	25.0	20	18.8	15	100	80
Social Credit	13.0	32	16.7	41	23.6	58	24.4	60	22.4	55	100	246
don't know	27.9	149	19.9	106	19.9	106	18.5	99	13.9	74	100	534
would not vote	36.6	30	13.4	11	13.4	11	22.0	18	14.6	12	100	82
no answer	51.8	44	12.9	11	17.6	15	8.2	7	9.4	8	100	85

be evaluated relative to meeting the objectives of the study and, in this instance, it adequately satisfied only the needs of an exploratory investigation. Consequently, the findings must be interpreted with this in mind.

IV. STATISTICAL PROCEDURES

The booklets returned by students who completed both instruments of the study were assigned individual case identification numbers. These identification numbers along with the basic data pertaining to the adolescent's political and personal attitudes, relevant background characteristics and to the agents of political socialization encountered, were coded by hand and submitted to a separate procedure for coding error over a period of twelve months after administration and prior to being punched on IBM cards and machine verified.⁵² Respondents' total scores for the respective attitude scales comprising the battery of political and personal attitude scales were computed separately by means of the scoring plan and procedures outlined above.⁵³ Afterwards, these total scores on these scales were transferred to their particular case IBM cards. The above computation and translocation of attitude scale total scores with other data transformation and analyses were accomplished through the use of a series of statistical routines and sub-routines from the Statistical Package for the Social

⁵²A summer research grant provided by the University of New Brunswick permitted the investigator to employ three senior political science students to code the above mentioned data.

⁵³See, pp. 119-120.

Sciences,⁵⁴ which were adapted for use with the IBM 370/158 computer at the University of New Brunswick. Statistical techniques appropriate to the data were then used in relation to each hypothesis advanced for investigation.⁵⁵

The first consideration was to test the significance of differences among eighth- through twelfth-graders' and among single-year age groups of the adolescents with respect to mean scores on the political and personal cynicism scales. A one-way analysis of variance was carried out to test Null Hypothesis I of the study.⁵⁶ This statistical technique was also utilized to test the significance of differences of group mean scores on the political and personal cynicism scales, with respect to levels of political influence of socialization agents and of selected relevant background characteristic variables of adolescents.

In as much as it was advisable to remove from the initial differences among grade eight through grade twelve, and/or thirteen year-old through eighteen year-old adolescent groups the effects due to their relevant background characteristic variables (uncontrolled factors), a one way analysis of covariance, with characteristic variables as covariates, was considered appropriate for testing Null

⁵⁴Norman H. Nie, Dale H. Bent and C. Hadlai Hull, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).

⁵⁵See Chapter I, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁶See Chapter I, p. 26.

Hypothesis II of the study.⁵⁷ This statistical procedure was employed, thus, to adjust for effects of uncontrolled variables and to permit thereby a more valid evaluation of the outcome of the study.

The following assumptions were made in the mathematical development of analyses of variance:

1. That the distribution of variances in the population from which the sample was drawn is normal.
2. That variances in the sub-populations from which group samples were drawn are equal. This is known as homogeneity of variance.
3. Effects of various factors on the total variation are additive.⁵⁸

Since the sample of the study is considered a large sample, and since no extreme departure from normality was detected by mere inspection of data, probabilities of computed F values can be employed as close approximations to the true probabilities. Further, D. J. Finney says:

The validity of the analysis of variance as a method of separating the total variation in a set of observations into components from different sources does not depend upon any assumption of normality. It requires only that the observations are independent and arise from the usual type of additive model.⁵⁹

The tenability of the second assumption of each analysis of variance carried out in the study was confirmed by employing the

⁵⁷See Chapter I, p. 26.

⁵⁸These assumptions are discussed in greater detail in Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 294-295.

⁵⁹D. J. Finney, An Introduction to the Theory of Experimental Design (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960), p. 18.

Cochran Test, as described by B. J. Winer.⁶⁰ The more complex Bartlett's Test was used where wide differences in cell frequency existed among groups of a characteristic variable. Variances of category groups were generally homogeneous in most cases. However, where reasonably small departures from the assumption of homogeneity of variance did occur, it is contended that these do not seriously affect the validity of inferences drawn from the data.⁶¹ The investigator was concerned only about relatively gross departures from the hypothesis of equal sample variances.

Additivity of effects has been simply assumed.

Whenever statistical tests on the difference between groups means were carried out, the following interpretations of differing levels of significance were used. If p is less than or equal to .05 ($p \leq .05$), then the difference is significant. If p is less than or equal to .01 ($p \leq .01$), the difference is very significant. If the value of p is between .10 and .05 or equal to .10 ($.05 < p \leq .10$), then a cautious interpretation is made that there is some difference between category groups. Therefore, no differences which were found to be significant beyond the .10 level were rejected out-of-hand as being due to chance. Rather, these findings have been reported on a tentative basis. Definite judgements concerning such differences found to be significant between the .10 and .05 levels have been withheld until such time as further research presents the opportunity

⁶⁰B. J. Winer, Statistical Principles in Experimental Design (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), pp. 94-95.

⁶¹Ferguson, op. cit., p. 295.

of corroborating or contradicting these tenuous findings. Conclusions reached in the study on the basis of statistical tests are relatively liberal, since the probability of indicating significant differences between category group means as a result of sampling error is .05.

Wherever a significant F ratio resulted following the application of an analysis of variance, the Scheffé S -method was employed to compare differences between pairs of means within each of the characteristic variables. Since this method permits the testing of differences among all possible means, a more meaningful interpretation of the data could be drawn than merely that category groups within characteristic variables were not the same. In addition, this method is affected very little if assumptions of normality and of homogeneity of variances are not satisfied. Finally, the Scheffé S -method is more appropriate when category group sizes differ markedly.⁶²

Since the Scheffé procedure is more rigorous than other methods of comparison of pairs of means with regard to Type I error, and since it leads to fewer significant results, the investigatory chose to employ a less rigorous level of significance when using the Scheffé S -method. The .10 level of significance was used instead of the .05 or .01 level. This is Scheffé's recommendation.⁶³

To test Hypothesis III,⁶⁴ the analysis focusses on a set of

⁶²William C. Guenther, Analyses of Variance (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 57-59; see also Henry Scheffé, The Analysis of Variance (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959) pp. 66-83.

⁶³Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 296-297.

⁶⁴See Chapter I, p. 26.

predictors (selected agents of politicization) which were hypothesized to relate to the development of political cynicism among adolescents. A major portion of this analysis will be devoted to an examination of the bivariate relationship of each of these four predictors to the criterion (political cynicism). Predictor variables can be either categorical or continuous. Since the first type is ideal for our data presentation, we treated these four predictor variables as categorical. For a number of reasons, it was felt to be desirable to treat the interval, or political cynicism, scales in the same manner; that is, to reduce each of them to a small number of categories. Simply, this permitted easy visual comparison of effects across both predictor and criterion variables. It also makes possible the use of a single multivariate analysis technique--one which can operate using both categorical and continuous variables. This technique is called Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA). A brief summary description is provided below.

The scales denoting the political influence and interest of agents of political socialization typically encountered in this study are indexes formed by the combination of two or more item-level responses. The resulting range of total scores was then collapsed, or bracketed, into dichotomous categories. The collapsing was done using more or less equal-sized intervals, with either category capturing the median score of the distribution. Often, these two categories include a larger interval in order to accommodate some of the extreme cases on a distribution.

The measure of association used to summarize bivariate relationships in this study was Eta, or the correlation ratio. This measure

was selected over the most common measure of association between two measure, the product-moment correlation, Pearson's r , for a number of reasons. First, Pearson's r is appropriate when the predictor being examined is a continuous, normally-distributed variable that relates to a criterion in a linear fashion. However, these conditions do not appear to hold for the various measures of political influence under investigation. These predictors are categorical but, by definition, we cannot assume that they are normally distributed or continuous nor that they are related to political cynicism in a linear fashion. Accordingly, a universal measure of relationship which could be used with every type of predictor was needed for this study. Eta is just such a measure. This is a correct coefficient to employ in examining relationships between sets of data when deviation from linearity is suspected.⁶⁵ Here, Bachman's description is helpful.

Eta is analogous in some ways to r , and to a degree it can be interpreted similarly. The most important differences are (a) Eta can be used with categorical variables, thus making it particularly appropriate for such predictor as race or geographical region; (b) it is not restricted to linear relationships. Another difference between Eta and r is trivial but potentially confusing; Eta has a range from zero to 1.00; it never takes a negative value when describing a relationship. In general, the absolute values of Eta and r are practically identical, when applied to interval or ratio scale data, whenever the association between predictor and criterion turns out to be linear; when the association is non-linear, Eta is larger than r . This means that Eta is better suited for many exploratory analyses, because of its ability to detect linear and non-linear associations equally well. Another

⁶⁵N. M. Downie and R. W. Heath, Basic Statistical Methods (2d ed.; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 199.

advantage of Eta is that it works for a wider range of predictors, since any continuous variable can be made categorical but many categorical variables cannot be treated as continuous.⁶⁶

For the reasons noted above, Eta is used almost exclusively here in reporting bivariate relationships between predictors and attitudes of political cynicism. While Eta indicates the strength of an association between two measures, Eta-square denotes what proportion of the total variance in feelings of political cynicism, the criterion, can be accounted for by the particular agent of politicization, or predictor.

It was noted earlier that an objective of this investigation was to look beyond the bivariate relationships and to discover the impact of the four agents of political socialization, or predictor dimensions, taken together upon the development of feelings of cynicism toward political processes and politicians among adolescents. Such analysis requires the use of a multivariate technique and the one utilized in this investigation is called Multiple Classification Analysis.⁶⁷ MCA permits predicting to a criterion dimension such as political cynicism using a number of predictor dimensions such as

⁶⁶Jerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Vol. II, The Impact of Family Background and Intelligence on Tenth-Grade Boys (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), p. 7; see also Downie and Heath, op. cit., pp. 199-203.

⁶⁷MCA is described in considerable detail by Bachman, The Impact of Family Background and Intelligence on Tenth-Grade Boys, pp. 62-75; a complete description of the MCA model and the corresponding computer program is provided by Frank Andrews, James Morgan and John Sonquist, Multiple Classification Analysis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1969). Much of the following introduction in this and next paragraphs is adapted from a briefer summary presented by Jerald G. Bachman, Swayzer Green and Ilona D. Wirtanen, Youth in Transition, Vol. III, Dropping Out-Problem or Symptom? (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1971), pp. 46-48.

agents of politicization and background characteristic variables simultaneously. It computes a multiple correlation coefficient, R , which when squared provides an estimate of the total variance in the criterion explainable by all predictors operating together. It may be helpful to think of MCA as a form of multiple regression analysis that has a good deal of extra freedom. Most important, it treats predictors as nominal scales, which means that, for some predictors, a curvilinear relationship does not get forced into a straight-line "compromise" estimate. In addition, MCA can handle a wide range of relationships among predictors which is an important feature in dealing with highly correlated dimensions. Finally, MCA can handle missing data on any particular predictor simply by treating absence of data as another prediction category.

One other feature of MCA needs to be noted here. It is a procedure that can be used to detect overlap among predictors. This can be accomplished by comparing two summary statistics provided for each of the predictors. One is eta-value, or the correlation ratio. As described earlier, this measure indicates the degree of the relationship between predictor and criterion variables. But, this measure also includes the unique effect of the particular predictor that results from its relationship with other predictors in the equation. The other summary statistic provided by MCA is an estimate, termed beta, of the separate effect of each predictor with its relationship with the other predictors in the equation statistically controlled. To the extent that eta and beta values differ, this will be utilized as an indication of how much a particular predictor overlaps with other factors being considered in the equation.

Testing of the Null Hypothesis IV of the study⁶⁸ was carried out by the use of multiple regression analysis. This statistical procedure is an adaptation of that recommended by Ferguson.⁶⁹ The technique of multiple regression was employed because it was desired to determine relative contribution of the independent and control variables in predicting score of political attitude scales. This procedure then permits the selection of a number of variables which provide the best possible estimate of attitude scale measures.

In regard to Null Hypothesis V advanced in the study,⁷⁰ relationships involved were treated by the calculation of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. These, afterwards, were submitted to a "t-test" to determine their significance from zero.⁷¹

Statistical significance, as presented, is an indication of whether or not a relationship that is observed is haphazard or is the result of some systematic variation. However, when sample size is as large as it is in the present investigation, many relationships meet the criterion of statistical significance without being substantively significant.⁷² Since substantive significance is in large measure a matter of personal judgement, findings are presented in a form that permits the reader to make his own judgement about their

⁶⁸See Chapter I, p. 26.

⁶⁹Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 385-390.

⁷⁰See Chapter I, p. 27.

⁷¹Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

⁷²This does not mean that many of the relationships which will be discussed in the following two chapters are not statistically trustworthy.

substantive significance. Accordingly, we report overall relationships in terms of strength of association and amount of variance explained; and, when we contrast subgroups, we consider the extent to which they overlap as well as differ. Two other statistics are also used to summarize bivariate relationships in the case of tables greater than 2×2 . One is Cramer's V , a measure of association of nominal level data.⁷³ The other is gamma, a measure of ordered predictive association, which is employed in this study, instead of the Pearson's r , to summarize relationships between ordinal-level scales that have been combined into single summary scales. Gamma was chosen over other rank-order measures because of the fact that it ignores "ties" in rankings on the predictor and criterion variables.⁷⁴ Another practice involves presenting more data than we discuss so that when a reader wishes to examine a set of findings closely, he is able to do so. Much of this extra information has been placed in Appendix C, although some also appears in tables within the following two chapters.

Computational procedures for analyses of variance (ANOVA), covariance (ANCOVA), multiple regression as described by Ferguson,⁷⁵ and Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) have been programmed for

⁷³Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), pp. 229-230; and Nie, Bent and Hull, op. cit., p. 276.

⁷⁴Dean J. Champion, Basic Statistics for Social Research (Scranton, Penn.: Chandler Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 219-224; William Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 655; and Blalock, op. cit. (2d ed.), pp. 424-426.

⁷⁵See Ferguson, op. cit., Chapters 18, 20 and 24.

use with the University of New Brunswick's computer. Programs were made available to the investigator by personnel of the Division of Educational Research Services, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, and the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan. Processing of the resultant data was executed over a fifteen-month period on an International Business Machine 370/158 computer with the use of suitable programs both in Fortran and APL/360 languages available in the computing facilities at the University of New Brunswick.

The present chapter has been a description of instruments employed to collect the data of the investigation, of the research design and of statistical procedures followed in analyzing the data of the investigation. The following chapters present the results of the analyses of the data.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION: EFFECTS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYNICISM

In the preceding chapters, problems under consideration have been stated, hypotheses pertinent to the problem have been formulated, and specific procedures for testing these hypotheses have been outlined. Results of the study are presented in the next two chapters. In the first of these chapters, the present one, we begin by considering findings from the statistical analyses on the relationships between the two measures of political cynicism, the dependent variables, and school grade plus age, the independent variables. Immediately after, the association between personal cynicism and school grade plus age will be examined. Having discussed the two independent variables which, at least initially, seem to be most able to evince developmental changes in the inculcation of political and personal cynicism among adolescents, it seems sensible to move to a consideration of the respective bivariate interrelationships between those "heuristically" selected socio-political background characteristic variables--alternating both as independent variables and control variables in this research project--and feelings of political and personal cynicism. Thus, the third part of this chapter analyzes the impact of sex, socioeconomic level, religious preference, area of residence, length of residence in communities, federal and provincial political party preferences, and

type of school system (that is, whether public, separate or composite general) upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism. The second part of the analysis, presented in Chapter six, will deal with the role played by the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media--political socializing agencies--upon the development of political and personal cynicism. All tables relating to our results are presented either in these two chapters or in Appendix C at the end of the study.

I. FINDINGS FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSES: SCHOOL GRADE AND AGE FOR POLITICAL CYNICISM

Generally, each of the null hypotheses tested in this section, is stated immediately before the presentation of results of appropriate statistical tests. The presentation of each set of results is followed by an unassuming interpretation.

Test of Hypothesis I - School Grade

Null Hypothesis I. There are no significant differences among grade-level mean scores obtained by adolescents in grades eight, nine, ten, eleven and grade twelve on (a) the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale and (b) the Political Cynicism Scale.

Table 10 lists group means and standard deviations for each attitude scale. Table 11 summarizes the results of analyses of variance carried out on the two political cynicism scale total scores. In Table 11, and in succeeding tables that summarize analyses of variance carried out on attitude scale scores, the following abbreviations are used:

N represents the number of adolescents' total scores involved

Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations of School Grade Variable's
Groups for Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	369	47.290	9.415
	Grade 9	311	44.106	9.134
	Grade 10	307	46.013	8.855
	Grade 11	307	45.065	8.820
	Grade 12	276	44.815	10.106
	Total	1570	45.540	9.321
Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	369	24.501	7.325
	Grade 9	311	23.344	5.715
	Grade 10	307	23.834	5.260
	Grade 11	307	23.769	5.134
	Grade 12	276	23.634	5.178
	Total	1570	23.846	5.866

Table 11

Summary of Analyses of Variance of School Grade Variable's
Group Mean Scores for Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	2051.00	4	512.75		
	WTH	134366.00	1565	85.86	5.97	.0001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	250.94	4	62.73		
	WTH	53775.81	1565	34.36	1.83	.12

 $F_{.10}(4,1565) = 1.94$
 $F_{.05}(4,1565) = 2.37$
 $F_{.01}(4,1565) = 3.32$

\bar{X} represents a group mean score

SS represents the "sum of squares" or the "sum of squares of differences between each score and the particular group mean"

$$[\text{i.e., } \sum_{i=1} (X_{ij} - \bar{X}_i)]$$

MS represents the mean square of variance estimate

MS_{GRP} represents the between-groups mean square

MS_{WTH} represents the within-groups or error mean square

F represents the F-ratio obtained by dividing MS_{GRP} by MS_{WTH}

$F_{.05} (4, 1565)$ represents the value of F required for significance at the .05 level with 4 degrees of freedom associated with the MS_{GRP} and 1565 degrees of freedom associated with MS_{WTH} (Critical F-ratio)

P represents estimate of probability that a significant difference among group mean scores occurs as a result of sampling error, or chance.

As shown immediately below Table 11, the critical F-ratio for .10-, .05- and .01-level tests and associated degrees of freedom in this instance are 1.94, 2.37 and 3.32, respectively.¹ This means that (1) there is some suggestion of a statistically significant difference among group mean scores if the appropriate F-ratio exceeds 1.94; (2) there is a statistically significant difference among group mean scores if the appropriate F-ratio exceeds 2.37; and (3) there is a highly statistically significant difference among group mean scores if the appropriate F-ratio exceeds 3.32. The use of an .05-level test ensures that differences among mean scores would not be considered significant unless they could only occur as a result of sampling error

¹These critical values of F were obtained from a table presented in B. J. Winer, Statistical Principles and Experimental Designs (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p. 646.

in less than five out of one hundred such sample mean score comparisons.

Analyses of variance were used to compare eighth through twelfth grade group means on the two scales of political cynicism. Inspection of the F-ratios in Table 11 shows that, while there was a highly significant difference among the group mean scores for the five grades on the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale, there exists no significant difference among the group mean scores on the Political Cynicism Scale. Since the observed F-ratios (5.97) computed in comparing the mean scores among the five school grade levels on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale exceeded the .01 critical value (3.32), null hypothesis 1(a) was rejected.

No statistically significant difference among group mean scores of school grade variable was found on the Political Cynicism Scale. Although differences among group mean scores on this scale are not statistically significant, the direction and pattern of differences generally followed that which was exhibited by mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale. Still, in light of the analysis of variance, null hypothesis 1(b) was accepted.

Since a significant difference was found among grade eight, nine, ten, eleven and twelve's mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale, the Scheffé S-method was employed to test further which of the mean school grade group scores contributed most to the significant F-ratio observed in Table 11.

Results of this technique indicate that grade eight adolescents, as a whole, scored significantly higher on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale than the grade nine, eleven and twelve adolescents. Although grade eight adolescents did achieve a higher score than did grade ten

adolescents on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale, this difference cannot be considered significant. Table 12 shows a summary of probability matrices obtained by use of the Scheffé S-method in each of these inter-school grade group mean score comparisons for both political cynicism scales.

The table of matrix is read from left to right. For each contrast, there is a double entry in the body of the table. The upper entry is the absolute difference between group mean scores being compared. The lower entry, enclosed between parentheses, is the probability statement of level of significance; that is, the probability of committing a Type I error by rejecting a true hypothesis. If the probability is less than or equal to .10 level of significance ($p \leq .10$), means are considered to be significantly different.

Results yielded by grade on political cynicism measures were somewhat equivocal. Only three of ten comparisons among school grade groups' mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale reached the .10 level of significance or a higher level; grade eight adolescents obtained a statistically significant higher score than did grade nine, eleven and twelve adolescents. The other seven comparisons on this scale and all ten comparisons on the Pol. Cyn. Scale were not statistically significant, although differences were mostly in the same direction for both measures of political cynicism. It was interesting to note that grade eight and grade ten adolescents scored consistently higher than did grade nine, eleven and twelve adolescents, and that grade nine adolescents scored consistently the lowest on the two scales that assess respondents' degree of political cynicism. In light of the information provided by analyses of variance and the Scheffé technique, the investigator

Table 12

Probability Matrices for Scheffé' Multiple Comparisons of School Grade Variable's
Group Mean Scores on Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	means	47.29	44.11	46.01	45.06	44.82
	Grade 8	47.29	3.18 (.00)***	1.28 (.53)	2.23 (.05)**	2.37 (.02)**
	Grade 9	--	--	1.90 (.16)	0.95 (.80)	0.71 (.93)
	Grade 10	--	--	--	0.95 (.81)	1.19 (.66)
Pol. Cyn.	Grade 11	--	--	--	--	0.24 (.999)
	means	24.50	23.34	23.83	23.77	23.63
	Grade 8	24.50	1.16 (.16)	0.67 (.70)	0.73 (.62)	0.87 (.48)
	Grade 9	--	--	0.49 (.90)	0.43 (.94)	0.29 (.99)
Grade 10	23.83	--	--	--	0.06 (1.00)	0.20 (.997)
	Grade 11	--	--	--	--	0.14 (.999)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

concluded that eight- and ten-graders, as a whole, scored higher on the two measures of political cynicism than nine-, eleven- and twelve-graders, or, vice-versa, that nine-graders consistently achieved a lower score on both measures of political cynicism than eight-, ten-, eleven- and twelve-graders. No definite explanation could be given for these results. The researcher would speculate that differences resulted from variables other than the one under investigation such as, perhaps, socioeconomic levels. Further attempt at explanation of these results will be provided after examining differences among chronological age groups' mean scores obtained on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. and the Pol. Cyn. Scales.

Test of Hypothesis II - Chronological Age

Null hypothesis II. There is no significant difference among the group mean scores obtained by those adolescents who are up to age thirteen, age fourteen, age fifteen, age sixteen, age seventeen and age eighteen and over on (a) the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale and (b) the Political Cynicism Scale.

Table 13 summarizes mean scores and standard deviations, respectively, obtained by the several different age groups of adolescents on both measures of political cynicism. Summaries of computed F-ratios for age group mean score differences are presented in Table 14.

Since the resulting F-ratios (1.10 and 0.24) yielded in testing the significant of differences among group mean scores of six age levels on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Pol. Cyn. Scale failed to exceed the .10 critical value (1.85), null hypotheses 11(a) and 11(b) were accepted.

Table 13

Means and Standard Deviations of Age Variable's Groups
for Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Age 13	185	46.189	8.977
	Age 14	321	46.065	9.922
	Age 15	322	44.683	8.913
	Age 16	317	45.713	8.535
	Age 17	267	45.037	9.928
	Age 18	151	45.616	9.680
	Total	1563	45.505	9.314
Pol. Cyn.	Age 13	185	23.649	7.493
	Age 14	321	23.950	6.240
	Age 15	322	23.739	5.804
	Age 16	317	23.618	5.047
	Age 17	267	24.064	5.285
	Age 18	151	23.801	5.313
	Total	1563	23.809	5.843

Table 14

Summary of Analyses of Variance of Age Variable's Group
Mean Scores for Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	478.00	5	95.60		
	WTH	135128.00	1557	86.79	1.10	.36
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	42.50	5	8.30		
	WTH	53318.44	1557	34.24	0.24	.94

$$F_{.10}(5,1557) = 1.85$$

$$F_{.05}(5,1557) = 2.21$$

$$F_{.01}(5,1557) = 3.02$$

Since there was no support in the above analyses of data for the notion of statistically significant differences among age group mean scores on the two measures of political cynicism, the investigator concluded that, across the age variable, group mean scores tended to remain relatively similar. Put differently, adolescents who either are up to age thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen or seventeen did not score significantly higher or lower than those adolescents of age eighteen and over on the two measures of political cynicism which were incorporated in instruments of this study.

We had expected to discover less political cynicism among the younger adolescents, or among those in the lower school grades, than we did. In the present analysis, these expectations are not borne out by the data. However, forewarned by Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron's findings, which reveal that, in the Appalachian region of the United States, children tend to become cynical toward the political system relatively early in life and stay that way with increasing age,² we were not overly surprised to find younger adolescents as politically cynical as older adolescents. What we were totally unprepared for was the prevalent fluctuating pattern of feelings of political cynicism encountered among the age-grade groups. Intuitively, one would also expect to uncover positive correlations between age and school grade variables and political cynicism. Yet, in the adolescent sample of the study, correlations were quite weak and mostly negative: Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale with grade, $r = -.07$, $p = .004$; with age, $r = -.03$,

²Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), p. 570.

$p = .15$; and Pol. Cyn. Scale with grade, $r = -.04$, $p = .08$; and with age, $r = .006$, $p = .40$. Substantively, although some of these correlations are statistically significant at the .05 level--perhaps, as a result of the sample size--we must interpret these correlations with caution, since they may lead us into the realm of idiosyncratic results.

Be that as it may, the balance of the evidence reveals that younger respondents tend to manifest a less favorable political outlook than did their older counterparts. Regardless of the political cynicism measure used, the responses of our sample stand in contrast to other researches. The negative political orientation of cynicism of these adolescents does not change greatly with increasing age. That this is the case is revealed by the nonsignificant F -ratios computed in testing the relationship between age and political cynicism measures. Moreover, and also in some contrast to findings of other investigations on the development of political cynicism, the negative political orientation of cynicism appears to have germinated during earlier school grades among the adolescents of the study. That this is so is illustrated by the significant F values yielded by comparing inter-school grade group mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale.

Turning to a re-examination of bivariate relationships between school grade and age variables and political cynicism which makes use of the collapsed measures of political cynicism, the data provide, in attenuated forms, essentially the same patterns of relationship as those reported above. The necessary data are supplied by Tables 15 and 16 which summarized results of the cross-tabulation procedure. The main entry in each cell is the percent of respondents by column,

Table 15
Political Cynicism by School Grade

Scales	Groups	Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	26.8% (99)	37.9% (118)	30.3% (97)	33.2% (102)	39.1% (108)
	Medium	30.1 (111)	35.0 (109)	32.9 (101)	37.1 (114)	30.1 (83)
	High	43.1 (159)	27.0 (84)	36.8 (113)	29.6 (91)	30.8 (85)
	N	(369)	(311)	(307)	(307)	(276)
$\chi^2 = 30.75, p > .10; \text{tau-b}^3 = -.07, p > .01;$ Gamma = $-.09$, Somer's D = $-.02$						
Pol. Cyn.	Low	32.0% (118)	36.7% (114)	31.6% (97)	33.9% (104)	35.1% (97)
	Medium	27.1 (100)	34.1 (106)	39.4 (121)	40.1 (123)	39.9 (110)
	High	40.9 (151)	29.3 (91)	29.0 (89)	26.1 (80)	25.0 (69)
	N	(369)	(311)	(307)	(307)	(276)
$\chi^2 = 31.95, p > .01; \text{tau-b} = -.06, p > .01;$ Gamma = $-.08$; Somer's D = $-.06$						

³The agreement between independent and dependent variables is indicated by a tau-b (also called tau-beta) correlation coefficient, a statistic nearly unaffected by the use of three or more categories of political cynicism scale spectra generated by the aggregation of measures of political cynicism's total scores. The magnitude of this statistic, tau-b, reflects the twin facts of the presence of exact agreement and the absence of many wide differences between independent and dependent variables. See George A. Ferguson, *Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education* (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 220-225, 365-369.

Table 16
Political Cynicism by Age

Scales	Groups	Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	28.6% (53)	33.3% (107)	35.4% (114)	30.3% (96)	37.1% (99)	33.8% (51)
	Medium	36.2 (67)	28.7 (92)	34.5 (111)	35.6 (113)	31.8 (85)	31.8 (48)
	High	35.1 (65)	38.0 (122)	30.1 (97)	34.1 (108)	31.1 (83)	34.4 (52)
	N	(185)	(321)	(322)	(317)	(267)	(151)
$\chi^2 = 10.8$, $p = .37$; $\text{tau-b} = -.03$, $p = .06$; $\text{Gamma} = -.04$; $\text{Somer's D} = -.02$							
Pol. Cyn.	Low	37.8% (70)	32.7% (105)	32.6% (105)	34.4% (109)	32.2% (86)	35.8% (54)
	Medium	26.5 (49)	34.0 (109)	36.3 (117)	37.5 (119)	40.4 (108)	38.4 (58)
	High	35.7 (66)	33.3 (107)	31.1 (100)	28.1 (89)	27.3 (73)	25.8 (39)
	N	(185)	(321)	(322)	(317)	(267)	(151)
$\chi^2 = 13.60$, $p = .19$; $\text{tau-b} = -.03$, $p = .05$; $\text{Gamma} = -.04$; $\text{Somer's D} = -.02$							

whereas the entry between parentheses presents number of respondents, likewise, by column. Again, we expected to find pronounced differences among age-school grade groups on indicators of political cynicism. The diversity among age-school grade groups in political cynicism was not as striking as we initially expected. In short, these findings generally repeat the slight, non-expected, negative relationships already reported between these two variables, school grade and age, and political cynicism.

Thus far, we have considered the relationship of school grade and age variables with measures of political cynicism unadjusted for effects of any other relevant background factors. We are now in the position to consider the unique effect of each school grade and age variables on political cynicism mean scores after removing effects that could be attributed to other explanatory factors.

Test of Hypothesis III - School Grade and Age Variables

Null hypothesis 111. Even when group differences in regard to relevant socio-psychological background factors are taken into account, there are no significant differences among the group mean scores on (a) the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale and (b) the Political Cynicism Scale obtained by those adolescents who are eighth- through twelfth-graders, or among those who are thirteenth- through eighteenth-years of age.

Since no experimental procedures could be employed to control for effects of selected socio-political background characteristic variables, and since, in all probability, there are significant differences among definite group mean scores within certain selected characteristic variables on either measure of political cynicism or on both, it was felt desirable to remove statistically any bias introduced by these conjectural differences in selected background characteristic variables on political cynicism scale total scores. Analyses of covariance were used as a statistical control technique to adjust for effects of uncontrolled variables. This statistical procedure permits the making of unbiased comparisons among age-grade groups' mean political cynicism scores. The covariates used were the nine selected relevant

socio-political background characteristic variables.

School grade and age group mean scores on the two political cynicism scales unadjusted and adjusted for effects of nine selected background characteristic variables, are presented in Tables 17 and 18. Comparisons between unadjusted and adjusted school grade and age groups' mean political cynicism scores are provided by Figures 2 and 3, Appendix C, pages 365 and 366.

A five by nine analysis of covariance, using the school grade variable, and a six by nine analysis of covariance, using the age variable by selected characteristic variables, were performed on the two political cynicism scale scores. Results of these analyses are presented in Tables 19 and 20. The observed, adjusted F-ratios associated with comparisons among school grade group mean score differences on the two measures of political cynicism did exceed critical values required for acceptable levels of significance.

Since significant differences were found among adjusted school grade group mean scores on the two measures of political cynicism, the Scheffé S-method was employed to test further which of the mean grade group scores contributed most to the significant F-ratios observed in Table 19. Results of this technique indicate that both grade eight and ten groups, as a whole, scored significantly higher than the grade nine group on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and that the grade nine group scored significantly lower than the grade twelve group on the Pol. Cyn. Scale. Table 21, page 173, shows matrices of F values obtained by use of the Scheffé S-method in each of these inter-school grade group mean score comparisons for two measures of political cynicism. Again, the table of matrix is read from left to right. For each

Table 17

School Grade Variable's Group Mean Scores Unadjusted
and Adjusted for Effects of Nine Characteristic
Variables on Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Grade	Unadjusted Group Mean Scores	Adjusted Group Mean Scores
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	47.29	46.64
	Grade 9	44.11	43.75
	Grade 10	46.01	46.48
	Grade 11	45.06	44.92
	Grade 12	44.82	45.72
Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	24.50	24.04
	Grade 9	23.34	23.17
	Grade 10	23.83	24.01
	Grade 11	23.77	23.54
	Grade 12	23.63	24.51

Table 18

Age Variable's Group Mean Scores Unadjusted and Adjusted
for Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables on
Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Age	Unadjusted Group Mean Scores	Adjusted Group Mean Scores
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Age 13	46.19	45.82
	Age 14	46.06	45.47
	Age 15	44.68	44.86
	Age 16	45.71	45.82
	Age 17	45.04	45.46
	Age 18	45.62	45.95
Pol. Cyn.	Age 13	23.65	23.46
	Age 14	23.95	23.58
	Age 15	23.74	23.74
	Age 16	23.62	23.62
	Age 17	24.06	24.31
	Age 18	23.80	24.38

Table 19

Summary of Analyses of Covariance of School Grade Variable's
Group Mean Scores for Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	df	MS	Adj. F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	4 1556	449.70 81.36	5.53	> .001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	4 1556	73.58 31.89	2.31	.056

$$F_{.10}(4,1556) = 1.94$$

$$F_{.05}(4,1556) = 2.37$$

$$F_{.01}(4,1556) = 3.32$$

Table 20

Summary of Analyses of Covariance of Age Variable's Group
Mean Scores for Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	df	MS	Adj. F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	5 1548	41.75 82.35	0.51	.771
Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	5 1548	31.80 31.78	1.00	.416

$$F_{.10}(5,1548) = 1.85$$

$$F_{.05}(5,1548) = 2.21$$

$$F_{.01}(5,1548) = 3.02$$

Table 21

F Values' Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons of School
Grade Variable's Group Mean Scores Adjusted for Effects
of Nine Characteristic Variables on Two
Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups		Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Gr.-Jo.	Means		46.64	43.75	46.48	44.92	45.72
Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	46.64	--	2.89 (4.33)***	0.16 (0.01)	1.72 (1.52)	0.92 (0.41)
	Grade 9	43.75	--	--	2.73 (3.54)***	1.17 (0.65)	1.97 (1.74)
	Grade 10	46.48	--	--	--	1.56 (1.15)	0.76 (0.26)
	Grade 11	44.92	--	--	--	--	0.80 (0.29)
Pol. Cyn.	Means		24.04	23.17	24.01	23.54	24.51
	Grade 8	24.04	--	0.87 (1.00)	0.03 (0.00)	0.50 (0.33)	0.47 (0.21)
	Grade 9	23.17	--	--	0.84 (0.85)	0.37 (0.17)	1.34 (2.06)*
	Grade 10	24.01	--	--	--	0.47 (0.27)	0.50 (0.28)
	Grade 11	23.54	--	--	--	--	0.97 (1.07)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

$F_{.10}(4,1556) = 1.94$

$F_{.05}(4,1556) = 2.37$

$F_{.01}(4,1556) = 3.22$

contrast, there is a double entry in the body of the table. The upper entry is the absolute difference between group mean scores being compared. The lower entry, enclosed between parentheses, is the F value obtained in comparing pair of mean scores. The regions of significance are provided at the bottom of the table.⁴

As shown in Table 20, computed adjusted F-ratios associated with comparisons among age group mean score differences on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Pol. Cyn. Scale did not exceed critical values required for any acceptable level of significance. These findings do not support the notion of statistically significant mean score differences among thirteenth- through eighteenth-years of age adolescent groups on the above-mentioned political cynicism scales. Results seem to suggest that the, statistically non-significant, differences found among age group mean scores on political cynicism scales can be attributed, within limits of error, to the age variable and to no other causal circumstances.

On the basis of preceding statistical procedures, after comparing results obtained for school grade and age variables, we were puzzled by the fact that significant differences were found among school grade groups' mean scores while no significant differences reveal themselves among age groups' mean scores. Looking briefly at the data found in Table 9, page 143, we noted that grade groups are aggregate of various age groups. On the face of it, we suspected

⁴For formula, see John T. Roscoe, Fundamental Research Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 240.

that significant mean score differences found among school grade groups may be attributed, in part, to differences among age groups composing the various grade groups. The next step requires that we "break" the mean political cynicism scores of school grade groups by age groups. The results of this procedure are summarized in Tables 53 and 54, Appendix C, pages 367 and 368. The data in these two tables indicate that for all school grade groups, except for age fourteen group in grade ten group, the younger adolescents obtained lower mean scores than did older adolescents on both political cynicism scales. These findings lend support to the view that significant mean score differences among school grade groups may be attributable to inter-age groups' mean score differences.⁵

Given these preliminary findings, it seemed appropriate to re-adjust school grade groups' mean scores for effects of nine selected background characteristic variables plus the age variable, and, vice-versa, to re-adjust age groups' mean scores for effects of nine characteristic variables plus the school grade variable.

Table 22 presents school grade groups' mean political cynicism scores unadjusted and adjusted for effects of nine characteristic variables plus age variable, while Figure 4, Appendix C, page 369, provides pictorial comparisons of these unadjusted and adjusted group mean scores. Age group mean scores, unadjusted and adjusted for effects of nine characteristic variables plus school grade variable on both cynicism scales, are presented in Table 23, while graphic

⁵Results of the "breakdown" of mean political cynicism scores of age groups by school grade groups are summarized in Tables 55 and 56, Appendix C, pages 371 and 372.

Table 22

School Grade Variable's Group Mean Scores Unadjusted and Adjusted
for Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables Plus Age
Variable on Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Grade	Unadjusted Group Mean Scores	Adjusted Group Mean Scores
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	47.29	48.01
	Grade 9	44.11	44.43
	Grade 10	46.01	46.41
	Grade 11	45.06	44.09
	Grade 12	44.82	44.12
Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	24.50	25.19
	Grade 9	23.34	23.75
	Grade 10	23.83	23.95
	Grade 11	23.77	22.84
	Grade 12	23.63	23.16

Table 23

Age Variable's Group Mean Scores Unadjusted and Adjusted for
Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables Plus School Grade
Variable on Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Age	Unadjusted Group Mean Scores	Adjusted Group Mean Scores
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Age 13	46.19	44.22
	Age 14	46.06	44.32
	Age 15	44.68	44.56
	Age 16	45.71	46.31
	Age 17	45.04	46.80
	Age 18	45.62	47.63
Pol. Cyn.	Age 13	23.65	22.73
	Age 14	23.95	23.06
	Age 15	23.74	23.60
	Age 16	23.62	23.84
	Age 17	24.06	24.91
	Age 18	23.80	25.14

comparisons between age group unadjusted and adjusted mean scores are offered in Figure 5, Appendix, C, page 370.

A five by ten analysis of covariance, using the school grade by nine selected background characteristic variables plus age variable, and, six by ten analysis of covariance, using the age by nine selected background characteristic variables plus school grade variable, were performed on the two political cynicism scale mean scores; results of these analyses are presented in Tables 24 and 25, respectively. The observed, re-adjusted F-ratios associated with comparisons among school grade group mean score differences exceeded the critical value required for .01 level of significance on both political cynicism scales. However, computed F-ratios for comparisons among age group mean score differences failed to exceed critical values required for any acceptable level of significance on either of the two political cynicism scales. In light of these statistical tests, Null Hypotheses III (1a) and (1b) were rejected and III (2a) and (2b) were accepted.

Since significant differences were found among school grade groups' mean scores on both political cynicism scales, the Scheffé S-method was again employed to determine which of these group mean scores contributed most to the significant F-ratios observed in Table 24. Results of this analysis indicate that the grade eight and the grade ten groups scored significantly higher than the grade nine, eleven and twelve groups on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and that the grade eight group scored significantly higher than the grade nine, ten, eleven and twelve groups on the Pol. Cyn. Scale. Although differences among remaining group mean scores on the latter scale are not statistically significant, the direction of differences

Table 24

Summary of Re-Analyses of Covariance of School Grade Variable's
Group Mean Scores for Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	df	MS	Adj. F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	4 1555	563.14 81.10	6.94	> .001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	4 1555	110.65 31.69	3.49	> .01

$$F_{.10}(4,1555) = 1.94$$

$$F_{.05}(4,1555) = 2.37$$

$$F_{.01}(4,1555) = 3.32$$

Table 25

Summary of Re-Analyses of Covariance of Age Variable's
Group Mean Scores for Two Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	df	MS	Adj. F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	5 1547	123.71 82.11	1.51	< .10
Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	5 1547	45.20 31.74	1.42	< .10

$$F_{.10}(5,1547) = 1.85$$

$$F_{.05}(5,1547) = 2.21$$

$$F_{.01}(5,1547) = 3.02$$

reflects slightly higher scores among the grade ten group, as well. Table 26, page 180, supplies matrices of F values obtained by use of the Scheffé procedure in between grade group mean score paired comparisons for two political cynicism scales.

In a nutshell, results yielded by school grade on the two measures of political cynicism were somewhat ambiguous. Only six of the ten comparisons among inter-group mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale reached the .10 level of significance or better, while merely four out of ten comparisons on the Pol. Cyn. Scale attained the .10 level of significance. It was interesting to note that, as a whole, grade eight and ten adolescents consistently scored higher than grade nine, eleven and twelve adolescents on the two scales that assess the respondents' degree of political cynicism. That being so, data from the present analyses are fully consistent with our earlier findings: the two political cynicism scales do a nearly identical job in determining significant differences among school grade groups' mean scores. Thus, differences in feelings of political cynicism, although relatively small in magnitude, do exist among school grade groups. On the basis of the preceding evidence, the investigator concluded that the statistically significant differences found among school grade group mean political cynicism scores can be attributed, within limits of error, to the school grade variable and to no other causal circumstances.

An important finding in these previous analyses is that grade eight and ten adolescents report higher feelings of political cynicism than did grade nine, eleven and twelve adolescents. The data are

Table 26

F Values' Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons of School
Grade Variable's Group Mean Scores Adjusted for Effects
of Characteristic Variables Plus Age on Two
Political Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups		Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Gr.-Jo.		Means	48.01	44.43	46.41	44.09	44.12
Pol. Cyn.	Grade 8	48.01	--	3.58 (6.67)***	1.60 (1.32)	3.92 (7.94)***	3.89 (7.37)***
	Grade 9	44.43	--	--	1.98 (1.87)*	0.34 (0.06)	0.31 (0.04)
	Grade 10	46.41	--	--	--	2.32 (2.55)**	2.39 (2.56)**
	Grade 11	44.09	--	--	--	--	0.03 (0.00)
Pol. Cyn.		Means	25.19	23.75	23.95	22.84	23.16
	Grade 8	25.19	--	1.44 (2.76)**	1.24 (2.03)*	2.35 (7.30)***	2.03 (5.13)***
	Grade 9	23.75	--	--	0.20 (0.05)	0.91 (1.01)	0.59 (0.40)
	Grade 10	23.95	--	--	--	1.11 (1.49)	0.79 (0.72)
	Grade 11	22.84	--	--	--	--	0.32 (0.12)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

$F_{.10}(4,1555) = 1.85$

$F_{.05}(4,1555) = 2.21$

$F_{.01}(4,1555) = 3.02$

certainly provocative; taken at surface value, they suggest that certain younger adolescents in our sample have somewhat less trust toward political processes and politicians than older adolescents. On the face of it, the data suggest that a common assumption may be wrong, that is they indicate that feelings of political cynicism do not in fact increase linearly from early to late adolescence. Indeed, these school grade group differences leave us with difficult problems of interpretation. The possibility certainly exists that the higher level of political cynicism exhibited by grade eight and ten adolescents reflects the idiosyncrasy of the particular sample of adolescents involved in this investigation. But to consider that this is the whole explanation is to indulge in a great and misleading oversimplification--one that ignores notable and consistent differences in mean political cynicism score among school grade groups. More interesting is the possibility that the mean political cynicism score differences among school grade groups are real, and reflect the various psychological, and interpersonal political, transformations that may occur during the adolescent developmental stage which result from the problematic relationship between self, or self identity, and society during adolescence. We cannot underestimate the inevitability of turbulence, rebellion and upheaval in this stage of life. It would suffice here to emphasize that the direction and extent of adolescent psycho-political development would seem to result from a complex interplay of biological and cognitive maturations with the changing familial, social, educational, economic and political conditions that constitute the political environmental matrices in which adolescents develop.

Perhaps one of the critical, conscious issues during adolescence is the tension between political idealism and realism. For Joseph Adelson, "a [sic] ubiquitous feature of early adolescent political thought" is its "pervasive authoritarian bias."⁶ In the early years of adolescence, individuals are more likely to answer political items in terms of constraint and, more often than not, they tend to be cloudy about concepts such as political parties and party systems. Adelson feels that such cloudiness leads young adolescents to become vaguely suspicious and uneasy toward politics.⁷ The prevailing images of politics among adolescents stem from a certain idealist-realist tension which may lead these young people to view government and law as though of the sacred character, while partisan politics is considered "worldly, secular--and thus potentially corrupt."⁸ What this amounts to, according to Adelson, is that the youngsters' grasp of political principles and ideologies is dim, erratic and shifting at the onset of adolescence.⁹ In fact, Adelson contends that

the ideological capacity in adolescence is extremely rare, almost never found before the later years of high school, and even then only among the most intelligent, intellectually committed, and politically intense.¹⁰

⁶Joseph Adelson, "The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent," Daedalus, Vol. 100 (1971), p. 1024.

⁷Adelson, op. cit., p. 1025.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 1028.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 1027.

That being the case, it appears, at least for our sample, that adolescents' feelings of political cynicism are very much ad hoc at the earlier grade levels. Apparently, they simply answered each scale item as it came, seeming to make little effort to reflect a consistent political ethic. Accordingly, the erratic pattern of mean political cynicism score differences found among our youngest adolescents, in terms of school grade, may be due, in part, to a capriciousness and naivete that characterizes these younger adolescents' grasp of politics.¹¹

Moreover, Kenneth Keniston claims that, phenomenologically, adolescence or pseudo youth,¹² "is a time of alternating estrangement and omnipotentiality."¹³ The estrangement of adolescents entails feelings of isolation, unreality, mistrust, absurdity and disconnectedness from the political world, while the omnipotentiality of adolescents is shown in feelings of absolute freedom, of living in a world of pure possibilities, and of trustworthiness.¹⁴ Such feelings appear to be more intense during adolescence than in any other period of life. It could be argued, then, that much of the political psychopathology of adolescents involves such alternating feelings, experienced as the idealization-derealization of the political world. Possibly, what the school grade variable captures are such alternating

¹¹Adelson, op. cit., p. 1028.

¹²Kenneth Keniston, Youth and Dissent: The Rise of a New Opposition (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), p. 19.

¹³Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴Ibid.

cycles of feelings of trust-mistrust toward political processes and politicians among adolescents and, thus, reflects the political idealism-realism tension current within the Albertan adolescent society. In short, because both ideology and personality at this stage of development seem too fluid, too shifty to allow us more than the most hesitant of impressions, we cannot offer more than intuitive insights about grade eight and ten adolescent groups' mean political cynicism score anomalies. Moreover, we cannot provide a complete explanation for our findings of significant mean differences in political cynicism score among our school grade groups because a final verdict requires the use of longitudinal data.

Let us put the matter in slightly different terms. We can only speculate that the disclosed, unforeseen, differential rates of political cynicism's developmental changes among school grade groups may be explained by maturational propensities. We cannot begin to pinpoint the pattern of causation in this area, as our findings can only suggest the sensitivity of adolescents to different sorts of political stimuli and tensions at different school grades. For the present, it will be sufficient to note that our ability to reach conclusions about school grade group differences on the political cynicism scales is limited, in part, by our research and sampling techniques, and suffers from the lack of objective data concerning the political psychopathological malaises of adolescents. Based on the evidence presented by other researchers thus far, however, we can suggest that the meaningful differences among school grade groups' mean political cynicism scores are largely interpretable in terms of

discrepancies between political cathexis and cognition, or between political idealism, or utopia, and political realism of adolescents.

Turning now to comparisons of re-adjusted mean political cynicism scores among age groups, we find results from the re-analyses of covariance unambiguous. As disclosed by the data presented in Table 25, scarcely any differences remain in mean political cynicism score among age groups after adjusting these mean scores for the effects of the nine characteristics variables and the school grade variable. Both F-ratios computed in comparing re-adjusted mean scores of age groups failed to reach the .10 level of significance. Although differences among mean political cynicism scores for the age groups were not statistically significant, as shown by Figure 5, Appendix C, page 370, differences were mostly in the direction predicted. We found a tendency for older adolescents to score slightly higher than younger adolescents on both measures of political cynicism. On the whole, our data concerning the thirteenth through eighteenth years of age for our adolescents manifest a number of consistencies with recent studies dealing with the development of political cynicism among adolescents. In sum, the present study represents a very weak replication of findings presented in studies by Caroline Freeman,¹⁵ Schley Lyons¹⁶ and Sandra

¹⁵Caroline Smith Freeman, "The Origins of Political Cynicism: A Study of the Development of Political Orientations in Adolescents" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966), pp. 57-58.

¹⁶Schley R. Lyons, "The Political Socialization of Ghetto Children: Efficacy and Cynicism," Journal of Politics, Vol. 32 (May, 1970), p. 292.

Kenyon.¹⁷ The major point established by these findings was that feelings of political cynicism increase during the adolescent years, or with maturation.

We remain cautious about a very literal interpretation of the seemingly positive relation between age and development of political cynicism among adolescents as displayed in Figure 5, Appendix C, for re-adjusted group mean scores. However, a similar pattern of relationship is met with when we look at the age group scores on the Don't Know (DK) Political Cynicism Index.¹⁸

This measure of attitude acquisition, developed by Hess and Torney,¹⁹ is based in the present study on whether an adolescent expressed an opinion in response to items included in the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale.²⁰ The index was formed by summing the number of "Don't Know-No Opinion" responses from fifteen items comprising the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale. The possible minimum and maximum total scores were zero and fifteen, respectively. These total scores skewed noticeably to the right (skewness = .874) with a kurtosis of 1.074. The DK Political Cynicism Index's mean score was 3.302 and the median 3.016.

¹⁷Sandra J. Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism: A Study of Political Socialization." (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970), p. 53.

¹⁸See Chapter IV, pp. 121-122.

¹⁹Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 23-26.

²⁰No DK Index was computed for the Political Cynicism Scale as the response categories available for each item did not contain an "I don't know," or "I have no opinion," option.

The rate of acquisition of political cynicism is reflected by a decrease in the number of "Don't Know-No Opinion" responses among school grade and age variables' groups. Table 27 summarizes the computed DK Political Cynicism Index mean scores for school grade and age sub-groups. These data, along with those presented in Figures 6 and 7, Appendix C, page 373, which describe definite and growing relationships between school grade and age variables and feelings of political cynicism, suggest that the acquisition of Political Cynicism among our sample of adolescents proceeds at a slow pace from the eighth- through the twelfth-grade, or from the thirteenth- through the eighteenth-years of age. Strangely, however, significant differences were found among age groups' mean scores on the above-mentioned DK Index, as Table 28, page 189, shows. As the results presented in Table 30, page 190 demonstrate, the age thirteen group obtained a significantly higher mean score than did age sixteen, seventeen or eighteen groups; the age fourteen group also had a significantly higher mean score than age eighteen group on the DK Political Cynicism Index. Moreover, as is shown in Table 29, page 189 the grade eight and nine groups obtained significantly higher mean scores than the grade ten and twelve groups on the DK Index.

To summarize, there are significant mean score differences among both school grade and age groups on the DK Political Cynicism Index. By and large, the findings fit our expectations. Thus, it is possible to interpret these findings as evidence of a movement toward an increase in feelings of political cynicism among older, senior high-school students.

Table 27

Distribution of DK Political Cynicism Index's Mean
Scores for School Grade and Age Groups

Variables	Groups	Sum	Means	S. Dev.	N
School Grade	Grade 8	1332	3.610	2.424	369
	Grade 9	1139	3.662	2.610	311
	Grade 10	949	3.091	2.281	307
	Grade 11	977	3.182	2.404	307
	Grade 12	787	2.851	2.123	276
	Total	5184	3.302	2.398	1570
Age	Age 13	702	3.795	2.545	185
	Age 14	1117	3.480	2.488	321
	Age 15	1105	3.432	2.468	322
	Age 16	993	3.123	2.248	317
	Age 17	817	3.060	2.356	267
	Age 18	424	2.808	2.009	151
	Total	5158	3.300	2.391	1563

Concluding Comments: Section I.

Much data have been presented in this first part of the chapter to show developmental trends across school grade and age in feelings of political cynicism. Most of the data do not indicate the expected large, and statistically significant, developmental changes in political cynicism during the junior and senior high school years. Quite to the contrary, reported findings show relatively little in a way of developmental changes that can be used to distinguish politically trusting adolescents from cynical adolescents. There are exceptions, of course, and we have noted them. But the fact remains that, in most cases, the evidence demonstrates "almost no," or at best, "muted," developmental change in political cynicism among the adolescents. We have presented the data in some detail so that the reader could "see for himself." We

Table 28

Summary of Analyses of Variance of School Grade
and Age Variables' Group Mean Scores for DK
Political Cynicism Index

Variables	Source of Variation	df	MS	F	P
School Grade	GRP	4	37.3477		
	WTH	1565	5.6687	6.59	> .001
Age	GRP	5	24.4094		
	WTH	1557	5.6559	4.32	> .001

Table 29

F Values' Matrix for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons
of School Grade Variable's Group Mean Scores
on the DK Political Cynicism Index

Index	Groups		Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
DK Index		Means	3.61	3.66	3.09	3.18	2.85
	Grade 8	3.61	--	0.05 (0.02)	0.52 (2.00)*	0.43 (1.37)	0.76* (4.32)***
	Grade 9	3.66	--	--	0.57 (2.21)*	0.48 (1.57)	0.81 (4.23)***
	Grade 10	3.09	--	--	--	0.09 (0.05)	0.24 (0.37)
	Grade 11	3.18	--	--	--	--	0.33 (0.70)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

$F_{.10}(4,1565) = 1.94$

$F_{.05}(4,1565) = 2.37$

$F_{.01}(4,1565) = 3.32$

Table 30

F Values' Matrix for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons of
Age Variable's Group Mean Scores for DK
Political Cynicism Index

Index	Groups		Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
DK Index	Means		3.80	3.48	3.43	3.13	3.06	2.81
	Age 13	3.80	--	0.32 (0.56)	0.37 (0.74)	0.67 (2.43)**	0.74 (2.77)**	0.99 (5.32)***
	Age 14	3.48	--	--	0.05 (.02)	0.35 (0.90)	0.42 (1.19)	0.67 (2.13)*
	Age 15	3.43	--	--	--	0.30 (0.67)	0.37 (0.93)	0.52 (1.29)
	Age 16	3.13	--	--	--	--	0.07 (0.03)	0.32 (0.48)
	Age 17	3.06	--	--	--	--	--	0.25 (0.28)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

$F_{.10}(5,1557) = 1.85$

$F_{.05}(5,1557) = 2.21$

$F_{.01}(5,1557) = 3.02$

suspect that the pattern of development which has emerged may reflect either growing realism, greater sophistication in question answering, or perhaps some actual development in political cynicism among adolescents; quite likely, it is a mixture of these and other things. This does not mean that our measures of political cynicism were unable to make useful distinctions among school grade and age groups. In most cases, the measures showed some degree of change in feelings of political cynicism among these sub-groups, some expected most non-expected.

We have examined a great amount of data, and one conclusion seems clear: we see ample evidence that, singly, school grade is an inappropriate independent variable to utilize in an investigation which is concerned with developmental changes and patterns of acquisition relating to political cynicism among adolescents. Since each school grade group is, at best, a composite of various age groups, a faulty reading of data could very likely result. Thus, caution has to be exercised when it comes to drawing conclusions about, or predicting developmental changes and patterns of acquisition concerning political cynicism among adolescents if we limit our consideration solely to any manifested differences among school grade subgroups. Indeed, misleading conclusions could easily result especially since, as revealed by the relevant data, the school grade variable seems to have a notably independent impact upon the structuring and development of political cynicism among the adolescent respondents of this study.

On the whole, we do not suppose that our data represent an adequate basis of reaching firm conclusions about the age-school grade effects upon the development of political cynicism among adolescents. We have, it is true, found that, in general, younger adolescents tended

to score modestly lower than older adolescents on the two measures of political cynicism. But to say that the slightly higher scores obtained by the latter group are exclusively the fault of their maturation would intuitively ignore the operation of socio-political variables, and of pervasive agents of political socialization, upon the structuring of political cynicism. So our conclusion about age's nonvariant effects on measures of political cynicism is limited, as we said it would be. We have specifically avoided any firm conclusions about the lack of significant differences among age groups in mean political cynicism scores. In spite of these uncertainties, and in spite of the obvious sampling limitations acknowledged earlier, we feel that the data concerning the development of political cynicism among our sample of Albertan adolescents may add support to the view that there may be important age-related cultural differences in the development of negative political outlooks, such as political cynicism.

Of course, the present findings are only preliminary. Hopefully, they will be expanded and clarified by those specializing in the analysis of the development of political attitudes and of political socialization through longitudinal analyses, at some later point in time, with different sub-groups of the adolescent population. For the present, our tentative conclusion is that feelings of political cynicism do increase with maturation, though modestly. Moreover, we would say that development of political cynicism is not closely linked with school grades; rather, it may have more to do with the quality of interpersonal relations between self and society.

II. FINDINGS FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSES: SCHOOL GRADE AND AGE FOR PERSONAL CYNICISM

A short series of items were included in the attitudinal inventory as an attempt to elicit respondents' feelings toward people and toward society, as a whole. We expected that, in some instances, adolescents who feel cynical toward political processes and public officials would also show feelings of mistrust, or cynicism, toward societal processes and toward people, in general. To ascertain the adolescents' trust in people, ten items from the attitudinal inventory were combined into a summated scale to form a relatively objective indicator of respondents' feelings of personal cynicism. Since this more general notion of cynicism has been theoretically and empirically linked to political cynicism by various scholars,²¹ it seemed appropriate to focus some attention upon certain developmental aspects of this so-called "parent" disposition.

Test of Hypothesis IV - School Grade

Null Hypothesis IV. There are no significant differences among mean scores on the Personal Cynicism Scale obtained by groups of those adolescents who are in grade eight, grade nine, grade ten, grade eleven or grade twelve.

Table 31 shows mean scores and standard deviations for all five school grade groups on the Personal Cynicism Scale.²² An analysis of

²¹See Chapter III, pp. 85-89.

²²For convenience, data for age variable are presented together with data for school grade variable in this table and following tables. The data for age variable will be discussed later.

Table 31

Means and Standard Deviations of School Grade and Age
Variables' Groups for Personal Cynicism Scale

Variables	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
School Grade	Grade 8	369	27.355	6.058
	Grade 9	311	25.074	5.962
	Grade 10	307	25.932	5.841
	Grade 11	307	24.720	6.271
	Grade 12	276	23.757	5.760
	Total	1570	25.477	5.981
Age	Age 13	185	26.384	5.579
	Age 14	321	26.215	6.231
	Age 15	322	25.780	6.197
	Age 16	317	25.341	5.908
	Age 17	267	24.135	6.316
	Age 18	151	24.676	5.964
	Total	1563	25.464	6.065

Table 32

Summary of Analyses of Variance of School Grade and Age Variables'
Group Mean Scores for Personal Cynicism Scale

Variables	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
School Grade	GRP	2407.50	4	601.88		
	WTH	56120.31	1565	35.86	16.78	> .001
Age	GRP	939.81	5	187.96		
	WTH	57454.94	1557	36.90	5.09	> .001

$F_{.10}(4,1565) = 1.94$ $F_{.05}(4,1565) = 2.37$ $F_{.01}(4,1565) = 3.32$

$F_{.10}(5,1557) = 1.85$ $F_{.05}(5,1557) = 2.21$ $F_{.01}(5,1557) = 3.02$

variance was used to test the significance of differences among school grade group mean scores on the Personal Cynicism Scale. A detailed summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table 32. Inspection of the computed F-ratio shows that among the school grade groups there were significant differences in mean scores on the measure of personal cynicism. In light of this result, Null Hypothesis IV was rejected.

Since the test of significance for differences among school grade group mean personal cynicism scores yielded a significant F-ratio the Scheffé S-method was employed to further test which pairs of the grade group mean scores were significantly different. This procedure indicates that adolescents in grade eight obtained a significantly higher mean score than adolescents in the remaining four grades, and that adolescents in grade ten scored significantly higher than those in grade twelve, on the scale used to assess the respondents' degree of personal cynicism. Differences among other pairs of grade group mean scores were not statistically significant. Thus, data from this analysis seem not to differ from our earlier findings for the political cynicism scales. Table 33 provides the relevant data.

We do not know the extent to which these differences in personal cynicism among school grade groups result from the effect of the independent variable or from potential sources of bias, such as differences among background characteristic variables. Accordingly, to control, or to adjust, group mean scores for effects of background characteristic variables and age, analyses of covariance were again employed. Unadjusted and adjusted group mean scores are presented in Table 34, while Figure 8, Appendix C, page 376, provides comparisons among unadjusted and adjusted school grade groups' mean personal

Table 33

Probability Matrix for Scheffe' Multiple Comparisons of School
Grade Variable's Group Mean Scores on the
Personal Cynicism Scale

Scale	Groups		Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Per. Cyn.		Means	27.36	25.07	25.93	24.72	23.76
	Grade 8	27.36	--	2.28 (.001)***	1.42 (.051)*	2.64 (.001)***	3.60 (.001)***
	Grade 9	25.07	--	--	0.86 (.530)	0.35 (.969)	1.38 (.133)
	Grade 10	25.93	--	--	--	1.21 (.179)	2.17 (.001)***
	Grade 11	24.72	--	--	--	--	0.96 (.44)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

cynicism scores.²³ The results of the analyses of covariance are summarized in Table 35. Inspection of the F-ratios in Table 35 shows that there are statistically significant differences among adjusted mean personal cynicism scores of school grade groups as observed F-ratios exceed the critical value for the .10 level of significance. These findings support the notion that much of the variation in personal cynicism observed among school grade groups can be attributed to the influence of the school grade variable.

Since tests of significance of differences among adjusted group mean personal cynicism scores yielded significant F-ratios, the Scheffé S-method was employed to further test which pairs of the grade group mean scores were significantly different from one another. The results of this test are shown in Table 36. The use of this technique revealed some inconsistencies. For instance, when controlling for the effects of the nine characteristic variables plus age, the grade nine group obtained a significantly higher mean score than the grade twelve group on the measure of personal cynicism. However, when controlling only for the effects of the nine characteristics variables, the mean score differences between the grade nine and the grade twelve groups was not statistically significant, whereas the difference between the grade nine and ten groups was statistically significant. It is interesting to note, moreover, that the grade eight group, on the whole, consistently obtained higher mean personal cynicism scores than either grade nine, the grade eleven or the grade twelve group, whether or not the effect

²³Additional data are provided in Tables 57 and 58, Appendix C, pages 374 and 375.

Table 34

School Grade and Age Variables' Group Mean Scores Unadjusted and
Adjusted for Effects of Uncontrolled Variables
on Personal Cynicism Scale

Variables	Groups	Unadjusted Means	Means Adjusted For Background Factors only	Means Adjusted For Background Factors and Age or Grade
School Grade	Grade 8	27.36	27.08	27.77
	Grade 9	25.07	24.79	25.13
	Grade 10	25.93	26.15	26.12
	Grade 11	24.72	24.68	24.27
	Grade 12	23.76	24.24	23.44
Age	Age 13	26.38	26.40	24.60
	Age 14	26.22	25.89	24.60
	Age 15	25.78	25.81	25.46
	Age 16	25.34	25.41	25.95
	Age 17	24.13	24.44	25.94
	Age 18	24.68	24.62	26.50

Table 35

Summary of Analyses of Covariance of School Grade Variable's
Group Mean Scores for Personal Cynicism Scale

Group Means Adjusted for	Source of Variation	df	MS	Adj. F	P
Background Factors only	GRP	4	427.65		
	WTH	1556	33.17	12.89	> .001
Background Factors + Age	GRP	4	338.67		
	WTH	1555	33.11	10.23	> .001

Table 36

F Values' Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons of School Grade
Variable's Group Mean Scores Adjusted for Effects of Nine
Characteristic Variables and Age on the
Personal Cynicism Scale

Group Means Adjusted For	Groups		Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Background Factors Only	Means		27.08	24.79	26.15	24.68	24.24
	Grade 8	27.08	--	2.29 (6.67)***	0.93 (1.09)	2.40 (7.28)***	2.84 (9.60)***
	Grade 9	24.79	--	--	1.36 (2.15)*	0.11 (0.01)	0.35 (0.14)
	Grade 10	26.15	--	--	--	1.47 (2.50)**	1.91 (4.22)***
	Grade 11	24.68	--	--	--	--	0.44 (0.76)
Background Factors + Age	Means		27.77	25.13	26.12	24.27	23.44
	Grade 8	27.77	--	2.64 (8.88)***	0.65 (0.53)	3.50 (15.50)***	4.33 (22.35)***
	Grade 9	25.13	--	--	0.99 (1.14)	0.86 (0.86)	1.69 (3.15)**
	Grade 10	26.12	--	--	--	1.85 (3.97)***	2.68 (8.32)***
	Grade 11	24.27	--	--	--	--	0.83 (0.76)

* Significant at the .10 level $F_{.10}(4,1556) = 1.94$ $F_{.10}(4,1555) = 1.94$

** Significant at the .05 level $F_{.05}(4,1556) = 2.37$ $F_{.05}(4,1555) = 2.37$

*** Significant at the .01 level $F_{.01}(4,1556) = 3.32$ $F_{.01}(4,1555) = 3.32$

of the age variable is controlled along with the effects of the nine characteristic variables.

In the light of preceding statistical analyses, the investigator concluded that, on the whole, the mean personal cynicism score of the grade eight group significantly exceeded the mean scores of the grade nine, eleven and twelve groups, and that the grade ten group obtained a significantly higher mean score on the measure of personal cynicism than either the grade eleven or the grade twelve groups. Although the results yielded for the grade nine, eleven and twelve groups were somewhat tenuous, they suggest that the grade twelve group tended to score consistently lower than either grade nine or eleven group on the measure of personal cynicism. Table 59, Appendix C, page 377, presents data on this erratic, inverse relationship between school grade and personal cynicism.

Again, no definite explanation could be given for these results. However, our own data appear to be consistent with Bachman's findings. He reported that tenth-grade boys had somewhat less trust in people than adults.²⁴ Thus, the analysis of our data for school grade variable suggest that younger adolescents have somewhat less trust in people and societal processes than older adolescents. Following Bachman's general view, we are of the opinion that the personal cynicism differences among grade groups are real and in our case reflect the norms of present Albertan adolescent society.

²⁴Jerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Vol. II, The Impact of Family Background and Intelligence on Tenth-Grade Boys (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), p. 150.

Here, as in our earlier results connected with political cynicism, we cannot begin to pinpoint the patterns of causation in this area; but our findings once again suggest the importance of the school grade variable upon the structuring of feelings of personal cynicism among adolescents. Be that as it may, the researcher would speculate that much of the difference revealed among school grade group mean personal cynicism scores results from the effects of variables other than those under investigation in this study, for instance, from anti-utopian sentiment,²⁵ or from other psychological and interpersonal transformations which may occur during the adolescent stage of development. Further research is proposed to investigate these findings, using for instance, "utopianism" questions. No further attempt at explanation of these results is given here.

Test of Hypothesis V- Age

Null Hypothesis V. There are no significant differences among mean scores on the Personal Cynicism Scale obtained by groups of those adolescents who are up to age thirteen, age fourteen, age fifteen, age sixteen, age seventeen and age eighteen and over.

Mean personal cynicism scores for the several age groups are reported in Table 31, page 194, while a detailed summary of the analysis of variance carried out to test the significance of differences among group mean scores is given in Table 32, page 194. As reported in Table 32, the computed F-ratio shows that the age group differences in mean personal cynicism score are statistically significant. On the

²⁵See Adelson, op. cit., p. 1035.

basis of this statistical test, Null Hypothesis V was rejected.

Since significant differences were found among age group mean scores, the Scheffé S-method was employed to further test which of the age group mean score differences contributed most to the significant F-ratio observed in Table 32. These results are interesting for they indicate that younger adolescents, those of age thirteen, fourteen and fifteen, scored significantly higher than some older adolescents, those of age seventeen, on the measure of personal cynicism. Although the age thirteen, fourteen and fifteen groups obtained higher mean scores than the age sixteen and the age eighteen groups on the Personal Cynicism Scale, these differences were not statistically significant. No significant differences were found among the age thirteen, fourteen and sixteen groups, or among the age sixteen, seventeen and eighteen groups' mean scores on the latter attitude scale. These comparisons are presented in Table 37. In sum, results suggest a marked tendency among younger adolescents to have a less positive image toward people in general and toward societal processes than do older adolescents. Table 60, Appendix C, page 378, also reveals this negative trend.

Considerable caution was exercised in reporting these findings on the relationship between the age variable and the measure of personal cynicism. One can read into these results more than what may be there. We did find the above evidence surprising because, in light of the previous findings we reported for political cynicism, we expected that no statistically significant differences would occur among age groups on the obtained personal cynicism scores. But statistically significant differences did appear in our data.

Table 37
Probability Matrix for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons
of Age Variable's Group Mean Scores on
Personal Cynicism Scale

Scale	Groups	Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
Per. Cyn.	Means	26.384	26.215	25.780	25.341	24.135	24.676
	Age 13	26.384	--	.169 (.99)	.604 (.95)	1.043 (.63)	2.249 (.01)***
	Age 14	26.215	--	--	.435 (.98)	.874 (.65)	2.080 (.004)***
	Age 15	25.780	--	--	--	.439 (.98)	1.645 (.06)*
	Age 16	25.341	--	--	--	--	1.206 (.34)
	Age 17	24.134	--	--	--	--	--
							.541 (.98)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

We suspected that these differences might be due, in part, to the effects of uncontrolled background variables and of the school grade variable. In order to control statistically for any such biasing effects on personal cynicism scores introduced by these factors, two analyses of covariance were performed. In the first of these, only the nine background characteristic variables on which information was collected were used as covariates. Whereas in the second analysis of covariance the school grade variable was added as a covariate along with the same nine background characteristics covariates. The unadjusted and adjusted mean personal cynicism scores for the several age groups, which result from these analyses, are presented in Table 34, page 198. Figure 9 (in Appendix C, page 379) depicts the comparison between these sets of unadjusted and adjusted mean scores.

The pattern shown for the age-related acquisition of personal cynicism is quite different when mean scores are adjusted only for the nine background characteristics variables than when the adjustment takes into account the school grade variable as well as these background characteristics variables (see Figure 9). Not only is the age group-personal cynicism relation reversed in its pattern in the second case, but the statistically significant differences in mean personal cynicism score, formerly found among the age groups, disappears, whereas these differences remain statistically significant when adjustment in score is only made for the effects of the background characteristics variables. The documentation for these findings is found in Table 38.

The Scheffé S-method was used to test further which of the group mean score differences contributed most to the significant F-ratio reported in Table 38. This technique resulted in the identification of

Table 38

Summary of Analyses of Covariance of Age Variable's
Group Mean Scores for Personal Cynicism Scale

Group Means Adjusted for	Source of Variation	df	MS	Adj. F	P
Background Factors only	GRP WTH	5 1548	120.50 34.00	3.54	.003
Background Factors + Grade	GRP WTH	5 1547	35.17 33.64	1.04	<.10

the age thirteen group as the only one to differ significantly from the age seventeen group, but not from any of the remaining four age groups, in mean scores obtained on the Personal Cynicism Scale. Table 39, page 206 shows the F values obtained by use of the Scheffé S -method in this instance, with group means adjusted only for effects of nine background factors. Also reported in Table 39 are the computed F values for comparisons among age group mean personal cynicism scores adjusted for the effects of the background factors plus school grade. None of the adjusted F values observed associated with latter comparisons among age groups, were statistically significant at any of the acceptable levels of significance. We have noted them simply to show how small the differences among age group mean scores are, and thereby to indicate what little difference in levels of personal cynicism we have found among age group after "statistically controlling" for effects of nine background characteristics variables and school grade variable. Further, what differences there are among age groups lie in the direction of suggesting slightly higher personal cynicism feelings on the part of older adolescents than younger adolescents. It should be noted that

Table 39

F Values' Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons of Age Variable's Group Mean Scores Adjusted for Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables Plus School Grade on the Personal Cynicism Scale

Group Means Adjusted For	Groups		Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
Background Factors Only	Means	26.40	26.40	25.89	25.81	25.41	24.44	24.62
	Age 13	26.40	--	0.51 (0.18)	0.59 (0.24)	0.99 (0.67)	1.96 (2.47)**	1.78 (1.55)
	Age 14	25.89	--	--	0.08 (0.01)	0.48 (0.22)	1.45 (1.80)	1.27 (0.97)
	Age 15	25.81	--	--	--	0.40 (0.15)	0.37 (0.12)	0.19 (0.02)
	Age 16	25.41	--	--	--	--	.97 (0.80)	0.79 (0.38)
	Age 17	24.44	--	--	--	--	--	0.18 (0.02)
Background Factors + Grade	Means	24.60	24.60	24.60	25.46	25.95	25.94	26.50
	Age 13	24.60	--	0.00 (0.00)	0.86 (.52)	1.35 (1.27)	1.34 (1.17)	1.90 (1.78)
	Age 14	24.60	--	--	0.86 (0.71)	1.35 (1.73)	1.34 (1.56)	1.90 (1.80)
	Age 15	25.46	--	--	--	0.49 (.23)	0.48 (0.20)	1.04 (0.66)
	Age 16	25.95	--	--	--	--	0.01 (0.00)	0.55 (0.18)
	Age 17	25.94	--	--	--	--	--	0.56 (0.18)

* Significant at the .10 level $F_{.10}(5,1548) = 1.85$ $F_{.10}(5,1547) = 1.85$

** Significant at the .05 level $F_{.05}(5,1548) = 2.21$ $F_{.05}(5,1547) = 2.21$

*** Significant at the .01 level $F_{.01}(5,1548) = 3.02$ $F_{.01}(5,1547) = 3.02$

these findings are very similar to those summarized earlier for feelings of political cynicism. In sum, the above findings do not support the notion of statistically significant differences in mean personal cynicism scores among age groups.

More clear-cut developmental changes emerge when we look at the relationship between school grade and age variables and personal cynicism using the DK Personal Cynicism Index. Table 61, Appendix C, page 380,, summarizes mean scores of the adolescents in our sample on the DK Personal Cynicism Index according to school grade and age, while Figures 10 and 11, Appendix C, page 381, portray the results graphically: an accelerating divergence between younger and older adolescents in their feelings of personal cynicism. The substantial movement between grades eight and twelve, and from thirteen to eighteen years of age, suggests that as adolescents grow older they are more likely to develop feelings of personal cynicism or trust toward others and society in general. Moreover, statistically significant differences exist among both school grade and age group mean scores on the DK Personal Cynicism Index, as shown in the results reported in Table 62, Appendix C, page 382.

Since significant F-ratios resulted in both of the analyses of variance summarized in Table 62, the use of the Scheffé S-method was employed to test which of the between school grade and between age groups pair comparisons of mean scores were significant. The results of these comparisons, shown in Tables 63 and 64, Appendix C, pages 382 and 383, respectively, indicate that, in general, the older an adolescent is, the less likely he is to select the "Don't Know-No Opinion" options in the response scale for the ten personal cynicism

items; thus, the more likely he is to have developed attitudes in the personal cynicism/trust domain. These relationships are not surprising; but, it is noteworthy that the DK Personal Cynicism Index seems to provide a somewhat more accurate picture of developmental changes in response to the personal cynicism domain related to chronological age, or school grade, than can be obtained using solely the relationship between age, or school grade, variable and the summated personal cynicism scale. To summarize, there are consistent mean score differences among school grade and age groups, or between younger and older adolescents on the DK Personal Cynicism Index. By and large, the findings fit our expectation. More persuasive, these latter findings support the hypothesis that the older the adolescent the more likely he is to respond toward his fellow man and toward social institutions in terms of the personal cynicism dimension.

Concluding Comments: Section II.

In the above data, as with those previously reported in connection with political cynicism, we have found discordant evidence with regard to developmental changes in feelings of personal cynicism among those ranges of school grade and age groups investigated in this study. Indeed, the picture is far from being clear. We have seen some evidence that the acquisition of personal cynicism proceeds moderately but not evenly during the junior and senior high school years. To be sure, the general pattern of developmental changes in personal cynicism unravelled in this study leaves us again with difficult problems of interpretation. The overall tendency of older adolescents to become less positive, and perhaps more bitter and cynical, toward people and

societal processes than younger adolescents cannot be attributed entirely--or even primarily--to some process of maturation during late adolescence. Further, our findings do suggest that, in part, the effects of age upon the acquisition of personal cynicism is tempered by the school grade variable, or by "obtained formal education." In sum, the differences in feelings of personal cynicism among age groups, very much like those previously reported for political cynicism, have been rather modest.

It is beyond the scope of our present effort to explore what may well be a "chicken-and-egg-question." That is, is political cynicism simply a specific manifestation of a generalized suspicion or distrust of societal processes and people in general? It would seem likely that each attitude, political and personal cynicism, tends to reinforce the other in feedback loops. We are simply suggesting that the relationship between the developmental changes of feelings of political and personal cynicism among adolescents is highly complex, such that bitterness, displeasure and lack of faith in people, in general, or lack of trust in social institutions may well produce hostility, mistrust and lack of faith in politicians or lack of trust in political institutions, or the reverse causal relation might hold equally well. We can only speculate that these two attitudes do affect each other and may continue to do so in a positive feedback system as maturation progresses; this could account for the "repeated" patterns of growth in political and personal cynicism found in this study. Our findings provide some hint that this may be so, but, this possibility, implied in our data, can only be viewed as suggestive. The more general conclusion to be drawn from the above findings is

that there is a slight developmental shift in feelings of personal cynicism with an increase in age, at least among the sample of adolescents of this study. We cannot explain these findings with any certainty, but they may reflect the adolescent's growing suspicion of the benevolence and omnipotence of all authority. Again, there is surely room for further detailed analyses of these data, but such analyses are outside the scope of the present investigation.

III. FINDINGS FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSES: BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLES

Among the most familiar findings in the literature of political science are those about the variations in political attitudes and behaviours associated with certain socio-political background variables of respondents. The political impact of these factors (and of other social background characteristics, as well) reflects the regular differences in experiences and objective self-interest associated with various socio-political background factors. Thus, other plausible hypothesis, although not explicitly stated, were that significant differences would result among group mean scores on the three cynicism scales for relevant background characteristic variables of the adolescents. Since each of the selected background variables possibly provides basis for, or is related to, many subcultural systems of political behaviour, values, norms and attitudes prevailing in Alberta, and since, within these subcultures, patterns of socio-political interaction could be present which may cause significant shifts upon the structuring of feelings of cynicism among adolescents, the investigator deemed desirable the exploration of whether or not any statistically

significant differences exist among and between group mean scores of selected characteristic variables on all three cynicism scales. A lesser objective was to furnish additional information about some of the implications that these selected background variables may have upon the development of feelings of cynicism among adolescents.²⁶ In order to determine whether or not any such differences were statistically significant, scores generated for three cynicism scales in the attitudinal inventory were compared independently for group mean differences within each of the nine selected background characteristic variables. Based on previous research and related literature, nine hypotheses were proposed. All of these associated hypotheses were tested by an analysis of variance technique.²⁷ And, since both political cynicism scales and the personal cynicism scale described above show similarities, we felt it useful and convenient in this section, and throughout the remainder of this chapter, to discuss these three scales jointly. The nine hypotheses, in the null form, are as follows:

There are no significant differences among and between mean scores obtained by groups of

²⁶No pretext is made that any discrepancies can be resolved. Simply, the data may provide patterns that are suggestive or helpful for subsequent research. This goal is compatible within the framework of the present analyses.

²⁷For those who may desire a more graphic and descriptive statistical technique, contingency tables were also constructed for each variable we plan to examine and the chi square test was applied to the distribution of each table. This statistic would tell us if the cell frequencies for respective variable's subcategories are proportional and, thus, test whether significant variations in feelings of cynicism arose from the selected background characteristic variables. These tables are presented in Appendix C.

1. those adolescents who are male and those who are female,
2. those adolescents who are Protestants and those who are Catholic,
3. those adolescents who have been residing up to four years, those who have been residing five to nine years, those who have been residing ten to fourteen years and those who have been residing fifteen years and over in their communities,
4. those adolescents who were ranked high, those who were ranked middle, and those who were ranked low on the Socioeconomic Level Index,
5. those adolescents who felt they belonged to the working class, those who felt they belonged to low (average) middle class, those who felt they belonged to the middle class, and those who felt they belonged to the upper class social status group,
6. those adolescents who support the Liberal Political Party, those who support the Conservative Political Party, and those who support the Social Credit Political Party in their provincial political party preferences,
7. those adolescents who support the Liberal Political Party and those who support the Conservative Political Party in their federal political preferences,
8. those adolescents who reside in an urban area and those who reside in rural areas, and
9. those adolescents who attend schools in a public school system, those who attend schools in a separate (Catholic) school system and those who attend schools in a composite general school system

on

- a) The Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale
- b) the Political Cynicism Scale, and
- c) the Personal Cynicism Scale

Results of statistical analyses of data with respect to each of the above null hypotheses are presented in the following pages of this chapter.

Null hypothesis 1 - sex. Table 65, Appendix C, page 384, summarizes mean scores and standard deviations obtained, respectively,

by male and female adolescents on three cynicism scales. A summary of computed F-ratios for sex group mean score differences is presented in Table 40. More detail is supplied in Table 66, Appendix C, page 384.

Since the resulting F-ratios (14.70 and 85.96) yielded in testing the significance of differences between mean scores of both sex groups on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Per. Cyn. Scale exceeded the .01 critical value (6.63), null hypotheses 1a) and 1c) were rejected.

No significant difference between group mean scores of sex variable were found on the Pol. Cyn. Scale. In light of the analysis of variance, null hypothesis 1b) was accepted.

Results yielded by sex on attitude measures were somewhat equivocal. Only two of the three comparisons between sex group mean scores on cynicism scales reached the .05 level of significance or better. Although the other comparison was not statistically significant, the difference was in the direction predicted. It was interesting to note that male adolescents, on the whole, consistently scored higher than female adolescents on the three scales that assess respondents' degree of political and personal cynicism. Our data are consistent with findings of other studies already discussed in the review of literature section.²⁸ On the basis of preceding evidence, the investigator concluded that male adolescents generally tended to score higher than female adolescents on measures of political and personal cynicism. Table 67, Appendix C, page 385, provides additional support for this conclusion.

²⁸See Chapter III, pp. 99-100.

Table 40

F-Values for Background Characteristic Variables
by Attitude Scales

Variables	Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Pol. Cyn.	Per. Cyn.
Sex	14.70#	0.07	85.96#
Religious Preference	9.17***	26.35#	2.01
Length of Residence	0.55	0.95	1.64
Socioeconomic level	9.27#	5.36***	8.02#
Social Class Self-Id.	9.66#	6.19#	4.83***
Prov. Pol. Party Preference	5.11***	4.75***	2.06
Fed. Pol. Party Preference	23.00#	23.98#	16.48#
Area of Residence	2.99*	39.07#	16.44#
School System Attended	8.77#	29.58#	9.85#

* Significant at the .10 level.

** Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

Significant at the .001 level.

Null hypotheses 2 - religious preference. Analyses of variance were used to test the significance of differences solely between Protestant and Catholic groups' mean scores for the three cynicism scales.²⁹ Table 40, page 214, summarizes the F-ratios that were computed in testing the significance of Protestant and Catholic adolescents groups' mean score differences. A more detailed presentation is given in Table 69, Appendix C, page 386. Table 68, Appendix C, page 386, presents mean scores and standard deviations of all four religious preference groups for three cynicism scales. Inspection of the F-ratios in both

²⁹The exclusion of the other two religious preference groups in analyses of variance was deliberate and made necessary because the vast discrepancy of these two groups, size in relation to the Protestant and the Catholic groups brought about serious departures from the normality and homogeneity of variance assumptions.

Tables 40 and 69 shows that they were statistically significant differences in mean political cynicism scores between Protestant and Catholic groups, while mean personal cynicism score differences between these two religious preference groups tended to be slight and statistically non-significant. On the basis of these statistical test, null hypotheses 2a) and 2b) were rejected and null hypothesis 2c) was accepted.

Comparisons of the group mean scores shown in Table 69 indicate that Catholics scored significantly lower than Protestants on the two scales used to index adolescents' degree of political cynicism. The difference between these two religious preference groups' mean scores on the Personal Cynicism Scale was not statistically significant; however, the Protestant group did achieve a higher mean score than the Catholic group. It is interesting to note that adolescents who were categorized as "other religion" group tended to show higher feelings of political and personal cynicism than either the Protestant or the Catholic group. Moreover, our data provide support to the general finding that people who express no religious preference (i.e., do not adhere to any religion) are far more likely to develop cynical attitudes toward politics and people in general, probably as the result of a shared pessimistic credo about people, in general, and politicians, and about societal and political processes. Table 70, Appendix C, page 387, contains some additional relevant data. In light of the information provided, the general conclusion we draw is that religious preference plays a role in the determination of political and personal cynicism among adolescents. In short, the above findings are consistent with other investigators'

findings.³⁰ We hope that these findings will provide some assistance in gaining further perspective upon the structuring of attitudes of cynicism among members of differing religious faiths. No further attempt at explanation of these results is given here.

Null hypothesis 3 - length of residence in communities. One-way analyses of variance were performed to compare differences among the four length of residence group mean scores on the three measures of cynicism. Results of these analyses are given in Table 40, page 214, and in Table 72, Appendix C, page 388. None of the computed F-ratios in these three analyses reached the minimum value required for any acceptable level of significance used here. In light of these analyses, null hypothesis 3 was accepted.

Since there was no support in the above analyses of data for the notion of statistically significant differences among length of residence groups' mean scores on the three cynicism scales, the investigator concluded that, within length of residence variable, group mean political and personal cynicism scores tended to remain relatively similar. Table 71, Appendix C, page 388, presents mean scores and standard deviations of each of the length of residence variable groups for the three cynicism scales. In short, length of residence variable had a negligible effect upon the structuring of both political and personal cynicism among adolescents. More support for this conclusion can be found in Table 73, Appendix C, page 389.

³⁰See Chapter III, p. 86.

Null hypothesis 4 - socioeconomic level. Analyses of variance were employed to test the significance of differences among socioeconomic level group mean scores. As reported in Table 40, page 214, and in Table 75, Appendix C, page 390, the three resulting F-ratios, which was computed in these analyses, show statistically significant differences among socioeconomic level groups in mean political and personal cynicism scores. In light of these statistical tests, null hypothesis 4 was rejected. The means and standard deviations for three socioeconomic level groups obtained on three cynicism measures are reported in Table 74, Appendix C, page 390.

Since tests of the significance of differences for the three cynicism measures yielded statistically significant F-ratios, the Scheffe S-method was employed to further test which pairs of the socioeconomic level group mean scores were significantly different. The use of this technique revealed some inconsistencies. The low SEL group obtained a significantly higher mean score than the high SEL group on all three measures of cynicism. Also, the medium SEL group, on the whole, scored significantly higher than the high SEL group on both measures of political cynicism; however, the mean personal cynicism score difference between the latter two SEL groups tended to be slight and failed to reach a minimum acceptable significance level. Moreover, although the low SEL group, as a whole, obtained a higher mean cynicism score than the medium SEL group on all three measures, only the mean personal cynicism score difference was statistically significant, thus mean political cynicism differences between the low SEL and medium SEL groups must be judged statistically non-significant. Table 76, Appendix, C, page 391, shows the P values obtained by use of the Scheffe S-method in each of the

paired comparisons between socioeconomic level group mean scores.

Not surprisingly, these findings lend credence to the notion that adolescents of higher socioeconomic level were least inclined to develop cynical attitudes toward politicians and people in general, and toward political and societal processes. Table 77, Appendix C, page 392, sheds some interesting new light on the negative relationship between socioeconomic level and feelings of cynicism. In this respect, the data suggest that the socioeconomic level variable may be an important factor in the shaping of feelings of political and personal cynicism among adolescents. In sum, adolescents of higher SEL are less likely to develop feelings of political and personal cynicism, or, vice-versa, adolescents of low SEL are more likely to develop such feelings.

It is quite beyond the scope of this study, however, to determine what portion of the low mean cynicism scores of the high SEL group can be assigned to the effects of social class milieu, or to other factors shown by previous research to have important impact upon the structuring of cynicism. In a sense, the socioeconomic level variable reflects a composite of numerous characteristics ranging from father's education, occupation and income through, intuitively, to social activities and subcultural orientations. The mere breadth of the concept probably accounts for many of the variations in feelings of cynicism which it elicits. In spite of these uncertainties, we feel that the data on socioeconomic level variable and feelings of cynicism add evidence to the view that people of lower socioeconomic level are the most inclined to develop cynical attitudes toward politicians and people in general, and toward political and societal processes.

Null hypothesis 5 - social class self-identification. A simple and direct measure of social class consists of asking the respondent of which social class group he perceives himself to be a member. In response to such a question in the socio-political information questionnaire, nine social class subcategories were collapsed into four sizable social class self-identification groups. Mean scores and standard deviations of all four social status groups for three cynicism scales were computed. Table 78, Appendix C, page 393, displays results of these computations.

Testing the significance of differences among social class group mean scores for the three cynicism scales was achieved by once more employing analyses of variance. Obtained mean score differences among the social class groups yielded statistically significant F-ratios on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale, the Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Per. Cyn. Scale. These analyses are presented in detail in Table 79, Appendix C, page 393, and are summarized in Table 40, page 214. Examination of these results led the investigator to reject null hypothesis 5.

Since significant F-ratios were computed in all three analyses of variance, the Scheffé S-method was employed to test further which pairs of the group mean scores contributed most to these significant F-ratios. Results of these comparisons, which are shown in Table 80, Appendix C, page 394, indicate that the working class group scored significantly higher than either the middle class or the upper class group on all three measures of cynicism. Significant differences in mean scores were also observed between the working class and low-middle class groups on the Per. Cyn. Scale and between the low middle class and middle class group on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale. However, since the resulting P values (.08 and .06, respectively) yielded in testing the

significance between these latter social class groups. mean scores on the Per. Cyn. Scale and the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale did not fall below the .05 probability value, these group mean score differences are only tentatively deemed statistically significant, until such time as further research can confirm or contradict these results. It is notable that no significant mean score differences were encountered between the middle class and the upper class groups on either of the indices of adolescents' degree of political cynicism, even though the upper class group consistently attained higher mean scores on these two measures. No significant differences among group mean scores were observed in any of the remaining comparisons. Corroborating descriptive data are provided by Table 81, Appendix C, page 395.

Similar to the already reported analyses for the socioeconomic level variable, the above statistical analyses indicate that adolescents who perceived themselves as being members of lower social class strata, on the whole, scored significantly higher than those adolescents who consider themselves members of either the middle or upper social stratum on measures of political and personal cynicism. These findings are not surprising, particularly in light of the tendency we noted earlier for adolescents at the lowest level on the Socioeconomic Level Index to have higher cynicism scores. Since both indicators of social status suggest a distinguishable tendency, at least among our sample of adolescents, for lower social status to be associated with higher levels of cynicism, or, vice-versa, for higher social status to be associated with low cynicism, we propose that a consistent negative relationship exists between social class status and feelings of political and personal cynicism. Overall, our tentative conclusion is that social background

causes related to the structuring of cynicism are linked to social-economic stratification. In spite of the murky pattern of relationship between social class and feelings of cynicism found elsewhere, our findings thus far suggest some warrant for more intensive investigation on this matter.

Null hypothesis 6 - provincial political party preference. In order to assess mean cynicism score differences among-provincial political preference groups (Liberal, Conservative and Social Credit), one-way analyses of variance were carried out. Results from these analyses are presented in Table 83, Appendix C, page 397, and the computed F-ratio are listed in Table 40, page 214. Obtained mean score differences among provincial political party preference groups yielded statistically significant F-ratios on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Pol. Cyn. Scale. The F-ratio computed in the remaining analysis did not reach the minimum acceptable level of significance. Table 82, Appendix C, page 396, discloses mean scores and standard deviations of provincial political party preference groups for three cynicism scales.

Since significant F-ratios were computed in two of the analyses of variance, the use of the Scheffé S-method was again employed to test which pairs of the provincial political party preference group mean scores were significantly different. Table 84, Appendix C, page 398, summarizes findings of the Scheffe procedure as applied in this instance. Referring to the latter table, one finds some consistency. The Liberal group's mean score was significantly different from the Conservative and the Social Credit groups' mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Pol. Cyn. Scale, with the Liberal group's mean score being lowest.

Although differences among group mean scores were observed on the Personal Cynicism Scale, these tended to be either slight or statistically non-significant. However, it is noteworthy that the Conservative group consistently obtained a higher mean score than the Liberal and the Social Credit groups on all measures of political and personal cynicism.

On the basis of the above statistical procedures, the investigator judged that computed data lent sufficient support to permit the rejection of null hypotheses 6a) and 6b), and the acceptance of null hypothesis 6c). In short, those adolescents who, provincially, would support the Liberal Political Party, on the whole are less likely to feel cynical toward politics than those adolescents who would support either the Conservative or the Social Credit parties.

As noted earlier, various studies that have investigated the link between political participation and feelings of cynicism have concluded that cynics were more likely to downgrade the importance of political participation, or were less likely to become active in politics. Such individuals not only may hesitate to take "gladiatorial action," but they are likely to withdraw from "spectator action" as well.³¹ From the data available in Table 85, Appendix C, page 399, and consistent with these previous findings, of those adolescents who reported they would not bother voting in a forthcoming provincial election, the majority shows a considerably higher level of cynicism than those who would bother voting; this "non-participator" group demonstrates noticeably higher degrees of political and personal cynicism. Because of the numerically

³¹See Chapter III, page 93 ; and Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 78.

small sub-group of adolescents in the "wouldn't vote" group, we feel rather cautious about presenting these data. Nevertheless, we find passable evidence in the data to support the notion that adolescents who tend to downgrade the importance of political participation are more likely to feel cynical about politics and people, in general, than adolescents who participate in political activities. In addition also worthy of consideration is the unexpected distribution of those adolescents who have no political party preference, the noncommitted group. They tend to distribute themselves more or less equally along the political and personal cynicism continual (see Table 85). In any event, we have presented and discussed these latter findings in the hope that they will stimulate others to explore them further with numerically larger samples of such provincial political party preference groups.

Null hypothesis 7 - federal political party preference. The mean scores and standard deviations pertaining to the three attitude scales for federal political party preference groups are reported in Table 86, Appendix C, page 400. Only the differences between mean scores on attitude scales for the Liberal and Conservative groups were analyzed for statistical significance. One way analyses of variance were employed to determine the significance of difference between the above-mentioned two federal political party preference groups, mean scores. Results produced by these analyses are presented in Table 40, page 214, and in Table 87, Appendix C, page 401. Significant differences between the Liberal and the Conservative groups, mean scores were observed on all three cynicism scales: Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale, the Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Per. Cyn. Scale. Computed F-ratios in all three analyses were statistically

significant at the .001 level of significance. On the basis of the above statistical procedure, null hypothesis 7 was rejected.

A closer examination of Table 86, Appendix C, reveals that adolescents who prefer the Liberal Political Party at the federal level of politics on the whole obtained lower mean scores on all three attitude scales than adolescents who prefer the Conservative Political Party. These findings correspond with the earlier reported data for provincial political party preference. Thus, the data for federal political party preference compliment the findings of Null Hypothesis 6. In sum, the parallel findings for provincial and federal political party preferences suggest that adolescents who prefer the Liberal Party on the whole have higher trust in government and in people in general, or conversely were less likely to display cynical attitudes toward politics and society in general, than adolescents who prefer the Conservative Party.

Moreover, as Table 88, Appendix C, page 402, illustrates, adolescents who would not vote in a forthcoming federal election, the non-participants, tended to show higher feeling of political and personal cynicism than those who would vote if it were possible. The data are consistent with other findings, already discussed, which show that adolescent political non-participants scored noticeably higher than did adolescent political participants on measures of political and personal cynicism. At the same time, looking briefly at the data for the noncommitted group, we again find more or less similar patterns of distribution on the three trichotomized cynicism scales. The data suggest that the noncommitted adolescents are distributed fairly equally among the three groups of political and personal cynicism continua. These findings fail to corroborate those reported by Caroline Freeman. She

found that adolescents who show absence of political party identification were more likely to display high rather than low feelings of political cynicism.³² In sum, the most general conclusion to be drawn from the above data is that the findings about the provincial and federal political party preference variables are consistent; as we have noted, our findings parallel, in some ways, previous disclosures reported by other investigators. If anything, we consider our findings, based on this sample of adolescents, to be limited, though nevertheless useful in providing significant new information about the relation between political party preferences and feelings of political personal cynicism.

Null hypothesis 8 - area of residence. Analyses of variance were performed to test the significance of differences between area of residence group mean scores; data from these analyses are presented in Table 90, Appendix C, page 403, while a summary of computed F-ratios is given in Table 40, page 214. Table 89, Appendix C, page 403, reveals the mean scores and standard deviations obtained by urban and rural adolescent groups on three cynicism scales.

All of the differences between area of residence group mean scores obtained on the indices used to measure adolescents' feelings of political and personal cynicism were statistically significant; that is, the analyses of variance yielded significant F-ratios. However, since the F-ratio (2.99) yielded in testing the significance of difference between urban and rural adolescent groups, mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale exceeded only the .10 critical value (2.71), Null

³²Freeman, op. cit., p. 74.

Hypothesis 8a) was only tentatively rejected, until such time as further research should confirm or contradict this result. In contrast, since the F-ratios (39.07 and 16.44) computed in comparing the mean scores between area of residence groups on the Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Per. Cyn. Scale exceeded the .01 critical value (6.63), Null Hypotheses 8b) and 8c) were clearly rejected.

In contrasting mean scores from adolescent respondents from urban versus rural areas, we discovered that adolescents who reside in rural areas uniformly obtained significantly higher mean cynicism scores than those who live in an urban area. In light of the information provided by analyses of variance, the investigator concluded that adolescents living in an urban area as a whole displayed significantly less political and personal cynicism than those residing in rural areas. Descriptive data provided by Table 91, Appendix C, page 404, further document these findings.

No definite explanation could be given for these results. The investigator would speculate that differences between group mean cynicism scores resulted, to a large extent, from effects of variables other than the one under investigation, for example those related to social, or political, milieu. Nevertheless, all of these findings are consistent with the often asserted position that urban dwellers are less apt to develop feelings of cynicism than rural dwellers. But we must add that any "statistically" significant group mean score differences identified in this section must be viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive.

Hypothesis 9 - school system attended. In testing the significance of differences among school system group mean scores, the

resulting F-ratios computed in all three analyses did reach the minimum acceptable level of significance. A summary of computed F-ratios is given in Table 40, page 214. An examination of computed F-ratios led the investigator to reject null hypothesis 9. More detailed results of these analyses of variance are presented in Table 93, Appendix C, page 405, while Table 92, Appendix C, page 405, shows the mean scores and standard deviations computed for the three school system type groups on measures of cynicism.

The use of the Scheffé S-method was employed to further compare paired type of school system group mean scores on the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale, the Pol. Cyn. Scale and the Per. Cyn. Scale. Results of these comparisons indicate that the separate school system group scored significantly lower on both measures of political cynicism than the public and composite general school system groups. As well, the separate and the public school system groups, mean scores were significantly different from the composite general school system group's mean score on the Per. Cyn. Scale; the latter group's mean score being the highest. In addition, the composite general school system group obtained a significantly higher mean score than the public school system group on the Pol. Cyn. Scale. Although other differences in mean scores on the three attitude scales were observed among the school system groups, these tended to be statistically non-significant. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the separate school system group obtained lower mean scores than the public and the general school system groups on all three measures of political and personal cynicism. Each of these comparisons is presented in Table 94, Appendix C, page 406.

The picture presented by our data is far from clear; we see some evidence of significant differences among certain school system groups in mean political and personal cynicism scores, but the patterns are varied and difficult to comment upon. The patterns revealed in Table 95, Appendix C, page 407, also conform generally to that picture. Overall, it appears that the kind of school system--public, separate or composite general--has some independent effect upon the structuring of feelings of cynicism among adolescents. To put it in another way, the kind of school system in which an adolescent attends school may contribute to his development of political and personal cynicism. But, it may also be that much of the relationship between school system variable and feelings of cynicism actually reflects other factors; effects operating through the school system as intervening variables. We remain rather skeptical about the association between school system and cynicism attitudes yielded by the data in our study. Nevertheless, the tentative conclusion we draw from the preceding statistical analyses is that the school system variable plays some role in the structuring of feelings of political and personal cynicism among the adolescents studied. While some of its effect may be unique and might not be traced to other background factors, we feel that an equal, if not larger, part of its role in structuring feelings of cynicism among adolescents is as an intervening variable--as the path through which some aspects of other educational and environmental factors get translated into an impact upon the development of cynicism. Put more simply, this means that, if two adolescents attend school in the same kind of school system they may still be quite different in terms of feelings of cynicism; and we suspect that other educational and environmental factors are among the major causes of

whatever similarity they might have in terms of such feelings.

Test of Hypothesis VI - Predictors of Attitude Scale Score.

Null Hypothesis VI. The following group of sub-hypotheses makes up Null Hypothesis VI: No significant contribution is made to the prediction of individuals' scores on

- (a) the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale,
- (b) the Political Cynicism Scale, or
- (c) the Personal Cynicism Scale

by knowing whether or not:

- (1) an adolescent is in grade eight, grade nine, grade ten, grade eleven, or grade twelve;
- (2) an adolescent is thirteen years of age or less, fourteen years of age, fifteen years of age, sixteen years of age, seventeen years of age, or eighteen or more years of age;
- (3) an adolescent is male or female;
- (4) an adolescent is a Protestant, a Catholic, of some other religious preference, or has no religious preference;
- (5) an adolescent has been residing in his community for a period of up to four years, five to nine years, ten to fourteen years, or for a period of fifteen or more years;
- (6) an adolescent is in the low group, the middle group, or the high group on the Socioeconomic Level Index (SEL);
- (7) an adolescent identifies himself as a member of the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, or the upper class in terms of social class standing;
- (8) an adolescent favors the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the New Democratic Party, the Social Credit Party, or is noncommitted, or a non-participator in terms of his provincial party preference;
- (9) an adolescent favors the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the New Democratic Party, the Social Credit Party, or is noncommitted, or a non-participator in the terms of his federal party preference;
- (10) an adolescent resides in an urban area or in a rural area;

- (11) an adolescent attends a school in a public school system, a separate school system, or a composite general school system.

These associated sub-hypotheses were proposed to determine which of these predictor variables provide the best predictive estimates of scores on each of the cynicism scales. The major statistical procedure used was step-wise multiple linear regression, a technique which permitted the joint use of all eleven predictor variables. The results of our application of this statistical procedure are shown in Tables 41 and 42.

In general, it was found that the variable(s):

1. school grade was significant in predicting the Pol. Cyn. Scale's and the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores at the .001 level of confidence;
2. age was significant in predicting the Pol. Cyn. Scale's and the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores at the .02 and .03 levels of confidence, respectively;
3. sex was significant in predicting the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale's and the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores at the .001 level of confidence;
4. religious preference and length of residence failed to contribute at any acceptable level of significance in predicting all three cynicism scales' scores;
5. socioeconomic level (SEL) was significant in the predicting the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale's and the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores at the .07 and .001 levels of confidence, respectively;
6. social class self-identification was significant in predicting all three cynicism scales' scores at the .01 level of confidence;
7. provincial political party preference was significant in predicting solely the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores at the .02 level of confidence;

Table 41

Intercorrelation Matrix Between Background Characteristic Variables and Cynicism Scales

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
School Grade		.87												
Age			-.06	-.06	.23	.22	.16	-.23	-.23	-.16	-.12	-.07	-.04	-.18
Sex				-.007	.18	.13	.09	-.18	-.18	-.06	-.02	-.02	.02	-.11
Religious Pref.				-.08	.03	-.15	-.02	.06	.06	.02	.02	-.10	-.007	-.23
Length of Residence					-.01	-.05	-.11	.07	.11	.04	.17	.02	.01	.05
SEL						-.04	.04	-.02	-.09	-.04	-.06	-.005	.03	-.03
Social Class Self-ID.							.35	-.17	-.23	-.31	-.28	-.09	-.12	-.10
Prov. Pol. Party Pref.								-.15	-.21	-.19	-.19	-.14	-.14	-.12
Fed. Pol. Party Pref.									.70	.06	.02	.13	.11	.11
Area of Residence										.08	.04	.16	.13	.13
School System											.87	.04	.16	.10
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.												-.009	.08	.07
Pol. Cyn. Scale													.58	.51
Per. Cyn. Scale														.37

$r > .05$ is significant at the .05 level for a two-tailed test

$r \geq .065$ is significant at the .01 level for a two-tailed test

$r \geq .08$ is significant at the .001 level for a two-tailed test

Table 42

Characteristic Variables Contributing at the .10 Level of Significance
to the Prediction of Cynicism Scale Scores

Scales	Predictor Variables	F value for Variable	P Level	Percent Variance Accounted for	Standard Error of Predicted Scores
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Social Class	32.73	> .01	2.04	9.23
	Fed. Pol.				
	Party Pref.	23.17	> .01	1.43	9.17
	Sex	19.92	> .01	1.21	9.11
	Area of Residence	10.75	> .01	0.65	9.11
	SEL	3.26	.07	0.20	9.10
	School System	3.11	.08	0.19	9.07
	Total			5.72	

Total percent of variance accounted for by all 11 predictors = 6.30

Pol. Cyn.	Fed. Pol.				
	Party Pref.	53.07	> .01	3.27	5.77
	Area of Residence	36.50	> .01	2.20	5.71
	Social Class	15.62	> .01	0.92	5.68
	School System	14.91	> .01	0.90	5.66
	Grade	7.33	> .01	0.43	5.65
	Age	5.86	.02	0.35	5.64
	Total			8.07	

Total percent of variance accounted for by all 11 predictors = 9.06

Per. Cyn.	Sex	85.96	> .01	5.20	5.95
	Grade	55.47	> .01	3.24	5.85
	SEL	17.91	> .01	1.03	5.82
	Social Class	7.28	> .01	0.42	5.81
	Prov. Pol.				
	Party Pref.	5.13	.02	0.20	5.80
	Age	4.65	.03	0.26	5.79
	School System	3.10	.08	0.18	5.79
	Area of Residence	2.72	.10	0.16	5.78
	Total			10.79	

Total percent of variance accounted for by all 11 predictors = 10.84

8. federal political party preference was significant in predicting the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale's and the Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores at the .001 level of confidence; and

9. area of residence and school system attended reached the minimum significant value (.10) required in predicting all three cynicism scales' scores.

The above findings suggest, first, that only three background characteristic variables--social class self-identification, area of residence and school system attended--made statistically significant independent contributions to the prediction of all three criterion measures, second, that solely religious preference and length of residence variables failed to reach a minimum acceptable probability in predicting either political or personal cynicism scale's scores, and, third, that the remaining six variables made intermittent "statistically" significant independent contributions to the prediction of definite criterion variables which were used to index adolescents' degree of political and personal cynicism attitudes.³³

³³For the purpose of comparability and in an attempt to provide more information about the selection of optimal combinations of predictor variables of cynicism scales' scores, we re-analyzed our data utilizing the Automatic Interaction Detection (AID) and the Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) techniques jointly, both sophisticated multivariate techniques which appear to be well suited to our purposes. Various combinations of predictor variables were analyzed. Results of these analyses are not discussed within the text of the dissertation: they are simply presented in figure and table forms as appendages to step-wise multiple regression analyses. Such being the case, AID's branching diagrams are given in Figures 12 to 17, pages 408 to 418, while MCA's results are provided in Tables 96, 97, 98, 101, 102 and 103, pages 411 to 413 and 419 to 421, Appendix C. Additional data are also provided in Tables 99 and 100, Appendix C, pages 414 to 416. The standard work describing the Automatic Interaction Detection is John A. Sonquist and James N. Morgan, The Detection of Interaction Effects (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1969); John A. Sonquist, Elizabeth L. Baker and James N. Morgan, Searching for Structure: Alias - AID - III (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for

Thus, in light of the above evidence, first, null hypotheses 7, 10 and 11 were rejected; second, null hypotheses 1b), 1c), 2b), 2c), 3a), 3c), 6a), 6c), 8c), 9a) and 9b) were also rejected; and, third, the remaining associated null hypotheses were accepted.

Test of Hypothesis VII - Comparisons Among Attitude Scale Total Scores

Null hypothesis VII. Correlations among total scores obtained by adolescents on

- (a) the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale,
- (b) the Political Cynicism Scale, and
- (c) the Personal Cynicism Scale

are not significantly different from zero, or $H_0 = 0$.

Tests of statistical significance using the distribution of t were utilized to verify the above null hypotheses.³⁴ A matrix of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (Pearson r) is presented in Table 43, and shows degrees of relationship among attitude scale total scores. Results of appropriate t -tests are summarized in Table 44.

Social Research, University of Michigan, 1971); and for the Multiple Classification Analysis, see Frank Andrews, James Morgan and John Sonquist, Multiple Classification Analysis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1969). For the best summary and contrast of the AID and MCA approaches, see John A. Sonquist, Multivariate Model Building (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), pp. 189-219. An application of the AID approach can be found in Keith Billingsley, "A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to the Study of Political Efficacy in Adolescents" (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 220-244, 280-285.

³⁴For formula, see Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

Table 43

Correlation Matrix Among Attitude Scale Total Scores

Scales	Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Pol. Cyn.	Per. Cyn.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	--	.58	.51
Pol. Cyn.		--	.37
Per. Cyn.			--

Table 44

Obtained Values of t in Comparisons Among Attitude
Scale Total Scores' Correlations

Scales	Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Pol. Cyn.	Per. Cyn.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	--	28.19	23.48
Pol. Cyn.		--	15.77
Per. Cyn.			--

$t \geq 3.29$ is significant at the .001 level for a two-tailed test.

All the resulting t values computed for among-total score comparisons on the cynicism scales, statistically, were highly significant different from zero at the .001 level of confidence. Tables 104 and 105, Appendix

C, pages 422 and 423, display the strong positive relationship among measures of political and personal cynicism.

Nor surprising, the expected high and positive correlations among the three measures of cynicism were found; this expectation is borne out by the data. On the basis of this information, Null Hypothesis VII was rejected. In short, at least among adolescents of this sample, distrust of other people tends to encompass political actors, or vice-versa.

IV. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In the first section of this chapter, we were concerned with the attitude of political cynicism. Statistical analyses showed that school grade groups differ significantly in their mean scores obtained on both political cynicism scales. It was expected that school grade would indicate a growing, linear positive correlation with political cynicism; that is, adolescents in senior school grades would display higher mean political cynicism scores than adolescents in junior school grades. However, this is not what we found. It was the case that the political attitudes among adolescents in junior school grades, notably those in grades eight and ten, tended to be less "positive" and more cynical than among adolescents in senior grades. We consider these findings puzzling and certainly unexpected. In short, there was statistically significant differences among school grade groups' mean political cynicism scores, and these differences were not eliminated, or reversed, when mean scores were adjusted for effects of background factors. Analogous findings were reported when the relationship of school grade variable to the structuring of personal cynicism was dissected in section two of this chapter.

The underlying thesis of this chapter has been that feelings of political cynicism should increase with maturation. This thesis has found only very limited support in the data. There was some evidence of change in feelings of political cynicism from younger to older adolescents, but the shifts among age groups were very modest, indeed. Again, alike findings were reported for personal cynicism. Nevertheless, quite a number of figures and tables have been presented in this chapter to unmask developmental changes in feelings of political and personal cynicism across age groups. In sum, most figures and tables failed to indicate a large and significant increase in feelings of cynicism during early to late adolescent years. Quite the contrary, the data reported in this chapter show relative nonvariance in the way of changes among age groups that can be used to distinguish political and personal cynics from non-cynics, at least, among adolescents of this sample. Here, the initial, slightly negative correlations found between age and cynicism attitudes were reversed, in the expected direction, when statistically controlling for effects of background factors and school grade, thus, hinting at a developmental pattern in feelings of cynicism among adolescents. The data are certainly suggestive and, taken at face value, they add some support to the view that young adolescents tend to show less cynicism, political and personal, than older adolescents. But the fact remains that in most cases the data demonstrate "non-statistically significant changes" among age groups in feelings of political and personal cynicism. On the whole, the differences among age groups in feelings of political cynicism, like those in feelings of personal cynicism, have been rather unpretentious.

The effort in section three of this chapter was directed toward bivariate analyses of several socio-political background characteristic variables claimed to have significant impact upon the structuring of cynicism among adolescents. Accordingly, differences among and between group mean political and personal cynicism scores of nine selected background characteristic variables were treated for statistical significance.

It was discovered that differences among length of residence variable's group mean political and personal cynicism scores were not statistically significant. Further, there were evidences, although rather tenuous and inconsistent, that, here and there, statistically significant differences prevailed among group mean scores of sex, religious preference, socioeconomic level, social class self-identification, provincial and federal political party preference, area of residence and school system variables obtained on cynicism measures which had been incorporated in the instrument of the study. In general, our data collaborate various findings reported by a number of investigators who have examined relationships between these selected socio-political background characteristic variables and feelings of cynicism among adult, or adolescent, samples. But, occasionally, contrary results cast doubts on findings which have also been reported by certain of these investigators.

The technique of step-wise multiple regression, which was employed to test Null Hypothesis VI, permitted the identification of social class self-identification, area of residence and school system variables as the only predictors out of eleven to make statistically significant independent contributions to the prediction of all three cynicism scales' scores, or criterion measures. At the same time, we became informed that, merely, religious preference and length of residence variables

failed to make statistically significant contributions to the prediction of either of the three criterion measures; the remaining background variables did make intermittent significant independent contributions to the prediction of criterion measures. Based on the evidence provided, a scant number of sub-hypotheses of Null Hypothesis VI were accepted, while a larger number were rejected.

In sum, patterns of relationship between socio-political background characteristic variables and political, or personal, cynicism are varied and difficult to remark upon. This is perhaps a disconcerting note on which to leave the patterns of cynicism acquisition related to background variables, but leave them we must. The point of these analyses was simply this: data presented in section three of this chapter are useful for summary purposes, but are not appropriate substitute for detailed analyses. It is beyond the scope of our present effort to explore alternative results that may be found by statistically controlling for effects of various combinations of background factors; however, this represents an interesting possibility for future analysis of our data.

Testing significance of total score correlations among the three measures of cynicism was achieved by using the distribution of t . Since all the computed t -values were highly significant at the .001 level of confidence, Null Hypothesis VII was, therefore, rejected. In short, it seems safe to say that, in this sample, adolescents who mistrust, or are cynical toward, people in general and societal processes would also tend to mistrust, or be cynical toward, politicians and political processes, or vice-versa.

Our intention in this chapter was to examine the development and structuring of feelings of political and personal cynicism among adolescents. The common impact of school grade and age variables as well as other selected socio-political background characteristic variables upon the gemmation of cynicism was studied and results were presented. We have as yet to consider the relative influence of various agents of political socialization upon the development of political and personal cynicism.

CHAPTER VI

THE ROLE OF SOCIALIZING AGENCIES UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYNICISM

In a study of the development of negative political attitudes among adolescents, one of the most crucial questions is that of the role played by various political socializing agencies upon the structuring of such attitudes. Answering this question involves, among other things, the identification of agency characteristics--such as salience or impact--which may have a bearing upon differential developmental patterns of negative political attitudes among adolescents. Since several factors, for instance, difficulty of access, combine to make research in this area complex, the relative impact of various political socialization agents upon the development of such a political attitude as cynicism elicits conflict. There is, indeed, very little agreement in the literature as to which agents in an adolescent's environment--family, school, peers and mass media--are the most, or the least, influential in increasing, or reducing, feelings of cynicism. To be sure, an agent of political socialization may engage in explicit or implicit teaching, may have direct and specific or diffuse and indirect effects, may be aware or unaware of its role and, of course, may succeed or fail in shaping such a political attitude as cynicism. Although these various circumstances of influence are interesting and important, we are most concerned in this chapter with the relative saliences, or impacts, of

four socialization agents (which have been posited as influentials by various political scientists and other scholars) upon the development of cynicism among adolescents. We selected to investigate solely the relative impacts of four political socialization agents upon the development of political and personal cynicism in a sample of Albertan adolescents because, first, our study is an exploratory one, second, of the difficulties involved in determining and measuring effects of various political influencers and, third, research considering the relative influence of each and all these four agents of political socialization together upon the development of cynicism are sadly lacking in the literature of political socialization.

In this chapter, we are engaged, first, in assessing the direct impact of agents of political socialization upon the shaping of cynical feelings among adolescents, individually and, second, in parcelling the relative influences of these agents upon the molding of political and personal cynicism, simultaneously. Our independent variables in this chapter are the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media (political socialization agents), but the dependent variables remain feelings of political and personal cynicism. Based on previous research and related literature, seven hypotheses were proposed. All of these associated hypotheses were tested by an analysis of variance technique. These hypotheses, in the null form, are as follows:

There are no significant differences between mean scores obtained by groups of

1. those adolescents whose parents yielded low political influence and those whose parents yielded high political influence,

2. those adolescents whose parents had low interest in politics and those whose parents had high interest in politics,
3. those adolescents whose families yielded low political influence and those whose families yielded high political influence,
4. those adolescents whose school teachers yielded low political influence and those whose teachers yielded high political influence,
5. those adolescents whose schools yielded low political influence and those whose schools yielded high political influence,
6. those adolescents whose peer groups yielded low political influence and those whose peers yielded high political influence, and
7. those adolescents upon whose the mass media had low political influence and those on whose the media had a high political influence

on

- a) the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale,
- b) the Political Cynicism Scale, and
- c) the Personal Cynicism Scale.

Results of statistical analyses of data with respect to each of the above null hypotheses are presented in the following pages of this chapter in a thorough and direct manner to enable readers to evaluate evidence precisely.

I. INTERPERSONAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AGENT: THE FAMILY

In the literature on children's political socialization, the dominant tendency has been to see the family as one of the most pervasive agents of political socialization. There is no reason to expect otherwise, since the family is the first unit with which the child has

continuous contact and the first context in which political socialization patterns develop. There is reason to suspect, however, that parents' and/or the family's influence may deteriorate as an individual grows older into adolescence as maturation may and does encourage political self assertion. Consistent with this general notion, we assumed that parental and/or familial circumstances can retard, or perhaps accelerate, the developmental process of feelings of cynicism.

Tables 106 and 112, pages 424 and 428, present summaries of mean scores and standard deviations of parent and family political influence variables' groups for measures of cynicism, while Table 109, Appendix C, page 426, provides a similar summary for parent political interest variable.

Analyses of variance were used to test the significance of differences between low and high group mean scores of parent and family political influence and parent political interest variables on three measures of cynicism. Table 45 summarized F-ratios which were computed in testing the significance of differences between group mean political and personal cynicism scores. More detailed presentations are observed in Tables 107, 110 and 113, Appendix C, pages 424, 426 and 428. Inspection of F-ratios in these tables shows that there were statistically significant differences between parent and family political influence and parent political interest groups' mean scores on all three cynicism scales. In light of these analyses, null hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 were rejected.

The data are illustrative but not altogether revealing. Overall,

it is evident that parents and the family through the aftermath of their political influence and interest were partially responsible for the growth pattern of cynicism manifested by adolescents of this sample. An examination of mean scores, although not statistically adjusted for any variant effects due to socio-political background characteristic variables, shows that the highest incidence of political and personal cynicism tends to occur among those adolescents whose parents and families yielded low political influence, or among those whose parents had low interest in politics.

Table 45

F-Values for Socialization Agents' Summated
Political Influence and Interest Indexes
by Attitude Scales

Indexes	Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Pol. Cyn.	Per. Cyn.
Parent Pol. Infl. Index	5.03*	10.06**	16.35#
Parent Pol. Int. Index	13.30***	16.95#	28.32#
Family Pol. Infl. Index	7.07**	14.74***	16.95#
Teacher Pol. Infl. Index	6.93**	6.81**	5.78*
School Pol. Infl. Index	18.63#	15.59***	16.26#
Friend Pol. Infl. Index	5.48*	5.92*	27.28#
Media Pol. Infl. Index	18.18#	30.75#	22.33#
Respondent Pol. Int. Index	26.16#	22.12#	43.90#

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

*** Significant at the .001 level.

Significant at the .0001 level.

Interrelationships between parent and family political influence and parent political interest variables and cynicism scales are negative, linear and statistically significant. Table 46 presents a comprehensive summary of various measures of association of these influence and interest variables with cynicism scales, while Tables 108, 111 and 114, Appendix C, pages 425, 427 and 429, describe definite and inverse relationships between parent and family political influence and parent political interest variables and cynicism scales. These results reaffirm those of analyses of variance. On the basis of this evidence, the investigator concluded that those adolescents who have parents and families yielding high political influence and parents having high political interest are less likely to develop cynical attitudes toward politics and society than those adolescents who have parents and families yielding low political influence and parents having low political interest.

As an overview of the results, perhaps, the most salient characteristic is that, in general, parent political interest variable tends to have a stronger negative relationship with political cynicism than either parent, or family, political influence variable, even though the three indexes are only modestly negatively correlated with cynicism scales. These findings might signify the particular importance of parent political interest upon the development of cynicism among adolescents. It is reasonable to believe, at least intuitively, that among the less tangible, but potentially important, aspects of family life which are passed on to adolescents are the political attitudes permeating the family milieu. By intention or accident both positive and/or negative attitudes toward politicians and people in general and toward political process and social institutions are passed on from one

Table 46
Relationships of Cynicism Scales With Socialization Agents'
Summated Political Influence and Interest Indexes

Scale	Indexes	Pearson r	Tau-b	Gamma	Somer's D	Spearman rho
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.05	-.09	-.04	-.06
	Parent Pol. Int.	-.09	-.09	-.15	-.08	-.10
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.09	-.06	-.11	-.05	-.07
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.07	-.04	-.07	-.04	-.06
	School Pol. Infl.	-.11	-.09	-.15	-.08	-.11
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.06	-.07	-.12	-.06	-.06
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.12	-.10	-.16	-.08	-.11
	Respondent Pol. Int.	-.13	-.12	-.20	-.10	-.13
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.06	-.07	-.13	-.06	-.09
	Parent Pol. Int.	-.09	-.09	-.16	-.08	-.11
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.06	-.09	-.16	-.08	-.11
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.06	-.06	-.10	-.05	-.07
	School Pol. Infl.	-.09	-.08	-.14	-.07	-.10
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.05	-.06	-.10	-.05	-.06
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.14	-.14	-.24	-.12	-.15
	Respondent Pol. Int.	-.11	-.11	-.19	-.10	-.13
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.11	-.19	-.09	-.12
	Parent Pol. Int.	-.14	-.13	-.22	-.11	-.14
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.11	-.19	-.10	-.12
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.06	-.10	-.05	-.07
	School Pol. Infl.	-.10	-.10	-.18	-.09	-.11
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.12	-.21	-.10	-.14
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.12	-.20	-.10	-.13
	Respondent Pol. Int.	-.16	-.16	-.28	-.14	-.18

generation to another within the family context.

The data presented thus far seem to support those who have argued that parents and the family play important roles as transmitters of political attitudes to adolescents. However, the question arises as to how different would our findings be if we introduce singly age and school grade variables into the relationship between various aspects of family political influence and interest and feelings of cynicism. Expanding our analysis to an examination of the interaction of age and school grade variables with aspects of family political influence and interest and feelings of cynicism, we discover intricate, incongruous patterns of relationship between parent and family political influence and parent political interest variables and cynicism among age and school grade groups. The strength of individual relationship among age and grade groups are determined by gamma, a statistical measure of association.¹ Tables 47 and 48 provide the values of gamma for zero-order relations between parent and family political influence and parent political interest variables and feelings of cynicism by age and school grade, respectively. Additional data are presented in Tables 127 and 128, Appendix C, pages 438 and 439, which are analogous to Tables 47 and 48. As the latter, they also report values of gamma for zero-order relations between parent and family political influence and parent political interest variables with feelings of cynicism, this time by reference to

¹According to Blalock, gamma is an appropriate measure of association between two ordinal scales. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 415.

Table 47

Gamma Correlation Coefficients for the Relation Between
Socialization Agents' Summated Political Influence
and Interest Indexes and Cynicism Scales
by Age

Scales	Indexes	Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
Gr.-Jo.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.32	.10	-.10	-.07	-.12	-.22
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Int.	-.32	-.18	-.07	-.06	-.21	-.17
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.24	.09	-.18	-.14	-.11	-.19
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.19	-.10	.02	-.01	-.07	-.31
	School Pol. Infl.	-.25	-.10	-.07	-.21	-.08	-.38
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.25	-.08	-.21	-.07	-.14	.01
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.22	-.19	-.18	-.10	-.08	-.25
	Resp. Pol. Int.	-.44	-.22	-.20	-.15	-.13	-.12
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.22	.22	-.13	-.28	-.21	-.19
	Parent Pol. Int.	-.28	.04	-.15	-.19	-.21	-.29
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.24	.16	-.15	-.34	-.20	-.21
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.07	-.24	.14	-.05	-.27	-.20
	School Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.26	.01	-.09	-.17	-.33
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.18	-.06	-.20	-.04	-.11	-.01
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.27	-.22	-.28	-.23	-.21	-.15
	Resp. Pol. Int.	-.26	-.15	-.32	-.17	-.10	-.08
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.19	-.02	-.28	-.17	-.28	-.14
	Parent Pol. Int.	-.14	-.25	-.26	-.12	-.17	-.31
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.17	-.004	-.29	-.26	-.14	-.24
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.14	-.16	-.09	-.03	-.15	-.31
	School Pol. Infl.	-.12	-.28	-.18	-.10	-.18	-.33
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.18	-.11	-.33	-.22	-.14	.11
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.14	-.24	-.21	-.17	-.14	-.18
	Resp. Pol. Int.	-.37	-.19	-.31	-.21	-.28	-.31

Table 48

Gamma Correlation Coefficients for the Relation Between
Socialization Agents' Summated Political Influence
and Interest Indexes and Cynicism Scales by
School Grade

Scales	Indexes	Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Gr.-Jo.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.11	-.06	-.07	-.09	-.13
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Int.	-.31	-.06	.002	-.20	-.10
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.06	-.08	-.15	-.10	-.12
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.02	-.07	-.14	-.16
	School Pol. Infl.	-.14	-.02	-.27	-.23	-.14
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.10	-.31	.10	-.12	-.11
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.21	-.14	-.15	-.14	-.02
	Resp. Pol. Int.	-.37	-.19	-.21	-.02	-.06
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.03	.02	-.18	-.18	-.27
	Parent Pol. Int.	-.13	-.11	.05	-.37	-.21
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.06	-.05	-.20	-.21	-.27
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.01	-.03	-.20	-.26
	School Pol. Infl.	-.19	-.05	-.08	-.18	-.26
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.06	-.31	.16	-.13	-.11
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.27	-.21	-.23	-.27	-.13
	Resp. Pol. Int.	-.30	-.21	-.16	-.07	-.13
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.03	-.22	-.24	-.20	-.22
	Parent Pol. Int.	-.25	-.14	-.19	-.22	-.14
	Family Pol. Infl.	-.07	-.18	-.19	-.23	-.16
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.15	-.13	-.18	-.04	-.21
	School Pol. Infl.	-.22	-.22	-.29	-.05	-.20
	Friend Pol. Infl.	-.17	-.31	-.10	-.15	.01
	Media Pol. Infl.	-.20	-.19	-.15	-.17	-.08
	Resp. Pol. Int.	-.27	-.32	-.29	-.13	-.24

sex of adolescents by age and school grade variables.²

Indeed, when either age or school grade variable is introduced into the relation between parent and family political influence and parent political interest and cynical attitudes, the original associations undergo considerable alteration. And the latter associations suffer further substantial changes when sex variable is introduced jointly with age, or school grade, into the analyses. From a cursory inspection of gamma coefficients in the latest four tables, it appears that the introduction into the analyses of control variables such as age and school grade, singly, or jointly with sex, leads to overly complex patterns of relationship between independent and dependent variables. For certain age and school grade groups, enhancement of initial relationships occur, but, for other groups a startling change in original coefficients is observed. To illustrate, for the fourteen years of age female group, the sign of the relation is changed from negative to positive, indicating reverse relationships between parent and family political influence and

²Unfortunately, it is not possible to describe each group's relation in an individual table. To do so would require a separate table for each gamma coefficient presented in these four tables, or, for instance, at least forty-eight tables for all six age groups per cynicism scale. This would involve needless duplication and confusion. Therefore, it was decided to depict patterns observed after the introduction of control variables by presenting summary tables of gamma coefficients which would, we felt, provide a general picture of effects of partitioning overall relationships between socialization agents' summated political influence and interest indexes and cynicism scales by age and school grade, singly, or jointly with sex. In short, the investigator is simply attempting to show that the respective effects of various political socialization agents upon the development of political and personal cynicism varies among adolescent age, school grade and sex groups, or, at least, specify conditions under which relations between political socialization agents and feelings of cynicism occur.

feelings of cynicism. One thing appears clear from these findings. Sex role differences, at least, among this sample of Albertan adolescents extend to effects of parents and family political influences upon the development of political and personal cynicism. This conclusion becomes evident through our examination of gamma coefficients reported in Tables 127 and 128, Appendix C. Simply, we claim that the family milieu socializes unequally male and female adolescents in feelings of cynicism.

In sum, these findings have merely photographed the impact, complexity and shift of parent and family political influence and parent political interest variables upon the long-term development of political and personal cynicism among adolescents. Indeed, it is not possible to interpret precisely the various complex and inconsistent patterns of relationship which have emerged between the above-mentioned independent variables and dependent variables when age and school grade are controlled for singly, or jointly with sex. We cannot explain away, neither do we propose to give extended comments about, these inconsistencies. However, these findings underscore the necessity of re-examining the relationship between family political influence and development of adolescent orientations toward politics utilizing an expanded model which would include various socio-political background factors as intervening variables. In sum, our data highlight the fact that parents and the family political influences are highly complex processes, having, in general, a good deal of impact during early and late adolescence, still surviving during middle adolescence though more weakly, upon the development of cynical attitudes among adolescents.

Our findings about parents and the family political influence variables upon the development of cynicism among adolescents, in general term, are consistent with other investigators' findings.³ However, they are inconclusive since the parent and the family influence measures are highly subjective in nature. Thus, our data must be interpreted with caution. In fact, we have presented and discussed much of the above relationships, and have provided some indications of effects of certain control variables, in the hope that they will stimulate others, with more objective measures of parent and family political influences, to explore these relationships further.

II. INTERPERSONAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AGENT: THE SCHOOL

No two adolescents develop their attitudes toward politics in the same manner. Each is influenced by a multitude of factors that shape and reshape his/her attitudes toward politicians and the political process. Some adolescents form positive attachments toward the government and governmental authority while others do not and become mistrustful and cynical. Among the variety of factors which appear to cause these differences, the school emerges as an important channel through which political values and attitudes can be inculcated. Gladys A. Wiggin believes that "the school is the most important instrument of cultural transmission in American society."⁴ Nevertheless, the

³See Chapter III, pp. 58-64.

⁴Gladys A. Wiggin, Education and Nationalism: An Historical Interpretation of American Education (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1962), p. 34.

centrality of the school in conveying political values and attitudes has increasingly become a matter of scholarly controversy, even though few would argue that a critical part of civic education presented in public schools focusses on the transmission of cultural and political values, norms, attitudes and expressive symbols considered desirable by the ongoing society and that teachers, regardless of their subject of instruction, have the potential for performing a political socialization function, since they are in a position to convey to adolescents knowledge about, and attitudes toward, the political process and politicians.

Data are available here which permit us to examine the impact of teachers and the school political influences upon the structuring of feelings of cynicism among adolescents.

Group mean scores and standard deviations of teacher and school political influence variables for three cynicism scales are shown in Tables 115 and 118, Appendix C, pages 430 and 432, respectively.

Analyses of variance were performed to test the significance of differences between teacher and school political influence groups' mean scores; data of these analyses are presented in Tables 116 and 119, Appendix C, pages 430 and 432, while a summary of computed F-ratios is given in Table 45, page 245. Inspection of F-ratios reveals that group mean score differences of teacher and school political influence variables on all three cynicism scales were statistically significant; that is, analyses of variance yielded statistically significant F-ratios. Comparisons of group mean scores indicate that those adolescents who have teachers, or who are attending schools, yielding high political influence scored significantly lower than those adolescents who have

teachers, or are attending schools, yielding low political influence on the three measures used to index adolescents' degree of political and personal cynicism. Additional descriptive data, presented in Tables 117 and 120, Appendix C, pages 431 and 433, document these findings. On the basis of these findings, null hypotheses 4 and 5 were rejected.

Thus far, it is not surprising, given the above findings, to see that feelings of cynicism are related moderately to teacher and school political influence variables. Although teacher and school political influence variables have been shown to be correlated to feelings of cynicism, these findings do not constitute overwhelming evidence of the teachers' and the school's impacts upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism among adolescents; nevertheless, they do indicate some influences of a modest strength.

Again, these findings raise the question we asked concerning parent and family relationship with cynicism: how different would our findings be if age and school grade variables were introduced singly, or jointly, with the sex variable, into the above relationships between teacher and school political influence variables and feelings of cynicism? Table 47, page 249, portrays the effects of introducing age variable, while Table 48, page 250, exhibits the effects of school grade variable for all three attitude scales. Tables 127 and 128, Appendix C, present the joint effects of sex and age variables and sex and school grade variables.⁵ These tables contain a great deal of information. We will

⁵Again, our primary interest in presenting these data is to indicate the complex and varied patterns of relationship, rather than their exact strength, which emerge between teacher and school political influence variables and the structuring of political and personal cynicism among adolescents when control variables are introduced into the analyses.

not attempt to describe here the many nuances of relationship disclosed in these latter tables, particularly, since most of the shades of difference discernable in these tables have already been treated in our discussion of parent and family political influence variables. Indeed, at a glance, substantial differences among adolescents of varying ages and school grades emerge and the addition of sex as a control variable magnifies these differences concerning teachers and the school impacts upon the structuring of cynicism-related variables. Even so, a closer examination of Tables 127 and 128, Appendix C, reveals a peculiar finding. Teachers and the school apparently have unequal political socialization effects on male and female adolescents. This divergence between male and female adolescents could possibly be better explained by other factors such as greater involvement and participation in extra curricular activities by male than female students, or more plausibly determined by age-linked factors such as deference, than, perhaps, the result of academic activities and successes within the classroom. Although these latest tables indicate many ambiguities, these results support our views that school teachers and the school, in general, may have dampening effects upon the development of political cynicism among male adolescent-students.⁶ However, for female adolescent-students, such dampening effects, if any, would have to be located in some aspect of school

⁶For a discussion of "dampening effect" of the school, see M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values From Parent to Child," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), p. 178.

socialization process other than that of teachers' influential effect, or in any school politically-induced influence, upon the structuring of cynicism, as either effect appears to be increasingly overridden by impact of other factors. Unfortunately, because we lack information, we cannot support our interpretation as strongly as we would like. The distinctness of female adolescent-students, nevertheless, stands out from all the data in this part even though some flaws exist in these findings.

Summarizing this section on effects of teachers and the school political influences upon the development of cynicism among adolescents, we have seen instances where impacts of relevant aspects of school socialization upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism change not only among age-grade groups but, also, between male and female adolescents. In the light of the evidence provided, it does seem likely that the various patterns of male adolescents' feelings of cynicism when compared to those of female adolescents can be traced plausibly and in part to the school's countervailing or "dampening" socialization. This appears not to be so for female adolescents. On the whole, differences in teacher and school impacts upon the materialization of cynicism among age and school grade groups, or between sex groups, of adolescents in this section, like those in the preceding section, have been rather modest.

III. INTERPERSONAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AGENT: THE PEER GROUP

It is generally held that, as an individual moves into adolescence

toward adulthood, he/she encounters another interpersonal socializing influence which is generally designated by the term peer group. For Elkin and Handel, the peer group, or more accurately the adolescent's "peer world" as a socializing agency has certain distinctive characteristics:

(1) by definition, it is made up of members who have about the same age status; (2) within the peer group the members have varying degree of prestige and power; (3) the peer group is centered about its own concerns (4) Thus, any long-run socializing implications are largely unintentional.⁷

However, as an agent of political socialization, the peer group occupy a somewhat obscure position even though it does not tax our powers of imagination to think that peer relationships become very influential among high school youth. The obscure position held by the peer group as a political socializer may be, in part, emanating from the conceded fact that its role as a political socialization agent has not been adequately investigated by political scientists.⁸ Accordingly, of interest to us in this section is the unique effect of peer group political influence upon the structuring of cynicism among adolescents.

Table 121, Appendix C, page 434, reports mean scores and standard deviations of friend, or peer, political influence groups for three cynicism scales. One-way analyses of variance were performed to compare differences between high and low friend political influence groups' mean scores on the three cynicism scales. Results of these

⁷Frederick Elkin and Gerald Handel, The Child and Society: The Process of Socialization (2d ed.; New York: Random House, 1972), p. 124.

⁸For instance, see Herbert Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 71 and Dean Jaros, Socialization to Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 134.

analyses are presented in Tables 45, page 245, and 122, Appendix C, page 434. All three computed F-ratios in these analyses reached the minimum value required for any acceptable level of significance. On the basis of these findings, null hypothesis 6 was rejected.

Our findings, although statistically significant, are somewhat weak. A closer examination of Tables 121, Appendix C, and 46, page 247, reveals some similarities and differences. The first similarity worth mentioning is that friend political influence variable is negatively correlated with all three cynicism dimensions; the higher an adolescent rates his/her friends on political influence, the more faith he/she has in societal institutions and people in general and the more trust, less cynicism, he/she holds toward governmental processes and politicians. Even though the data show parallel patterns for all three cynicism scales, the relationship is weaker for political cynicism than for personal cynicism. Table 123, Appendix C, page 435, describe these inverse relationships between the friend political influence variable and cynicism scales. This table again demonstrates that, as a whole, adolescents who have friends yielding low political influence were more likely to feel cynical toward society and politics than those who have friends yielding high political influence. Further, our data suggest that the friendship, or peer, group, apparently, will have greater impact upon the structuring of adolescents' personal feelings and orientations than upon political feelings and orientations.

As well, we re-examined these relationships between the friend political influence variable and cynicism scales with the addition of

age and school grade as control variables. These relationships, in general, re-assert themselves. However, the interrelation between friend political influence variable and personal cynicism is reversed for the eighteen years of age group, while it becomes essentially irrelevant with the political cynicism scales for the latter age group. A similar turnabout asserts itself for the grade ten group on both political cynicism scales. Apparently the movement from junior to senior high school alters the nature of friendship group influence upon the structuring of political cynicism. Tables 47 and 48, pages 249 and 250, supply the necessary data.

In short, the nature of peer group influence upon the structuring of cynicism is at best exceedingly ambiguous if not puzzling as Tables 127 and 128, Appendix C, pages 438 and 439, make clear. Indeed, this is more evident when the variable sex is added to analyses with either the variable age, or school grade, as control variables. Although, once again, we can offer no clear explanation for our findings, we suspect, for one thing, that peer group's strength to structure feelings of cynicism among adolescents not only depend upon the psychological burden, or make up, the adolescent brings into the peer-group setting, but it is also conditioned by such factors as sex, age and school grade, and perhaps the total social setting itself.

Again, our intent here in presenting the above findings is not only to demonstrate that friendship, or peer, groups in forging such political and personal attitudes as cynicism do not exert equal influence on all adolescents, but also to sketch the compound patterns of relations which emerge when control variables are interjected into

relationships between the peer group political influence variable and feelings of cynicism. At the same time, if our sample is indicative, we cannot discern in our data any support for the view that political and personal values and attitudes reinforced by peer groups are running counter to those advanced by parents, or the family, and educational authorities. On the whole, adolescent peer-group cultures are much more likely to augment the political and, perhaps, the personal attitudes formed by the adult world than to oppose them. Too, there are no clear-cut endorsement in the data to bolster James Best's assertion that, as adolescents grow older, the peer group becomes an increasingly important factor in the political socialization process.⁹ Our own data are more consistent with Hirsch's findings that "peers do not increase in impact as the child grows older."¹⁰ Presumably, the effectiveness of the adolescent peer group in influencing the development of feelings of political and personal cynicism of its members increases concomitantly with age, or school grades, among male and female adolescents.

IV. IMPERSONAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AGENT: THE MASS MEDIA

The mass media, together with the family, the school and the peer group, provide the complex matrix within which an adolescent learns to live and to deal with his political environment. Unlike the other three agencies of political socialization, mass media do not directly

⁹James J. Best, Public Opinion: Micro and Macro (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1973), p. 112.

¹⁰Hirsch, op. cit., p. 76.

involve interpersonal interaction; they may be called "impersonal agents" of political socialization.¹¹ For James Best,

there is no question that the mass media play an important role in the every day [adolescent] life. In addition to providing [them] with light entertainment they are also major sources of trustworthy information about our political environment The mass media have provided [adolescents] with the information necessary for [them] to form opinions about objects in [their] political environment.¹²

Yet, the role of the mass media as a possible agent of political socialization has not been extensively investigated by political scientists¹³ and the findings which have been reported are far from being consistent or conclusive.

For us, the obvious question is whether there is any relationship between what adolescents see on television, or read in newspapers, or hear on radio, and their attitudes toward social and political processes and toward people in general and politicians in particular. Thus, in our attempt to assess fully the probable effect of the mass media upon the structuring of cynicism among adolescents, a general composite measure which takes into account mass media exposure is employed.

Table 124, Appendix C, page 436, summarizes mean scores and standard deviations obtained respectively by adolescents, who are grouped as high and low on the mass media political influence variable, for three cynicism scales. Analyses of variance were employed to test

¹¹Hirsch, op. cit., p. 118.

¹²Best, op. cit., p. 129.

¹³Hirsch, op. cit., p. 118.

the significance of differences between group mean political and personal cynicism scores of mass media political influence variable. Table 45, page 245, summarized F-ratios which were computed in testing the significance of group mean score differences, while a more detailed presentation is observed in Table 125, Appendix C, page 436. Inspection of F-ratios in both tables shows that there were significant differences between mass media political influence groups' mean scores on all attitude scales. In light of these analyses, null hypothesis 7 was rejected.

Overall, exposure to mass media, or mass media political influence, is inversely related to cynicism, as Table 46, page 247, shows. For the three cynicism scales, the pattern is quite straight forward: the more exposure to mass media an adolescent reports, the more positive (the less cynical) are his attitudes toward the social and political processes and toward people in general and politicians in particular--greater exposure to mass media leads to lower cynicism. Not surprisingly, descriptive data reported in Table 126, Appendix C, page 437, substantiate these findings. In sum, these findings are highly similar to those reported by Hirsch¹⁴ and Freeman.¹⁵

Once more, if the control variables age and school grades are inserted into the analyses, interesting results appear. As Tables 47 and 48, pages 249 and 250, make clear, when either age or school grade

¹⁴Hirsch, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁵Caroline Smith Freeman, "The Origins of Political Cynicism: A Study of the Development of Political Orientations in Adolescents," (unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966), p. 137.

were controlled for, only modest changes occurred in the original correlations between the mass media political influence variable and cynicism attitudes. Although differences among age and school grade groups do occur which appear to indicate that exposure to mass media, or mass media political influence, variable is related to these two control variables, it seems safe to believe that mass media political influence is directly related to the strength of an adolescent's feelings of cynicism. Similarly, the contribution of mass media to the structuring of cynicism among adolescents, at least, in this sample, has every appearance of overriding the effects of age and school grade variables. Of course, the picture begins to get a little more complicated when one moves to control simultaneously for effects of sex and age, or sex and school grade, variables. Looking briefly at the data displayed in Tables 127 and 128, Appendix C, pages 438 and 439, they show fairly consistently that exposure to mass media has a greater impact upon the molding of cynicism among female adolescents regardless of age and school grade groups than among male adolescents. If all this evidence is accurate, our data seem to sustain Hirsch's contention that male adolescents are less likely than their female counterparts to pay attention to political news in mass media.¹⁶ In short, the data suggest that the mass media political influence variable has more impact upon the shaping of feelings of cynicism among our Albertan female adolescents than among our male adolescents.

To summarize, there is evidence throughout the data that the

¹⁶Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

effect of mass media political influence variable upon the incubation of feelings of political and personal cynicism is both complicated and mixed. Ostensibly, mass media can play a strong role in the development of cynicism among adolescents. Surprisingly, we observe that, in general, greater exposure to mass media had a greater impact upon the structuring of cynicism among female adolescents than among male adolescents. In brief, mass media may bring about a greater reinforcing effect (or they may even create new political attitudes where none existed before) for female adolescents than for male adolescents regardless of ages and school grades.

V. FAMILY, SCHOOL, PEER GROUP AND MASS MEDIA: THEIR RELATIVE EFFECTS

There is very little direct and conclusive evidence available in the literature as to the relative effects of these four political socialization agents. From the previous discussion presented in the "Agents of Political Socialization" section,¹⁷ many political scientists have argued that the family is by far the most important agent of political socialization, while others have asserted that the school, or the peer group, is the most pervasive political socializer. For instance, Langsdon Longstreth feels that, if we are concerned with the socialization process as an interactive process, then, after adolescents enter school, the role of the family tends to decline dramatically, that of the school to increase and that of the peer group to predominate.¹⁸

¹⁷See Chapter III, pp. 57-82.

¹⁸Langsdon Longstreth, Psychological Development of the Children (New York: Ronald Press, 1968).

Still some scholars assumed that the mass media has certain effects upon the development of individuals' political values, norms and attitudes. To be sure, while the adolescent spends far more time with his family, friends and in school, in contact with agents that have preeminent and predominant roles in the political socialization process, he is still an insatiable consumer of various mass media such as radio and television. One might well have argued that the mass media serves as an important transmission line between the dominant adult culture and the adolescent culture, both reinforcing political values and beliefs learned elsewhere and structuring new political values and beliefs. And, the debate endures as to the relative and differential impact of each of these four political socialization agents.

From the data already reported and discussed in this chapter, we have seen that, individually, these four political socialization agents have some effects upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism among adolescents. But, the data are not very revealing as to how these four agents share their roles, simply, because the relationships considered in section one through four of this chapter are essentially bivariate and two dimensional--the high/low political influence dimensions of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media, treated as rough continua, have been compared on three measures of cynicism, one agent at the time. Thus, one wonders what the relative effects of each agent considered together would be upon the structuring of feelings of cynicism toward the social and the political processes and toward people in general and politicians.

Since direct comparisons among the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media are virtually non-existent, an appropriate step to ameliorate this situation would be to reconsider the combined predictive power of these four political socializers viewed simultaneously upon each of the three cynicism scales. Such analyses require the use of rather sophisticated multivariate techniques. One such technique was found to be particularly well-suited to our purpose. This is the Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA).¹⁸ Thus, it is our contention that the MCA procedure is an appropriate technique for parcelling out the relative effects of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media upon the development of political and personal cynicism among adolescents.¹⁹

Before performing the MCA analysis, several preliminary steps were taken. After recoding the variables and creating the needed political influence indexes, all respondents who did not give a codable response on one or more variables were omitted from the sample. The resulting sample was composed of 1340 respondents, thus insuring that each of the statistics was based on the same sample. Since the major

¹⁸For a brief discussion of this technique, see Chapter IV, pp. 151-154.

¹⁹The MCA program is quite suitable for the analysis of the kind of survey data which political socialization researchers usually have available; that is, variables as weak as nominal scales, or data which fail to meet the assumptions of most conventional multivariate statistical techniques such as normal distribution, linearity and uncorrelated predictors. Further, the MCA is specifically designed to parcel out the relative effects of several independent variables on a dependent variable both before and after taking into account the effects of other variables involved in the analysis. See Frank Andrews, James Morgan and John Sonquist, Multiple Classification Analysis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1969), pp. 8-17.

restrictive assumption of the MCA technique is that of additive effects among the predictor variables,²⁰ then, the Automatic Interaction Detector (AID) program was employed to check for interaction among the predictor variables; this is a procedure advocated by John Sonquist²¹ because, in effect, the MCA technique "covers up" any evidence of interaction among the independent variables.²² Figure 18, Appendix C, page 440, illustrates the sequence of partitions, or the outputted truncated tree, for the three cynicism scales computed from the set of data applying the recommended split reducibility value of .6% (i.e., .006).²³ Since very few subdivisions occur as shown by the branching diagram in Figure 18, the analysis was re-run for each dependent variable--cynicism scales--forcing the algorithm to run to capacity; we set the parameter used to stop the splitting process at the .001% (i.e., reducibility = .00001). This insures that variables which were second, third and fourth in their ability to explain variance at various stages in the first splitting process were used, thus, making it possible for interaction terms involving

²⁰ Andrews, Morgan and Sonquist, op. cit., pp. 24-28.

²¹ John A. Sonquist, Multivariate Model Building: The Validation of a Search Strategy (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), pp. 201-209; and John A. Sonquist, "Finding Variables that Work," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1969), pp. 89-94.

²² John A. Sonquist, "Finding Variables that Work," p. 85; and Andrew, Morgan and Sonquist, op. cit., p. 25.

²³ See Institute for Social Research, Osiris II: OS Users Manual (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, 1971), p. 380.

these variables to be revealed.²⁴ The data produced the tree structures depicted in Figures 19 to 21, Appendix C, pages 441 to 443. The evidence from the AID runs indicate that, in general, the presence of interaction is in doubt, although it appears that elusive complex interaction are affecting the occasional subgroups of variables which are fourth in their ability to explain variance on all three measures of cynicism. Since the logic is not one of hypothesis testing, but rather one of data-searching for the optimum explanatory power of various variables, and since the suspected interaction terms do not appear to make sense theoretically, thus, for compelling conjectual and causal senses, we decided to retain all terms as is and not to construct new interaction terms to replace any of the raw variables.²⁵ Too, we felt that generating only certain interaction terms would not improve the explanatory powers of the affected variables. Hence, following Sonquist's suggestion, we assume that the additive model is appropriate and we proceeded directly to the MCA analysis employing the raw data.²⁶

²⁴For a detailed description of the AID program, see John A. Sonquist and James N. Morgan, The Detection of Interaction Effects (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1969); and John A. Sonquist, Elizabeth L. Baker and James N. Morgan, Searching For Structure (Alias - AID - III) (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute For Social Research, University of Michigan, 1971).

²⁵See Sonquist, Multivariate Model Building, pp. 215, 190. He suggests that the theoretical importance of deleting terms from the analysis should be kept in mind.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 94-95. Of course, our interpretation of the data will be cautious because of possible sporadic interaction effects within some subgroups of certain predictors.

Several separate MCA analyses were performed on each cynicism scale. First, each of the four independent variables--family, school, peer group and mass media political influence indexes--was used as a predictor on the three dependent variables--political and personal cynicism scales. Next all possible combinations of two and three predictors at a time were employed. And, finally, all four independent variables were included in separate runs. This procedure was carried out to measure the changes in R^2 , or percent variance accounted for, as new variables are added to the set of predictors.²⁷ Tables 129 to 131, Appendix C, pages 444 to 446, summarize the several effects associated with the various combinations of family, school, peer group and mass media and show the unique contribution (or net effect) of each of our four predictor variables for individual cynicism scales.

Table 49 presents Eta, Eta^2 , Beta and Beta^2 statistics for each political influence index predicting to the three measures of cynicism, along with a summary of proportion of variance explained by the multiple prediction (that is, using all four predictors simultaneously).²⁸ Again, the Eta statistic in Table 49 is a measure of the general ability of a particular independent variable to predict the values of the particular independent variable under consideration, while Eta^2 indicates the proportion of the total sum of squares explained by the particular

²⁷ Similar procedures were followed utilizing the multiple regression analysis technique. Results are presented in Table 132, Appendix C, page 447.

²⁸ We rely on similar tables for the presentation of results from MCA runs throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Table 49

Multiple Classification Analyses of Family, School, Friend
and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Predicting
to Cynicism Scales' Scores

Scale	Indexes	Predicting From Each Index Separately		Predicting From 4 Indexes Simultaneously		Eta ² -Beta ²
		Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²	
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.071	.005	.023	.0005	.0045
	School Pol. Infl.	.119	.014	.105	.011	.003
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.048	.002	.001	.000	.002
	Media Pol. Infl.	.105	.011	.083	.007	.004
R = .14		R ² = .02		Percent Variance Explained = 1.99		
Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.101	.010	.046	.002	.008
	School Pol. Infl.	.109	.012	.084	.007	.005
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.066	.004	.003	.000	.004
	Media Pol. Infl.	.151	.023	.123	.015	.008
R = .17		R ² = .03		Percent Variance Explained = 2.97		
Per. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.112	.013	.053	.003	.01
	School Pol. Infl.	.111	.012	.082	.007	.005
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.111	.012	.058	.003	.009
	Media Pol. Infl.	.124	.015	.079	.006	.009
R = .17		R ² = .03		Percent Variance Explained = 2.84		

predictor variable operating alone (i.e., without adjustment for correlation with other predictors). Beta is similar to Eta, but it takes into consideration the simultaneous effects of other independent variables included in the analysis. Beta² then provides a measure of the ability of a particular predictor to explain variation in a dependent variable after adjusting for effects of all other predictor variables.²⁹ In a sense, Eta is analogous to a simple correlation coefficient while Beta is analogous to a partial correlation coefficient. And, both the eta and beta statistics give a clear picture of the relative strength of predictor variables. So, by observing differences between eta and beta values, we can obtain an indication of which predictor has the strongest, or weakest, influence on the dependent variable. Too, by computing Eta² and Beta² for each independent variable, we also find how the adjustment procedure operates from one prediction to another.

Unfortunately, our findings are both disappointing and unpretentious. As Table 49 indicates, the greatest effects for the prediction of both political cynicism scales' scores are provided by the school and the mass media political influence variables. The family political influence variable by itself would account for only about half as much variance as the school or the mass media in predicting the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's scores. However, in predicting the Personal Cynicism Scale's scores, the family political

²⁹For the origins and formulae of these statistics, see Andrew, Morgan and Sonquist, op. cit., pp. 2, 95-97.

influence variable accounts for approximate alike amount of variance as the school political influence variable. By far the weakest predictor of all three cynicism scales' scores is the peer political influence variable, even though it is a good deal stronger predictor (unadjusted) of the Personal Cynicism Scale's scores than of Political Cynicism Scales' scores.

Turning to the $Beta^2$ statistic, we discover that (1) the school political influence variable is the strongest predictor of the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores; (2) the mass media political influence variable is the strongest predictor of the Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores; (3) both the school and the mass media variables are the strongest predictors of Personal Cynicism Scale's scores; and (4) the peer group political influence variable is by far the weakest predictor of all three cynicism scales' scores. But, when we compare Eta^2 and $Beta^2$ for each variable on the three cynicism scales, specifically, we discover that the adjusted effects of the school political influence variable are noticeably lower than the effects of the other three political influence variables (that is, the ability of school political influence variable to explain variation in the dependent variables is the least affected after adjusting for the effects of all other predictors). Perhaps, more striking are the extensive reductions in the ability of the family and peer group political influence variables to explain variation in the three cynicism scales' scores after contributions of other predictors are adjusted for. Their effects are reduced nearly to zero. To put it another way, the $Beta^2$ statistics in Table 49 lead us to suppose that we could do a fair job in predicting political and personal cynicism

scales' scores using only the school and the mass media political influence variables--and that we would not account for much more of the variance by adding the family and the peer group political influence predictors. This supposition received support from Tables 129, 130 and 131, Appendix C, which summarize the unique contribution of each of the four predictor variables by themselves and with various combinations. In short, the pattern is quite conspicuous: those adolescents whose schools yield a high level of political influence and for those the mass media has high political influence are less likely to develop cynical attitudes toward political and social processes, and toward people in general and politicians in particular. It is noteworthy also that the total set of the four predictor variables considered in the above section account for less than three percent of the variance in each of our three cynicism scales' scores.³⁰

In sum, using the Multiple Classification Analysis technique, it has been possible to determine the relative predictive powers of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media political influence variables for each of the three measures of cynicism. The data computed by the MCA procedure show that the school political influence variable is the strongest and most direct predictor of the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's scores, while the mass

³⁰ Alike data resulting from the application of the AID and MCA techniques to the task of predicting the three cynicism scales' scores using here the parent, the teacher, the peer group and the mass media political influence indexes as predictor variables can be found in Appendix C, from pages 450 to 460. Additional data are also offered in Figures 22 and 27, and Tables 133, 139 to 141, Appendix C.

media political influence variable is the strongest predictor of the Political Cynicism Scale's and the Personal Cynicism Scale's scores, and, moreover, even when the concurrent effects of the other predictors are taken into account, these two predictors--school and mass media--retain their powerful impact upon the development of political and personal cynicism beliefs.

On the other hand, the data computed by the MCA program indicate that both the family and the peer group political influence variables are by a great deal the weakest predictors of political cynicism scales' scores and, when adjusting for effects of all other variables, each retains very little capability to explain variations in the political cynicism scales' scores. Still, a more precise view of the relative effects of the family and peer group political influence variables requires differentiation among the dissimilar aspects of cynicism. In general, these two predictor variables are more closely related to the personal cynicism scale than to the political cynicism scales, but, when effects of other predictors are considered, the β^2 values for either the family or the peer group political influence variable as a predictor of personal cynicism drop sharply, thereby suggesting that the family and the peer group have little direct effects upon the development of feelings of personal cynicism among adolescents. Indeed, the predictive strength of both the family and the peer group variables are clearly greater for the personal cynicism scale's scores than for the political cynicism scales' scores. Of all the political influence dimensions analyzed here, the peer group has the weakest predictive strength upon all three cynicism scales' scores.

As we examine these data, we note that our findings show a number of consistencies with Hirsch's recent study. He discovered in an American sub-culture that the mass media was the most important agent of political socialization in terms of political information transmission followed in importance by the school, the parents and the peer group.³¹ However, he reported that these relationships were "further complicated by identification of the agent's salience on four governmental levels. Each agent did not rank equally high on each level."³² Our findings are essentially the same as those reported by Hirsch. In general, the mass media had the strongest and the most direct effect upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism among adolescents followed in importance by the school, the family and the peer group, which had the weakest and the least direct effect upon the formation of these attitudes. We note, however, that the predictive strength of each of these four predictors are unequal on everyone of the three measures of cynicism. Thus, the mass media political influence variable is the strongest and most direct predictor of Political Cynicism Scale's scores and also of the Personal Cynicism Scale's scores. The school political influence variable is the second-best predictor of these two scales, while it is the strongest and the most direct predictor of the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's scores, with the peer group having the weakest effect on all three scales. The effect of the family varies from scale to scale. For instance, the family has almost

³¹Hirsch, op. cit., p. 138.

³²Ibid.

the same predictive strength as the school on the Political Cynicism Scale and the Personal Cynicism Scale, but ranks a weak third-best on the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale.

To all appearances, these data suggest that the mass media and the school have nearly replaced the family and have just about displaced the peer group as primarily political socializers of cynical attitudes among adolescents. Perhaps, both the school and the mass media are providing perceived trustworthy information and experiences about the political and social processes and about people in general and politicians in particular which could possibly be prerequisite for the maintenance and nurturing of positive, or perhaps negative, political and personal attitudes. By the same token, the primary function of the peer group is less clear cut, in part due to the difficulty of extricating its effects from that of the school and the family. In short, the effect of the peer group upon the structuring of feelings of cynicism is minimized, or neutralized, by other political socializers. In fact, the role of the peer group upon the development of cynical attitudes may be largely supportive. Simply, the peer group may be forming an ancillary-family reference group for testing particular values, norms and attitudes toward political and social objects which have been "caused" by other political socialization agents. Indeed, there is no support in the data for the assertion that peer groups are increasingly important factors in the political socialization process of adolescents. In any event, the total effects of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media political influence variables upon the development of political and personal cynicism among adolescents have

been rather slight.

Equally important, however, attention should be focussed on the "power" of political socialization agents as predictors of feelings of political and personal cynicism. In the three scales of cynicism studied here, with all four predictor variables taken together, it was not possible to explain more than three percent of the variance in any one scale. Yet, weak as they are, and even though specific effects of these agencies remain somewhat elusive, we were at least able to gauge the relative impacts of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media upon the acquisition of cynical attitudes among adolescents.³³

VI. RESPONDENT POLITICAL INTEREST

A cluster of items were included in the questionnaire to assess respondents' interest in politics. These items were utilized to construct a summated scale showing respondents' levels of political interest.³⁴ As we have noted in chapter four, adolescents who may be categorized as "political participators" scored noticeably lower than "non-political participators" on the three measures of cynicism. Thus, we felt compelled not only to assess the relationships of respondent political interest variable with cynical attitudes, but also to relate the effects of respondent political interest to those of the two major independent,

³³The relative predictive power of these four political socialization agents also varies across age and grade groups and between male and female adolescents. That is, various patterns of relative predictive ability emerge among age, school grade and sex variables' groups. These patterns are presented in Tables 142 to 144, Appendix C, pages 463 to 465, for information only as any discussion of these data lies outside the scope of this dissertation. Additional data are presented in Tables 145 to 147, Appendix C.

³⁴These items and responses' distribution are presented in Tables 5 and 6, Chapter IV, pages 133 and 134.

or "developmental", variables of this investigation: age and school grade. We hypothesize that adolescents who have high interest in politics will feel less cynical about politics and society than those who have low interest in politics--the lower the interest in politics, the greater the cynicism.

As we suspected, those adolescents who reported high level of political interest tended to score significantly lower than those who reported low level of political interest on all three cynicism scales. Tables 148 and 149, Appendix C, page 469, supply the necessary data. In sum, the respondent political interest variable shows moderate negative relationships with cynicism scales. Table 46, page 247, summarizes various measures of association between the respondent political interest variable and the three cynicism scales.

When either age or school grade were controlled, fluctuating patterns of relationship emerged among age and school grade groups, thereby suggesting that this independent variable has irregular impact upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism among adolescents of various age and school grade groups. Tables 47 and 48, pages 249, and 250, illustrate these ununiform patterns. Moreover, as Tables 127 and 128, Appendix C, pages 438 and 439, reveal, there are sizable alterations to original associations between the respondent political interest variable and cynicism scales when the sex variable is introduced jointly with either age or school grade into the analyses. The data from the latest two tables suggest that the introduction of sex and age, or sex and school grade, into the analyses leads to a significant

increase of the original relation between male and female adolescents among various age and school grade groups, noticeably, for younger adolescents and to significant reduction of the original relation, specifically, among older male and female adolescents. Therefore, even though it is necessary to speak in general terms, it does appear that introduction of sex and age, or sex and school grade, as control variables specify conditions under which relations between respondent political interest variable and components of cynicism occur. Such being the case, it is not possible to state specifically what the effects of controlling for age and school grade, singly, or simultaneously with sex, are on the original relations.

This further bit of data was added here, briefly, to indicate that adolescents who have high political interest, regardless of their sex, age or school grade groups, are less likely to develop cynical attitudes toward political and societal processes and toward people and politicians than those who have low political interest. Table 150, Appendix C, page 470, describes these relationships in detail. These findings add some support to the view that those who are interested in politics will tend to feel less cynical toward the political process and politicians. As well, they tend to corroborate our previous findings for political participation. In short, adolescents who score highly on cynicism are less likely to become active and interested in politics.

VII. SUMMARY

A number of political influence and political interest variables

were related to feelings of political and personal cynicism. Using analysis techniques that dealt with only two variables at a time, we presented evidence which demonstrate that all seven political influence and interest variables were inversely related to all three measures used to index adolescents' feelings of political and personal cynicism. Adolescents whose parents, family, teacher, school and friend yielded high political influence, upon whose the mass media had high political influence and whose parents have high interest in politics are less likely to develop cynical attitudes toward politics and society than those whose political socialization agents yielded low political influence and whose parents have low interest in politics. These bivariate negative relationships, while generally statistically significant tended to be at best moderate. However, using partition design as a method of statistical control, the introduction of age, or school grade, as a control variable in analyses leads to some important changes in original relations between political socialization agents and cynicism scales. The picture gets more complicated if age, or school grade, is introduced simultaneously with sex as control variables in these analyses as original relations undergo considerable and drastic alterations. Weak and strong negative and positive relations between the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media political influence variables and three cynicism scales were unravelled across age and grade groups both for male and female adolescents. The data suggest that the respective effect of political socialization agents upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism among adolescents

not only meanders through age and school grade groups for males and females, but it is also quite complex and multiple facets. Too, these findings lead us to suspect that the development of cynical attitudes by adolescents is dependent on a complex interaction of socio-cultural and psychodynamic processes.

More relevant for our purposes, a series of Multiple Classification Analysis procedures were employed to uncover the relative effects of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media political influence variables upon each of the three measures pertaining to feelings of cynicism. The analytical breakdowns provided by the MCA technique revealed that the predictive strength of each of these four political socialization agents is differential on everyone of the three measures of cynicism. Although each agent did not rank equally high, or low, on its relative predictive power on the three cynicism scales, by and large, the mass media tended to be the strongest and most direct predictor of all three cynicism scales' scores. The school was the second-best predictor, followed by the family, with the peer group having the weakest effect. In light of the information provided by the MCA technique, the investigator concluded that, all in all, the mass media had the greatest impact upon the development of feelings of political and personal cynicism among adolescents followed in importance by the school, the family, with the peer group influence being the least predominant.

On the face of it, it is possible to interpret these findings as evidence that most of the adolescents in this sample did not turn

away from their parents and families to become the captives of their peers. As a matter of fact, the results lend credence to the notion that parental, or familial, political influence is more likely to predominate in the inculcation of underlying specific social and political values and attitudes than the peer group, in part due to the remoteness, or low saliency, of specific political and social matters for most adolescents. And some might explain these findings by arguing that, in the development of feelings of cynicism, the peer group serve solely to reinforce parental, or familial, values. No doubt these may be explained in term of the usually considerable overlap between parental and peer values because of the commonalities of their social and political backgrounds. Certainly, neither parental nor peer group nor school nor mass media political influence is monolithic in the structuring of feelings of cynicism among adolescents. The weight given to either of these four political socialization agents appears to depend, to a significant degree, on the adolescent's appraisal of its relative value in a specific social and political situations. Too, it may be considered, in part, a function of the remoteness, or low saliency, of political matters, relating directly to the adolescent's ego involvement in the topics investigated. In short, what has emerged in our findings is that, in the development of feelings of political and personal cynicism, adolescents were more likely to be influenced by the mass media and the school than by the family and the peer group. We suspect that, not only they are perceived as more trustworthy sources of political information than the family or the peer group, but also they may fulfill a more, compensatory, egalitarian function. It is bemusing to discover a more clear, rational explanation for our findings. Nevertheless,

after having unmasked the relative predictive effects of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media political influence variables on each of the three measures of cynicism, we were disappointed by the "power" of political influence variables as predictors of cynical attitudes. In all three attitude scales studied here, even when all four political socialization agents are taken together, it was not possible to explain more than three percent of the variance in any one constituent of cynicism.

Another type of data, presented very briefly in the latter section of this chapter, indicate that adolescents who have high interest in politics scored significantly lower on all three cynicism scales than those who have low interest in politics. This bit of data is encouraging for it suggests that persons who have high interest in politics are much less likely than those who have low interest to develop feelings of cynicism toward society and politics.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

I. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

This study, exploratory in character, examined the development of cynical attitudes among junior and senior high school students from selected rural and urban centres in Alberta. The initial thrust of the study was descriptive--an attempt to chart and to document the growth of political and personal cynicism after objectively quantifying, with applicable attitude scales, adolescents' feelings of political and personal cynicism. The focus of the study was not limited solely to an examination of the development of cynicism among adolescents, but attempted also to delineate the operants through which they acquire these specific political and personal beliefs. Since the process of acquisition is deemed to include the accumulation of specific knowledge, experiences and attitudes taught by interpersonal political socialization agents (the family, the school and the peer group) and of information provided by the impersonal political socialization agent (the mass media), the study undertook, as well, to appraise the relative effects of these four political socialization agents upon the inculcation of political and personal cynicism among adolescents. In addition to the two main purposes specified, a subsidiary aim of the study was to identify which of the selected socio-political background characteristic variables,

used either by themselves or in combination, were significant predictors of the attitude criterion measures; designedly, to give direction that future research in the area of development of political attitudes may take. The investigation was so designed that data could be gathered and analyzed to meet the above purposes.

Political cynicism has been formally defined as an attitude characterized by feelings of disrepute and distrust directed toward politics and politicians. Following the Likert method of attitude scale construction, we put together an appropriate measure to operationalize the concept of political cynicism by concentrating our attention on cynicism concerning politicians. Some consideration was also devoted to negative evaluations of the operation of governmental institutions and decision-making processes.

It is possible that the constructed measure of political cynicism administered to the adolescent respondents was more indicative of projections of personal imagination, or of an emotionally-based, simplistic belief system, than it was a stable indicator of a distinctive political attitude. This does not imply that the empirical measure did not reflect political feelings, but that young persons, who are primarily engaged in the creation and maintenance of proximate relationships, may have mixed and confused feelings about political objects. Since they may be more greatly influenced with respect to the direction and levels of their political attitudes by their immediate successes and failures in achieving personal integration, or self-identity, it is difficult to evaluate how they may feel toward political processes and politicians by an introspective method. Moreover, we cannot deny the possibility

that among many adolescents we may have stimulated the development of cynical attitudes, or caused latent feelings of cynicism to become manifested in the atmosphere of enhanced saliency created by the administration of questionnaires.¹ Converse has argued that survey research often creates attitudes among adult respondents by asking them to consider matters about which, for all practical purposes, they have no attitudes.² Perhaps what we have available for our analyses are snapshots of a superficial, fluctuating attitude, that we term "political cynicism," rather than manifestations of real political cynicism. Thus, while we cannot assess the degree of objective political cynicism involved in the respondents' responses to items, nor whether we created a new attitude rather than measuring existing feelings of cynicism, we do know that those regarded here as cynical are unusual, by comparison with their peers, in the degree to which they consistently express cynical political views.

Data for the study were obtained from approximately half-hour long, paper-and-pencil questionnaires administered to a non-random, selected sample of 1570 adolescents in grade eight through twelve. The data were collected in one large urban center and in one rural center of each major region of Alberta (Northern, Central and Southern) during the period from April through May, 1970.

¹For a discussion of this problem, see, for instance, Pauline Marie Vaillancourt, "Stability of Children's Survey Responses," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 37 (Fall, 1973), pp. 373-387.

²Phillip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems, ed. Edward R. Tufte (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 168-189; and Phillip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief System in Mass Public," Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

Null hypotheses³ were set out relating to the questions that the study had been designed to answer.⁴ Different statistical techniques were employed to evaluate the acceptability of the differing kinds of null hypotheses stated. Thus, null hypotheses concerning differences between age groups and between school grade groups in terms of unadjusted mean scores on the attitude scales were tested by carrying out one-way analyses of variance and by extending that analysis through use of the Scheffe S-method wherever significant results warranted so doing. Acceptability of each of the null hypotheses associated with adjusted group mean scores on three cynicism scales among age and school grade groups was tested by carrying out one-way analyses of covariance, using socio-political characteristic variables as covariates. When testing those null hypotheses concerned with identifying significant predictors of attitude scale score, step-wise regression techniques were chosen as the appropriate test procedure. Finally, when the null hypothesis was directed toward establishing the statistical significance of correlations among the total scores on the three cynicism scales, conventional t-tests were utilized.

In the statistical analyses carried out in the study, differences between or among group mean scores were considered to have been statistically significant only if the probability of observing a difference of that magnitude as a result of sampling error was .05 or less. Test results having probabilities between .05 and .10 or which were equal

³Chapter I, pp. 26-27.

⁴Chapter I, p. 13.

to .10 ($.05 < p \leq .10$) were tentatively considered statistically significant until such time as further research should have the opportunity of collaborating or contradicting such tenuous findings.

Both the cognitive-developmental and the political reality explanatory frameworks stressed in Chapter two offered valuable insights into the growth of cynicism among adolescents. Despite their limitations, these two explanatory frameworks seem to be theoretically satisfying if not sound, while recognizing that a coherent theory of development of political attitudes has yet to be completed. Still, these explanatory frameworks and other empirical evidences provided a rationale for expecting that, as adolescents mature, they will tend to develop cynical attitudes toward politics and society. Put differently, we hypothesized that younger, less cognitively mature adolescents are less likely than older, more cognitively mature to feel cynical toward politics and society. This expectation was not borne out by the data.

In common with other studies, differences were found among mean political cynicism scores when comparisons among chronological age groups were made. However, no significant differences, statistically admissible, were obtained when testing the significance of differences among group mean scores. Not only were these differences not statistically significant for unadjusted group mean scores, but also for contrasts among these group mean scores adjusted for effects of nine socio-political characteristic variables on both political cynicism scales. Re-adjusting group mean scores for effects of nine characteristic variables plus school grade again failed to produce significant

differences among age groups' mean political cynicism scores. At best, what after effects there were from the re-adjustment procedure lie in slight reversals in the direction of mean scores, thereby suggesting that older adolescents were insignificantly more politically cynical than younger adolescents (see Figure 5). In sum, we had expected younger adolescents to view governmental processes and politicians much more positively--less cynical--than older adolescents. Instead we found that differences among age groups in feelings of political cynicism though in the hypothesized direction, were relatively inconsequential. That is, the increase in feelings of political cynicism observable among adolescents of age thirteen to age eighteen was not sufficiently large to achieve statistical significance. In reality, the data provide scant evidence to support the assertion that feelings of political cynicism tend to increase with age. On the whole, the picture is one of virtually no change among age groups in feelings of political cynicism, as any shifts in political cynicism displayed among age groups were very modest. indeed, even after statistically controlling for effects of nine socio-political characteristic variables plus school grade.

The implication of our findings, taken at face value, is that, for Albertan adolescents, there is relatively little change in feelings of political cynicism with maturation. Their negative image of politics in terms of cynicism does not change greatly with increasing age. Ostensibly, feelings of political cynicism are relatively static among age groups. However, this nonvariant pattern of development of political cynicism exhibited by the data differs not only from the general variant pattern reported by previous political socialization studies, but it is

also theoretically inconsistent. In short, we have felt very cautious about concluding that the results summarized above are based entirely on real differences in age-political cynicism relationships--we cannot be very sure without further confirming data.

Corroborative data of another sort are available through a measure of attitude acquisition, a DK (Don't Know) Political Cynicism Index, which was developed based on whether adolescents expressed an opinion in response to items included in the political cynicism scale. These data are encouraging for they suggest that feelings of political cynicism do increase as an adolescent gets older. On the whole, older adolescents offered fewer "don't know" responses than younger adolescents. Moreover, there was statistical support in these data for the notion that feelings of political cynicism heightened substantially among adolescents from age thirteen to age eighteen. More persuasive, these latter findings do legitimize our intuitive contention that political cynicism does in fact intensify with maturation. In short, since these findings for the DK Political Cynicism Index were clearer and more conclusive than others and since there are theoretical reasons for expecting such a pattern of development to occur, these data add to our willingness to place some reliance on the developmental pattern ascertained in the previous findings. Thus, the overall impression to be gained from the data is that greater sense of political cynicism emanates with increased age among adolescents.

As a practical alternative to chronological age, it is possible to relate the rate and pattern of political cynicism acquisition to school grade. In keeping with a developmental perspective, and assuming that our maturational thesis is correct, we would expect to find a

markedly higher amount of political cynicism among our twelfth- than among our eighth-graders. Comparisons among school grade groups were made. Here, the findings contrasted sharply with those drawn from the other development-related variable--age. The contrast took two forms. First, there was evidence that differences among group mean political cynicism scores of school grade variable were statistically significant. These significant differences were not eliminated, or reversed, when statistically controlling for effects of nine characteristic variables plus age on the two political cynicism scales. Second, we were surprised to discover that grade eight and ten adolescents were distinctively more politically cynical than grade nine, eleven and twelve adolescents. Even though there were differences among grade nine, eleven and twelve adolescents in expressed feelings of political cynicism, however, there was no support in the data for the notion of statistically significant differences among these three school grade groups' mean scores on both political cynicism scales. These were provocative findings; but it left us with difficult problems of interpretation. Still, any conclusions about the extent of these shifts in feelings of political cynicism among eighth- through twelfth-graders should be considered with care until bolstered by supportive data.

With the use of the DK Political Cynicism Index, we re-examined the development of political cynicism among eighth- through twelfth-graders. We exposed essentially the same positive linear pattern of relation between school grade and the DK Political Cynicism Index as appeared between age and this index. The data disclosed that the rate of "don't know" responses for items incorporated in the political

cynicism scale decrease with increasing grade in school. These findings might signify that political cynicism does develop substantially from the eighth- through the twelfth-grade. While these latest findings were consistent with our expectation that older adolescents were more likely to feel cynical toward politics than younger adolescents, they unfortunately failed to endorse the peculiar findings previously reported for eight and ten graders. We cannot explain away these inconsistent findings, but these incongruities leave us with severe doubts about the advisability of employing such a global variable as school grade to investigate developmental patterns of feelings of political cynicism, or of other political attitudes, among adolescents. We shall speculate further on this doubt shortly.

To summarize, our findings about school grade's group differences in political cynicism are not as clear cut as those that involved age's group differences. It was hoped that the school grade findings would provide solid data to support the pattern of findings for age. But the results did not work out that way as clearly acknowledged by the conflicting evidence. Nonetheless, with the exclusion of grade eight and ten adolescents, by and large, the findings fit our expectations with a gradual pro-cynicism shift in senior high school grades. Surprisingly, statistically significant differences among school grade groups were confirmed primarily to grade eight and ten from the other three grade groups. It is difficult to know whether these data signify a genuine developmental process, or differences among generations. Once again, we can offer no clear explanation for our findings, but they do suggest that something must alter the development of political cynicism during grades eight and ten which may be an outgrowth of socio-

political status differences of these students within the school environment. Perhaps, the safest conclusion to be drawn from these contradictory findings is that adolescents from our sample tend to manifest cynical attitudes toward political processes and politicians, but that socio-political situational contingencies within different school grade can affect profoundly the depth of political cynicism exhibited by adolescents.

Much that we have been saying concerning the development of political cynicism among adolescents seems to be applicable to the development of personal cynicism. It is interesting to note that the same sort of pattern reversal encountered for age variable when controlling statistically for effects of nine characteristic variables plus school grade on the political cynicism scales re-appeared appreciably on the personal cynicism scale. Too, the DK Personal Cynicism Index provided alike findings for both age and school grade variables as the DK Political Cynicism Scale. Finally, the same general pattern of development we have sketched for political cynicism among school grade groups turned up for personal cynicism. Indeed, the weight of the evidence does point to alike patterns of development for political and personal cynicism across age and school grade groups. However, we do not know which came first--political cynicism or personal cynicism. Perhaps, it is not a question of which came first as the one reinforces the other. Thus, it is not surprising, taken as a whole, that all these individual results constitute a varied body of evidence which offers some general support for our notion that feelings of political and personal cynicism will tend to increase among adolescents as they mature.

We cannot leave this summary discussion of age and school grade as development-related variables without stressing a note of caution about the utilization of school grade to investigate patterns of development of political attitudes among adolescents. This caveat is based on the fact that most junior and senior high school grades are composite of various age groups, primarily the result of promotional factors, containing adolescents at various levels of physical and cognitive growths and developments, thus with varying qualities, norms and experiences. Accordingly, interdifferences among school grade groups in the acquisition of political attitudes will tend to be, at best, composite effects of a number of age groups rather than outcomes of actual generational variances among adolescents. Thus, a clearer picture of political attitudes' developmental change among adolescents can be best obtained by investigating differences among age, or cohort, groups than among school grade groups. Although it is variability in the development of political attitudes that ultimately should command our attention, we are more willing to place some reliance on developmental inferences drawn from generational changes exhibited across an age span than over a number of school grades. It is important to realize, however, that statements regarding change over time from cohort analyses are inferences and require longitudinal data for full testing.

Summarizing these findings in terms of the developmental framework we have employed as our guide, we ascertain that the cognitive maturational paradigm that we borrowed from Piaget, and expanded by Merelman, with the political-reality postulate have proved to be useful, though not definite guides. Lacking the necessary evidence, we can only speculate that young adolescents tend to be political idealists, partly

because they take working political ideals literally and, moreover, partly because they acquire political ideals not fully operative within a particular socio-political environment, or culture. As they mature, this relatively unchecked political idealism of young adolescents is eventually complicated by the well-known fact that young adolescents experience cognitive growth and development. As adolescents grow older and become exposed to more social and political stimuli, they gain more cognitive maturity. They learn to reason abstractly, conceptually and logically. More importantly, the cognitively developed adolescent not only can absorb more knowledge, but he can use his new logical, abstract ability to process this information and comprehend its meaning. Such development of cognitive, or logical, capacity, combined with high political ideals and the initial lack of political experiences means that young adolescents soon discover with increasing age that most political ideals they had been taught as true and consistent are not so in fact. If the political ideals young adolescents have assimilated cannot be reconciled with and do not fit political reality, mental conflict thereupon ensues. And, as a possible solution, or reaction, to their idealism versus realism conflict, adolescents may become disillusioned about the political processes and politicians which usually lead to the eventual development of cynical attitudes.

According to Kingsley David,

[c]ynicism has the advantage of giving justification for behavior that young organisms crave anyway. It might be mistaken for genuine realism if it were not for two things. The first is the emotional strain behind the "don't care" attitude. The cynic, in his judgment that the world is bad because of inconsistency and untruth of ideals, clearly implies that he still values the ideals. The true realist sees the inconsistency and untruth, but without emotion; he uses either ideals or reality whenever it suits his purpose. The second is the early disappearance of the cynical. Increased

experience usually teaches the adolescent that overt cynicism is unpopular and unworkable, that to deny and deride all beliefs which fail to cohere or to correspond to facts, and to act in opposition of them, is to alienate oneself from any groups because these beliefs, however unreal, are precisely what makes group unity possible. Soon, therefore, the youthful cynic finds himself bound up with some group having a system of working ideals, and becomes merely another conformist, cynical only about the beliefs of other groups.⁵

However, this tentative explanation of the slight increase of feelings of cynicism from age thirteen to eighteen discovered in the data holds only insofar as the logic of personality development is the sole factor. Because of other socio-psycho-political and cultural factors, concrete situations may be quite different, thereby bringing about other solutions. In short, the development of political cynicism among adolescents is too complex a process to be encompassed by any single developmental pattern, even one as sophisticated and subtle as Piaget's. The real explanation probably resides in the nature of the developmental process and in the character of country-, provincial- and local-attitudes toward politics.

One final problem that our study investigated remains. Merelman claims that "we can make few judgements about the crystallization of youthful political orientations until we become more sophisticated about the [impact] of socialization agencies."⁶ Our task, therefore, was not only to describe the shifts in the political and personal attitudes of cynicism among adolescents' age and school grade groups, but also to identify the relative effects, if any, of four specific political

⁵Kingsley David, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," Youth and Sociology, eds. Peter K. Manning and Marcello Truzzi (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 98.

⁶Richard M. Merelman, "The Adolescence of Political Socialization," Sociology of Education, Vol. 45 (1972), p. 157.

socialization agencies--the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media--upon the germination of cynicism among adolescents. The empirical evidences gathered in this investigation substantiate the conception that each political socialization agent has a significant effect upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism. Greater political influence by all four agents leads to lower feelings of cynicism. The importance of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media upon the structuring of feelings of cynicism among adolescents is obvious. However, be that as it may, we have discovered little about the relative effects of these four political socializers upon the development of cynicism by focussing our analyses on specific agency's political influence characteristics, seriatim.

In an attempt to uncover the relative impacts, or multivariate relationships, of the four political socializers upon the structuring of cynicism among adolescents, we employed a rather sophisticated multivariate technique called the Multiple Classification Analysis Program (MCA) which is specifically designed to parcel out the relative effects of several independent variables on a dependent variable. From the MCA output, the researcher determines that, in general, the mass media political influence variable was the strongest and most direct predictor of political and personal cynicism. The school was the second-best predictor, followed in importance by the family, with the peer group having the weakest effect. However, the relative predictive capabilities of these four political socialization agents were further complicated by the fact that each agent did not rank equally high as a predictor on every one of the three cynicism scales. To our surprise, the data suggest that the peer world of most adolescents in this sample

is not a prime source of political influence in the structuring of cynical attitudes. If anything, with respect to politics, peers do not appear to be crucially different from the family in terms of their values and standards. One may even say that family exercises what might well be called, in accord with the Rosenberg usage, "contradictory influence"⁷ on the peer group, thereby cancelling out, or nullifying, the relationship that would otherwise operate between the peer group political influence variable and cynicism scales. Too, low impact of peer group upon the structuring of cynicism among adolescents could possibly be considered the function of the low saliency of political matters to most adolescents, relating directly to their ego-involvement in the attitudinal objects investigated in this study; quite likely it is a mixture of these and other things.

It is conjectural, yet legitimate, to speculate upon the meanings of these latest findings. The computed relationships of these political socializers with feelings of cynicism seem to confirm that the cue-stimuli provided by the family and the peer group are not as significant as those provided by the mass media and the school when the structuring of feelings of political and personal cynicism is involved. In short, both the mass media and the school have the appearance of minimizing, or neutralizing, the effects of the family and the peer group upon the evolution of cynical attitudes among adolescents. We do not wish to imply that the mass media and the school alone are responsible for the structuring of cynicism we have observed among adolescents. To be sure,

⁷Morris Rosenberg, "The Logical Status of Suppressor Variables," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 37 (Fall, 1973), p. 366.

no matter what are their educational environments and how sensitive they may be to mass media exposure, adolescents may and do become cynical about various aspects of politics and society. All that is clear is, in the structuring of cynical attitudes toward politics and society among adolescents, the relative effects of the four political socialization agents will fluctuate (that is, individually, the relative predictive ability of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media is different on each one of the cynicism scales), but that the mass media with the school tend to be, consistently, the strongest and most direct predictors of political and personal cynicism scales' scores. Finally, these findings do raise some questions concerning the accuracy of assigning the peer group a preeminent role in the political socialization of adolescents.

While not the focus of this study, we have, nevertheless, reported on the stability of relationships between political socialization agents and feelings of cynicism across age and school grade groups. Using partition design as a method of statistical control, the data indicated that the introduction of age, or school grade, variable into the analyses lead to highly varied, unsystematic, complex and considerable alterations of original relations between agents and each political cynicism scale. And shifts in these relations became more drastic and complicated when sex and age, or sex and school grade, variables were controlled simultaneously. Therefore, even though it is necessary to speak in general terms, it does appear that introduction of age and school grade singly, or jointly with sex, as control variables specifies conditions under which relations between political socialization agents and political and personal cynicism occur. Still, in the experience of

any particular adolescent, the agencies of socialization are closely interlinked and, presumably, all four agents made respective independent contribution to the development of feelings of cynicism among adolescents. From these agencies, adolescents have learned a particular socio-political content. However, the respective impact of each agent upon the development of cynical attitudes of adolescents will vary greatly; depending, in part, upon their sub-group affiliation in the socio-political culture. It may be argued that adolescents have been socialized into certain subcultural and subpolitical patterns and not into others by these four political socialization agents. Perhaps, only one point is clear: the relative effects of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media political influence variables upon the structuring of cynical attitudes among adolescents depend in part on social, political and cultural conditions. In sum, the evidences support the view that the relative influence of each agent upon the development of cynicism among adolescents is partly governed by such intervening variables as age, school grade and sex. Though it is beyond the scope of our present effort to expand on all of these ramifications, nevertheless, we felt compelled to touch on what are surely basic issues in political socialization: the intervening effects which age, school grade and sex variables have on original relations between political socializers and cynical attitudes. Finally, these data provide some hints that the relative effects of political socialization agents quite likely differ from sub-culture to sub-culture.

Since it was possible that any one of the selected socio-political background characteristic variables of the study, or even all of them,

could create significant effects on attitude scale scores, each characteristic variable provided therefore a plausible rival hypothesis to the main hypotheses that age and school grade had some effects on attitude scale scores. This was the subsidiary problem investigated in the study. To explore characteristic variables underlying political and personal cynicism, and to test the significance between and among group mean scores, analyses of variance were applied to empirical data provided by three attitude scales. There were differences between and among all characteristic variables' group mean scores obtained on all three cynicism scales. There were, however, no statistical evidences observed in these analyses to substantiate that those differences found among group mean scores of length of residence variable were significant. Few of these data, then, can offer much support for the thesis that an individual's basic orientations to the political system will be affected by the length of time he has been residing in a particular community. Nevertheless, there were, here and there, statistical suggestions that certain particular differences among group mean scores of sex, religious preference, socioeconomic level, social class self-identification, provincial and federal political party preferences, area of residence and school system variables were significant.

With the use of multiple regression procedures, relative independent contributions of each background characteristic variable plus age and school grade as predictor variables of attitude scale scores were obtained. The following predictor variables indicated statistically significant independent contribution to the prediction

of distinctive cynicism scale scores:

1. social class self-identification, federal political party preference, sex, area of residence, socioeconomic level and school system variables to the prediction of the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's scores,

2. federal political party preference, area of residence, school system, social class self-identification, school grade and age variables to the prediction of the Political Cynicism Scale's scores, and


3. sex, school grade, socioeconomic level, social class self-identification, provincial political party preference, age, school system and area of residence variables to the prediction of Personal Cynicism Scale's scores.

All the findings summarized thus far are reasserted in a proposed causal model illustrating the effects of political socialization agents and socio-political background characteristic variables plus age and school grade when predicting to feelings of political and personal cynicism among adolescents. We have chosen to consider socio-political characteristic variables plus age and school grade as intervening variables in the model. The upper part of Figure 1, page 298, presents the relationship schematically. The lower portion of the figure indicates how the explained variance is assigned. The model⁸ in Figure 1

⁸This model is patterned after the one presented by Jerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Vol. II, The Impact of Family Background and Intelligence on Tenth-Grade Boys (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), p. 88. Of course, to account for the total amount of variance in political and personal cynicism scales' scores, at least two other elements should be added to the model: one labelled "Other" or "Unknown Causes", and the other "Error".

Figure 1

Model Summarizing the Effects of Political Socialization Agents, Socio-Political Background Characteristic Variables Plus Age and School Grade Upon the Structuring of Cynical Attitudes Among Adolescents



Note: This analysis deals with very small relationships solely with political and personal cynicism. The figures are presented primarily for their heuristic values and as general guides to the interpretation of our data.

Arrow A: Effects of socio-political characteristic variables plus age and school grade that are independent of political socialization agents

Arrow B: Joint or "overlapping" effects of political socialization agents and socio-political characteristic variables plus age and school grade, which we interpreted as the effects of political socialization agents operating through socio-political characteristic variables plus age and school grade as intervening variables

Arrow C: Effects of political socialization agents that are independent of socio-political characteristic variables plus age and school grade

Arrow A + B: Total effects of socio-political characteristic variables plus age and school grade

Arrow B + C: Total effects of political socialization agents

Arrow A + B + C: Total effects of political socialization agents and socio-political characteristic variables plus age and school grade

Given the data from Multiple Classification Analyses presented in the text, we can fill in the model as follows:

A + B + C = 9.29% of variance in the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale's Scores (unadjusted)
 = 14.11% of variance in the Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores (unadjusted)
 = 15.40% of variance in the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores (unadjusted)

A + B = 8.89% of variance in the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores
 = 13.33% of variance in the Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores
 = 13.97% of variance in the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores

B + C = 1.60% of variance in the Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores
 = 2.90% of variance in the Pol. Cyn. Scale's scores
 = 2.46% of variance in the Per. Cyn. Scale's scores

Therefore:

A = 7.69% (Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale)
 = 11.21% (Pol. Cyn. Scale)
 = 12.94% (Per. Cyn. Scale)

B = 1.20% (Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale)
 2.12% (Pol. Cyn. Scale)
 1.03% (Per. Cyn. Scale)

C = 0.40% (Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale)
 0.78% (Pol. Cyn. Scale)
 1.43% (Per. Cyn. Scale)

indicates that some of the effects of political socialization agents are unique, or independent, of background characteristic variables plus age and school grade (Arrow C), and some effects of political socialization agents overlap with background characteristic variables plus age and school grade (Arrow B). The unique contribution of background characteristic variables plus age and school grade is somewhat larger than the other effects (Arrow A). It must be stressed that we present these figures primarily for their heuristic values, not because we feel they fully represent the actual relationships between political socialization agents, background characteristic variables plus age and school grade and feelings of political and personal cynicism.

Lastly, the significance of intercorrelations among attitude scales' total scores obtained by 1570 adolescents were tested by employing appropriate t-tests. Since all computed t values reveal that attitude scales' total score correlations were significant at the .001 level, null hypothesis VII was rejected in its entirety.

II. CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of results of statistical analysis and procedures carried out and after consideration of adolescents' responses to the questionnaire, the following conclusions were derived:

1. Assuming that the attitude scales are valid measures of political and personal cynicism, it would seem that younger adolescents scored consistently lower than older adolescents on scales used to assess respondents' feelings of political and personal cynicism when

age groups' mean scores were adjusted for effects of selected socio-political background characteristic variables plus school grade. Although the data demonstrate non-statistically significant changes among age subgroups in expressed feelings of political and personal cynicism, we are able to state with a fair degree of certainty that younger adolescents investigated in the present study were more likely than older adolescents to hold positive feelings rather than negative feelings (cynical attitudes) toward politics and society. In common with other studies, the inference we have drawn (and again without longitudinal data, it can only be an inference) is that feelings of cynicism will tend to increase with maturation.

2. Findings from bivariate analyses lead us to conclude that the respective political influence of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media has significant impact upon the structuring of adolescents' own attitudes toward politics and social processes. Further, various research endeavors have affirmed that the mass media are the primary means of keeping adolescents informed of contemporary political issues and events. The general conclusion drawn out from the findings of these studies is that the mass media play a dual role so that in addition to serving as important means of political communication for the adolescents, they are also prime political socialization agents for them. It has been found in the present study that such conclusions would seem warranted when applied to the sample of adolescents investigated in the study. From the persistent evidence provided by analytical breakdowns of the Multiple Classification Analysis procedures,

the mass media political influence variable was deemed to be the strongest and the most direct predictor of cynicism scales' scores (that is, it had the strongest consistent effect upon the structuring of political and personal cynicism among adolescents) followed in importance by the school and the family with the peer group having the weakest effect.

3. The following significant conclusions are based on results of one-way analyses of variance carried out in the investigation of the subsidiary problem of the study:

- a) Male adolescents were more likely than female adolescents to have high feelings of political and personal cynicism.
- b) Religious preference shows a fairly substantial relationship with political cynicism. Adolescents of protestant religious faiths were more inclined to have high cynical feelings toward politics than adolescents of the catholic faith.
- c) There was much empirical evidence in the present study to support the prediction that feelings of political and personal cynicism were positively related to socio-economic status. Both an "objective" index and a "subjective" measure of social status were employed in this study. No matter how social status is measured, lower social class adolescents were more likely to develop cynical attitudes toward politics and society than high social class adolescents.
- d) Dividing adolescents by political parties which they would tend to vote for in federal and provincial elections, respectively, we found that Conservative Party supporters among adolescents of this study were more likely to display high feelings of cynicism than either the Liberal Party or the Social Credit Party supporters at the provincial level, and the Liberal Party supporters at the federal level.
- e) Adolescents who score highly on cynicism scales are much less likely to participate and be interested in politics. Various results provided confirmatory evidences for this conclusion.
- f) Several scholars have suggested that the environment in which a person is raised has an important impact upon the structuring of cynical attitudes. In agreement, the data infer that adolescents living in rural areas were more

politically and personally cynical than adolescents living in an urban area. There was no empirical evidence in the present study, however, to indicate that feelings of cynicism are related to length of residence in a particular community.

- g) Adolescents who attended schools located in the public school system, as a whole, tended to feel more cynical toward politics and society than adolescents who attended schools located in either the separate or the general school system.

We have stated these conclusions based on the evidences presently available in the study. In all respects, it appears that the structuring, or development, of political and personal cynicism among adolescents is very complex and multi faceted. The above notion is triggered partially by some of our findings which have been presented simply to illustrate that the growth of cynical attitudes among adolescents is influenced by meandering dissimilar effects of political socialization agents across age, school grade and sex variables' groups. At the same time, we recognize the limitations of a study which follows adolescents from the age of thirteen to eighteen utilizing cohort analyses. In sum, our data lend some support not only to the inference that there are individual differences in adolescents' tempo of cynicism growth, but also that the acculturation of feelings of political and personal cynicism is rooted in political and socio-cultural factors and psychodynamic processes. It would be presumptuous, of course, to generalize from the data presented here to the whole population of adolescents of Alberta; undoubtedly, adolescents of this study are different in many ways from other adolescents around this province and/or other provinces in Canada. Despite this methodological caveat which leads us to consider our findings based on this particular sample of adolescents to be limited,

they are nevertheless useful. In particular, we hope that they will stimulate more thorough studies in the area of development of political attitudes among Canadian adolescents--who have been sadly neglected by Canadian political scientists in their research efforts--employing sampling and methodological techniques more appropriate for that task. Indeed, in exploratory research such as this, more questions are raised than answered. Hopefully, they will suggest new paths of inquiry as well as some techniques for answering them.

III. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Several of the major directions for research in the area of development of political attitudes among adolescents have been implicit in the foregoing discussion, that is, the need for a broader, more flexible conceptual framework and a greater plurality of investigations of limited scope.

A view of this study as exploratory implies that considerably more work must be done in order to clarify the origins of political cynicism. Too, the question of whether younger adolescents are still relatively more trusting of (less cynical from) politics and society than older age groupings needs to be thoroughly investigated. It has been shown that the results of this particular study are somewhat ambiguous. The data, in general, showed younger adolescents to be more trusting of government and politicians, taken in the broadest sense, than older adolescents, but, would such be true of adolescents in other urban and rural areas of Alberta and of adolescents in other parts of Canada and of different ethnic backgrounds? Have they

relatively greater trust in federal politics than provincial or local politics? Are there signs that their distrust of one level of politics extending to other levels? Or, has their mistrust in politics and politicians increased over time? Answers to such questions are vital in any attempt to understand the likely future contribution of Albertan youths to the Albertan and the Canadian political scenes.

While a study such as the one described in this report serves the purpose of providing some knowledge about the relative effects of four political socialization agencies--the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media--there is surely room, and it seems appropriate, for future research to reexamine the relationships between these agents and cynical attitudes. This is especially the case since the agent political influences indexes available in the foregoing analyses may be considered either artificial or arbitrary as there might be poor correspondence between indexes and the underlying concepts to which they are supposed to refer. It would also be appropriate to ask whether the indexes were not proxies for other political influences not in the analyses. If so, these should be obtained and included if possible in future research. Then, there is the possibility that the four indexes can represent many causal factors, not all necessarily operating in the same direction. Here, it may be desirable to use other raw variables in the construction of such indexes of political influence. In particular, more and better indexes of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media political influences should be developed for and utilized in future exploratory research concerning the development of cynical attitudes among adolescents.

Of all the conclusions offered here, one in particular would seem to require substantiation in a study much larger in scope than this one: the assertion that the mass media is the strongest and the most direct predictor of cynical attitudes among adolescents.. Before this may be regarded as more than a suggestion, there is a profound need for more thorough multivariate investigations which would explore the relative effects and/or constraints imposed by political socialization agents upon the acculturation of political cynicism and of other political attitudes such as powerlessness, anomie, sense of political efficacy and sense of citizen duty. It seems highly probable that there are more relative effects' patterns into which these agents might arrange themselves than those considered in this work. As well, there is further need to give greater attention to the subtle and the multifaceted political influence compartments of the family, the school, the peer group and the mass media, as transmitters and creators of political attitudes and norms among, for instance, age, school grade, sex and socioeconomic level variables' groups of adolescents, for some very important dynamics may be discovered which may well provide greater understanding about how the development of political attitudes take place. Agreeing that these four agencies are effective political socializers does not answer how they are effective, when they are effective and effective toward what. Our need to understand more of the relative impacts of political socialization agents upon the development of political attitudes is as obvious as it is important.

The investigation reported herein should be replicated with

tighter experimental control. Personal, open-ended interviews rather than closed-ended, paper-and-pencil questionnaire survey might well be employed in gathering, perhaps, more reliable data to be used for statistical analyses. Serious consideration must also be given to the mode of administration and the effect of role-authoritative questionnaire administrator on the nature of responses. This is doubly important in survey research of adolescents who are likely to be more anxious to please the survey administrator than adult respondents. Too, the design of questionnaire items and format presentation must be carefully reevaluated in terms of age-grading for comprehension and emotional loading. In addition, it would be more economical and practical to investigate a smaller sample of adolescents selected at random and to consider solely age group differences in feelings of cynicism, while retaining such intervening variables as school grade, sex, religious preference, social status self-identification, political party preference, area of residence plus ethnicity and a more appropriate index of political participation. Since there is also the possibility that many personality traits are associated with political cynicism, in particular, self-esteem, pessimism, anxiety, hostility, authoritarianism, totalitarianism and chauvinism, measures of such personality traits should be incorporated in questionnaires of future explorative study of the development of political cynicism to provide greater insight into the origin and growth of cynical attitudes toward politics and politicians. Finally, since moderate departures from the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance were observed in the present study, non-parametric tests such as the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance

by ranks⁹ rather than parametric methods could be appropriately used to test certain null hypotheses.

Moreover, the possibility cannot be overlooked that some individuals develop feelings of cynicism toward politics and society only in adulthood or earlier in life than age thirteen. Harmon Zeigler and Wayne Peak, for instance, point out that "there is . . . the possibility that cynicism is latent in the high school population and, therefore, is released from constraint when adulthood is reached,"¹⁰ while Jaros and others have shown that by the fifth grade, a sample of school students from the Appalachian were relatively cynical toward politics with non-significant change with maturation.¹¹ This study has been based on the premise that some feelings of cynicism toward politics and politicians are structured by a complex interrelation of political and socio-cultural factors with psychodynamic processes operating in adolescence, but it cannot prove, and does not seek to prove, that all feelings of political cynicism are rooted in adolescence experiences. A research project which would investigate a wider range of age groups--from childhood into adulthood--could probably identify most of the developmental changes and patterns of acquisition, or rate and sequence

⁹George A. Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education (2d ed.: New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 362-363.

¹⁰Harmon Zeigler and Wayne Peak, "The Political Functions of the Educational System," Sociology of Education, Vol. 43 (1970), p. 133.

¹¹Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 569-570.

tempo, with which individuals acquire their feelings of political cynicism. In order, then, are longitudinal studies of the development of political attitudes, following children from childhood into adolescence and possibly into early adulthood. This is the only possible way to understand empirically the development and shaping of political cynicism and other political attitudes during the maturation process of individuals. An alternative to this procedure would be, of course, quasi-longitudinal studies investigating cohort groups from childhood, adolescence and adulthood communities in order to provide insight into changes within specific universes over a period of time. From such cohort studies, inferences about developmental configurations of political orientations and attitudes could be made.

In sum, on the basis of research conducted here, there are a number of interesting questions which warrant further investigation. Several new directions for research in the area of political socialization have been explicated in the foregoing discussion, that is the need for broader, longitudinal and a greater plurality of studies investigating the development of political cynicism as well as other political attitudes. Too, a number of changes which could profitably be made in techniques, procedures and methods employed to investigate the development of particular political attitudes have been suggested here. There would be definite advantage to conduct research into the nature of political cynicism in heterogeneous communities, or at least in communities in which a much larger sample could be drawn, which would allow more extensive, detailed analyses to be carried out. It is likely that many

of the limitations and problems which faced the investigator will be coped with and overcome in time. It is hoped that, as more studies in the area of development of political attitudes are conducted, they will be employing not only research skills and information solely from the discipline of political science, but also from other major behavioral sciences. Indeed, if a meaningful body of empirically-based knowledge of how adolescents develop and change in their feelings toward their social and political milieu is to be achieved by political scientists, then, they must eventually incorporate in their future research efforts resources from various social science disciplines.

FINIR -- C'EST MOURIR UN PEU

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APPENDIX A

FINAL VERSION OF THE BATTERY OF ATTITUDE SCALES

and

SOCIO-POLITICAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

COPY OF THE BATTERY OF ATTITUDE SCALES ADMINISTERED
TO ADOLESCENTS

POLITICAL OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE
and
SOCIO-POLITICAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Both questionnaires are parts of a study we are doing of Canadian young people in schools in various parts of Alberta. We are interested particularly in how young people your age feel about government and politics.

These are not tests of how much you know. You will not be graded in any way. These are not intelligence tests. THEY ARE INVENTORIES OF POLITICAL OPINIONS. We want to know about you and your ideas and feelings so we can learn more about young people. The answers you give us will be kept strictly confidential. No one but the researchers will see them. We do not want your name on these questionnaires.

Both questionnaires are completely voluntary. If you do not wish to answer some questions or statements, indicate this on the questionnaire. However, we would appreciate it if you would answer all the questions. Please answer the questions as accurately as you can. The success of the study depends on this.

PART I: POLITICAL OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions: This part of the study consists of a number of opinion statements about politics and about people in general. Please read each statement and decide whether you agree or disagree with the opinion expressed in the statement.

Do not argue with yourself about a statement. Answer quickly and frankly. Judge each opinion statement as a general rule. Do not think too much about special exceptions. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers here.

You are entitled to hold any opinion you wish about the matter described in each statement. Please be frank in indicating exactly how you feel. Do not respond as though you were trying to make a good impression.

(continue on next page)

By means of the scale below, try to show the strength of your feelings toward each statement.

Scale for Responses

A = I agree strongly with the statement.

a = In general, I agree with the statement, but not too strongly.

? = I am neutral toward the statement OR I do not know how I feel toward this statement.

d = In general, I am not inclined to agree with the statement. I think I would disagree with the statement but not too strongly.

D = I absolutely do not agree with the statement. I disagree strongly with the statement.

ONCE AGAIN: PLEASE DO EVERY STATEMENT. INCOMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES ARE USELESS TO OUR STUDY, BUT PLEASE WORK AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN.

We hope you find the questions interesting and that you enjoy answering them. THANK YOU FOR BEING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT.

At the right side of each statement are four letters and one symbol. These correspond to the answers given on the Scale of Responses. Circle either the symbol or the letter that best indicates your own feeling to the statement on each line.

	Agree Strongly	Agree	I Don't Know - No Opinion	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
1. It seems to me that other people find it easier to decide what is right than I do.	A	a	?	d	D
2. Local politicians never pay any attention to what young people want.	A	a	?	d	D
3. Many politicians believe that there is a sucker born every minute.	A	a	?	d	D

(continue on next page)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	I Don't Know - No Opinion	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
4. I would say that more than 90% of all political leaders would not hesitate to be crooked if they were absolutely certain that no one would find out about it.	A	a	?	d	D
5. The trouble with the world today is that most people really do not believe in anything.	A	a	?	d	D
6. It does not matter which political party wins an election, the little man's interests will be ignored.	A	a	?	d	D
7. What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do. It is like the weather, there is nothing people can do about it.	A	a	?	d	D
8. It is a pretty good policy to "trust a politician about as far as you can throw a bull by the tail".	A	a	?	d	D
9. With everything in such a state of disorder, it is hard for a person to know where he stands from one day to the next.	A	a	?	d	D
10. Most political leaders would tell lies if they could benefit by doing so.	A	a	?	d	D
11. Political leaders like to manipulate people.	A	a	?	d	D
12. Too often people like my parents get a raw deal from their local government.	A	a	?	d	D
13. People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act.	A	a	?	d	D
14. Parents who think that politicians really mean what they say are just fooling themselves.	A	a	?	d	D

(continue on next page)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	I Don't Know - No Opinion	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
15. Under the "rules of the game" in politics, it is better to do the other fellow in before he does you in.	A	a	?	d	D
16. If you sincerely try to be thoughtful of others, people will appreciate it and not try to take advantage of your good nature.	A	a	?	d	D
17. Success in politics is primarily a matter of "who you know", not what you stand for.	A	a	?	d	D
18. Most elections are nothing more than "popularity contests" among candidates.	A	a	?	d	D
19. Generally speaking, I feel that most people can be trusted.	A	a	?	d	D
20. A good many local elections are not important enough to bother with (to participate in).	A	a	?	d	D
21. With everything so uncertain these days, it seems as though anything could happen.	A	a	?	d	D
22. I often feel that many things our parents stood for are just going to ruin before our very eyes.	A	a	?	d	D
23. I feel that most of the time people are just looking out for themselves; they do not try to be helpful.	A	a	?	d	D
24. If they so desire, my parents have many chances to say what they think about running the government of Alberta.	A	a	?	d	D
25. Most people who like to "play politics" are just trying to promote their own interests.	A	a	?	d	D

(continue on next page)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	I Don't Know - No Opinion	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
26. So many people vote in the federal elections that it does not matter much to me whether I vote or not.	A	a	?	d	D
27. Without the right breaks, one cannot be very effective in political affairs.	A	a	?	d	D
28. "A fool and his money are soon parted" and I would just as soon be the one to take it away from him, because if I do not, someone else will.	A	a	?	d	D
29. Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow.	A	a	?	d	D
30. If a person has enough money, he can get any government to do anything he wants.	A	a	?	d	D
31. When people like me become adults, I feel that we will not have any influence on what the government does.	A	a	?	d	D
32. Canadian politics is really controlled by a small group of powerful politicians who can pretty much do whatever they want.	A	a	?	d	D
33. The government is sincerely interested in the welfare of my family and other people like my family.	A	a	?	d	D
34. Because our society lacks any firm moral standards, it is often hard to decide what is right and what is wrong to do.	A	a	?	d	D
35. "Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost" sounds like good sense to me.	A	a	?	d	D
36. What is lacking in the world today is the old kind of friendship that lasted for a lifetime.	A	a	?	d	D

(continue on next page)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	I Don't Know - No Opinion	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
37. Government officials are really trying to find more ways for people like my family to play an important part in politics.	A	a	?	d	D
38. When I am old enough to vote, I think I will get a great amount of satisfaction from being able to vote.	A	a	?	d	D
39. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on.	A	a	?	d	D
40. If a political leader looks after the wishes of the most influential people, then he does not really have to worry about getting re-elected in the next election.	A	a	?	d	D
41. No matter who is elected to run the government, there is still going to be a lot of corruption involved.	A	a	?	d	D
42. The trouble with most young people today is that they do not have any personal moral standards.	A	a	?	d	D
43. If a person does not care how an election comes out, he should not vote in it.	A	a	?	d	D
44. The political views and activities of students are very important.	A	a	?	d	D
45. In this "game" called "Life", it is best to do the other fellow in before he does you in.	A	a	?	d	D
46. Politicians say that "all men are equal before the law", but I do not believe it.	A	a	?	d	D
47. Only a fool would ever vote to increase his own taxes.	A	a	?	d	D

(continue on next page)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	I Don't Know - No Opinion	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
48. With very few exceptions, one could say that most clergymen today have what we could call a "soft job".	A	a	?	d	D
49. It is not so important for my parents to vote when they know their political party does not have a chance to win the election.	A	a	?	d	D
50. Voting is nothing but a nuisance, a waste of time.	A	a	?	d	D
51. Anyone who firmly believes that the duty of man is to be fair to others just does not understand how this world is run.	A	a	?	d	D
52. People like me do not have any say about what the government does.	A	a	?	d	D
53. I would rather be a dull, honest person than a smart, crooked one.	A	a	?	d	D

END OF PART I

COPY OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

ADMINISTERED TO ADOLESCENTS

PART II: SOCIO-POLITICAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions: Most of the questions need only a check mark () to answer. Some questions require written answers. On these questions, sentences are NOT necessary. Read each sentence, then check the answer that shows how often it is true for you. PLEASE, answer all the questions in order.

1. What is your sex:
a) male _____
b) female _____
2. About how old are you: _____
3. Although you are a Canadian citizen, which nationality or ethnic group do you consider yourself part of: _____

4. Do your parents own their house, or are they renting it? (Select one)
a) own their home _____
b) rent their home _____
c) I don't know _____
5. About how long have you been living in the community where you are now? _____
6. While you are going to school, what is your father's occupation? That is, what kind of work does he do? (If your father is not alive, what is your mother's occupation? (Please say if you are putting down your mother's job.)

(continue on next page)

7. How many grades of school did your father finish? If your father is not alive, please give your mother's grades. (Select one)

a) no schooling _____
 b) elementary school -- 1 to 6 grades _____
 c) junior high -- 7 to 9 grades _____
 d) ten to eleven grades _____
 e) twelve grades _____
 f) one to three years university _____
 g) university graduate or professional training _____
 h) I don't know _____
 i) other schooling (Please specify) _____

8. Below is a list showing different income groups (about how much money your parents make in one year). Just CIRCLE the letter of the group which shows about what you think your father's income will be this year. (If your father is not living, give the income of the head of the family.)

a) under \$2,000
 b) \$2,000 to \$2,999
 c) \$3,000 to \$3,999
 d) \$4,000 to \$4,999
 e) \$5,000 to \$6,999
 f) \$7,000 to \$9,999
 g) \$10,000 to \$14,999
 h) \$15,000 and over
 i) I don't know

9. Below is a list showing different social status groups. Just CIRCLE (1) the letter of the group you feel you belong to; and (2) the letter of the group you think most of your best school friends belong to. (Circle a letter in each column)

	<u>Myself</u>	<u>Friends</u>
Lower working class	A	A
Average working class	B	B
Upper working class	C	C
Average middle class	D	D
Middle class	E	E
Upper middle class	F	F
Upper class	G	G
More than one class		H
I don't know, uncertain	H	J

(continue on next page)

10. About how often do you talk about public affairs and politics with each of the following persons: (Please be sure to place a mark for each person)

	<u>Two or more times a week</u>	<u>About once a week</u>	<u>A couple of times a month</u>	<u>Almost never</u>	<u>Never</u>
father	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
mother	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
other members of your family . . .	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
best friends . . .	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
other friends . .	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
other people . . .	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

11. As nearly as you can tell, do you think your parents are interested in public affairs and politics? (Select one)

_____ they are very much interested
 _____ interested quite a lot
 _____ somewhat interested
 _____ not very interested (very little)
 _____ not interested at all

12. About how often do your parents talk about public affairs and politics in your home? (Select one)

_____ two or more times a week
 _____ about once a week
 _____ a couple of times a month or so
 _____ almost never
 _____ never
 _____ I don't know

13. When you were in earlier grades, did you ever talk about politics, government or public affairs in your SOCIAL STUDIES class? (Check one)

_____ often
 _____ sometimes
 _____ almost never (seldom)
 _____ never

14. How about now, this year? Do you ever talk about politics, government or public issues in your SOCIAL STUDIES class? (Check one)

_____ often
 _____ sometimes
 _____ almost never (seldom)
 _____ never

(continue on next page)

15. What is your grade in school: (Circle one) 8 9 10 11 12
16. Which subject do you like the most at school? (Specify only one)

17. Thinking back over the last three months or so, would you say you follow what is going on in government and politics? That is, were you interested in political affairs? (Check one)

☐ most of the time
☐ some of the time
☐ only now and then
☐ hardly at all
☐ never

18. Would you say you follow political affairs very closely, fairly closely, or not much at all? (Check one)

☐ very closely
☐ fairly closely
☐ not much at all
☐ never

19. About how often this year have you talked about politics, government and public issues in and outside classrooms with your SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHER or with other teachers? (Check one in each column)

	<u>Social Studies Teacher</u>	<u>Other Teachers</u>
About two or more times a week	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
About once a week	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A couple times a month or so	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Almost never	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Never	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

20. About how often do you follow the news and public affairs programs on T.V. or on radio, and about how often do you read about public affairs and politics in newspapers? (Check one in each column)

	<u>T.V.</u>	<u>Radio</u>	<u>Newspapers</u>
Almost every day	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A few times a week	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
About once a week	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A couple times a month or so	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Less than once a month	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Almost never	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Never	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(continue on next page)

21. How often have your parents participated in political activities (going to political meetings, rallies and dinners, talking to politicians and things like that)? (Check one)
- ☐ often
☐ sometimes
☐ almost never
☐ never
☐ I don't know
22. Where were you born? (Check one)
- ☐ farm
☐ small town
☐ suburb
☐ big city
☐ I don't know
23. As closely as you can remember, have you lived in Alberta all your life? (Select one)
- ☐ no
☐ yes
☐ I don't know
- If "no", in which province or country did you live before coming to Alberta? _____ About how long ago did you come to Alberta? _____
24. What is your religion? (Check one)
- ☐ Protestant
☐ Roman Catholic
☐ Other
25. I have worn a button for a candidate in a public election.
- ☐ yes
☐ no
26. I have helped a candidate by doing things for him -- such as handing out buttons and papers with his name on them.
- ☐ yes
☐ no
27. I have read about a candidate in newspapers and magazines.
- ☐ yes
☐ no

(continue on next page)

28. Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do?

☐ It pays very much attention to what people think
☐ it pays a lot of attention to what people think
☐ it pays some attention to what people think
☐ it pays a little attention to what people think
☐ it pays no attention to what people think

29. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, OR that it is run for the benefit of all the people? (Check one)

☐ Nearly always run for a few big interests
☐ usually run for a few big interests
☐ run some for the big interests, some for the people
☐ usually run for the benefit of all the people
☐ nearly always run for the benefit of all the people

30. Do you think that almost all the people running the government try to treat everybody equally, OR do you think that quite a few of them treat people unequally? (Check one)

☐ They almost always treat everybody equally
☐ they often treat everybody equally
☐ they sometimes treat everybody equally
☐ they seldom treat everybody equally
☐ they never treat anybody equally (treat unequally)

31. Would you say that you can trust the people in the government to tell the truth almost all the time, only sometimes or almost never? (Check one)

☐ Almost all the time
☐ often
☐ only sometimes
☐ almost never (seldom)
☐ never

32. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right? (Check one)

☐ Almost always
☐ often
☐ sometimes
☐ seldom
☐ never

(continue on next page)

33. Do you feel that the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing? (Check one)

☐ They almost always know what they are doing
☐ they usually know what they are doing
☐ they sometimes know what they are doing
☐ they seldom know what they are doing
☐ they never know what they are doing

34. Do you think the government wastes much of the money your parents pay in taxes? (Check one)

☐ Nearly all tax money is wasted
☐ a lot of tax money is wasted
☐ some tax money is wasted
☐ a little tax money is wasted
☐ no tax money is wasted

35. Do you think some of the people running the government are crooked or dishonest? (Check one)

☐ Most of them are crooked or dishonest
☐ quite a few are crooked
☐ some are crooked
☐ hardly any are crooked
☐ none at all are crooked or dishonest

36. Would you say that quite a few of the people running the government work hard at their jobs, OR do you think that quite a few of them do as little work as they can get away with? (Check one)

☐ They almost always work hard
☐ they usually work hard
☐ they sometimes work hard
☐ they seldom work hard
☐ they never work hard; they do as little work as possible

37. If you were 21 now, whom would you vote for most of the time in provincial elections and federal elections? (Check one in each column)

	<u>Provincial</u>	<u>Federal</u>
Mostly Liberal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mostly Conservative	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mostly NDP - CCF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mostly Social Credit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I probably wouldn't bother voting . . .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

(continue on next page)

38. If they were 21, whom do you think most of your best friends would vote for most of the time in provincial elections and federal elections? (Check one in each column)

	<u>Provincial</u>	<u>Federal</u>
Mostly Liberal	_____	_____
Mostly Conservative	_____	_____
Mostly NDP - CCF	_____	_____
Mostly Social Credit	_____	_____
I don't know	_____	_____
Probably, they wouldn't bother voting .	_____	_____

39. Whom do you think your parents would vote for, if there were (1) a provincial election; and (2) a federal election today? (Please be sure to place one check mark in each column)

	<u>Father</u>		<u>Mother</u>	
	<u>Prov.</u>	<u>Fed.</u>	<u>Prov.</u>	<u>Fed.</u>
Mostly Liberal	_____	_____	_____	_____
Mostly Conservative	_____	_____	_____	_____
Mostly NDP - CCF	_____	_____	_____	_____
Mostly Social Credit	_____	_____	_____	_____
I don't know	_____	_____	_____	_____
Probably wouldn't vote	_____	_____	_____	_____

40. Generally speaking, if you were/are just getting out of school, would you like to go into politics as a lifework? (Check one)

_____ yes
 _____ no
 _____ I don't know

41. Could you tell us why you selected "yes" or "no" for answer to the question above?

THANK YOU FOR HELPING US WITH OUR STUDY. IF YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS YOU WISH TO MAKE ABOUT SOME OF THE QUESTIONS OR THE STATEMENTS, PLEASE MAKE THEM HERE AS WE ARE INTERESTED IN YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT OUR QUESTIONNAIRES.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF ITEMS FOR SINGULAR SCALE AND COMPOSITE INDEX OF THE BATTERY OF ATTITUDE SCALES AND SOCIO-POLITICAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

LIST OF ITEMS FOR SINGULAR SCALE OF THE
BATTERY OF ATTITUDE SCALES

The columns are to be interpreted as follows:

Column 1	shows Pearson correlation coefficients of item score to scale total score computed for pilot study group.
Column 2	shows Pearson correlation coefficients of item score to scale total score computed for social studies teacher study group.
Column 3	shows Pearson correlation coefficients of item score to scale total score computed for adolescent study group.
Column 4	shows serial numbers of items in the Battery of Attitude Scales.
Column 5	provides the item description.
Column 6-10	show Scales for Responses given to provide weight-values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, to the items. Row 1 under the Scale for Responses lists the number of respondents selecting each category. Row 2 shows the percent of respondents selecting each category.

GRONDIN-JOHNSTON POLITICAL CYNICISM SCALE

.55	.52	.49	(3)	Many politicians believe that there is a sucker born every minute.	D 205 13.1	d 328 20.9	? 568 36.2	a 317 20.2	A 152 9.7
.59	.55	.60	(4)	I would say that more than 90% of all political leaders would not hesitate to be crooked if they were absolutely certain that no one would find out about it. ..	D 211 13.4	d 420 26.8	? 280 17.8	a 412 26.2	A 247 15.7
.64	.50	.58	(8)	It is a pretty good policy to "trust a politician about as far as you can throw a bull by the tail".	D 183 11.7	d 549 35.0	? 411 26.2	a 301 19.2	A 126 8.0
.58	.70	.63	(10)	Most political leaders would tell lies if they could benefit by doing so.	D 118 7.5	d 398 25.4	? 359 22.9	a 496 31.6	A 199 12.7
.52	.64	.50	(11)	Political Leaders like to manipulate people.	D 74 4.7	d 241 15.4	? 560 35.7	a 512 32.6	A 183 11.7
.56	.52	.49	(12)	Too often people like my parents get a raw deal from their local government.	D 100 6.4	d 394 25.1	? 387 24.6	a 445 28.3	A 244 15.5
.57	.39	.58	(14)	Parents who think that politicians really mean what they say are just fooling themselves.	D 109 6.9	d 545 34.7	? 329 21.0	a 420 26.8	A 167 10.6
.50	.52	.49	(15)	Under the "rules of the game" in politics, it is better to do the other fellow in before he does you in.	D 174 11.1	d 322 20.5	? 399 25.4	a 485 30.9	A 190 12.1
.61	.61	.51	(17)	Success in politics is primarily a matter of "who you know", not what you stand for.	D 284 18.1	d 451 28.7	? 248 15.8	a 395 25.2	A 192 12.2
.58	.50	.47	(25)	Most people who like to "play politics" are just trying to promote their own interests.	D 58 3.7	d 329 21.0	? 452 28.8	a 565 36.0	A 166 10.6

.58	.58	.52	(30)	If a person has enough money, he can get any government to do anything he wants.	D 539 34.3	d 462 29.4	? 223 14.2	a 235 15.0	A 111 7.1
.57	.56	.59	(32)	Canadian politics is really controlled by a small group of powerful politicians who can pretty much do whatever they want. ...	D 227 14.5	d 505 32.2	? 286 18.2	a 369 23.5	A 183 11.7
.56	.47	.51	(40)	If a political leader looks after the wishes of the most influential people, then he does not really have to worry about getting re-elected in the next election...	D 272 17.3	d 438 27.9	? 239 15.2	a 412 26.2	A 209 13.3
.62	.56	.40	(41)	No matter who is elected to run the government, there is still going to be a lot of corruption involved.	D 82 5.2	d 274 17.5	? 277 17.6	a 656 41.8	A 281 17.9
.57	.40	.43	(46)	Politicians say that "all men are equal before the law", but I do not believe it.	D 265 16.9	d 277 17.6	? 166 10.6	a 462 29.4	A 400 25.5

PERSONAL CYNICISM SCALE

.63	.43	.40	(16)	If you sincerely try to be thoughtful of others, people will appreciate it and not try to take advantage of your good nature. .	D 371 23.6	d 533 33.9	? 106 6.8	a 366 23.3	A 194 12.4
.56	.46	.40	(19)	Generally speaking, I feel that most people can be trusted.	A 176 11.2	a 641 40.8	? 189 12.0	d 395 25.2	D 169 10.8
.61	.63	.40	(23)	I feel that most of the time people are just looking out for themselves; they do not try to be helpful.	D 65 4.1	d 349 22.2	? 171 10.9	a 674 42.9	A 311 19.8
na	na	.61	(28)	"A Fool and his money are soon parted" and I would just as soon be the one to take it away from him, because if I do not, someone else will.	D 410 26.1	d 447 28.5	? 245 15.6	a 311 19.8	A 157 10.0
.57	.42	.59	(35)	"Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost" sounds like good sense to me.	D 515 32.8	d 547 34.8	? 253 16.1	a 175 11.1	A 80 5.1
na	na	.35	(42)	The trouble with most young people today is that they do not have any personal moral standards.	D 538 34.3	d 451 28.7	? 228 14.7	a 251 16.0	A 102 6.5
.63	.40	.64	(45)	In this 'game' called "life", it is best to do the other fellow in before he does you in.	D 508 32.4	d 530 33.8	? 255 16.2	a 204 13.0	A 73 4.6
na	na	.46	(48)	With very few exceptions, one could say that most clergymen today have what we could call a "soft job".	D 340 21.7	d 413 26.3	? 393 25.0	a 277 17.6	A 147 9.4
.59	.33	.58	(51)	Anyone who firmly believes that the duty of man is to be fair to others just does not understand how this world is run.	D 611 38.9	d 453 28.9	? 208 13.2	a 190 12.1	A 108 6.9
na	na	.38	(53)	I would rather be a dull, honest person than a smart crooked one.	A 603 38.4	a 359 22.9	? 356 22.7	d 133 8.5	D 119 7.6

POLITICAL ALIENATION SCALE

na	na	.53	(2)	Local Politicians never pay any attention to what young people want.	D 85 5.4	d 473 30.1	? 262 16.7	a 504 32.1	A 246 15.7
.58	.59	.63	(6)	It does not matter which political party wins an election, the little man's interests will be ignored.	D 227 14.5	d 509 32.4	? 218 13.9	a 384 24.5	A 232 14.8
na	na	.60	(18)	Most elections are nothing more than "Popularity contests" among candidates.	D 236 15.0	d 368 23.4	? 176 11.2	a 499 31.8	A 291 18.5
.57	.47	.66	(33)	The government is sincerely interested in the welfare of my family and other people like my family.	A 126 8.0	a 478 30.4	? 350 22.3	d 438 27.9	D 178 11.3
.55	.64	.58	(37)	Government officials are really trying to find more ways for people like my family to play an important part in politics.	A 74 4.7	a 302 19.2	? 527 33.6	d 476 30.3	D 191 12.2
.48	.43	.54	(38)	When I am old enough to vote, I think I will get a great amount of satisfaction from being able to vote.	A 395 25.2	a 509 32.4	? 283 18.0	d 284 18.1	D 99 6.3

ANOMY SCALE

na	na	.46	(1)	It seems to me that other people find it easier to decide what is right than I do.	D 261 16.6	d 598 38.1	? 239 15.2	a 397 25.3	A 75 4.8
na	na	.44	(5)	The trouble with the world today is that most people really do not believe in anything.	D 271 17.3	d 399 25.4	? 210 13.4	a 437 27.8	A 253 16.1
na	na	.59	(9)	With everything in such a state of disorder, it is hard for a person to know where he stands from one day to the next.	D 102 6.5	d 354 22.5	? 209 13.3	a 640 40.8	A 265 16.9
na	na	.52	(13)	People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act.	D 329 21.0	d 460 29.3	? 238 15.2	a 307 19.6	A 236 15.0
na	na	.55	(21)	With everything so uncertain these days, it seems as though anything could happen.	D 30 1.9	d 204 13.0	? 186 11.8	a 759 48.3	A 391 24.9
na	na	.50	(22)	I often feel that many things our parents stood for are just going to ruin before our very eyes. ..	D 89 5.7	d 309 19.7	? 328 20.9	a 526 33.5	A 318 20.3
na	na	.65	(29)	Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow.	D 149 9.5	d 324 20.6	? 179 11.4	a 588 37.5	A 330 21.0
na	na	.62	(34)	Because our society lacks any firm moral standards, it is often hard to decide what is right and what is wrong to do.	D 232 14.8	d 417 26.6	? 240 15.3	a 494 31.5	A 187 11.9
na	na	.52	(36)	What is lacking in the world today is the old kind of friendship that lasted for a lifetime.	D 130 8.3	d 233 14.8	? 170 10.8	a 498 31.7	A 539 34.3

SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE

.56	.54	.57	(7)	What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do. It is like the weather, there is nothing people can do about it.	D 141 9.0	d 223 14.2	? 108 6.9	a 584 37.2	A 514 32.7
.60	.58	.51	(24)	If they so desire, my parents have many chances to say what they think about running the government of Alberta.	D 176 11.2	d 415 26.4	? 342 21.8	a 427 27.2	A 210 13.4
na	na	.44	(27)	Without the right breaks, one cannot be very effective in political affairs.	A 202 12.9	a 563 35.9	? 362 23.1	d 332 21.1	D 111 7.1
na	na	.62	(31)	When people like me become adults, I feel that we will not have any influence on what the government does.	A 125 8.0	a 247 15.7	? 217 13.8	d 521 33.2	D 460 29.3
.52	.47	.42	(39)	Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on.	A 434 27.6	a 640 40.8	? 123 7.8	d 284 18.1	D 89 5.7
na	na	.41	(44)	The political views and activities of students are very important.	D 51 3.2	d 113 7.2	? 203 12.9	a 596 38.0	A 607 38.7
.64	.62	.62	(52)	People like me do not have any say about what the government does.	A 476 30.3	a 472 30.1	? 176 11.2	d 290 18.5	D 156 9.9

SENSE OF CITIZEN DUTY SCALE

.68	.63	.66	(20)	A good many local elections are not important enough to bother with (to participate in).	A 44 2.8	a 171 10.9	? 165 10.5	d 555 35.4	D 635 40.4
.71	.68	.70	(26)	So many people vote in the federal elections that it does not matter much to me whether I vote or not.	A 69 4.4	a 178 11.3	? 128 8.2	d 421 26.8	D 774 49.3
.70	.59	.34	(43)	If a person does not care how an election comes out, he should not vote in it.	A 619 39.4	a 520 33.1	? 156 9.9	d 170 10.8	D 105 6.7
.54	.49	.55	(47)	Only a fool would ever vote to increase his own taxes.	A 363 23.1	a 270 17.2	? 331 21.1	d 398 25.4	D 208 13.2
.70	.69	.67	(49)	It is not so important for my parents to vote when they know their political party does not have a chance to win the election.	A 35 2.2	a 95 6.1	? 134 8.5	d 504 32.1	D 802 51.1
.74	.53	.66	(50)	Voting is nothing but a nuisance, a waste of time.	A 40 2.5	a 56 3.6	? 109 6.9	d 383 22.5	D 1012 64.5

LIST OF ITEMS FOR SINGULAR SCALE AND COMPOSITE INDEX
OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE

The columns are to be interpreted as follows:

- Column 1 shows correlations of item score to scale or index total score computed for adolescent study group. For the Political Cynicism Scale, Pearson correlation coefficients are provided. Spearman correlation coefficients are provided for items comprising the various composite political influence and interest indexes.
- Column 2 shows serial numbers of items in the Socio-Political Information Questionnaire.
- Column 3 provides the description for each item. Rows under each item description indicate categories of responses.
- Column 4 shows weight-values given to each category in the computation of the scale's and indexes' total scores.
- Column 5 lists the number of respondents selecting each category.
- Column 6 gives the percent of respondents selecting each category.

POLITICAL CYNICISM SCALE

- .67 28. Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to do what the people think when it decides what to do?
- | | | | |
|--|---|-----|------|
| 1. It pays <u>very much</u> attention to what people think | 1 | 105 | 6.7 |
| 2. It pays <u>a lot</u> of attention to what people think | 2 | 399 | 25.4 |
| 3. It pays <u>some</u> attention to what people think | 3 | 709 | 45.2 |
| 4. It pays <u>a little</u> attention to what people think | 4 | 281 | 17.9 |
| 5. It pays <u>no</u> attention to what people think | 5 | 57 | 3.6 |
| 0. No answer | 0 | 19 | 1.2 |
- .63 29. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, OR that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
- | | | | |
|--|---|-----|------|
| 1. Nearly always run for a few big interests | 5 | 104 | 6.6 |
| 2. Usually run for a few big interests | 4 | 221 | 14.1 |
| 3. Run some for the big interests, some for the people | 3 | 678 | 43.2 |
| 4. Usually run for the benefit of all the people | 2 | 442 | 28.2 |
| 5. Nearly always run for the benefit of all the people | 1 | 109 | 6.9 |
| 0. No answer | 0 | 16 | 1.0 |
- .69 30. Do you think that almost all the people running the government try to treat everybody equally, OR do you think that quite a few of them treat people unequally?
- | | | | |
|---|---|-----|------|
| 1. They almost always treat everybody equally | 1 | 192 | 12.2 |
| 2. They often treat everybody equally | 2 | 392 | 25.0 |
| 3. They sometimes treat everybody equally | 3 | 532 | 33.9 |
| 4. They seldom treat everybody equally | 4 | 354 | 22.5 |
| 5. They never treat anybody equally (treat unequally) | 5 | 79 | 5.0 |
| 0. No answer | 0 | 21 | 1.3 |
- .74 31. Would you say that you can trust the people in the government to tell the truth almost all the time, only sometimes or almost never?
- | | | | |
|------------------|---|-----|------|
| 1. Almost always | 1 | 292 | 18.6 |
| 2. Often | 2 | 528 | 33.6 |
| 3. Sometimes | 3 | 580 | 36.9 |
| 4. Seldom | 4 | 123 | 7.8 |
| 5. Never | 5 | 34 | 2.2 |
| 0. No answer | 0 | 13 | 0.8 |

.75	32.	How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right?			
	1.	Almost always	1	215	13.7
	2.	Often	2	535	34.1
	3.	Sometimes	3	635	40.4
	4.	Seldom	4	134	8.5
	5.	Never	5	33	2.1
	0.	No answer	0	18	1.1
.66	33.	Do you feel that the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing?			
	1.	They almost always know what they are doing	1	312	19.9
	2.	They usually know what they are doing	2	796	50.7
	3.	They sometimes know what they are doing	3	347	22.1
	4.	They seldom know what they are doing	4	61	3.9
	5.	They never know what they are doing	5	39	2.5
	0.	No answer	0	15	1.0
.63	34.	Do you think the government wastes much of the money your parents pay in taxes?			
	1.	Nearly all tax money is wasted	5	83	5.3
	2.	A lot of tax money is wasted	4	533	33.9
	3.	Some tax money is wasted	3	614	39.1
	4.	A little tax money is wasted	2	275	17.5
	5.	No tax money is wasted	1	46	2.9
	0.	No answer	0	19	1.2
.64	35.	Do you think some of the people running the government are crooked or dishonest?			
	1.	Most of them are crooked or dishonest	5	43	2.7
	2.	Quite a few are crooked	4	173	11.0
	3.	Some are crooked	3	773	49.2
	4.	Hardly any are crooked	2	512	32.6
	5.	None at all are crooked or dishonest	1	49	3.1
	0.	No answer	0	20	1.3
.64	36.	Would you say that quite a few of the people running the government <u>work hard</u> at their jobs, <u>OR</u> do you think that quite a few of them do as little work as they can get away with?			
	1.	They almost always work hard	1	175	11.1
	2.	They usually work hard	2	685	43.6
	3.	They sometimes work hard	3	480	30.6
	4.	They seldom work hard	4	144	9.2
	5.	They never work hard; they do as little work as possible	5	63	4.0
	0.	No answer	0	23	1.5

ITEMS OF VARIOUS COMPOSITE INDEXES

.79*	.73	10. a	About how often do you talk about public affairs and politics with your father:			
			1. two or more times a week	5	197	12.5
			2. about once a week	4	251	16.0
			3. a couple times a month	3	327	20.8
			4. almost never	2	385	24.5
			5. never	1	182	11.6
			6. not applicable, no answer, missing data	0	222	14.5
.73*	.73	10. b	About how often do you talk about public affairs and politics with your mother:			
			1. two or more times a week	5	171	10.9
			2. about once a week	4	228	14.5
			3. a couple times a month	3	331	21.1
			4. almost never	2	457	29.1
			5. never	1	186	11.8
			6. not applicable, no answer, missing data	0	197	12.5

* For Parent Political Influence Index

.62	10. c	About how often do you talk about public affairs and politics with other members of your family:			
		1. two or more times a week	5	94	6.0
		2. about once a week	4	138	8.8
		3. a couple times a month	3	240	15.3
		4. almost never	2	463	29.5
		5. never	1	415	26.4
		6. not applicable, no answer, missing data	0	220	14.0
.79	10. d	About how often do you talk about public affairs and politics with best friends:			
		1. two or more times a week	5	132	8.4
		2. about once a week	4	187	11.9
		3. a couple times a month	3	405	25.8
		4. almost never	2	531	33.8
		5. never	1	272	17.3
		6. not applicable, no answer, missing data	0	43	2.7
.74	10. e	About how often do you talk about public affairs and politics with other friends:			
		1. two or more times a week	5	39	2.5
		2. about once a week	4	95	6.1
		3. a couple times a month	3	273	17.4
		4. almost never	2	573	36.5
		5. never	1	377	24.0
		6. not applicable, no answer, missing data	0	213	13.6
.26	13.	When you were in earlier grades, did you ever talk about politics, government or public affairs in your social studies class?			
		1. often	4	398	25.4
		2. sometimes	3	775	49.4
		3. almost never (seldom)	2	276	17.6
		4. never	1	110	7.0
		5. do not remember, no answer	0	11	0.7
.53	14.	How about now, in 1969-70, do you ever talk about politics, government or public issues in your social studies class?			
		1. often	4	729	46.4
		2. sometimes	3	557	35.5
		3. almost never (seldom)	2	189	12.0
		4. never	1	79	5.0
		5. no answer, do not remember	0	16	1.0
.79**	.72	19. a About how often in the 1969-70 school year that the respondent has talked about politics, government and public issues in and outside the classrooms with his social studies teacher?			
		1. about two or more times a week	5	248	15.8
		2. about once a week	4	269	17.1
		3. a couple times a month or so	3	329	21.0
		4. almost never	2	339	21.6
		5. never	1	330	21.0
		6. no answer	0	55	3.5
.60**	.53	19. b About how often in the 1969-70 school year that the respondent has talked about politics, government and public issues in and outside classrooms with other teachers besides his social studies teacher?			
		1. about two or more times a week	5	19	1.2
		2. about once a week	4	67	4.3
		3. a couple times a month or so	3	198	12.6
		4. almost never	2	510	32.5
		5. never	1	666	42.4
		6. no answer	0	110	7.0
.67	20. a	About how often does the respondent follow the news and public affairs programs on TV?			
		1. almost every day	7	329	21.0
		2. a few times a week	6	384	24.5
		3. about once a week	5	239	15.2
		4. a couple times a month or so	4	181	11.5
		5. less than once a month	3	76	4.8
		6. almost never	2	181	11.5
		7. never	1	104	6.6
		8. do not know, no answer	0	76	4.8

** For Teachers Political Influence Index

.70	20. b	About how often does the respondent follow the news and public affairs programs on radio?			
		1. almost every day	7	513	32.7
		2. a few times a week	6	305	19.4
		3. about once a week	5	152	9.7
		4. a couple times a month or so	4	110	7.0
		5. less than once a month	3	69	4.4
		6. almost never	2	184	11.7
		7. never	1	151	9.6
		8. do not know, no answer	0	86	5.5
.65	20. c	About how often does the respondent read about public affairs and politics in newspapers?			
		1. almost every day	7	405	25.8
		2. a few times a week	6	306	19.5
		3. about once a week	5	203	12.9
		4. a couple times a month or so	4	182	11.6
		5. less than once a month	3	78	5.0
		6. almost never	2	163	10.4
		7. never	1	136	8.7
		8. do not know, no answer	0	97	6.2
.62	11.	As nearly as you can tell, do you think your parents are interested in public affairs and politics?			
		1. they are very much interested	5	289	18.4
		2. interested quite a lot	4	507	32.3
		3. somewhat interested	3	595	37.9
		4. not very interested (very little)	2	142	9.0
		5. not interested at all	1	22	1.4
		6. do not know, no answer	0	15	1.0
.70	12.	About how often do your parents talk about public affairs and politics in your home?			
		1. two or more times a week	5	465	29.6
		2. about once a week	4	343	21.8
		3. a couple times a month or so	3	372	23.7
		4. almost never	2	192	12.2
		5. never	1	34	2.2
		6. do not know, no answer	0	164	10.4
.56	21.	How often have the parents of the respondent participated in political activities?			
		1. often	4	84	5.4
		2. sometimes	3	353	22.5
		3. almost never	2	348	22.2
		4. never	1	452	27.5
		5. do not know, no answer	0	353	22.5
.81	17.	Respondent interest in political affairs over the last three months--follow what is going on in government and politics:			
		1. most of the time	5	205	13.1
		2. some of the time	4	472	30.1
		3. only now and then	3	487	31.0
		4. hardly at all	2	281	17.9
		5. never	1	111	7.1
		6. no answer	0	14	0.9
.79	18.	Would you say that you follow political affairs very closely, fairly closely, or not much at all?			
		1. very closely	4	36	2.3
		2. fairly closely	3	617	39.3
		3. not much at all	2	796	50.7
		4. never	1	80	5.1
		5. no answer	0	41	2.6

APPENDIX C

ADDITIONAL DATA

Table 50

Estimated Correlation Matrix with Error-Free Measures Among
Scales of the Battery of Attitude Scales for Pilot Study,
Teacher Study* and (Adolescent Study) Groups

Scales	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gr.-Jo.		--	.92	.97	--	-.48	-.44
Pol. Cyn.		-- (.70)	.82* (.69)	1.00* (.91)	-- (.52)	-.60 (-.71)	-.44* (-.49)
Pol. Cyn.			-- (.48)	-- (.68)	-- (.37)	-- (-.54)	-- (-.40)
Per. Cyn.				.80 .81* (.52)	-- -- (.46)	-.46 -.38* (-.64)	-.30 -.52* (-.64)
Pol. Alie.					-- -- (.43)	-.60 -.79* (-.77)	-.34 -.44* (-.45)
Anomy						-- -- (-.63)	-- -- (-.56)
Pol. Eff.							.83 .74* (.74)
Cit. Duty							

-- missing data

Table 51

Correlations Between Half-Test Scores of Scales of the
Battery of Attitude Scales for Pilot Study, Teacher
Study* and (Adolescent Study) Groups: Even-
Numbered Half Tests by Odd-Numbered
Half Tests

Scales	1-II	2-II	3-II	4-II	5-II	6-II	7-II
Gr.-Jo.	.795						
Pol. Cyn.	.764* (.657)						
Pol. Cyn.		-- -- (.770)					
Per. Cyn.			.605 .563* (.521)				
Pol. Alie.				.420 .383* (.404)			
Anomy					-- -- (.544)		
Pol. Eff.						.473 .387* (.404)	
Cit. Duty							.643 .466* (.514)

-- missing data

Table 52

Matrix of z Values in Test of Significance of Differences Between
Pilot Study and Adolescent Study Group Correlations for
Seven Scales of the Battery of Attitude Scales

Scales	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	--	NA	7.87*	1.74	NA	2.77*	-0.21
Pol. Cyn.		--	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Per. Cyn.			--	4.27*	NA	1.74	4.51*
Pol. Alie.				--	NA	2.31*	1.44
Anomy					--	NA	NA
Pol. Eff.						--	2.30*
Cit. Duty							--

NA = data not available since these two scales were not in the original battery of attitude scales.

* = Significant at the .01 level for a two-tailed test.

Figure 2

Comparisons of Unadjusted and Adjusted School Grade Groups' Mean Scores for Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables on Two Political Cynicism Scales




Figure 3

Comparisons of Unadjusted and Adjusted Age Groups'
Mean Scores for Effects of Nine Characteristic
Variables on Two Political Cynicism Scales




Table 53

Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's Mean Scores Broken-Down
by School Grade Variable by Age Variable: Group Mean Scores,
Standard Deviations and Number of Respondents

Grades	Grade Group Means	Age Groups	Means	S. Dev.	No.
Grade 8	47.290	Age 13	46.459	9.085	172
		Age 14	47.595	10.182	158
		Age 15	48.966	5.519	29
		Age 16	50.000	11.518	7
		Age 17	57.500	7.778	2
Grade 9	44.106	Age 13	42.615	6.678	13
		Age 14	44.298	9.504	151
		Age 15	43.892	9.312	120
		Age 16	44.227	7.559	22
		Age 17	47.500	10.607	2
Grade 10	46.013	Age 14	48.167	8.441	12
		Age 15	44.519	9.110	154
		Age 16	47.000	8.275	123
		Age 17	49.545	9.267	11
		Age 18	50.833	7.468	6
Grade 11	45.065	Age 15	44.474	7.523	19
		Age 16	44.760	8.329	150
		Age 17	45.470	9.473	117
		Age 18	45.524	9.983	21
Grade 12	44.815	Age 16	44.867	11.351	15
		Age 17	44.074	10.253	135
		Age 18	45.379	9.717	124

Table 54

Political Cynicism Scale's Mean Scores Broken-Down
by School Grade Variable by Age Variable: Group
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations and
Number of Respondents

Grades	Grade Group Means	Age Groups	Means	S. Dev.	No.
Grade 8	24.501	Age 13	23.820	7.644	172
		Age 14	24.627	7.160	158
		Age 15	26.483	6.010	29
		Age 16	27.286	6.945	7
		Age 17	30.000	1.414	2
Grade 9	23.344	Age 13	21.385	4.718	13
		Age 14	23.179	5.201	151
		Age 15	23.575	5.936	120
		Age 16	22.955	6.979	22
		Age 17	27.000	11.314	2
Grade 10	23.834	Age 14	24.750	4.093	12
		Age 15	23.442	5.482	154
		Age 16	23.959	5.209	123
		Age 17	24.818	4.401	11
		Age 18	26.833	2.422	6
Grade 11	23.769	Age 15	23.000	6.523	19
		Age 16	23.307	4.474	150
		Age 17	24.487	5.598	117
		Age 18	23.762	5.384	21
Grade 12	23.634	Age 16	23.200	4.694	15
		Age 17	23.504	4.973	135
		Age 18	23.685	5.399	124

Figure 4

Comparisons of Unadjusted and Adjusted School Grade Groups'
Mean Scores for Effects of Nine Characteristic
Variables Plus Age on Two Political
Cynicism Scales




Figure 5

Comparisons of Adjusted and Unadjusted Age Groups' Mean Scores for Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables Plus School Grade on Two Political Cynicism Scales




Table 55

Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's Mean Scores
 Broken-Down by Age Variable by School Grade
 Variable: Group Mean Scores, Standard
 Deviations and Number of Respondents

Age	Age Group Means	Grade Groups	Means	S. Dev.	No.
Age 13	46.189	Grade 8	46.459	9.085	172
		Grade 9	42.615	6.678	13
Age 14	46.065	Grade 8	47.595	10.182	158
		Grade 9	44.298	9.504	151
		Grade 10	48.167	8.441	12
Age 15	44.683	Grade 8	48.966	5.519	29
		Grade 9	43.892	9.312	120
		Grade 10	44.519	9.110	154
		Grade 11	44.474	7.523	19
Age 16	45.713	Grade 8	50.000	11.518	7
		Grade 9	44.227	7.559	22
		Grade 10	47.000	8.275	123
		Grade 11	44.760	8.329	150
		Grade 12	44.867	11.351	15
Age 17	45.037	Grade 8	57.500	7.778	2
		Grade 9	47.500	10.607	2
		Grade 10	49.545	9.267	11
		Grade 11	45.470	9.473	117
		Grade 12	44.074	10.253	135
Age 18	45.616	Grade 10	50.833	7.468	6
		Grade 11	45.524	9.983	21
		Grade 12	45.379	9.717	124

Table 56

Political Cynicism Scale's Mean Scores Broken-Down by Age
Variable by School Grade Variable: Group Mean Scores,
Standard Deviations and Number of Respondents

Age	Age Group Means	Grade Groups	Means	S. Dev.	No.
Age 13	23.649	Grade 8	23.820	7.644	172
		Grade 9	21.385	4.718	13
Age 14	23.950	Grade 8	24.627	7.160	158
		Grade 9	23.179	5.201	121
		Grade 10	24.750	4.093	12
Age 15	23.739	Grade 8	26.483	6.010	29
		Grade 9	23.575	5.936	120
		Grade 10	23.442	5.482	154
		Grade 11	23.000	6.523	19
Age 16	23.618	Grade 8	27.286	6.945	7
		Grade 9	22.955	6.979	22
		Grade 10	23.959	5.209	123
		Grade 11	23.307	4.474	150
		Grade 12	23.200	4.693	15
Age 17	24.064	Grade 8	30.000	1.414	2
		Grade 9	27.000	11.314	2
		Grade 10	24.818	4.400	11
		Grade 11	24.487	5.598	117
		Grade 12	23.504	4.973	135
Age 18	23.801	Grade 10	26.333	2.422	6
		Grade 11	23.762	5.384	21
		Grade 12	23.685	5.399	124

Figure 6

Comparisons of Means of School Grade Eight Through
Twelve in Acquisition of Political Cynicism




Figure 7

Comparisons of Means of Age Thirteen Through
Eighteen in Acquisition of
Political Cynicism




Table 57

Personal Cynicism Scale's Mean Scores Broken-Down by School Grade
 Variable by Age Variable: Group Mean Scores,
 Standard Deviations and Number of
 Respondents

Grades	Grade Group Means	Age Groups	Means	S. Dev.	No.
Grade 8	27.355	Age 13	26.419	5.612	172
		Age 14	27.759	6.471	158
		Age 15	30.621	5.144	29
		Age 16	28.000	6.325	7
		Age 17	26.000	8.485	2
Grade 9	25.074	Age 13	25.923	5.315	13
		Age 14	24.834	5.662	151
		Age 15	25.125	6.523	120
		Age 16	25.182	5.795	22
		Age 17	27.000	4.243	2
Grade 10	25.932	Age 14	23.250	4.957	12
		Age 15	25.416	5.568	154
		Age 16	26.488	6.209	123
		Age 17	28.364	5.297	11
		Age 18	29.167	5.307	6
Grade 11	24.720	Age 15	25.474	7.545	19
		Age 16	24.353	5.411	150
		Age 17	24.658	7.040	117
		Age 18	27.000	6.148	21
Grade 12	23.757	Age 16	24.800	6.858	15
		Age 17	23.267	5.557	135
		Age 18	24.065	5.814	124

Table 58

Personal Cynicism Scale's Mean Scores Broken-Down by Age
 Variable by School Grade Variable: Group Mean Scores,
 Standard Deviations and Number of Respondents

Age	Age Group Means	Grade Groups	Means	S. Dev.	No.
Age 13	26.384	Grade 8	26.419	5.612	172
		Grade 9	25.923	5.315	13
Age 14	26.215	Grade 8	27.759	6.471	158
		Grade 9	24.834	5.662	151
		Grade 10	23.250	4.957	12
Age 15	25.779	Grade 8	30.621	5.144	29
		Grade 9	25.125	6.523	120
		Grade 10	25.416	5.568	154
		Grade 11	25.474	7.545	19
Age 16	25.341	Grade 8	28.000	6.325	7
		Grade 9	25.182	5.795	22
		Grade 10	26.488	6.209	123
		Grade 11	24.353	5.411	150
		Grade 12	24.800	6.858	15
Age 17	24.135	Grade 8	26.000	8.485	2
		Grade 9	27.000	4.243	2
		Grade 10	28.364	5.297	11
		Grade 11	24.658	7.040	117
		Grade 12	23.267	5.557	135
Age 18	24.675	Grade 10	29.167	5.307	6
		Grade 11	27.000	6.148	21
		Grade 12	24.065	5.814	124

Figure 8

Comparisons of Unadjusted and Adjusted School Grade Groups' Mean Scores for Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables Plus Age on Personal Cynicism Scale




Table 59
Personal Cynicism by School Grade

Scale	Groups	Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Per. Cyn.	Low	22.5% (83)	34.1% (106)	28.0% (86)	38.4% (118)	45.3% (125)
	Medium	29.0 (107)	32.2 (100)	36.8 (113)	32.9 (101)	34.1 (94)
	High	48.5 (179)	33.8 (105)	35.2 (108)	28.7 (88)	20.7 (57)
	N	369	311	307	307	276

$\chi^2 = 73.21, p > .001$; tau-b = $-.16, p > .01$;
Gamma = $-.22$; Somer's D = $-.15$

Table 60
Personal Cynicism by Age

Scale	Groups	Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
Per. Cyn.	Low	24.3% (45)	30.5% (98)	29.5% (95)	32.8% (104)	44.2% (118)	38.4% (58)
	Medium	37.8 (70)	25.9 (83)	34.8 (112)	36.6 (116)	30.0 (80)	34.4 (52)
	High	37.8 <u>(70)</u>	43.6 <u>(140)</u>	35.7 <u>(115)</u>	30.6 <u>(97)</u>	25.8 <u>(69)</u>	27.2 <u>(41)</u>
	N	185	321	322	317	267	151

$\chi^2 = 44.28, p > .001$; tau-b = -.11, $p > .01$;
Gamma = -.15; Somer's D = -.10

Figure 9

Comparisons of Unadjusted and Adjusted Age Groups' Mean Scores
for Effects of Nine Characteristic Variables Plus Grade
on Personal Cynicism Scale




Table 61

Distribution of DK Personal Cynicism Index's Mean Scores
for School Grade and Age Groups

Variables	Groups	Sum	Means	S. Dev.	No.
School Grade	Grade 8	719	1.949	1.635	369
	Grade 9	559	1.797	1.668	311
	Grade 10	443	1.443	1.529	307
	Grade 11	357	1.163	1.398	307
	Grade 12	326	1.181	1.336	276
	Total	2404	1.531	1.559	1570
Age	Age 13	370	2.000	1.691	185
	Age 14	593	1.847	1.604	321
	Age 15	528	1.640	1.671	322
	Age 16	416	1.312	1.445	317
	Age 17	301	1.127	1.390	267
	Age 18	183	1.212	1.236	151
	Total	2391	1.530	1.560	1563

Figure 10

Comparisons of Means of School Grade Eight Through
Twelve in Acquisition of Personal Cynicism




Figure 11

Comparisons of Means of Age Thirteen Through
Eighteen in Acquisition of
Personal Cynicism




Table 62

Summary of Analyses of Variance of School Grade
and Age Variables' Group Mean Scores for DK
Personal Cynicism Index

Variables	Source of Variation	df	MS	F	P
School Grade	GRP	4	41.04	17.59	> .001
	WTH	1565	2.33		
Age	GRP	5	30.13	12.86	> .001
	WTH	1557	2.34		

Table 63

F Values' Matrix for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons of
School Grade Variable's Group Mean Scores for DK
Personal Cynicism Index

Index	Groups	Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
DK Index	Means	1.95	1.80	1.44	1.16	1.18
	Grade 8	1.95	--	0.15 (0.41)	0.79 (11.22)***	0.77 (10.04)***
	Grade 9	21.80	--	0.36 (2.15)*	0.64 (6.79)***	0.62 (6.03)***
	Grade 10	1.44	--	--	0.28 (1.29)	0.26 (1.05)
	Grade 11	1.16	--	--	--	0.02 (0.01)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

$F_{.10}(4,1565) = 1.94$

$F_{.05}(4,1565) = 2.37$

$F_{.01}(4,1565) = 2.32$

Table 64

F Values' Matrix for Scheffé' Multiple Comparisons
of Age Variable's Group Mean Scores for DK
Personal Cynicism Index

Index	Groups	Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
DK Index	Means	2.00	1.85	1.64	1.31	1.13	1.21
	Age 13	2.00	-- (0.23)	0.15 (1.30)	0.36 (4.75)***	0.87 (7.07)***	0.79 (4.43)***
	Age 14	1.85	--	-- 0.21 (0.61)	0.54 (3.98)***	0.72 (6.46)***	0.64 (3.60)***
	Age 15	1.64	--	--	0.31 (1.31)	0.51 (3.24)***	0.43 (1.62)
	Age 16	1.31	--	--	--	0.18 (0.40)	0.10 (0.09)
	Age 17	1.13	--	--	--	--	0.08 (0.05)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

$F_{.10}(5,1557) = 1.85$

$F_{.05}(5,1557) = 2.21$

$F_{.01}(5,1557) = 3.02$

Table 65
Means and Standard Deviations of Sex Variable's
Groups for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Male	721	46.515	9.246
	Female	849	44.711	9.316
	Total	1570	45.540	9.321
Pol. Cyn.	Male	721	23.892	6.158
	Female	849	23.807	5.614
	Total	1570	23.846	5.866
Per. Cyn.	Male	721	26.988	6.120
	Female	849	24.194	5.800
	Total	1570	25.477	6.106

Table 66
Analyses of Variance of Sex Variable's Group Mean Scores
for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	1267.00	1	1267.00		
	WTH	135150.00	1568	86.19	14.70	> .001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	2.50	1	2.50		
	WTH	54024.25	1568	34.45	.07	.79
Per. Cyn.	GRP	3041.75	1	3041.75		
	WTH	55486.06	1568	35.39	85.96	> .001

$$F_{.10}(1,1568) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1568) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1568) = 6.63$$

Table 67
Political and Personal Cynicism by Sex

Scales	Groups	Male	Female
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	27.9% (201)	37.6% (319)
	Medium	35.4 (255)	31.0 (263)
	High	36.8 (265)	31.4 (267)
	N	(721)	(849)
$\chi^2 = 16.58, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = -.09, p = .02;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.15; \text{Somer's D} = -.10$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	33.0% (238)	34.4% (292)
	Medium	36.1 (260)	35.3 (300)
	High	30.9 (223)	30.3 (257)
	N	(721)	(849)
$\chi^2 = 0.33, p = .85; \text{tau-b} = -.01, p = .24;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.02; \text{Somer's D} = -.01$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	24.3% (175)	40.4% (343)
	Medium	31.6 (228)	33.8 (287)
	High	44.1 (318)	25.8 (219)
	N	(721)	(849)
$\chi^2 = 69.52, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = -.20, p > .01;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.35; \text{Somer's D} = -.23$			

Table 68

Means and Standard Deviations of Religious Preference
Variable's Groups for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Protestant	822	45.933	9.215
	Roman Catholic	506	44.336	9.506
	Other Religion	157	45.968	8.790
	No Religion	34	51.206	9.782
	Total	1536	46.861	9.259
Pol. Cyn.	Protestant	822	24.241	5.600
	Roman Catholic	506	22.595	5.792
	Other Religion	157	25.185	5.968
	No Religion	34	26.088	6.468
	Total	1536	24.528	5.792
Per. Cyn.	Protestant	822	25.490	5.706
	Roman Catholic	506	25.006	6.527
	Other Religion	157	25.752	6.598
	No Religion	34	28.324	6.148
	Total	1536	26.143	6.079

Table 69

Analyses of Variance of Protestant's and Catholic's Group
Mean Scores for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	798.00	1	798.00		
	WTH	115348.00	1326	86.99	9.17	.003
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	848.25	1	848.25		
	WTH	42688.62	1326	32.19	26.35	> .001
Per. Cyn.	GRP	73.19	1	73.19		
	WTH	48240.75	1326	36.38	2.01	.16

$$F_{.10}(1,1326) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1326) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1326) = 6.63$$

Table 70

Political and Personal Cynicism by Religious Preference

Scales	Groups	Protestant	Catholic	Other Religions	No Religion
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.9% (254)	39.9% (202)	28.7% (45)	14.7% (5)
	Medium	34.1 (280)	30.2 (153)	38.2 (60)	23.5 (8)
	High	35.0 (288)	29.8 (151)	33.2 (52)	61.8 (21)
	N	(822)	(506)	(157)	(34)
	$\chi^2 = 26.92, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = -.02, p = .11;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.03; \text{Somer's D} = -.02$				
Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.9% (254)	42.1% (213)	25.5% (40)	26.5% (9)
	Medium	37.6 (309)	36.0 (182)	30.6 (48)	29.4 (10)
	High	31.5 (259)	21.9 (111)	43.9 (69)	44.1 (15)
	N	(822)	(506)	(157)	(34)
	$\chi^2 = 42.38, p > .01; \text{tau-b} = -.02, p = .10;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.03; \text{Somer's D} = -.02$				
Per. Cyn.	Low	30.7% (252)	38.7% (196)	34.4% (54)	20.6% (7)
	Medium	36.0 (296)	29.1 (147)	27.4 (43)	26.5 (9)
	High	33.3 (274)	32.2 (163)	38.2 (60)	52.9 (18)
	N	(822)	(506)	(157)	(34)
	$\chi^2 = 19.44, p = .004; \text{tau-b} = -.01, p = .25;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.02; \text{Somer's D} = -.01$				

Table 71

Means and Standard Deviations of Length of Residence Variable's
Groups for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo.	Up to 4 years	421	45.843	9.215
Pol. Cyn.	5 to 9 years	380	45.266	9.145
	10 to 14 years	407	45.604	9.395
	15 years and over	344	45.047	9.452
	Total	1552	45.463	9.289
Pol. Cyn.	Up to 4 years	421	24.005	5.730
	5 to 9 years	380	23.358	5.704
	10 to 14 years	407	23.835	6.080
	15 years and over	344	23.922	5.745
	Total	1552	23.784	5.815
Per. Cyn.	Up to 4 years	421	25.789	6.171
	5 to 9 years	380	25.742	5.804
	10 to 14 years	407	25.108	6.151
	15 years and over	344	25.052	6.177
	Total	1552	25.052	6.074

Table 72

Analyses of Variance of Length of Residence Variable's Group
Mean Scores for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	142.00	3	47.33		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	133837.00	1548	86.46	.55	.65
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	97.00	3	32.33		
	WTH	52450.31	1548	33.88	.95	.41
Per. Cyn.	GRP	182.25	3	60.75		
	WTH	57211.44	1548	36.96	1.64	.18

$$F_{.10}(3,1548) = 2.08$$

$$F_{.05}(3,1548) = 2.60$$

$$F_{.01}(3,1548) = 3.78$$

Table 73

Political and Personal Cynicism by Length of Residence in Communities

Scales	Groups	Up to 4 years	5 to 9 years	10 to 14 years	15 years and over
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.2% (127)	31.8% (121)	34.6% (141)	37.5% (129)
	Medium	35.6 (150)	34.5 (131)	30.5 (124)	30.8 (106)
	High	34.2 (144)	33.7 (128)	34.9 (142)	31.7 (109)
	N	(421)	(380)	(407)	(344)
$\chi^2 = 6.56, p = .36; \text{tau-b} = -.04, p = .02;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.05; \text{Somer's D} = -.03$					
Pol. Cyn.	Low	32.8% (138)	33.4% (127)	35.4% (144)	34.0% (117)
	Medium	34.7 (146)	38.4 (146)	33.9 (138)	37.2 (128)
	High	32.5 (137)	28.2 (107)	30.7 (125)	28.8 (99)
	N	(421)	(380)	(407)	(344)
$\chi^2 = 3.46, p = .75; \text{tau-b} = -.02, p = .14;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.03; \text{Somer's D} = -.02$					
Per. Cyn.	Low	31.6% (133)	26.8% (102)	35.1% (143)	39.8% (137)
	Medium	29.0 (122)	38.7 (147)	31.7 (129)	32.3 (111)
	High	39.4 (166)	34.5 (131)	33.2 (135)	27.9 (97)
	N	(421)	(380)	(407)	(344)
$\chi^2 = 23.54, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = -.08, p > .001;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.11; \text{Somer's D} = -.07$					

Table 74

Means and Standard Deviations of Socioeconomic Level Variable's Groups for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low SEL	552	46.252	9.022
	Medium SEL	547	45.642	9.240
	High SEL	443	44.332	9.698
	Total	1542	45.485	9.291
Pol. Cyn.	Low SEL	552	24.527	6.203
	Medium SEL	547	23.812	5.907
	High SEL	443	22.923	5.263
	Total	1542	23.813	5.836
Per. Cyn.	Low SEL	552	26.263	5.771
	Medium SEL	547	25.080	6.144
	High SEL	443	24.856	6.409
	Total	1542	25.439	6.088

Table 75

Analyses of Variance of Socioeconomic Level Variable's Group Mean Scores for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	632.19	2	316.09	9.27	> .001
	WTH	52490.69	1539	34.11		
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	926.00	2	463.00	5.36	.005
	WTH	133030.00	1539	86.44		
Per. Cyn.	GRP	595.62	2	297.81	8.02	> .001
	WTH	57116.25	1539	37.11		

 $F_{.10}(2,1539) = 2.30$
 $F_{.05}(2,1539) = 3.00$
 $F_{.01}(2,1539) = 4.61$

Table 76

Probability Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons
of Socioeconomic Level Variable's Group Mean
Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups		Low SEL	Medium SEL	High SEL
Gr.-Jo.		Means	46.252	45.642	44.332
Pol. Cyn.	Low SEL	46.252	--	.610 (.55)	1.920 (.005)***
	Medium SEL	45.642	--	--	1.310 (.09)*
Pol. Cyn.		Means	24.527	23.812	22.923
	Low SEL	24.527	--	.715 (.13)	1.604 (.0001)#
	Medium SEL	23.812	--	--	.888 (.06)*
Per. Cyn.		Means	26.263	25.080	24.856
	Low SEL	26.263	--	1.182 (.006)***	1.407 (.001)#
	Medium SEL	25.080	--	--	.225 (.85)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

Significant at the .001 level

Table 77

Political and Personal Cynicism by Socioeconomic Level

Scales	Groups	Low SEL	Medium SEL	High SEL
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.6% (169)	32.0% (175)	38.4% (170)
	Medium	33.3 (184)	33.6 (184)	32.1 (142)
	High	36.1 (199)	34.4 (188)	29.6 (131)
	N	(552)	(547)	(443)
	$\chi^2 = 8.32, p = .08; \text{tau-b} = -.06, p > .001;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.09; \text{Somer's D} = -.06$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.4% (168)	32.2% (176)	40.9% (181)
	Medium	32.6 (180)	37.3 (204)	37.0 (164)
	High	37.0 (204)	30.5 (167)	22.1 (98)
	N	(552)	(547)	(443)
	$\chi^2 = 28.58, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = -.11, p > .001;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.16; \text{Somer's D} = -.11$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	26.1% (144)	34.7% (190)	40.4% (179)
	Medium	34.4 (192)	34.7 (190)	28.2 (125)
	High	39.5 (218)	30.5 (167)	31.4 (139)
	N	(552)	(547)	(443)
	$\chi^2 = 27.34, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = -.10, p > .001;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.15; \text{Somer's D} = -.10$			

Table 78

Means and Standard Deviations of Social Class Self-Identification
Variable's Groups for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo.	Working Class	348	47.287	8.530
Pol. Cyn.	Low Middle Class	358	45.824	9.441
	Middle Class	441	44.045	9.494
	Upper Class	271	44.221	9.460
	Total	1418	45.324	9.237
Pol. Cyn.	Working Class	348	24.652	5.905
	Low Middle Class	358	23.846	5.798
	Middle Class	441	23.240	5.396
	Upper Class	271	22.904	5.531
	Total	1418	23.676	5.646
Per. Cyn.	Working Class	348	26.310	6.289
	Low Middle Class	358	25.134	5.818
	Middle Class	441	24.717	5.891
	Upper Class	271	25.063	6.355
	Total	1418	25.279	6.057

Table 79

Analyses of Variance of Social Class Self-Identification
Variable's Group Mean Scores for Three
Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	2479.00	3	826.33		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	120896.00	1414	85.50	9.66	> .001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	592.94	3	197.65		
	WTH	45163.88	1414	31.94	6.19	> .001
Per. Cyn.	GRP	532.62	3	177.54		
	WTH	51984.81	1414	36.76	4.83	.002

$$F_{.10}(3,1414) = 2.08$$

$$F_{.05}(3,1414) = 2.60$$

$$F_{.01}(3,1414) = 3.78$$

Table 80

Probability Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons
of Social Class Self-Identification Variable's
Group Mean Scores on Three
Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups		Working Class	Low Middle Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Gr.-Jo.		Means	47.287	45.824	44.048	44.218
Pol. Cyn.	Working Class	47.287	--	1.463 (.22)	3.240 (.0001)#	3.070 (.0009)#
	Low Middle Class	45.824	--	--	1.776 (.06)*	1.606 (.20)
	Middle Class	44.048	--	--	--	.170 (.99)
Pol. Cyn.		Means	24.652	23.846	23.258	22.875
	Working Class	24.652	--	.806 (.31)	1.394 (.008)***	1.778 (.002)***
	Low Middle Class	23.846	--	--	.588 (.54)	.972 (.21)
	Middle Class	23.258	--	--	--	.384 (.86)
Per. Cyn.		Means	26.310	25.134	24.707	25.077
	Working Class	26.310	--	1.176 (.08)*	1.603 (.004)***	1.233 (.10)*
	Low Middle Class	25.134	--	--	0.427 (.81)	0.057 (.99)
	Middle Class	24.707	--	--	--	0.370 (.89)

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level

*** Significant at the .01 level

Significant at the .001 level

Table 81

Political and Personal Cynicism by Social Class Self-Identification

Scales	Groups	Working Class	Low Middle Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	24.1% (84)	33.0% (118)	39.5% (174)	41.7% (113)
	Medium	34.8 (121)	31.8 (114)	32.9 (145)	29.2 (79)
	High	41.1 (143)	35.2 (126)	27.7 (122)	29.2 (79)
	N	(348)	(358)	(441)	(271)
	$\chi^2 = 32.23, p > .001$; tau-b = $-.12, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.17$; Somer's D = $-.11$				
Pol. Cyn.	Low	29.3% (102)	31.6% (113)	38.8% (171)	40.6% (110)
	Medium	31.6 (110)	38.0 (136)	37.2 (164)	36.5 (99)
	High	39.1 (136)	30.4 (109)	24.0 (106)	22.9 (62)
	N	(348)	(358)	(441)	(271)
	$\chi^2 = 30.71, p > .001$; tau-b = $-.11, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.16$; Somer's D = $-.11$				
Per. Cyn.	Low	29.9% (104)	33.0% (118)	35.6% (157)	40.6% (110)
	Medium	30.2 (105)	36.0 (129)	35.6 (157)	27.3 (74)
	High	39.9 (139)	31.0 (111)	28.8 (127)	32.1 (87)
	N	(348)	(358)	(441)	(271)
	$\chi^2 = 18.86, p = .004$; tau-b = $-.07, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.10$; Somer's D = $-.07$				

Table 82

Means and Standard Deviations of Provincial Political Party
Preference Variable's Groups for Three
Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Liberal	297	43.431	9.341
	Conservative	246	45.630	8.868
	CCF-NDP	80	45.525	8.607
	Social Credit	246	45.585	9.542
	Do Not Know	534	45.208	9.064
	Wouldn't Vote	82	52.988	8.623
	Total	1485	45.432	9.320
Pol. Cyn.	Liberal	297	22.667	5.100
	Conservative	246	23.959	5.092
	CCF-NDP	80	23.675	5.511
	Social Credit	246	23.606	5.066
	Do Not Know	534	23.736	5.583
	Wouldn't Vote	82	30.537	6.360
	Total	1485	23.910	5.610
Per. Cyn.	Liberal	297	24.616	6.005
	Conservative	246	25.581	6.007
	CCF-NDP	80	24.050	6.465
	Social Credit	246	25.443	6.148
	Do Not Know	534	25.159	5.821
	Wouldn't Vote	82	29.890	6.305
	Total	1485	25.369	6.107

Table 83

Analyses of Variance of Provincial Political Party Preference
Variable's Liberal, Conservative and Social Credit Group
Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	877.00	2	438.50		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	67403.00	786	85.75	5.11	.006
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	245.94	2	122.97		
	WTH	20336.44	786	25.87	4.75	.009
Per. Cyn.	GRP	151.00	2	75.50		
	WTH	28774.94	786	36.61	2.06	.13

$$F_{.10}(2,786) = 2.30$$

$$F_{.05}(2,786) = 3.00$$

$$F_{.01}(2,786) = 4.61$$

Table 84

Probability Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons of
Provincial Political Party Preference Variable's
Liberal, Conservative and Social Credit Group
Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups		Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit
Gr.-Jo.		Means	43.431	45.630	45.585
Pol. Cyn.	Liberal	43.431	--	2.199 (.02)**	2.154 (.03)**
	Conservative	45.630	--	--	.045 (.99)
Pol. Cyn.		Means	22.667	23.959	23.606
	Liberal	22.667	--	1.293 (.01)***	.939 (.10)*
	Conservative	23.959	--	--	.354 (.74)
Per. Cyn.		Means	24.616	25.581	25.443
	Liberal	24.616	--	.965 (.18)	.827 (.28)
	Conservative	25.581	--	--	.138 (.97)

* Significant at the .10 level
 ** Significant at the .05 level
 *** Significant at the .01 level

Table 86

Means and Standard Deviations of Federal Political Party
Preference Variable's Groups for Three
Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Liberal	444	42.757	9.414
	Conservative	280	46.193	9.345
	CCF-NDP	87	47.425	8.292
	Social Credit	60	47.850	8.048
	Do Not Know	506	45.460	8.780
	Wouldn't Vote	83	53.169	8.878
	Total	1460	45.432	9.355
Pol. Cyn.	Liberal	444	22.286	4.685
	Conservative	280	24.129	5.300
	CCF-NDP	87	25.552	6.000
	Social Credit	60	24.917	4.976
	Do Not Know	506	23.814	5.383
	Wouldn't Vote	83	30.132	7.127
	Total	1460	23.918	5.589
Per. Cyn.	Liberal	444	24.198	5.974
	Conservative	280	26.064	6.102
	CCF-NDP	87	25.207	6.590
	Social Credit	60	26.183	6.334
	Do Not Know	506	25.109	5.724
	Wouldn't Vote	83	29.868	6.004
	Total	1460	25.336	6.098

Table 87

Analyses of Variance of Federal Political Party Preference
Variable's Liberal and Conservative Group Mean Scores
for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	2027.00 63628.00	1 722	2027.00 88.13	23.00	> .001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP WTH	583.12 17558.06	1 722	583.13 24.32	23.98	> .001
Per. Cyn.	GRP WTH	598.00 26199.44	1 722	598.00 36.29	16.48	> .001

$$F_{.10}(1,722) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,722) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,722) = 6.63$$

Table 89

Means and Standard Deviations of Area of Residence Variable's Groups for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Urban	996	45.231	9.306
	Rural	574	46.075	9.340
	Total	1570	45.540	9.316
Pol. Cyn.	Urban	996	23.152	5.767
	Rural	574	25.051	5.852
	Total	1570	23.846	5.796
Per. Cyn.	Urban	996	25.005	5.983
	Rural	574	26.296	6.239
	Total	1574	25.477	6.076

Table 90

Analyses of Variance of Area of Residence Variable's Group Mean Scores for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	260.00	1	260.00		
	WTH	135623.00	1568	86.84	2.99	.09
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	1313.38	1	1313.38		
	WTH	52713.81	1568	33.62	39.07	> .001
Per. Cyn.	GRP	607.31	1	607.31		
	WTH	57920.88	1568	36.94	16.44	> .001

$$F_{.10}(1,1568) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1568) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1568) = 6.63$$

Table 91

Political and Personal Cynicism by Area of Residence

Scales	Groups	Urban	Rural
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	34.9% (348)	30.0% (172)
	Medium	33.8 (337)	31.5 (181)
	High	31.2 (311)	38.5 (221)
	N	(996)	(574)
	$\chi^2 = 9.00, p = .01; \text{tau-b} = .07, p > .001;$ Gamma = .12; Somer's D = .08		
Pol. Cyn.	Low	37.1% (370)	27.9% (160)
	Medium	38.0 (378)	31.7 (182)
	High	24.9 (248)	40.4 (232)
	N	(996)	(574)
	$\chi^2 = 41.94, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = .14, p > .001;$ Gamma = .25; Somer's D = .17		
Per. Cyn.	Low	36.1% (360)	27.5% (158)
	Medium	33.1 (330)	32.2 (185)
	High	30.7 (306)	40.2 (231)
	N	(996)	(574)
	$\chi^2 = 17.94, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = .10, p > .001;$ Gamma = .18; Somer's D = .12		

Table 92

Means and Standard Deviations of School System Variable's
Groups for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Public	448	46.471	8.928
	Separate	548	44.217	9.493
	General	574	46.075	9.340
	Total	1570	45.540	9.273
Pol. Cyn.	Public	448	24.047	5.657
	Separate	548	22.420	5.757
	General	574	25.051	5.852
	Total	1570	23.846	5.760
Per. Cyn.	Public	448	25.388	5.647
	Separate	548	24.692	6.231
	General	574	26.296	6.239
	Total	1570	25.477	6.070

Table 93

Analyses of Variance of School System Variable's Group
Mean Scores for Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	1510.00	2	755.00	8.77	.0002
	WTH	134907.00	1567	86.09		
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	1965.62	2	982.81	29.58	.00002
	WTH	52061.12	1567	33.22		
Per. Cyn.	GRP	726.75	2	363.38	9.85	.0001
	WTH	57801.06	1567	36.89		

$$F_{.10}(2,1567) = 2.30$$

$$F_{.05}(2,1567) = 3.00$$

$$F_{.01}(2,1567) = 4.61$$

Table 94

Probability Matrices for Scheffé Multiple Comparisons
of School System Variable's Group Mean Scores
on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Groups		Public	Separate	General
Gr.-Jo.		Means	46.471	44.217	46.075
Pol. Cyn.	Public	46.471	--	2.254 (.0008)#	.396 (.80)
	Separate	44.217	--	--	1.858 (.004)***
Pol. Cyn.		Means	24.047	22.420	25.051
	Public	24.047	--	1.627 (.001)#	1.004 (.02)**
	Separate	22.420	--	--	2.631 (.001)#
Per. Cyn.		Means	25.388	24.692	26.296
	Public	25.388	--	.697 (.20)	.908 (.06)*
	Separate	24.692	--	--	1.605 (.001)#

* Significant at the .10 level

** Significant at the .05 level


*** Significant at the .01 level

Significant at the .001 level

Table 95
Political and Personal Cynicism by School System

Scales	Groups	Public	Separate	General
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	28.1% (126)	40.5% (222)	30.0% (172)
	Medium	38.4 (172)	30.1 (165)	31.5 (181)
	High	33.5 (150)	29.4 (161)	38.5 (221)
	N	(448)	(548)	(574)
	$\chi^2 = 26.76, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = .02, p = .08;$ Gamma = .04; Somer's D = .02			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	31.7% (142)	41.6% (228)	27.9% (160)
	Medium	39.3 (176)	36.9 (202)	31.7 (182)
	High	29.0 (130)	21.5 (118)	40.4 (232)
	N	(448)	(548)	(574)
	$\chi^2 = 54.03, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = .08, p > .001;$ Gamma = .12; Somer's D = .08			
Per. Cyn.	Low	32.4 % (145)	39.2 % (215)	27.5 % (158)
	Medium	35.5 (159)	31.2 (171)	32.2 (185)
	High	32.1 (144)	29.6 (162)	40.2 (231)
	N	(448)	(548)	(574)
	$\chi^2 = 23.32, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = .06, p > .001;$ Gamma = .10; Somer's D = .06			

Figure 12
An Optimal Combination of Explanatory Background Factors of Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scales' Scores Using
An Aid (Version II) Analysis*



* Reducibility = .006

Figure 13
An Optimal Combination of Explanatory Background Factors of Political
Cynicism Scale's Scores Using An Aid (Version II) Analysis*





Figure 14
An Optimal Combination of Explanatory Background Factors of the Personal Cynicism Scale's
Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis*



* Reducibility = .006

Table 96
Multiple Classification Analysis of Background Factors
Predicting to Grondin-Johnston Political
Cynicism Scale

Background Predictors	Predicting From Each Characteristic Separately		Predicting From All Background Characteristics Simultaneously	
	Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²
School Grade	.129	.017	.142	.020
Age	.064	.004	.087	.008
Sex	.078	.006	.070	.005
Religious Pref.	.125	.016	.073	.005
Length of Residence	.032	.001	.039	.002
Socioeconomic Level	.072	.005	.029	.001
Social Class Self-Id.	.155	.024	.128	.016
Prov. Pol. Party Pref.	.189	.036	.055	.003
Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	.244	.060	.196	.038
Area of Residence	.020	.0003	.071	.005
School System	.096	.009	.061	.004
R = .298				
R ² = .09				
Percent Variance Explained = 8.87				

Eta is the correlation ratio unadjusted.

Eta² is the explained sum of squares unadjusted.

Beta is the correlation ratio adjusted for effects of other predictors.

Beta² is the explained sum of squares adjusted for effects of other predictors.

R is the multiple correlation coefficient corrected for degrees of freedom.

R² indicates the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by all predictors together after correcting for degrees of freedom.

The Percent Variance Explained is the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by all predictors together with correction for degrees of freedom.

Note: This table follows a standard format that will reappear in later tables presenting results of Multiple Classification Analysis.

Table 97
Multiple Classification Analysis of Background Factors
Predicting to Political Cynicism Scale

Background Predictors	Predicting From Each Characteristic Separately		Predicting From 11 Background Characteristics Simultaneously	
	Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²
School Grade	.100	.010	.098	.010
Age	.061	.004	.086	.007
Sex	.023	.0006	.012	.0001
Religious Pref.	.194	.038	.126	.016
Length of Residence	.043	.002	.042	.002
Socioeconomic Level	.138	.019	.051	.003
Social Class Self-Id.	.155	.024	.105	.011
Prov. Pol. Party Pref.	.261	.068	.160	.026
Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	.291	.084	.172	.030
Area of Residence	.153	.024	.079	.006
School System	.195	.038	.163	.027
R = .365				
R ² = .13				
Percent Variance Explained = 13.33				

Table 98

Multiple Classification Analysis of Background Factors
Predicting to Personal Cynicism Scale

Background Predictors	Predicting From Each Characteristic Separately		Predicting From 11 Background Characteristics Simultaneously	
	Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²
School Grade	.209	.044	.236	.056
Age	.128	.016	.068	.005
Sex	.222	.049	.233	.054
Religious Pref.	.102	.010	.107	.012
Length of Residence	.062	.004	.074	.006
SEL	.088	.008	.079	.006
Social Class Self-Id.	.086	.008	.038	.001
Prov. Pol. Party Pref.	.186	.035	.131	.017
Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	.217	.047	.123	.015
Area of Residence	.059	.004	.072	.005
School System	.084	.007	.059	.004
R = .37				
R ² = .14				
Percent Variance Explained = 13.97				

Table 99
Intercorrelation Matrix Between Background Characteristic Variables and Political Influences and Interest Indexes

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
1. School Grade	--	.87	-.004	-.06	.23	.22	.16	-.23	-.23	-.16	-.12	.18	.15	.20	-.07	-.05	.26	.17	.13
2. Age			-.06	-.007	.18	.13	.09	-.18	-.18	-.06	-.02	.13	.10	.15	-.07	-.03	.20	.11	.08
3. Sex				-.08	.03	-.15	-.02	.06	.06	.02	.02	-.04	.01	-.04	.06	.05	-.05	-.04	-.10
4. Religious Preference					-.01	-.05	-.11	.07	.11	.04	.17	-.04	-.06	-.04	-.08	.03	-.08	-.15	-.03
5. Length of Residence						-.04	.04	-.02	-.09	-.04	-.06	.19	.08	.20	-.04	-.02	.07	.03	.02
6. Socioeconomic Level							.35	-.17	-.23	-.31	-.28	.26	.21	.24	.06	.04	.18	.20	.19
7. Social Class Self-Id.								-.15	.70	-.19	-.19	.22	.15	.22	.08	.06	.17	.19	.18
8. Prov. Pol. Party Pref.										.06	.02	-.12	-.18	-.13	-.10	-.09	.15	-.22	-.20
9. Fed. Pol. Party Pref.										.08	.04	-.21	-.25	-.21	-.12	-.11	-.23	-.28	-.27
10. Area of Residence											.87	-.30	-.02	-.31	.01	.02	.15	-.12	-.09
11. School System												-.26	.001	-.27	.06	.07	-.14	-.09	.001
12. Parent Pol. Infl.													.28	.92	.12	.11	.40	.29	.33
13. Parent Pol. Int.														.27	.16	.17	.27	.28	.37
14. Family Pol. Infl.															.12	.12	.44	.30	.33
15. Teacher Pol. Infl.																.74	.16	.24	.20
16. School Pol. Infl.																	.18	.20	.21
17. Friend Pol. Infl.																		.30	.35
18. Media Pol. Infl.																			.41
19. Resp. Pol. Int.																			


$r \geq .05$ is significant at the .05 level for a two-tailed test
 $r \geq .065$ is significant at the .01 level for a two-tailed test
 $r \geq .08$ is significant at the .001 level for a two-tailed test

Table 100

Characteristic Variables and Political Influence and Interest
Indexes Contributing at the .10 Level of Significance
to the Prediction of Cynicism Scale Scores


Scales	Predictor Variables	F value for Variable	P Level	Percent Variance Accounted for	Standard Error of Predicted Scores
Gr.-Jo.	Social Class	32.73	.00	2.04	9.23
Pol. Cyn.	Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	23.16	.00	1.43	9.17
	Sex	19.92	.00	1.21	9.11
	Resp. Pol. Int.	14.50	.00	.88	9.07
	School Pol. Infl.	7.49	.01	.45	9.05
	Media Pol. Infl.	3.90	.05	.23	9.05
	Total			6.24	
Total Percent Variance Accounted For by all 19 Predictors = 7.73					
Pol. Cyn.	Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	53.07	.00	3.27	5.77
	Area of Residence	36.50	.00	2.20	5.71
	Media Pol. Infl.	19.00	.00	1.13	5.68
	School System	14.03	.00	.83	5.65
	Social Class	10.93	.001	.64	5.63
	Age	7.46	.01	.44	5.62
	School Grade	5.12	.02	.30	5.62
	School Pol. Infl.	4.74	.03	.25	5.61
	Parent Pol. Infl.	4.68	.03	.25	5.60
	Religious Pref.	3.63	.06	.22	5.60
	Total			9.58	
Total Percent Variance Accounted For by all 19 Predictors = 9.97					
Per. Cyn.	Sex	85.95	.00	5.20	5.95
	Resp. Pol. Int.	60.48	.00	3.52	5.84
	School Grade	43.12	.00	2.44	5.76
	Socioeconomic Level	10.37	.002	.59	5.74
	School Pol. Infl.	6.88	.01	.39	5.73
	Area of Residence	4.63	.03	.26	5.73
	Prov. Pol. Party Pref.	3.26	.07	.18	5.72
	Age	3.22	.07	.19	5.72
	Parent Pol. Int.	2.81	.09	.16	5.72
	Total			12.92	
Total Percent Variance Accounted For by all 19 Predictors = 13.37					

Figure 15
An Optimal Combination of Explanatory Background Factors with Political Influence and Interest Indexes of the
Grandin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis*




* Reducibility = .006

Figure 16
An Optimal Combination of Explanatory Background Factors with Political Influence and Interest Indexes of the
Political Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis*



* Reducibility = .006

Figure 17
An Optimal Combination of Explanatory Background Factors with Political Influence and Interest Indexes of the
Personal Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an AId (Version II) Analysis*



* Reductibility = .006

Table 101

Multiple Classification Analysis of Background Factors Plus
Political Influence and Interest Indexes Predicting
to the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale

Factors	Predicting From Each Factor Separately		Predicting From All Factors Simultaneously	
	Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²
School Grade	.126	.016	.139	.019
Age	.065	.004	.076	.006
Sex	.078	.006	.073	.005
Religious Pref.	.126	.016	.073	.005
Length of Residence	.031	.001	.041	.002
SEL	.072	.005	.023	.001
Social Class Self-Id.	.158	.025	.126	.016
Prov. Pol. Party Pref.	.189	.036	.049	.002
Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	.242	.059	.176	.031
Area of Residence	.019	.0004	.068	.005
School System	.097	.010	.055	.003
Parent Pol. Infl.	.061	.004	.024	.001
Parent Pol. Int.	.075	.006	.004	.00001
Family Pol. Infl.	.070	.005	.028	.001
Teacher Pol. Infl.	.089	.008	.020	.0004
School Pol. Infl.	.113	.013	.074	.005
Friend Pol. Infl.	.043	.002	.018	.0003
Media Pol. Infl.	.092	.008	.020	.0004
Resp. Pol. Int.	.126	.016	.088	.008
R = .31				
R ² = .10				
Percent Variance Explained = 9.48				

Table 102

Multiple Classification Analysis of Background Factors Plus
Political Influence and Interest Indexes Predicting to
the Political Cynicism Scale

Factors	Predicting From Each Factor Separately		Predicting From All Factors Simultaneously	
	Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²
School Grade	.999	.010	.094	.009
Age	.060	.004	.071	.005
Sex	.023	.001	.009	.0001
Religious Pref.	.196	.038	.123	.015
Length of Residence	.040	.002	.040	.002
SEL	.135	.018	.042	.002
Social Class Self-Id.	.155	.024	.102	.010
Prov. Pol. Party Pref.	.262	.069	.147	.022
Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	.292	.085	.156	.024
Area of Residence	.154	.024	.077	.006
School System	.198	.039	.163	.026
Parent Pol. Infl.	.087	.008	.018	.0003
Parent Pol. Int.	.108	.012	.021	.0004
Family Pol. Infl.	.101	.010	.029	.001
Teacher Pol. Infl.	.084	.007	.048	.002
School Pol. Infl.	.117	.014	.096	.009
Friend Pol. Infl.	.074	.005	.004	.00002
Media Pol. Infl.	.145	.021	.058	.003
Resp. Pol. Int.	.124	.015	.033	.001
R = .38				
R ² = .14				
Percent Variance Explained = 14.04				

Table 103

Multiple Classification Analysis of Background Factors Plus
Political Influence and Interest Indexes Predicting to
the Personal Cynicism Scale

Factors	Predicting From Each Factor Separately		Predicting From All Factors Simultaneously	
	Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²
School Grade	.211	.045	.224	.050
Age	.132	.017	.067	.004
Sex	.222	.049	.238	.057
Religious Pref.	.104	.011	.099	.010
Length of Residence	.065	.004	.072	.005
SEL	.088	.008	.071	.005
Social Class Self-Id.	.087	.008	.032	.001
Prov. Pol. Party Pref.	.187	.035	.110	.012
Fed. Pol. Party Pref.	.217	.047	.119	.014
Area of Residence	.061	.004	.065	.004
School System	.089	.009	.061	.004
Parent Pol. Infl.	.100	.010	.061	.004
Parent Pol. Int.	.129	.017	.030	.001
Family Pol. Infl.	.091	.008	.045	.002
Teacher Pol. Infl.	.093	.009	.012	.0001
School Pol. Infl.	.118	.014	.074	.006
Friend Pol. Infl.	.108	.012	.038	.002
Media Pol. Infl.	.107	.011	.002	.000001
Resp. Pol. Int.	.170	.029	.120	.014

R = .41

R² = .17

Percent Variance Explained = 16.65

Table 104

Political Cynicism Aggregated Scales by Personal
Cynicism Aggregated Scale

Scales	Groups	Personal Cynicism		
		Low	Medium	High
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	56.9% (295)	32.7% (168)	10.6% (57)
	Medium	27.2 (141)	40.2 (207)	31.7 (170)
	High	15.8 (82)	27.2 (140)	57.7 (310)
	N	(518)	(515)	(537)
$\chi^2 = 331.33, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = .40, p > .001;$ Gamma = .57; Somer's D = .40				
Pol. Cyn.	Low	51.7% (268)	31.3% (161)	18.8% (101)
	Medium	31.3 (162)	41.0 (211)	34.8 (187)
	High	17.0 (88)	27.8 (143)	46.4 (249)
	N	(518)	(515)	(537)
$\chi^2 = 169.49, p > .001; \text{tau-b} = .29, p > .001;$ Gamma = .42; Somer's D = .29				

Table 105

Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism Aggregated Scale by
Political Cynicism Aggregated Scale

Scale	Groups	Political Cynicism		
		Low	Medium	High
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	62.3% (330)	25.0% (140)	10.4% (50)
	Medium	28.3 (150)	43.6 (244)	25.8 (124)
	High	9.4 (50)	31.4 (176)	63.8 (306)
	N	(530)	(560)	(480)

$\chi^2 = 472.60$, $p > .001$; tau-b = .47, $p > .001$;
Gamma = .66; Somer's D = .47

Table 106

Means and Standard Deviations of Parent Political
Influence Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo.	Low	702	45.926	8.864
Pol. Cyn.	High	681	44.787	9.971
	Total	1383	45.365	9.439
Pol. Cyn.	Low	702	24.343	6.200
	High	681	23.339	5.544
	Total	1383	23.849	5.884
Per. Cyn.	Low	702	25.934	6.138
	High	681	24.606	6.072
	Total	1383	25.280	6.103

Table 107

Analyses of Variance of Parent Political Influence
Categories' Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	447.00	1	447.00		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	122678.00	1381	88.83	5.03	.02
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	348.62	1	348.62		
	WTH	47851.19	1381	34.65	10.06	.002
Per. Cyn.	GRP	609.56	1	609.56		
	WTH	51477.94	1381	37.28	16.35	.0001

$$F_{.10}(1,1381) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1381) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1381) = 6.63$$

Table 108

Political and Personal Cynicism by Parent Political Influence

Scales	Groups	Low Political Influence	High Political Influence
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.5% (214)	38.0% (259)
	Medium	35.6 (250)	29.4 (200)
	High	33.9 (238)	32.6 (222)
	N	702	681
$\chi^2 = 10.08, p = .006$; Tau-b = $-.05, p = .002$; Gamma = $-.09$; Somer's D = $-.04$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	32.1% (225)	36.4% (248)
	Medium	33.9 (238)	37.7 (257)
	High	34.0 (239)	25.8 (176)
	N	702	681
$\chi^2 = 11.10, p = .004$; Tau-b = $-.07, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.13$; Somer's D = $-.06$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	30.9% (217)	38.6% (263)
	Medium	31.1 (218)	34.5 (235)
	High	38.0 (267)	26.9 (183)
	N	702	681
$\chi^2 = 20.41, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.11, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.19$; Somer's D = $-.09$			

Table 109

Means and Standard Deviations of Parent Political
Interest Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	766	46.441	9.035
	High	795	44.667	9.503
	Total	1561	45.537	9.315
Pol. Cyn.	Low	766	24.476	5.998
	High	795	23.264	5.642
	Total	1561	23.859	5.819
Per. Cyn.	Low	766	26.288	6.044
	High	795	24.657	6.069
	Total	1561	25.457	6.055

Table 110

Analyses of Variance of Parent Political Interest
Categories' Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	1230.00	1	1230.00		
	WTH	134142.00	1559	86.04	14.30	.0002
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	573.88	1	573.88		
	WTH	52790.06	1559	33.86	16.95	.0001
Per. Cyn.	GRP	1039.12	1	1039.12		
	WTH	57192.81	1559	36.69	28.32	.0000

$$F_{.10}(1,1559) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1559) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1559) = 6.63$$

Table 111

Political and Personal Cynicism by Parent Political Interest

Scales	Groups	Low Political Interest	High Political Interest
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	27.3% (209)	38.6% (307)
	Medium	36.7 (281)	29.6 (235)
	High	36.0 (276)	31.8 (253)
	N	766	795
$\chi^2 = 23.18, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.09, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.15$; Somer's D = $-.08$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	29.5% (226)	37.9% (301)
	Medium	36.2 (277)	35.2 (280)
	High	34.3 (263)	26.9 (214)
	N	766	795
$\chi^2 = 15.19, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.09, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.16$; Somer's D = $-.08$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	27.2% (208)	39.0% (310)
	Medium	33.2 (254)	32.3 (257)
	High	39.7 (304)	28.7 (228)
	N	766	795
$\chi^2 = 30.43, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.13, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.22$; Somer's D = $-.11$			

Table 112

Means and Standard Deviations of Family Political
Influence Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo.	Low	702	46.013	8.887
Pol. Cyn.	High	686	44.669	9.917
	Total	1388	45.349	9.431
Pol. Cyn.	Low	702	24.453	6.298
	High	686	23.242	5.411
	Total	1388	23.854	5.874
Per. Cyn.	Low	702	25.956	6.176
	High	686	24.608	6.021
	Total	1388	25.290	6.098

Table 113

Analyses of Variance of Family Political Influence
Categories' Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	626.00	1	626.00		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	122734.00	1386	88.55	7.07	.008
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	509.12	1	509.12		
	WTH	47860.12	1386	34.53	14.74	.0002
Per. Cyn.	GRP	630.69	1	630.69		
	WTH	51571.88	1386	37.21	16.95	.0001

$$F_{.10}(1,1386) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1386) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1386) = 6.63$$

Table 114

Political and Personal Cynicism by Family Political Influence

Scales	Groups	Low Political Influence	High Political Influence
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.1% (211)	38.6% (265)
	Medium	35.8 (251)	29.3 (201)
	High	34.2 (240)	32.1 (220)
	N	702	686
$\chi^2 = 12.34, p = .002; \text{Tau-b} = -.06, p > .001;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.11; \text{Somer's D} = -.05$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.6% (215)	37.8% (259)
	Medium	35.0 (246)	36.4 (250)
	High	34.3 (241)	25.8 (177)
	N	702	686
$\chi^2 = 13.73, p = .001; \text{Tau-b} = -.09, p > .001;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.16; \text{Somer's D} = -.08$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	30.6% (215)	38.6% (265)
	Medium	31.2 (219)	34.4 (236)
	High	38.2 (268)	27.0 (185)
	N	702	686
$\chi^2 = 20.87, p > .001; \text{Tau-b} = -.11, p > .001;$ $\text{Gamma} = -.19; \text{Somer's D} = -.10$			

Table 115

Means and Standard Deviations of Teacher Political
Influence Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo.	Low	801	46.095	9.019
Pol. Cyn.	High	728	44.838	9.651
	Total	1529	45.496	9.343
Pol. Cyn.	Low	801	24.213	5.742
	High	728	23.442	5.794
	Total	1529	23.846	5.778
Per. Cyn.	Low	801	25.769	5.995
	High	728	25.016	6.239
	Total	1529	25.411	6.122

Table 116

Analyses of Variance of Teacher Political Influence
Categories' Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	603.00	1	603.00		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	132790.00	1527	86.96	6.93	.009
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	226.38	1	226.38		
	WTH	50782.62	1527	33.26	6.81	.009
Per. Cyn.	GRP	215.94	1	215.94		
	WTH	57044.25	1527	37.38	5.78	.02

$$F_{.10}(1,1527) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1527) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1527) = 6.63$$

Table 117

Political and Personal Cynicism by Teacher Political Influence

Scales	Groups	Low Political Influence	High Political Influence
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.7% (246)	36.1% (263)
	Medium	34.8 (279)	31.5 (229)
	High	34.5 (276)	32.4 (236)
	N	801	728
$\chi^2 = 5.14, p = .08$; Tau-b = $-.04, p = .006$; Gamma = $-.07$; Somer's D = $-.04$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	30.7% (246)	37.4% (276)
	Medium	38.0 (304)	34.1 (248)
	High	31.3 (251)	28.6 (208)
	N	801	728
$\chi^2 = 7.55, p = .02$; Tau-b = $-.06, p = .001$; Gamma = $-.10$; Somer's D = $-.05$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	31.1% (249)	36.3% (264)
	Medium	33.2 (266)	32.7 (238)
	High	35.7 (286)	31.0 (226)
	N	801	728
$\chi^2 = 5.55, p = .06$; Tau-b = $-.06, p = .001$; Gamma = $-.10$; Somer's D = $-.05$			

Table 118

Means and Standard Deviations of School Political
Influence Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	778	46.555	9.077
	High	787	44.535	9.435
	Total	1565	45.539	9.356
Pol. Cyn.	Low	778	24.440	5.979
	High	787	23.278	5.653
	Total	1565	23.856	5.845
Per. Cyn.	Low	778	26.098	5.984
	High	787	24.858	6.180
	Total	1565	25.474	6.113

Table 119

Analyses of Variance of School Political Influence
Categories' Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	1597.00	1	1597.00	18.63	.0001
	WTH	133985.00	1563	85.72		
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	527.75	1	527.75	15.59	.0002
	WTH	52899.81	1563	33.85		
Per. Cyn.	GRP	601.62	1	601.62	16.26	.0001
	WTH	57838.94	1563	37.01		

 $F_{.10}(1,1563) = 2.71$
 $F_{.05}(1,1563) = 3.84$
 $F_{.01}(1,1563) = 6.63$

Table 120

Political and Personal Cynicism by School Political Influence

Scales	Groups	Low Political Influence	High Political Influence
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	28.4% (221)	37.6% (296)
	Medium	34.8 (271)	31.4 (247)
	High	36.8 (286)	31.0 (244)
	N	778	787
$\chi^2 = 15.27, p = .001$; Tau-b = $-.09, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.15$; Somer's D = $-.08$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	29.8% (232)	37.7% (297)
	Medium	36.8 (286)	34.7 (273)
	High	33.4 (260)	27.6 (217)
	N	778	787
$\chi^2 = 12.11, p = .002$; Tau-b = $-.08, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.14$; Somer's D = $-.07$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	28.1% (219)	37.9% (298)
	Medium	33.7 (262)	32.0 (252)
	High	38.2 (297)	30.1 (237)
	N	778	787
$\chi^2 = 18.96, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.10, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.18$; Somer's D = $-.09$			

Table 121

Means and Standard Deviations of Friend Political
Influence Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	858	46.008	8.840
	High	673	44.890	9.890
	Total	1531	45.517	9.316
Pol. Cyn.	Low	858	24.178	6.147
	High	673	23.447	5.420
	Total	1531	23.857	5.836
Per. Cyn.	Low	858	26.174	6.123
	High	673	24.541	6.008
	Total	1531	25.456	6.071

Table 122

Analyses of Variance of Friend Political Influence
Categories' Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	GRP	474.00	1	474.00		
	WTH	132299.00	1529	86.53	5.48	.02
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	201.63	1	201.63		
	WTH	52116.25	1529	34.09	5.92	.02
Per. Cyn.	GRP	1006.00	1	1006.00		
	WTH	56388.56	1529	36.88	27.28	.0001

 $F_{.10}(1,1529) = 2.71$
 $F_{.05}(1,1529) = 3.84$
 $F_{.01}(1,1529) = 6.63$

Table 123

Political and Personal Cynicism by Friend Political Influence

Scales	Groups	Low Political Influence	High Political Influence
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	28.8% (247)	38.8% (261)
	Medium	36.2 (311)	28.8 (194)
	High	35.0 (300)	32.4 (218)
	N	858	673
$\chi^2 = 18.39, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.07, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.12$; Somer's D = $-.06$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	32.1% (275)	36.3% (244)
	Medium	35.0 (300)	36.8 (248)
	High	33.0 (283)	26.9 (181)
	N	858	673
$\chi^2 = 6.96, p = .03$; Tau-b = $-.06, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.10$; Somer's D = $-.05$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	28.7% (246)	39.2% (264)
	Medium	32.9 (282)	32.7 (220)
	High	38.5 (330)	28.1 (189)
	N	858	673
$\chi^2 = 24.60, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.12, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.21$; Somer's D = $-.10$			

Table 124

Means and Standard Deviations of Mass Media Political
Influence Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo.	Low	744	46.480	9.126
Pol. Cyn.	High	770	44.444	9.446
	Total	1514	45.444	9.287
Pol. Cyn.	Low	744	24.622	6.228
	High	770	22.992	5.178
	Total	1514	23.793	5.716
Per. Cyn.	Low	744	26.152	5.921
	High	770	24.678	6.213
	Total	1514	25.402	6.069

Table 125

Analyses of Variance of Mass Media Political Influence
Categories' Mean Scores on Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	1569.00	1	1569.00		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	130485.00	1512	86.30	18.18	.0001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	1005.38	1	1005.38		
	WTH	49441.25	1512	32.70	30.75	.0000
Per. Cyn.	GRP	823.00	1	823.00		
	WTH	55732.06	1512	36.86	22.33	.0001
$F_{.10}(1,1512) = 2.71$		$F_{.05}(1,1512) = 3.84$		$F_{.01}(1,1512) = 6.63$		

Table 126

Cynicism Political and Personal by Mass Media Political Influence

Scales	Groups	Low Political Influence	High Political Influence
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	28.9% (215)	37.9% (292)
	Medium	34.0 (253)	32.5 (250)
	High	37.1 (276)	29.6 (228)
	N	744	770
$\chi^2 = 15.84, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.10, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.16$; Somer's D = $-.08$			
Pol. Cyn.	Low	29.8% (222)	37.9% (292)
	Medium	32.4 (241)	40.1 (309)
	High	37.8 (281)	21.9 (169)
	N	744	770
$\chi^2 = 45.38, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.14, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.24$; Somer's D = $-.12$			
Per. Cyn.	Low	27.4% (204)	39.6% (305)
	Medium	35.1 (261)	31.2 (240)
	High	37.5 (279)	29.2 (225)
	N	744	770
$\chi^2 = 26.27, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.12, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.20$; Somer's D = $-.10$			

Table 127

Gamma Correlation Coefficients for the Relation Between
Political Influence and Interest Indexes and Attitudes of
Cynicism for Sex Variable Controlling for Age

Scales	Sex	Indexes	Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Male	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.22	.00	-.24	.03	-.16	.42
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.41	-.29	-.13	-.10	-.17	-.19
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.01	-.34	-.002	-.12	-.37
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.27	-.12	.11	.03	-.22
		School Pol. Infl.	-.34	-.35	-.28	-.14	-.02	-.28
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.40	-.20	-.23	.07	-.04	-.07
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.21	-.15	.05	-.05	-.15
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.35	-.22	-.24	-.05	-.15	-.07
	Female	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.39	.16	-.01	-.14	-.12	.04
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.32	-.02	.04	-.02	-.25	-.15
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.31	.13	-.08	-.24	-.12	.02
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.25	.05	.11	-.12	-.11	-.38
		School Pol. Infl.	-.11	.13	.08	-.28	-.10	-.49
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.15	.01	-.22	-.18	-.22	.04
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.28	-.21	-.23	-.23	-.13	-.37
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.52	-.26	-.21	-.25	-.15	-.20
	Male	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.18	.02	-.21	-.24	-.22	-.33
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.31	-.15	-.27	-.27	-.14	-.31
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.25	-.05	-.30	-.29	-.12	-.31
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.10	-.46	.15	.04	-.16	-.29
		School Pol. Infl.	-.31	-.53	.06	-.08	-.08	-.26
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.39	-.27	-.28	.03	-.14	-.10
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.16	-.26	-.24	-.12	-.12	-.25
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.31	-.32	-.39	-.002	.05	-.10
	Female	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.24	.37	-.07	-.32	-.20	.04
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.28	.20	-.05	-.12	-.26	-.25
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.24	.32	-.04	-.37	-.28	-.06
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.04	-.04	.14	-.12	-.27	-.08
		School Pol. Infl.	-.01	.01	-.03	-.08	-.23	-.45
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.05	.10	-.14	-.08	-.09	.11
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.34	-.19	-.32	-.31	-.29	-.004
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.23	-.02	-.30	-.28	-.23	-.05
Per. Cyn.	Male	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.34	-.23	-.50	.03	-.12	-.20
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.43	-.31	-.42	-.01	-.08	-.22
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.24	-.24	-.41	-.12	-.005	-.29
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.02	-.29	-.27	-.12	.02	-.28
		School Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.42	-.25	-.16	-.18	-.19
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.22	-.24	-.42	-.16	-.01	.09
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.05	-.29	-.24	-.14	-.06	-.15
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.35	-.27	-.41	-.28	-.21	-.37
	Female	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.12	-.08	-.15	-.31	-.47	-.06
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.06	-.18	-.12	-.22	-.24	-.42
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.18	.11	-.21	-.37	-.30	-.20
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.14	-.03	.04	-.002	-.22	-.21
		School Pol. Infl.	-.07	-.14	-.09	-.13	-.13	-.47
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.08	-.31	-.34	-.24	.04
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.16	-.26	-.25	-.27	-.25	-.12
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.44	-.21	-.33	-.29	-.41	-.20

Table 128

Gamma Correlation Coefficients for the Relation Between
Political Influence and Interest Indexes and Attitudes of
Cynicism for Six Variable Controlling for School Grade

Scales	Sex	Indexes	Grade 8	Grade 9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Male	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.04	-.25	-.10	-.13	-.23
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.36	-.32	.01	-.09	-.23
		Family Pol. Infl.	.01	-.22	-.18	-.14	-.17
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.11	-.06	-.07	-.12
		School Pol. Infl.	-.30	-.18	-.23	-.27	-.09
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.43	.13	-.09	.04
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.03	-.11	-.06	-.08	-.02
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.33	-.25	-.20	-.03	.02
	Female	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.16	.13	-.05	-.07	-.07
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.28	.21	-.34	.06	-.14
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.10	.03	-.15	-.07	-.09
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.05	.07	-.07	-.20	-.15
		School Pol. Infl.	.06	.14	-.30	-.22	-.15
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.11	-.20	.08	-.19	-.22
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.34	-.20	-.22	-.22	-.03
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.43	-.14	-.23	-.06	-.28
Pol. Cyn.	Male	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.09	-.17	-.19	-.12	-.42
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.12	.16	.09	-.37	-.18
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.14	-.20	-.26	-.16	-.34
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.31	.04	-.02	-.21	-.33
		School Pol. Infl.	-.44	-.13	-.03	-.13	-.24
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.12	-.43	.13	-.20	-.11
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.18	-.07	-.25	-.21
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.42	-.29	-.04	.03	-.05
	Female	Parent Pol. Infl.	.01	.23	-.08	-.23	-.15
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.35	.01	-.37	-.24	-.38
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.003	.10	-.12	-.24	-.22
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	.03	-.02	-.04	-.18	-.17
		School Pol. Infl.	.04	.04	-.13	-.22	-.26
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.01	-.20	.25	-.07	-.09
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.36	-.26	-.31	-.29	-.06
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.21	-.13	-.18	-.17	-.22
Per. Cyn.	Male	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.02	-.44	-.31	-.06	-.22
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.38	-.27	-.24	-.19	-.02
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.09	-.41	-.23	-.16	-.11
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.08	-.27	-.24	-.13	-.15
		School Pol. Infl.	-.27	-.34	-.10	-.16	-.14
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.13	-.38	-.26	-.12	.13
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.11	-.26	-.08	-.10	-.13
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.28	-.40	-.37	-.20	-.22
	Female	Parent Pol. Infl.	-.03	-.09	-.22	-.34	-.26
		Parent Pol. Int.	-.19	.01	-.18	-.25	-.23
		Family Pol. Infl.	-.09	-.05	-.19	-.32	-.22
		Teacher Pol. Infl.	-.14	.01	-.10	-.03	-.19
		School Pol. Infl.	-.10	-.12	-.31	-.04	-.18
		Friend Pol. Infl.	-.18	-.32	-.03	-.32	-.08
		Media Pol. Infl.	-.24	-.22	-.26	-.30	-.03
		Resp. Pol. Int.	-.30	-.34	-.33	-.21	-.32

Figure 18

An Optimal Combination of Family, School, Friend and Mass Media
Political Influence Indexes of the Three Cynicism Scales' Scores
Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .006




Figure 19
An Optimal Combination of Family, School, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes of The
Gronfin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's Scores Using An Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .00001




Figure 20
An Optimal Combination of Family School, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes of
The Political Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .00001




Figure 21
An Optimal Combination of Family, School, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes
of The Personal Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .00001




Table 129*

Alternative Predictions to the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism
Scale Scores Using Family, School, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes

Predictor Index(es)	Percent of Total Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale Scores' Sum of Squares
1. Family	0.50
2. School	1.32
3. Friend	0.19
4. Mass Media	1.13
5. Family + School	1.52
6. Family + Friend	0.37
7. Family + Media	1.11
8. School + Friend	1.34
9. School + Media	2.04
10. Friend + Media	1.00
11. Family + School + Friend	1.49
12. Family + School + Media	2.06
13. Family + Friend + Media	1.04
14. School + Friend + Media	1.91
15. Family + School + Friend + Media	1.99
16. All four Political Influence Indexes + Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes	2.79

* The outline for this summary table is borrowed from Gerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Volume II, The Impact of Family Background and Intelligence on Tenth-Grade Boys. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute For Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), pp. 73-75.

Table 130

Alternative Predictions to the Political Cynicism
Scale Scores Using Family, School, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes

Predictor Index(es)	Percent of Total Pol. Cynicism Scale Scores' Sum of Squares
1. Family	1.02
2. School	1.12
3. Friend	0.37
4. Mass Media	2.29
5. Family + School	1.74
6. Family + Friend	0.97
7. Family + Media	2.43
8. School + Friend	1.27
9. School + Media	2.90
10. Friend + Media	2.19
11. Family + School + Friend	1.73
12. Family + School + Media	3.03
13. Family + Friend + Media	2.37
14. School + Friend + Media	2.78
15. Family + School + Friend + Media	2.97
16. All four Political Influence Indexes + Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes	3.28

Table 131

Alternative Predictions to the Personal Cynicism
Scale Scores Using Family, School, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes

Predictor Index(es)	Percent of Total Per. Cynicism Scale Scores' Sum of Squares
1. Family	1.26
2. School	1.18
3. Friend	1.16
4. Mass Media	1.45
5. Family + School	1.97
6. Family + Friend	1.69
7. Family + Media	1.96
8. School + Friend	1.96
9. School + Media	2.25
10. Friend + Media	2.03
11. Family + School + Friend	2.36
12. Family + School + Media	2.62
13. Family + Friend + Media	2.27
14. School + Friend + Media	2.52
15. Family + School + Friend + Media	2.84
16. All four Political Influence Indexes + Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes	4.25

Table 132
Percent of Variance Accounted For by Political Socialization Agents (Family, School, Peers and Mass Media)
on Prediction of Cynicism Scales' Scores with the Multiple Regression Technique

Scales	Agents	By Itself	With Var 1	With Var 2	With Var 3	With Var 4	With Var 1, Var 2	With Var 1, Var 3	With Var 1, Var 4	With Var 2, Var 3	With Var 2, Var 4	With Var 3, Var 4	With All Agents	Eta ²	Beta ²
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Family	0.77	--	0.56	.77	0.31	--	--	--	0.56	0.24	0.31	0.24	.0050	.0005
	School	1.14	1.14	--	1.13	0.72	--	1.14	0.72	--	--	0.72	0.38	.0143	.0109
	Peers	0.36	0.06	0.18	--	0.07	0.02	--	0.003	--	0.02	--	0.001	.0023	.0000
	Media	1.42	1.42	1.42	1.42	--	1.42	1.42	--	1.42	--	--	1.42	.0111	.0068
Total Percent of Variance													2.04		1.99
Pol. Cyn.	Family	0.42	--	0.29	0.42	0.05	--	--	--	0.29	0.04	0.05	0.04	.0102	.0022
	School	0.86	0.86	--	0.86	0.41	--	0.86	0.43	--	--	0.43	0.43	.0120	.0071
	Peers	0.26	0.06	0.12	--	0.01	0.02	--	.00	--	.0001	--	0.01	.0043	.0001
	Media	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	--	2.01	2.01	--	2.01	--	--	2.01	.0227	.0150
Total Percent of Variance													2.49		2.97
Per. Cyn.	Family	1.77	--	1.77	1.77	0.96	--	--	--	1.77	0.96	0.96	0.96	.0126	.0028
	School	1.03	0.74	--	0.65	0.58	--	0.74	0.48	--	--	0.43	0.48	.0123	.0068
	Peers	1.64	0.61	1.64	--	0.86	.44	--	0.35	--	0.75	--	0.81	.0123	.0033
	Media	1.81	1.81	1.81	1.81	--	1.81	1.81	--	1.81	--	--	1.81	.0153	.0062
Total Percent of Variance													3.53		2.84

Percent of Variance accounted for > 0.22 is significant at the .05 Level.
Percent of Variance accounted for \geq 0.17 is significant at the .10 Level.

Figure 22

An Optimal Combination of Family, School, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Plus Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes to the Three Cynicism Scales' Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .006




Table 133

Multiple Classification Analyses of Family, School, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Plus Parent and
Respondent Political Interest Indexes Predicting to
Cynicism Scales' Scores

Cynicism Scales	Indexes	Predicting From Each Index Separately		Predicting From 6 Indexes Simultaneously		Eta ² -Beta ²
		Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²	
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.069	.005	.011	.0001	.0049
	School Pol. Infl.	.121	.015	.099	.010	.005
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.049	.002	.027	.001	.001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.106	.011	.05	.002	.009
	Parent Pol. Int.	.099	.01	.047	.002	.008
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.133	.018	.093	.009	.009
R = .17	R ² = .03	Percent Variance Explained = 2.79				
Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.100	.010	.023	.0005	.0095
	School Pol. Infl.	.112	.012	.081	.007	.005
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.066	.004	.013	.0002	.0038
	Media Pol. Infl.	.152	.023	.106	.011	.012
	Parent Pol. Int.	.109	.012	.047	.002	.010
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.123	.015	.046	.002	.013
R = .18	R ² = .03	Percent Variance Explained = 3.28				
Per. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.110	.012	.005	.000	.012
	School Pol. Infl.	.111	.012	.072	.005	.007
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.114	.013	.030	.001	.012
	Media Pol. Infl.	.127	.016	.048	.002	.014
	Parent Pol. Int.	.148	.022	.076	.006	.016
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.173	.030	.101	.010	.020
R = .21	R ² = .04	Percent Variance Explained = 4.25				

Figure 23

An Optimal Combination of Parent, Teacher, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes to Three Cynicism Scales' Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .006




Figure 24
An Optimal Combination of Parent, Teacher, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes to
Gronin-Johnston Political Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .00001




Figure 25
An Optimal Combination of Parent, Teacher, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes to
The Political Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .00001




Figure 26
An Optimal Combination of Parent, Teacher, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes
to The Personal Cynicism Scale's Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .00001




Table 134

Multiple Classification Analyses of Parent, Teacher, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Predicting to
Cynicism Scales' Scores

Cynicism Scales	Indexes	Predicting From Each Index Separately		Predicting From 4 Indexes Simultaneously		Eta ² -Beta ²
		Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²	
Gr.-Jo.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.054	.003	.012	.0001	.0029
Pol. Cyn.	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.083	.007	.07	.005	.002
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.044	.002	.006	.000	.002
	Media Pol. Infl.	.106	.011	.092	.008	.003
R = .12	R ² = .01	Percent Variance Explained = 1.35				
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.081	.006	.026	.001	.005
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.071	.005	.005	.002	.003
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.061	.004	.009	.001	.003
	Media Pol. Infl.	.151	.023	.134	.018	.005
R = .15	R ² = .02	Percent Variance Explained = 2.36				
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.107	.011	.057	.003	.008
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.074	.006	.048	.002	.004
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.108	.012	.063	.004	.008
	Media Pol. Infl.	.120	.014	.08	.006	.008
R = .15	R ² = .02	Percent Variance Explained = 2.32				

Table 135

Alternative Predictions to the Grondin-Johnston Political Cynicism
Scale Scores Using Parent, Teacher, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes

Predictor Index(es)	Percent of Total Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn. Scale Scores' Sum of Squares
1. Parent	0.29
2. Teacher	0.69
3. Friend	0.19
4. Mass Media	1.13
5. Parent + Teacher	0.71
6. Parent + Friend	0.21
7. Parent + Media	1.03
8. Teacher + Friend	0.65
9. Teacher + Media	1.46
10. Friend + Media	1.01
11. Parent + Teacher + Friend	0.64
12. Parent + Teacher + Media	1.42
13. Parent + Friend + Media	0.97
14. Teacher + Friend + Media	1.41
15. Parent + Teacher + Friend + Media	1.35
16. All four Political Influence Indexes + Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes	2.25

Table 136

Alternative Predictions to the Political Cynicism
Scale Scores Using Parent, Teacher, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes

Predictor Index(es)	Percent of Total Pol. Cynicism Scale Scores' Sum of Squares
1. Parent	0.64
2. Teacher	0.51
3. Friend	0.37
4. Mass Media	2.29
5. Parent + Teacher	0.85
6. Parent + Friend	0.61
7. Parent + Media	2.27
8. Teacher + Friend	0.63
9. Teacher + Media	2.41
10. Friend + Media	2.18
11. Parent + Teacher + Friend	0.89
12. Parent + Teacher + Media	2.43
13. Parent + Friend + Media	2.20
14. Teacher + Friend + Media	2.37
15. Parent + Teacher + Friend + Media	2.36
16. All four Political Influence Indexes + Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes	2.62

Table 137

Alternative Predictions to the Personal Cynicism
Scale Scores Using Parent, Teacher, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes

Predictor Index(es)	Percent of Total Per. Cynicism Scale Scores' Sum of Squares
1. Parent	1.15
2. Teacher	0.55
3. Friend	1.16
4. Mass Media	1.45
5. Parent + Teacher	1.34
6. Parent + Friend	1.63
7. Parent + Media	1.85
8. Teacher + Friend	1.39
9. Teacher + Media	1.65
10. Friend + Media	1.91
11. Parent + Teacher + Friend	1.84
12. Parent + Teacher + Media	2.03
13. Parent + Friend + Media	2.17
14. Teacher + Friend + Media	2.11
15. Parent + Teacher + Friend + Media	2.32
16. All four Political Influence Indexes + Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes	3.68

Table 138
Percent of Variance Accounted For by Political Socialization Agents (Parent, Teacher, Peers and Mass Media)
on Prediction of Cynicism Scales' Scores with the Multiple Regression Technique

Scales	Agents	By Itself	With Var 1	With Var 2	With Var 3	With Var 4	With Var 1, Var 2	With Var 1, Var 3	With Var 1, Var 4	With Var 2, Var 3	With Var 2, Var 4	With Var 3, Var 4	All Agents	Eta ²	Beta ²
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Parent	0.58	--	0.58	0.58	0.20	--	--	--	0.58	0.17	0.20	0.17	.0029	.0001
	Teacher	0.52	0.41	--	0.52	0.20	--	0.42	0.20	--	--	0.20	0.20	.0069	.0048
	Peers	0.36	0.11	0.24	--	0.07	.08	--	0.01	--	0.05	--	0.01	.0019	.00003
	Media	1.42	1.42	1.42	1.42	--	1.42	1.42	--	1.42	--	--	1.42	.0113	.0085
Total Percent of Variance													1.80		1.35
Pol. Cyn.	Parent	0.30	--	0.23	0.30	0.02	--	--	--	0.23	0.01	0.02	0.02	.0064	.0007
	Teacher	0.34	0.34	--	0.34	0.06	--	0.34	.06	--	--	0.06	0.06	.0051	.0025
	Peers	0.26	0.10	0.18	--	0.01	.07	--	.001	--	0.01	--	0.001	.0037	.0001
	Media	2.01	2.01	2.01	2.01	--	2.01	2.01	--	2.01	--	--	2.01	.0229	.0181
Total Percent of Variance													2.09		2.36
Per. Cyn.	Parent	1.79	--	1.79	1.79	0.98	--	--	--	1.79	0.98	0.98	.98	.0115	.0033
	Teacher	0.70	0.46	--	0.42	0.27	--	0.34	0.23	--	--	0.20	0.18	.0055	.0023
	Peers	1.64	0.67	1.64	--	0.86	0.67	--	0.39	--	0.85	--	0.39	.0116	.0040
	Media	1.81	1.81	1.81	1.81	--	1.81	1.81	--	1.81	--	--	1.81	.0145	.0063
Total Percent of Variance													3.36		2.32

Percent of Variance accounted for $\geq .22$ is significant at the .05 Level.
Percent of Variance accounted for $\geq .17$ is significant at the .10 Level.

Figure 27

An Optimal Combination of Parent, Teacher, Friend and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Plus Parent and Respondent Political Interest Indexes to Three Cynicism Scales' Scores Using an Aid (Version II) Analysis: Reducibility = .006




Table 139

Multiple Classification Analyses of Parent, Teacher, Friend and
Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Plus Parent and
Respondent Political Interest Indexes Predicting to
Cynicism Scales' Scores

Cynicism Scales	Indexes	Predicting From Each Index <u>Separately</u>		Predicting From 6 Indexes <u>Simultaneously</u>		Eta ² -Beta ²
		Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²	
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.053	.003	.031	.001	.002
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.082	.007	.063	.004	.003
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.046	.002	.024	.001	.001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.107	.011	.059	.003	.008
	Parent Pol. Int.	.098	.010	.056	.003	.007
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.129	.017	.098	.010	.007
R = .15	R ² = .02	Percent Variance Explained = 2.25				
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.08	.006	.001	.000	.006
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.071	.005	.047	.002	.003
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.061	.004	.011	.0001	.0039
	Media Pol. Infl.	.152	.023	.111	.012	.011
	Parent Pol. Int.	.104	.011	.050	.002	.009
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.114	.013	.050	.002	.011
R = .16	R ² = .03	Percent Variance Explained = 2.62				
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.105	.011	.004	.000	.011
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.074	.006	.04	.002	.004
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.111	.012	.033	.001	.011
	Media Pol. Infl.	.124	.015	.049	.002	.013
	Parent Pol. Int.	.144	.021	.076	.006	.015
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.168	.028	.102	.010	.018
R = .19	R ² = .04	Percent Variance Explained = 3.68				

Table 140

Multiple Classification Analyses of Political Influence and
Interest Indexes Predicting to
Cynicism Scales' Scores

Cynicism Scales	Indexes	Predicting From Each Index <u>Separately</u>		Predicting From 8 Indexes <u>Simultaneously</u>		Eta ² -Beta ²
		Eta	Eta ²	Beta	Beta ²	
Gr.-Jo.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.053	.003	.060	.004	-.001
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Int.	.098	.010	.053	.003	.007
	Family Pol. Infl.	.068	.005	.040	.002	.003
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.082	.007	.017	.0003	.0067
	School Pol. Infl.	.117	.014	.106	.011	.003
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.046	.002	.030	.001	.001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.107	.011	.056	.003	.008
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.129	.017	.091	.008	.009
R = .16		R ² = .03		Percent Variance Explained = 2.63		
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.080	.006	.045	.002	.004
	Parent Pol. Int.	.104	.011	.048	.002	.009
	Family Pol. Infl.	.097	.009	.059	.004	.005
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.071	.005	.028	.001	.004
	School Pol. Infl.	.107	.012	.099	.010	.002
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.061	.004	.018	.0003	.0037
	Media Pol. Infl.	.152	.023	.109	.012	.011
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.114	.013	.043	.002	.011
R = .17		R ² = .03		Percent Variance Explained = 3.03		
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.105	.011	.017	.0003	.0107
	Parent Pol. Int.	.144	.021	.075	.006	.015
	Family Pol. Infl.	.106	.011	.016	.0002	.0108
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.074	.006	.024	.001	.005
	School Pol. Infl.	.109	.012	.090	.008	.004
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.111	.012	.027	.001	.011
	Media Pol. Infl.	.124	.015	.045	.002	.013
	Resp. Pol. Int.	.168	.028	.102	.010	.018
R = .20		R ² = .04		Percent Variance Explained = 3.87		

Table 141

Indices Contributing at the .10 Level of Significance
to the Prediction of Cynicism Scales' Scores
Using the Multiple Regression Technique

Scales	Predictor Variables	F-Values For Variable	P Level	Percent Variance Accounted For	Standard Error of Predicted Scores
Gr.-Jo.	Resp. Pol. Int.	25.69	.00	1.61	9.25
Pol. Cyn.	School Pol. Infl.	10.64	.001	.66	9.22
	Media Pol. Infl.	6.68	.01	.42	9.21
	Total			2.69	
Total Percent of Variance Accounted For by all 8 Predictor Variables = 3.02					
Pol. Cyn.	Media Pol. Infl.	32.09	.00	2.01	5.81
	School Pol. Infl.	6.93	.01	.43	5.80
	Resp. Pol. Int.	4.16	.04	.26	5.79
	Total			2.70	
Total Percent of Variance Accounted For by all 8 Predictor Variables = 3.03					
Per. Cyn.	Resp. Pol. Int.	43.89	.00	2.72	6.03
	Parent Pol. Int.	11.38	.00	.70	6.01
	Family Pol. Infl.	8.12	.005	.50	5.99
	School Pol. Infl.	5.28	.02	.32	5.98
	Media Pol. Infl.	3.28	.07	.20	5.98
	Total			4.44	
Total Percent of Variance Accounted For by all 8 Predictor Variables = 4.58					

Table 142

Multiple Classification Analyses of Family, School, Peers and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes
Predicting to Cynicism Scales' Scores: School Grade Subgroups

Scales	Indexes	$\overline{\text{Eta}}^2$ Grade 8	$\overline{\text{Beta}}^2$	$\overline{\text{Eta}}^2$ Grade 9	$\overline{\text{Beta}}^2$	$\overline{\text{Eta}}^2$ Grade 10	$\overline{\text{Beta}}^2$	$\overline{\text{Eta}}^2$ Grade 11	$\overline{\text{Beta}}^2$	$\overline{\text{Eta}}^2$ Grade 12	$\overline{\text{Beta}}^2$
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.001	.002	.002	.002	.005	.003	.003	.001	.016	.010
	School Pol. Infl.	.014	.010	.015	.010	.028	.025	.008	.006	.021	.015
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.004	.001	.008	.003	.005	.016	.001	.0001	.006	.0003
	Media Pol. Infl.	.022	.020	.023	.018	.007	.007	.005	.002	.001	.0002
		$R^2 = .14$		$R^2 = .14$		$R^2 = .17$		$R^2 = .06$		$R^2 = .13$	
		$R^2 = .02$		$R^2 = .02$		$R^2 = .03$		$R^2 = .003$		$R^2 = .02$	
	Percent Variance Explained = 1.96			% Variance = 1.98		% Variance = 3.17		% Variance = 0.31		% Variance = 1.66	
Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.001	.0004	.001	.009	.014	.008	.022	.010	.045	.030
	School Pol. Infl.	.004	.003	.021	.016	.003	.001	.011	.003	.054	.040
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.000	.001	.039	.036	.0004	.010	.006	.0001	.006	.002
	Media Pol. Infl.	.024	.025	.015	.007	.030	.028	.033	.018	.011	.002
		$R^2 = .12$		$R^2 = .22$		$R^2 = .17$		$R^2 = .17$		$R^2 = .27$	
		$R^2 = .01$		$R^2 = .05$		$R^2 = .03$		$R^2 = .03$		$R^2 = .07$	
	Percent Variance Explained = 1.38			% Variance = 4.66		% Variance = 2.92		% Variance = 3.07		% Variance = 7.11	
Per. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.001	.002	.015	.001	.014	.008	.019	.014	.008	.003
	School Pol. Infl.	.004	.001	.018	.010	.022	.018	.015	.011	.032	.029
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.010	.008	.023	.009	.002	.000	.004	.000	.001	.001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.015	.014	.027	.013	.004	.0003	.009	.001	.004	.002
		$R^2 = .10$		$R^2 = .18$		$R^2 = .13$		$R^2 = .13$		$R^2 = .15$	
		$R^2 = .01$		$R^2 = .03$		$R^2 = .02$		$R^2 = .02$		$R^2 = .02$	
	Percent Variance Explained = 1.07			% Variance = 3.37		% Variance = 1.64		% Variance = 1.74		% Variance = 2.19	
		$N = 285$		$N = 241$		$N = 266$		$N = 284$		$N = 264$	

Table 143

Multiple Classification Analyses of Family, School, Peers and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes
Predicting to Cynicism Scales: Age Subgroups

Scales	Indexes	Age 13	Age 14	Age 15	Age 16	Age 17	Age 18
		Eta^2	Beta^2	Eta^2	Beta^2	Eta^2	Beta^2
Gr.-Jc. Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.013	.002	.007	.001	.005	.024
	School Pol. Infl.	.022	.014	.006	.015	.001	.064
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.011	.002	.001	.000	.005	.054
	Media Pol. Infl.	.027	.017	.011	.007	.002	.001
		$R = .16$	$R = .16$	$R = .04$	$R = .08$	$R = .09$	$R = .28$
		$R^2 = .02$	$R^2 = .02$	$R^2 = .002$	$R^2 = .007$	$R^2 = .008$	$R^2 = .08$
	Percent Variance Explained = 2.42	% Variance = 2.51	% Variance = 0.15	% Variance = 0.70	% Variance = 0.83	% Variance = 7.69	
Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.002	.000	.009	.017	.023	.019
	School Pol. Infl.	.001	.020	.001	.035	.012	.022
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.002	.001	.008	.005	.009	.065
	Media Pol. Infl.	.021	.028	.028	.019	.037	.001
		$R = .21$	$R = .13$	$R = .17$	$R = .19$	$R = .27$	$R = .07$
		$R^2 = .04$	$R^2 = .02$	$R^2 = .03$	$R^2 = .04$	$R^2 = .07$	
	Percent Variance Explained = 0.42	% Variance = 4.38	% Variance = 1.63	% Variance = 2.99	% Variance = 3.61	% Variance = 7.07	
Per. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.005	.005	.032	.025	.003	.034
	School Pol. Infl.	.002	.011	.007	.013	.024	.063
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.018	.005	.033	.012	.010	.059
	Media Pol. Infl.	.006	.040	.014	.011	.007	.006
		$R = .06$	$R = .20$	$R = .16$	$R = .12$	$R = .02$	$R = .33$
		$R^2 = .004$	$R^2 = .04$	$R^2 = .02$	$R^2 = .02$	$R^2 = .11$	$R^2 = .11$
	Percent Variance Explained = 0.38	% Variance = 3.28	% Variance = 3.81	% Variance = 2.44	% Variance = 1.52	% Variance = 10.94	
		N = 155	N = 264	N = 286	N = 258	N = 141	

Table 144

Multiple Classification Analyses of Family, School, Peers
and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Predicting
to Cynicism Scales: Sex Subgroups

Scales	Indexes	Male		Female	
		Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
Gr.-Jo.	Family Pol. Infl.	.009	.002	.004	.0005
Pol. Cyn.	School Pol. Infl.	.025	.020	.006	.004
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.003	.0000	.003	.0001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.015	.008	.010	.007
		R = .18		R = .10	
		R ² = .03		R ² = .01	
Percent Variance Explained = 1.00		% Variance = 3.07			
Pol. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.017	.005	.006	.001
	School Pol. Infl.	.021	.014	.006	.003
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.007	.0004	.002	.0002
	Media Pol. Infl.	.016	.006	.030	.026
		R = .18		R = .17	
		R ² = .03		R ² = .03	
Percent Variance Explained = 2.82		% Variance = 3.18			
Per. Cyn.	Family Pol. Infl.	.026	.008	.011	.002
	School Pol. Infl.	.021	.012	.005	.001
	Friend Pol. Infl.	.020	.005	.014	.005
	Media Pol. Infl.	.019	.005	.020	.011
		R _c = .21		R _c = .16	
		R ² = .04		R ² = .02	
Percent Variance Explained = 2.48		% Variance = 4.46			
		N = 617		N = 723	

Table 145
Multiple Classification Analyses of Parent, Teacher, Peers and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes
Predicting to Cynicism Scales: School Grade Subgroups

Scales	Indexes	Grade 8		Grade 9		Grade 10		Grade 11		Grade 12	
		Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.001	.002	.0003	.005	.001	.0004	.004	.002	.018	.011
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.005	.002	.014	.011	.003	.003	.004	.002	.026	.019
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.004	.001	.008	.003	.005	.013	.001	.0004	.006	.001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.022	.021	.023	.020	.007	.011	.005	.003	.001	.0002
		R = .11 R ² = .01		R = .14 R ² = .02		R = .07 R ² = .006		R = .07 R ² = .005		R = .15 R ² = .02	
Percent Variance Explained = 1.22				% Variance = 2.11		% Variance = 0.55		% Variance = 0.46		% Variance = 2.33	
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.0001	.001	.0004	.013	.012	.006	.022	.010	.040	.024
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.0002	.000	.008	.062	.000	.000	.009	.002	.051	.038
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.000	.0004	.038	.037	.0004	.008	.005	.0005	.005	.0002
	Media Pol. Infl.	.026	.031	.013	.008	.030	.031	.031	.020	.012	.003
		R = .12 R ² = .01		R = .20 R ² = .04		R = .16 R ² = .03		R = .17 R ² = .03		R = .26 R ² = .06	
Percent Variance Explained = 1.40				% Variance = 4.05		% Variance = 2.62		% Variance = 2.87		% Variance = 6.51	
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.001	.010	.019	.004	.019	.016	.014	.009	.025	.020
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.001	.0002	.017	.008	.006	.005	.014	.009	.021	.015
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.010	.010	.022	.009	.002	.000	.003	.000	.001	.001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.015	.018	.025	.010	.004	.0005	.007	.001	.004	.001
		R = .13 R ² = .02		R = .18 R ² = .03		R = .10 R ² = .01		R = .10 R ² = .01		R = .16 R ² = .03	
Percent Variance Explained = 1.62				% Variance = 3.29		% Variance = 0.91		% Variance = 1.07		% Variance = 2.56	
		N = 281		N = 239		N = 266		N = 281		N = 262	

Table 146
Multiple Classification Analyses of Parent, Teacher, Peers and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes
Predicting to Cynicism Scales: Age Subgroups

Scales	Indexes	Age 13		Age 14		Age 15		Age 16		Age 17		Age 18	
		Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.015	.005	.023	.002	.000	.0001	.0002	.0001	.007	.003	.031	.031
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.010	.009	.007	.001	.0002	.0004	.0002	.0004	.007	.005	.038	.021
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.007	.002	.001	.000	.000	.002	.000	.002	.004	.001	.001	.019
	Media Pol. Infl.	.025	.016	.034	.012	.011	.011	.008	.011	.002	.0002	.020	.010
		R = .12 R ² = .01		R = .18 R ² = .03		R = .06 R ² = .003		R = .06 R ² = .004		R = .06 R ² = .003		R = .22 R ² = .05	
		% Variance Explained = 1.41		% Variance = 3.24		% Variance = 0.33		% Variance = 0.40		% Variance = 0.32		% Variance = 5.02	
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.003	.0003	.032	.003	.000	.000	.025	.017	.022	.007	.013	.009
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.000	.001	.016	.002	.005	.005	.0003	.000	.027	.019	.042	.029
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.002	.0004	.000	.008	.002	.002	.003	.001	.008	.0001	.001	.013
	Media Pol. Infl.	.025	.023	.038	.027	.025	.025	.023	.015	.034	.021	.022	.013
		R = .03 R ² = .001		R = .22 R ² = .05		R = .14 R ² = .02		R = .16 R ² = .02		R = .22 R ² = .05		R = .20 R ² = .04	
		% Variance Explained = 0.09		% Variance = 4.94		% Variance = 1.88		% Variance = 2.45		% Variance = 4.62		% Variance = 3.94	
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.005	.002	.007	.025	.011	.011	.017	.009	.018	.011	.022	.022
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.0005	.000	.003	.003	.001	.001	.006	.003	.012	.007	.072	.057
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.016	.013	.005	.032	.021	.021	.012	.002	.009	.009	.006	.031
	Media Pol. Infl.	.005	.002	.042	.012	.002	.002	.012	.003	.004	.0001	.013	.004
		R = .08 R ² = .006		R = .18 R ² = .03		R = .18 R ² = .03		R = .12 R ² = .01		R = .11 R ² = .01		R = .28 R ² = .08	
		% Variance Explained = 0.59		% Variance = 3.15		% Variance = 3.32		% Variance = 1.36		% Variance = 1.24		% Variance = 8.10	
		N = 152		N = 260		N = 263		N = 284		N = 255		N = 140	

Table 147

Multiple Classification Analyses of Parent, Teacher, Peers
and Mass Media Political Influence Indexes Predicting
to Cynicism Scales: Sex Subgroups

Scales	Indexes	Male		Female	
		Eta ²	Beta ²	Eta ²	Beta ²
Gr.-Jo.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.008	.002	.001	.000
Pol. Cyn.	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.008	.004	.005	.004
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.003	.000	.002	.0003
	Media Pol. Infl.	.015	.010	.010	.008
		R = .12		R = .09	
		R ² = .02		R ² = .009	
Percent Variance Explained = 1.57		% Variance = 0.89			
Pol. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.013	.004	.003	.000
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.007	.003	.004	.002
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.006	.001	.002	.0001
	Media Pol. Infl.	.016	.008	.030	.030
		R = .14		R = .16	
		R ² = .02		R ² = .03	
Percent Variance Explained = 1.94		% Variance = 2.65			
Per. Cyn.	Parent Pol. Infl.	.025	.010	.008	.001
	Teacher Pol. Infl.	.011	.005	.001	.000
	Peers Pol. Infl.	.019	.006	.014	.006
	Media Pol. Infl.	.018	.005	.019	.011
		R = .19		R = .15	
		R ² = .04		R ² = .02	
Percent Variance Explained = 3.75		% Variance = 2.17			
		N = 611		N = 718	

Table 148

Means and Standard Deviations of Respondent Political
Interest Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Categories	No.	Means	S. Dev.
Gr.-Jo.	Low	794	46.712	8.636
Pol. Cyn.	High	769	44.320	9.827
	Total	1563	45.535	9.315
Pol. Cyn.	Low	794	24.531	6.038
	High	769	23.150	5.561
	Total	1563	23.852	5.806
Per. Cyn.	Low	794	26.466	5.976
	High	769	24.443	6.092
	Total	1563	25.471	6.032

Table 149

Analyses of Variance of Respondent Political Interest
Categories For Three Cynicism Scales

Scales	Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Gr.-Jo.	GRP	2234.00	1	2234.00		
Pol. Cyn.	WTH	133306.00	1561	85.40	26.16	.001
Pol. Cyn.	GRP	746.12	1	746.12		
	WTH	52661.94	1561	33.74	22.12	.001
Per. Cyn.	GRP	1598.19	1	1598.19		
	WTH	56827.81	1561	36.40	43.90	.001

$$F_{.10}(1,1561) = 2.71$$

$$F_{.05}(1,1561) = 3.84$$

$$F_{.01}(1,1561) = 6.63$$

Table 150

Cynicism Political and Personal by Respondent Political Interest

Scales	Groups	Low Political Interest	High Political Interest
Gr.-Jo. Pol. Cyn.	Low	27.0% (214)	39.4% (303)
	Medium	35.3 (280)	30.8 (237)
	High	37.8 (300)	29.8 (229)
	N	794	769
	$\chi^2 = 28.03, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.12, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.20$; Somer's D = $-.10$		
Pol. Cyn.	Low	29.1% (231)	38.8% (298)
	Medium	36.0 (286)	35.5 (273)
	High	34.9 (277)	25.7 (198)
	N	794	769
	$\chi^2 = 21.53, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.11, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.19$; Somer's D = $-.10$		
Per. Cyn.	Low	26.1% (207)	40.3% (310)
	Medium	32.9 (261)	32.8 (252)
	High	41.1 (326)	26.9 (207)
	N	794	769
	$\chi^2 = 46.86, p > .001$; Tau-b = $-.16, p > .001$; Gamma = $-.28$; Somer's D = $-.14$		

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